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Preface
“Do not bring Aids into Samoa!” read the poster clearly visible to all who had
landed at Faleolo Airport and were about to enter Samoa i Sisifo early in 1989.
The reaction of a group of Europeans, who were transformed into Papalagi
upon leaving the plane, was to giggle. They partly suppressed their hilarity, less
out of shame than because they were anxious not to provoke the Samoan cus-
toms officer standing nearby. As is so often the case, arrogance was combined
with ignorance, and the result was derisive smiles at what was considered to be
excessive South Pacific naïveté.
I am sure that none of those who displayed such (typically European?)
broad and lofty grins had ever heard of the faama‘i, the Samoan influenza epi-
demic of 1918. If they had, they would probably have been quiet. But such
things do not feature in travel literature, guides, or handbooks. Strangely
enough, many history books are little better.1 For the Samoans, however, the
influenza of 1918 and the end of the First World War in the Pacific remain
deeply engraved on their minds right to the present. The epidemic has been
regarded as a distinctive historical watershed. This view was so universally held
among Samoans that their age was expressed in terms of whether they were
born before or after the faama‘i.
The Samoan influenza epidemic of 1918 is just one episode, but an impor-
tant one, of the 1914 –1918 European war in the Pacific. Here I argue that this
war, its implications, and its consequences, have been largely neglected by his-
torians in the past. But this book is not a new military history. The military cam-
paigns in the Pacific can indeed be summarized in a few sentences. My interest
centers around the impact the war had on the indigenous societies of the
former German island territories in the Pacific: the northeastern half of New
Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Northern Solomons, Micronesia,
and Western Samoa. What changes occurred as a result of the war, and how did
Pacific Islanders perceive them? What actions did they initiate in response to
these changes, and how did they react?
The current consensus among historians is that there was no real change at
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all. The shift from one colonial power to another as a result of Germany’s defeat
and the loss of its Pacific empire is seen as only nominal. As one of the most
ardent supporters of this orthodoxy has put it: “the fundamental institutions of
colonial society in New Guinea, all of German origin, were kept intact by the
Australians. . . . The Australians . . . established contact with villagers more
peacefully than the Germans but in many other respects they were simply run-
ning the same colonial business under new management.”2 Similar views have
been expressed about the New Zealanders who took over from the Germans
in Samoa.3
These judgments can at best be described as superficial, but such assess-
ments have probably contributed to the fact that more thorough research has
not been carried out in this field. Even a brief glance at what actually happened
after 1914 reveals a different story. It does not reflect well upon economic his-
torians that an anthropologist was the only one to point out that after the Aus-
tralians took over in New Guinea the local wages were statutorily fixed at a
level lower than it had been in 1895. Nevertheless, the number of indentured
laborers rose sharply during the war. “The result was predictable: a series of
regulations ensuring the planters’ absolute control over workers and trade,
against which German officials had so far resisted.”4
One would have thought that Salisbury’s observations, made from data
available even to nonhistorians, might have initiated an interesting debate
among historians. Was the Australian occupation changing New Guinea into a
colony in which the plantocracy became the decisive political element at last?
There was other evidence which seemed to support such an interpretation.
The ratio of copra gathered by independent local producers to that harvested
by the European plantations rose sharply in favor of the latter after 1914. New
Guineans were increasingly regarded as a source of labor rather than as direct
producers (who would compete with the Europeans) for the export market.
Government control over education—never the planters’ favorite cause—was
given up almost immediately after the Australian occupation. But no historical
debate ensued, and no further research was undertaken in this field. Instead,
almost a decade after Salisbury’s work appeared, a textbook by three eminent
Pacific historians, widely considered to be the authorities on the history of
Papua New Guinea, stated categorically: “The old German priorities were
maintained by the Australians: business first, and all else afterwards.”5
As no questions were asked, it comes as no surprise that some historical
myths extending back to World War I propaganda have survived even among
historians.6 What really happened with the advent of the First World War in the
Pacific? This book sets out to show that to tell this story, hitherto shunned, pro-
vides a worthwhile enterprise for a historian. After all, this “neglected war” can
in many respects be considered a real turning point in the history of the Pacific
Islanders. I confine my study to the area of the former German colonies, but it
seems clear to me that the war was a historical divide in other areas of the
Pacific as well. Much has been written about the indigenous revolt of 1917 in
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New Caledonia, which was a direct result of France’s policy of drafting Melane-
sians. But little is known about local unrest in the New Hebrides in the second
half of 1916. There were also serious “native troubles” close to the end of the
European war in the southern Gilberts and in Fiji. In all these cases, cruisers
were considered necessary to quell the “disturbances.” In March 1919 the
Polynesian soldiers who had been returned to the Cook Islands rioted; and
February 1920 marked the beginning of a series of strikes by Indians in Fiji.
Even in quiet Tonga, there was an attempt by a number of nobles to reduce
British influence by appealing directly to the United States.7 In my opinion, all
of these events need to be seen in context. From the outside, it looks as if the
European war stirred up a hornets’ nest. Surely much more research is neces-
sary to fill a gap that has been left wide open by historians in the past.
This is a revisionist book, and it is revisionist in many ways. I consider it
also to be an original book. And it might be controversial as well. Behind its
Pacific story line lies the more general issue of differences in colonial policy
and their impact on the colonized. How important are differences in the nature
of particular colonial regimes? And what effect do these differences have on
indigenous peoples? Do indigenous people differentiate at all among colonial
regimes? And if so, where do they see differences, how do they evaluate them,
and what conclusions do they draw?
In the past, historians have insisted that there were indeed differences in
colonial rule and in their effects on the ruled. A decade ago Lewis Gann, one of
the leading historians of colonial Africa, claimed that “no reasonable man in
any part of the world” would have preferred Japanese, German, Russian, or
Chinese colonial rule to that of the British.8 Gann’s statement summarizes the
gist of current historical opinion. If there were any differences in the impact of
colonial rule, then surely British rule stands out from the rest. Yet at this point I
should like to stress that I am not interested in a debate on which colonial rule
was the best. I wholly subscribe to Ranke’s famous words that jede Epoche ist
unmittelbar zu Gott, that each century is equally close to (and, I would add,
equally distant from) God. And Ranke, just as much a child of his time, had
national histories and national epochs in mind. What I am saying is that New
Zealanders of today, for example, cannot be blamed for what their great-grand-
fathers did in Samoa (if they were there at all). As a German, I would be the
last to argue that there is anything like a historical fall from grace. To align the
behavior of modern New Zealanders with the possible faults of some of their
forebears would be reminiscent of the kind of racism which claims that once a
cannibal, always a cannibal. On the other hand, the danger that someone might
misinterpret my book is no reason to avoid criticizing attitudes of the past if
they deserve criticism.
It is also important to stress that any assessment of colonial policy would be
incomplete if it did not take into account the changes that occurred within that
colonial power’s administration. I would not go so far as to describe overall Aus-
tralian rule in New Guinea as “an outstanding illustration of those philan-
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thropic contributions which have marked the best and finest stage of
colonialism,”9 or New Zealand’s record in Samoa as having been guided by
“humanitarian imperial ideology.”10 But there can be no doubt that Australia’s
policy in New Guinea and New Zealand’s policy in Samoa after 1945 were in
many respects quite different from the policies they had pursued before the
Pacific War. This represents another, and indisputably even greater, watershed
in relations between the Pacific Islanders and their European colonizers.
Yet I believe that it is of immense historical interest to study and analyze
the differences in colonial rule in, for example, the Pacific. This will bring us
closer to the cardinal question: how did Pacific Islanders act toward nonindige-
nous people in their environment? And why did Pacific Islanders act as they
did? What motives did they have in mind, and what schemes did they invent to
influence their contacts with Europeans? Why did they develop different or
similar strategies? Why were some more and others less successful in achieving
their aims? Tracing the heterogeneity among European approaches could help
us achieve a better understanding of Pacific Islanders’ attitudes, actions, and
behavior, which were enormously diversified and changed dramatically as time
passed.
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1Introduction
the german legacy
In the European summer of 1914, Germany’s Pacific colonies seemed to be a
quiet backwater of its empire. German colonial policy in the Pacific and Africa
had gone in different directions since at least the turn of the century. After the
financial and political disaster left by the Neuguinea-Kompanie, Germany’s
share of New Guinea had been placed under the direct control of the Reich. At
about the same time, Berlin had acquired its last colonies: most of Micronesia,
and, a little later, the western half of Samoa.1 There is evidence enough that
Germany was prepared to learn from its previous mistakes in Africa.
What set German New Guinea, the Micronesian Islands, and German
Samoa so much apart from German Africa? First of all there was the geograph-
ical factor. The Pacific colonies were at the periphery, in every sense of the
word. The fact that they were so far away from Europe—much farther than
Africa—had a variety of consequences. The German public, like German poli-
ticians, were much less concerned about developments in the Pacific than in
Africa. Germany’s Pacific possessions were certainly regarded as conclusive evi-
dence that Germany had finally attained the status of a world power. But there
was little strategic value in extending the Reich to the Pacific. Indeed, as the
world war was to show, it brought Germany more disadvantages than advan-
tages. As early as December 1898, the German Naval High Command had
advised against the acquisition of Micronesia, pointing out that the islands were
too remote from Germany to be of any military use.2
Nonetheless, pride in having acquired a real “place in the sun” at last, har-
bored by the future German chancellor, Bülow, the Kaiser, and many other
Germans, gave the Pacific colonies something like collectors’ value. They rep-
resented an ideal that allowed Germany to show off, enhancing the prestige of
a country still striving to be acknowledged as an equal by the old, traditionally
accepted world powers. If Germany had not been able to gain economically or
strategically important territories in the South Pacific, it had at least “acquired”
the “best” people, inspiring the envy of the other European powers. Germany’s
Pacific empire was like “beautiful jewellery, which is of value only to its collec-
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tor and does not yield a profit, but which gave us pleasure.”3 Or, as the gover-
nor of German New Guinea put it in the German Reichstag, defending the
acquisition of Micronesia: “Admittedly, Germany is unlikely to gain much eco-
nomic advantage from this island territory. But I still think that we can pursue a
highly idealistic purpose there. This is to preserve the Polynesian. . . . [Polyne-
sians] are a proud, but peace-loving and beautiful people, and Germany should
take pride in preserving and gradually civilizing them. Germany should hold
tight to the idea that this purpose alone is enough to justify keeping and admin-
istering these islands.” At the end of this speech, German parliamentarians
from all sides joined in with “lively cheers of ‘bravo!’ .” A little later, Solf, the
governor of Samoa, added: “I can assure you that Samoa is indeed the pearl of
the South Seas. And I should like to express my gratitude, in my own name and
in that of my brown protégés, if this House does not stint in providing gold for
the setting of this pearl.” Again, the response was unanimous: “Cheering and
lively applause from all sides.” Seconds later, the colonial budget for the Pacific
had been passed.4
A direct result of this attitude was that colonial administrations in the
Pacific were given much more time and latitude to develop, pursue, and imple-
ment their policies than in Africa. Berlin’s marked tolerance toward the Pacific
meant that administrators there were under less pressure to show immediate
results. The rush to produce results that was so characteristic of some, if not
all, parts of German Africa was largely absent from the Pacific, where a
much more relaxed, balanced, and flexible attitude prevailed.5 As it was not a
place where laurels could be gained, the Pacific was also spared the political
careerists and military adventurers who had such a disastrous impact on Ger-
many’s African colonies.
Indeed, the administrators who went there provide one of the most strik-
ing contrasts between the German Pacific and German Africa. In German
Africa public officials, especially those who filled the top positions, were largely
drawn from the aristocracy,6 and many of them translated their idea of a class
society into a race society. The Pacific, by contrast, was the domain of the Ger-
man middle classes. They arrived on the scene usually with a university degree
and administrative training behind them. Compared with German Africa, there
was also much more continuity in the Pacific; the majority of German officials
there regarded the Pacific not merely as a place to work but one that offered an
opportunity to combine work with their interests. For many, it was a hobby to
study and write down the local history of the people and the areas in which
they lived, note local customs, and try to preserve them. Some even emulated
them. An enormous amount of ethnographic data was collected by German
officials.7 But because of the language barrier (exacerbated by the German
script), many anthropologists today cannot make use of this material. After
their initial tours of duty, normally three years, were over, most officials in the
Pacific extended their contracts. Others really took root, becoming part of their
environment and adopting Pacific ideas and patterns of behavior. Far from
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their puritanical backgrounds, most Germans enjoyed the liberties that many
Pacific cultures offered.8 The story of those German colonial officials who not
only lived with local women but actually married them has yet to be written.
This was far more common among the Germans than among the officials of
other European colonial regimes; and as a result these Germans gained consid-
erably greater insights into indigenous affairs and patterns of behavior.
At least one month away from communication with Berlin, German gover-
nors in the Pacific enjoyed great influence. Policy-making fell to them, de facto
if not de jure. Albert Hahl and Wilhelm Solf were exceptional men, in any
sense of the word.9 Hahl was a doctor of law. Solf, a law graduate and a doctor
of philosophy, was also an expert in Eastern languages and culture. Both men
were multilingual and determined to learn as much as possible from the mis-
takes of colonial policy in German Africa, as well as from the examples set by
the British, Dutch, and French in the Pacific. Both shaped conditions in the
colonies over which they presided to a far greater extent than any German gov-
ernor in Africa or any other European governor in the Pacific at the same time.
Hahl stayed in the Pacific for eighteen years, of which more than eleven were
spent as governor of German New Guinea. Solf worked in Samoa for eleven
years, ten as governor.
What was typical of German colonial policy in the Pacific and of internal
developments in Germany’s Pacific colonies? Germany’s colonial activities in
the Pacific have not been well documented in the past. Peter Hempenstall’s
standard work is still the best study available. Concentrating on indigenous
resistance movements, Hempenstall found “that, for the German Pacific
empire, violence was not automatic nor always the prerogative of the Islander,
and that resistance to Germans and their policies, when it did occur, was a great
deal more subtle and limited than contemporary German colonists, and indeed
a long line of later historians, were prepared to accept.”10 Stewart Firth’s
account of German New Guinea is a good study of economic and social rela-
tions, but his interpretation of the overall picture of German–Melanesian rela-
tions raises doubts.11 It is highly questionable whether economic motives were
always paramount, as has so often been suggested in the past.12 To be sure,
although German policies in the Pacific were very different from those in its
African empire, Germany was not an extended arm of the Salvation Army. If
economic goals seemed realizable, they played an important part in shaping the
administration’s policies; but they were never pursued without taking into con-
sideration the other motives that the colonial government, or governor, might
have had.
In German New Guinea, for instance, Hahl was determined to prevent the
European settlers from realizing their dream, which was to transform New
Guinea into a plantation colony run in the interests of the white minority. He
was also quite able to do this. He repeatedly dismissed demands for the intro-
duction of forced labor regulations.13 Instead, year by year, he pushed through
more stringent laws reducing the capitalist latitude that European employers
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had enjoyed as one of the fatal legacies of Neuguinea-Kompanie (New Guinea
Company) rule. But though Hahl’s government clearly supported the indige-
nous economy by protecting native land as far as possible from European greed
and encouraging the cultivation of copra,14 Hahl nonetheless regarded the
European plantations as the other basic, even indispensable, pillar of his col-
ony’s economy. And whereas the indigenous side was able to take advantage of
growing economic prosperity,15 officially upholding the colony’s hybrid charac-
ter made it increasingly difficult for the administration to maintain the balance.
Neither wanting to give in to the demands of the European settlers always to
be given priority and to enforce compulsory labor, nor prepared (or able) to
appease indigenous interests alone, Hahl decided to shift the problem by favor-
ing the introduction of foreign labor. But he was only too aware that this policy
had had tremendously negative consequences for the people involved, and had
also turned out to be economically disastrous when it had been tried by the
Neuguinea-Kompanie before the turn of the century. The war saved the Ger-
man administration from being forced to sort out their perplexities.
A look at village level, at what the German administration called the “free”
Melanesians (in contrast to the “unfree” Melanesians who were bound by con-
tract as laborers), may give us further insight into the rather complex German
attitude, and into the Germans’ relationship with their indigenous contacts.
From the start, it was made clear that Germany’s overlordship could never be
questioned. Melanesians, like other Pacific Islanders, had to recognize Ger-
many as the sole authority for the overall political destiny of the Islands. Indig-
enous resistance to this fundamental principle of German rule was never
tolerated. In theory, this was not much different from the behavior of other
colonial powers, but the German approach was possibly more determined and
coherent. When it came to the internal workings of the system, however, it was
a different story. Here a great deal of local input was possible and, indeed,
invited by the colonial administration.
In New Guinea, Hahl “hardly made a decision without having listened to
the advice of trustworthy and experienced natives.”16 The system of luluai and
tultul, much misunderstood by historians in the past, which Hahl introduced,
guaranteed the indigenous side an area of autonomy in which the colonial
administration did not interfere as long as peace was maintained. Most conflicts
that occurred in Melanesian societies could be solved internally. Thus two of
the basic pillars of Melanesian society, the system of internal conciliation and
compensation as the basis for all forms of reconciliation, were not only officially
acknowledged by the German administration but were integrated into its colo-
nial policy, thus becoming a substantive part of it. There is a great deal of evi-
dence that the Germans supported their indigenous administration in applying
the Melanesian principle of compensation to atone for violations of the local
code of behavior or to give satisfaction to those who had been offended. In such
cases, the luluai was permitted to set the balance straight by imposing fines in
traditional shell money right up to the end of the German colonial period.17
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The fact that the Germans incorporated Melanesian principles into their
administrative system helped to smooth German–Melanesian relations to a
degree that has been overlooked in the past. It also exerted a dynamic force
that attracted more and more unpacified Melanesians, who came forward and
asked to be included in the German administrative area. Increasingly, the Pax
Germanica developed an impetus of its own, as the indigenous population
aspired to join the German colonial organization. Hahl’s attempts to pacify the
country were supported in particular by the women, who obviously preferred
the Pax Germanica to the Perpetuum Bellum Melanesicum pursued by their
menfolk.18
Admittedly, Germany’s attempt to pacify and unite the fragmented
Melanesian cultures under its tutelage was based on the conviction that the use
of force was necessary. The application of universal laws and the pacification of
the country were achieved by superior strength. Yet superior strength alone
would not have been enough, even if it had always been available to the colo-
nial government: Germany’s Pacific colonies, unlike its African colonies, had no
Schutztruppe (colonial force). The gunboats stationed in Tsingtao only paid fly-
ing visits, which came to be regarded as days of celebration, and did not offer
the kind of military security that was readily available to the governor and upon
which he could really rely. Hahl’s Pax Germanica therefore was anchored in a
combination of German and Melanesian patterns of behavior.
Little attention has so far been paid to the special nature of Germany’s
attempt to establish, and systematically to expand, a Pax Germanica on the
basis of Melanesian principles. During Hahl’s period of office, Germany
usurped supremacy over many indigenous societies in New Guinea. It estab-
lished an unprecedented monopoly of power in all the islands of the Bismarck
Archipelago, the Northern Solomons, Manus, and the northeast coast of Kai-
ser-Wilhelmsland. The German administration put an end to tribal warfare by
fighting (and thus damaging) belligerent tribes until they gave up. Violence was
part of Germany’s colonial administration, but it was a means to an end. It was
but one element in the long-term goal of imposing internal peace. It is impor-
tant to stress that there was a system behind this use of violence, and possibly
even more important to point out that the Germans were able to communicate
this idea to the local side. German consistency and steadfastness played an
important role in achieving the Pax Germanica. For the indigenous peoples,
strength and especially steadfastness were the most striking features of Ger-
man behavior.
But the real key to the German approach gradually coming to be accepted
among the indigenous societies was the official adoption of traditional, indige-
nous patterns of behavior. In order to put an end to “eternal” blood feuds and
tribal warfare, the colonial power also resorted to traditional Melanesian mea-
sures such as taking hostages and making whole kin-groups responsible for the
actions of their members. When actual or potential damage reached a certain
level, Melanesian village communities were prepared to give up their weapons
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and conclude the strife in peace, or to hand over the accused member to face
German justice. Peace was established in the same traditional way in which
“war” had been waged. There was an official ceremony, an exchange of goods,
and weapons were destroyed under the eyes of all concerned. The Germans
demonstrated their goodwill by destroying some of their weapons as well.19
German and Melanesian traditions mingled. As the Germans were increasingly
accepted as arbiters between feuding tribes, a simple declaration of peace by
the administrative officer alone was sometimes enough to stop the fighting. His
authority rested solely upon the fact that he was known by the offenders and
familiar with them and their customs, and on his reputation for impartiality:
“The following amicable agreement is concluded. The two parties are recon-
ciled again and shake hands.”20
One of the most striking features of German colonial rule in the Pacific,
and one that, again, has hitherto largely escaped the attention of historians, was
its marked tolerance toward indigenous ideas of behavior. In the legal system of
German New Guinea, traditional behavior was considered a mitigating circum-
stance. Although groups that resisted the Pax Germanica were dealt with
firmly, individual cases were treated with remarkable leniency. Headhunters,
cannibals, and those pursuing blood feuds were, as a rule, banished for an aver-
age of three years. Longer periods of imprisonment were practically unknown.
In any case, the maximum period of punishment was five years. Death sen-
tences were extremely rare, by comparison not only with Germany’s African
colonies but also with other European colonies in the Pacific. In Fiji, for exam-
ple, the British executed thirty-eight people between 1903 and 1910 alone,
whereas in German New Guinea only thirty-seven death sentences were
imposed in the entire period from 1899 to 1913, almost half of them in connec-
tion with an alleged indigenous “revolt.” Moreover, the Germans replaced
hanging by shooting as the preferred method of execution; and by the end the
German administration had abolished public executions.21
If a culprit came from an area where the colonial administration had not
yet been established, this was considered a special mitigating circumstance. In
such cases, even murderers were not punished, but only reprimanded, or at
most removed from the scene for a while in order to calm the area. As late as
1912 a “murderer” from Karkar was remitted because he came from an area
that had not yet been integrated into the German colonial administration.22
Local views could even be given absolute precedence over German-European
legal concepts. At the beginning, German officials obstinately refused to deal
with cases of local sorcery, which they regarded as mere superstition. However,
they increasingly came to acknowledge that indigenous people had good cause
to complain about the effects of what Melanesians called witchcraft. As the
German legal system (which was officially valid in the colonies) provided no
basis on which to punish “sorcerers,” Hahl ordered his officials to use their
power to quell the disturbances caused by such “sorcerers” by deporting them
or punishing them on the pretext that they had committed acts of “public nui-
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sance.” (In this way, a European-German legal term was made to seem applica-
ble, at least superficially.) “Further, sorcerers are as a matter of course liable to
pay compensation for the damage which they have caused.”23
To be sure, there were conflicts right up to the end of the German colonial
period. But in retrospect it must be said that the Germans achieved pacifica-
tion relatively quickly, and without encountering much resistance. To compare
the German approach and the Melanesian response to the well-known colonial
wars fought in German South West and East Africa, in which thousands of peo-
ple were killed, is absurd.24 Similarly, it is at the very least unsatisfactory to
argue that the lack of stronger Melanesian resistance and/or German violence
was due only to the fragmentation of Melanesian village society.25 Just a brief
glance at the colonial wars in New Caledonia and Fiji suggests that this was not
the case. It is also an exclusively Eurocentric view of history to criticize the col-
onizing power for not having introduced Melanesian villagers to Western
notions of jurisprudence but having adopted Melanesian customs of warfare
and retribution.26 On the contrary, it was probably the fact that Germany did
adopt indigenous patterns of behavior which made the ‘German system’ seem
much less disturbing to indigenous eyes than could have been expected.27
When Hahl left New Guinea early in 1914, his acting successor was an
engineer. At first glance it looks as if Eduard Haber was sent in only to put eco-
nomic above indigenous interests at last and to expedite the exploitation of the
colony’s mineral resources, which Hahl had deliberately shelved until pacifica-
tion of the area was completed. But, in fact, Haber’s first concern was the indig-
enous population. On his return from a tour of inspection to the Micronesian
islands, Haber reported to his superiors in Berlin that “we must convince the
Islanders that they fare better under German rule than under any other foreign
flag. . . . The colonial administration must be more concerned to ensure that
the natives are content with German rule than with higher or lower profits for
the leasing companies.” And, he continued, its experience in Ponape should
make the administration “cautious about modernizing the customs and views of
the natives.” Like Hahl, Haber supported the creation of an indigenous admin-
istrative elite as, in his view, the people of the Marshall and Caroline islands
were not only “intelligent,” but also keen for education and “hard-working.”28
A beginning had already been made. The first graduates of the govern-
ment school in Rabaul-Namanula had been employed by the colonial govern-
ment as administrative assistants since October 1913. A similar step had been
taken earlier in Micronesia, where graduates of the government school in
Saipan had started to fill positions in the local administration. Micronesia was
the only area in the German Pacific where the majority of the young generation
spoke German. The colonial administration had intended to expand the system
of secondary education provided by government schools to cover all of New
Guinea and the Island Territories (Micronesia) from 1915 on.29
Samoa also had its government school. Solf had early decreed that Samoan
was to be the exclusive language of instruction in all schools for Samoans. The
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children of the European and mixed population who had their own govern-
ment school were officially asked to attend the Samoan government school
from time to time in order to learn Samoan.30 This was in line with the official
policy of respecting and preserving the Samoan character of the islands, of pre-
venting European immigration, and opposing the Germanization of Germany’s
part of Polynesia. It reflects far more than a linguistic peculiarity that all non-
Samoans, including the Germans, were officially termed “strangers” by the
government.31
The principles of Solf’s policy in Samoa are well known. As in New Guinea,
and indeed in all the other German colonies, Germany’s claim to hegemony
and the right to formulate the overall rules for the colony had to be accepted.
Opposition was not tolerated, whether it came from Samoans or German set-
tlers. On the other hand, both sides enjoyed some sort of political participation.
For the Europeans, there was the government council, in which non-Germans
were also represented. Indeed, for a long time English was the language of the
council (and of other offices), and Germans who had no knowledge of English
had to have their speeches translated.32 For the Samoans, there was at first
Mata‘afa Iosefo as ali‘i sili (“the highest chief”), a title clearly beneath that
given to the Kaiser (tupu sili, or “highest ruler”). But in status, it came right
after the emperor who, after all, was not present in Samoa.33 Certainly Solf,
who preferred to be called tama (“father”), tried to limit the significance of the
concessions Germany made to Samoan traditional authority. On the other
hand, there is some indication that, at the beginning at least, Mata‘afa had
much more influence than has been assumed. He was definitely not the naïve
figurehead as which he is sometimes portrayed.34
After the death of Mata‘afa and the abolition of the title of ali‘i sili, the fau-
tua (“adviser”) became the highest Samoan official in the German colonial sys-
tem. Because of Samoa’s past and its complex hierarchical structure, Solf chose
to have two fautua, one representing the Malietoa line, and the other the
Tamasese line. Since 1905 there had been the fono a faipule, a council of
chiefs, which met once or twice annually to discuss the possible Samoan input
into the general political future of the islands. In the way it worked and was
consulted by the administration, it closely resembled its European equivalent,
the government council.
But the sphere of actual Samoan autonomy lay elsewhere. Outside the cap-
ital Apia, which was increasingly receiving a German-European overlay and
where Samoan influence was limited, the Samoans continued to be the real
masters of their environment. As long as peace was maintained and the German
claim to overall hegemony was at least tolerated, the German administration
was little concerned with what happened in the villages. There Samoan views
and traditions remained unchallenged, and their predominance was guarded by
an autonomous Samoan administration that had officially been acknowledged
by the Germans at the beginning of German rule.35 The inner circle of Samoan
life was untouched by Europeans. Its sacrosanct character was underlined by a
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number of decisions by the colonial government in which it made clear that the
Samoan sphere was taboo for Europeans. Any European infringement of this
taboo was liable to be punished by the government. Thus the daily life of the
Samoans remained relatively unchanged under the German regime.
One of the cornerstones of this policy was Solf’s decision to exempt Samo-
ans from working for Europeans. Samoa was the only German colony in which
the indigenous people were not “persuaded” to work in one way or another.
But as not even Solf was prepared to sacrifice at least the appearance of run-
ning an economically profitable colony, the consequence of his decision was the
importation of foreign labor from China. If we examine the brutal treatment
the Chinese received, the contrast with the German approach toward the
Samoans becomes even more apparent. The Chinese, like the “black boys”
employed by the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagengesellschaft, the biggest
German company and the one that had a monopoly on importing foreign labor
from the Bismarck Archipelago and the German and British Solomons, were
subjected to disciplinary corporal punishment. The fact that this punishment
was frequently carried out by Samoans, who themselves were free from this
form of castigation, strengthened the Samoan belief that they were a special
people. After all, this notion appeared to be acknowledged by the leading
European power in the country.36 The second cornerstone of Solf’s system, the
setting up of a Land and Titles Commission in order to avoid the recurrence of
civil war, has been well studied.37
Solf’s successor as governor, Erich Schultz (-Ewerth), was less resolute.
But as a former chairman of the Land and Titles Commission, he was fully
familiar with Samoan customs and therefore seemed to be the perfect man to
carry on the principles of German rule laid down by Solf. The aim was still “to
provide the means for the inevitable process of individualization to take place
without damaging consequences, so that the Samoan is not forced to run
before he can walk.”38 There can be no doubt that one major result of German
rule in Samoa up to 1914 was the strengthening of a special identity and tradi-
tionalism that were becoming increasingly rare in the changing Pacific land-
scape around Samoa. By the end of German rule, the old Samoan elite had
come to terms with the German administrative elite, and vice versa. But the
success of this policy, which was to a large extent propped up by the personality
of the governor, should not obscure the fact that a strong current was already
building which might have undermined the whole structure. Just as more and
more young German officials tended to question the old, largely unwritten, and
tacit agreement with Samoa’s traditional elite, so a young Samoan elite, itself
the product of Germany’s education policies, was ready to challenge German
hegemony and demand more rights for Samoans in the shaping of Samoa’s
political future.39
Although it differed in many respects from that in New Guinea, the Ger-
man administration in Samoa was also trying to maintain a balance that was
becoming more and more difficult to achieve. It had to tread a narrow line
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between appeasing economic and indigenous interests. For the government,
pursuing commercial aims while not really subscribing to the views of the
European settlers, on the one hand, and trying to introduce a German form of
the European concept of modernism without endangering the local traditions,
on the other, became an increasingly impossible task. The fact that the Ger-
man system did not collapse under the sheer weight of all its contradictions
was due to the war, which came as a complete surprise. It was to play a special
part in saving the image of a German rule that had, in fact, come to the end of
its rationale.
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The First World War as a Turning Point
THE PACIFIC IN GERMAN WAR PLANS
Until 1914 the German protectorates in the Pacific were undefended. No
marine stations had been established, and the crews of warships from Tsingtao
regarded their more or less regular visits to the Pacific as welcome recreational
breaks. There were no military laurels to gather there; nor were they sought.
Even in the worst case East Asia was of only secondary significance to the Ger-
man fleet. The warships were intended, if necessary, to make Britain’s Far
Eastern and Australian trading routes unsafe. Their main objective was to pre-
vent wool being shipped from Australia to Britain.1 The German navy had
made no contingency plans to defend Germany’s Pacific colonies.
Provision had not even been made for the fleet to have adequate access to
coaling stations in the case of a conflict. Most of the coal depots in the German
sphere of influence in the Pacific were under the control of private companies,
the most important of which were the Norddeutsche Lloyd and the Neu-
guinea-Kompanie. The navy had only a contractual right to use these depots.
Unprepared for a war at sea, the Germans had given equally little thought to
the defense of their colonies by land. The only fortifications, those in Kolonia
on Ponape, had been razed after having been taken over from the Spanish.
What cannons there were in the German Pacific were useless for defensive
purposes because they had always been used exclusively for firing salutes, and
no live ammunition had been ordered.2
No colonial troops were stationed in Germany’s Pacific colonies. The Ger-
mans had not introduced obligatory military training for the colonial popula-
tion. Nor had any attempt been made to organize a civil defense or military
reserve for the contingency of an invasion. A large number of German planters
had evaded military service at home. In Samoa, not even the governor had
served. The native police was all that existed in the way of military support. In
Samoa, this had been disbanded in January 1914 after four of its members had
run amok.3 German New Guinea alone possessed a larger number of “police
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soldiers.” Badly equipped with old Mauser rifles, they had been employed only
to pacify Melanesia and to maintain order in Micronesia. There had been no
military training for the eventuality of countering a European or Asian inva-
sion. The only thing that had been started before 1914 was a planned network
of Pacific radio links.
War was not on the agenda of the German colonies in the Pacific. Their
failure to take defensive measures could be interpreted as the result of a rather
naive belief in a general consensus among Europeans to leave the colonies out
of any military conflicts in Europe. The Congo Act, although it did not apply to
the Pacific, may have nourished such ideas. Moreover, there was a historical
precedent. During the Franco-Prussian War, the naval commanders of the
French and Prussian fleets in the Far East had come to a private agreement
not to attack each other.4 Whether colonists in Rabaul and Apia were aware of
this precedent, however, is another matter. It is more likely that the German
colonial government in the Pacific was hostile to any move that would have
given the military greater influence over local administration. The Pacific
under German administration was at the periphery, a world of its own where
exceptions were possible and local solutions could be found. Those who bene-
fited from this situation had no wish to be dictated to by military constraints
and pressures from outside. The fact that Berlin did not initiate any moves to
put its Pacific colonies in a position at least to defend themselves against attack
indicates how little political value was placed on them. On closer inspection, all
talk of the Islands’ economic and strategic value proves to have been empty.
These were merely “show colonies” to boost Germany’s prestige as a world
power. But until 1914 the German Reich was not in a position to back up its
claim to be a world power, with all this entailed. The Pacific colonies reveal as a
sham a self-professed world power that suffered from “imperial overstretch”
even before it became a real world power.
This also meant that Germany did not want to know about developments
that would have required an urgent change of policy. During the Agadir crisis
of 1911, the British warship Challenger, under the command of Captain (later
Admiral) Gaunt, entered the harbor of Apia at night and unannounced. The
circumstances surrounding this event—all the ships’ lights had been put out,
and the regulation that a German pilot was to be taken on board had been
ignored—suggest that there was more than a grain of truth in the rumor soon
circulating that the Challenger had received orders to occupy Samoa on the
outbreak of war in Europe. As the ship arrived, the British settlers in Samoa
gathered at the harbor to welcome it, while the Germans fled into the bush in
panic.5 Even after this, the German administration saw no reason to revise its
naive idea that its paradise of Anglo-German harmony was not under threat.
In Australia, the German consul-general in Sydney constantly pointed out
the dangers posed by a militant, subcolonial Australian imperialism directed
against the German presence in New Guinea.6 No observer could be in any
doubt about Australian hostility to German activities in the Pacific. In order to
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meet Australian demands, Germany pursued a type of appeasement policy in
Berlin as well as in the Pacific. There were no preferential tariffs in Germany’s
Pacific colonies. But when the Australian company Burns Philp complained
vociferously that the Jaluitgesellschaft (Jaluit Company) exercised a monopoly
of trade in a German colony, Germany paid considerable financial compensa-
tion.7 Burns Philp went so far as to put political pressure on Germany via Lon-
don. In 1913, ignoring the guidelines regulating the acquisition of land in New
Guinea by Europeans that he himself had introduced, the governor allowed a
dummy company acting for Burns Philp to acquire a total of 10,000 hectares in
the German Solomons. This was one of the largest tracts of land Germany per-
mitted to pass into European ownership after taking over the administration
from the Neuguinea-Kompanie.8 And when, in preparation for opening up the
interior of New Guinea, the government considered expanding the Melanesian
police force, the German colonial office expressly asked it to take Australian
fears of German expansionism in the Pacific into account. The government in
Rabaul was to make it clear that its measures applied only to a local police
force, and that it had no intention of establishing a colonial force.9
THE ENTENTE
In the course of the nineteenth century the British population of Australia and
New Zealand had developed a hypersensitivity toward all non-British colonial
ventures in the Pacific. The list of potential enemies and invaders was long. In
addition to Russia, which was believed to be capable of launching a seaborne
attack on Australia from Vladivostok, it included France, Germany, and even
the United States. During the Boer War, Australian fears escalated into a pho-
bia. In August 1901 MPs speaking in the Federal Parliament conjured up the
spectre of a combined German-French-Russian naval attack on Australia.10
The Australian dislike of the French, Britain’s traditional rivals in the Pacific,
was especially well developed; in 1891 the military governor of Victoria saw
France as Australia’s main enemy in a future war. One year later, the Melbourne
Argus, one of Victoria’s most influential papers, insisted stridently that France
was threatening Australia. France had just brought Saint-Paul and Amsterdam,
two small and insignificant isles in the Indian Ocean, under its control.11 Forty
years earlier, New Zealand had already drawn up concrete plans for a war
against the French in the Pacific. In 1852 Governor George Grey intended to
occupy Tahiti with one thousand European and three to four thousand Maori
soldiers, who were to be used as fifth columnists in French Polynesia.12
New Caledonia, which was a French colony, and the New Hebrides were a
constant bone of contention. In 1902 the British MP Charles Dilke suggested
to the British commander of the Australian Commonwealth’s military forces
that they should invade New Caledonia and the New Hebrides.13 The Anglo-
French rapprochement of 1903 had little effect on their mutual aversion in the
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Pacific. In the debate on the Naval Agreement Bill in July 1903, the Australian
prime minister, Edmund Barton, publicly called France a threat to Australia.14
While the Australians objected to the French presence as such, and wanted to
see the French possession of colonies in the Pacific brought to an end as
quickly as possible, the French in the Pacific feared Australian influence.
These fears were not unfounded, for Australian secret agents, or Australian
spies working for the British government, were active in New Caledonia and
the New Hebrides. As late as April 1914, G. Galitzenstein of the Comité de
l’Oceanie française wrote: “The Entente Cordiale does not apply in Australasia.
Great Britain may be our friend, but her colonies certainly are not.”15
The spectre of a Japanese attack on Australia existed from 1895 at least,
when the Japanese occupation of Formosa sent shock waves as far as Sydney.
In annual maneuvers, white Australians practised driving Japanese warships
out of Sydney harbor.16 Existing fears flared up overnight when the outcome of
the Battle of Tsushima completely changed the strategic situation in the
Pacific. Although complaints about French and German activities in the Pacific
continued, Japan suddenly became the main threat. Leaders of public opinion
believed that a military conflict was only a matter of time. In New Zealand, too,
the attitudes of politicians changed from one minute to the next. In 1897 Prime
Minister Seddon had proposed that London undertake a joint campaign with
Japan in order to stop their “potential enemies,” the Americans, in Hawaii. Six
years later, speaking in Parliament, Seddon called Russia the only real threat to
the security of New Zealand.17 Now concern about the “Yellow Peril” suddenly
emanated from both sides of the Tasman Sea. In Australia and New Zealand
these fears fell on fruitful soil because each country was pursuing its own racist
immigration policy. The White Australia Policy and the White New Zealand
Policy designated Asians in general as an inferior race and excluded them from
migrating to Australia and New Zealand, respectively.18 Yet, it was generally
believed, the vast open spaces of New Zealand and Australia must act as a mag-
net for the overpopulated countries of Asia. Barely two months after Tsushima,
New Zealand’s supreme judge, Robert Stout, published a pamphlet entitled
Yellow Races, in which he presented an imminent Asian invasion of northern
Australia as a foregone conclusion. The only thing that was debatable was the
timing. In Australia the minister for defense, Thomas Ewing, a Liberal, had
already developed similar fantasies in his book Yellow Peril, predicting a racial
war of extermination within a generation.19
Neither of the Pacific dominions greeted the Anglo-Japanese alliance,
which was renewed and extended in 1905, with much pleasure. As far as they
were concerned, it was “a pact with the devil.”20 At the London Colonial Con-
ference in 1907 the prime minister of New Zealand, Ward, voiced the fears of
Australians and New Zealanders about the millions in the East. At the Imperial
Conference two years later, Ward expressed the opinion that any attempt by
Britain to enlist New Zealand support for Japan if the alliance were activated,
would be rejected unseen and would precipitate New Zealand’s separation
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from the British Empire. Australians and New Zealanders were especially con-
cerned because immediately after the Russo-Japanese War Britain had begun
to recall its Pacific fleet to Europe: on the day after Tsushima, five British bat-
tleships had been withdrawn.21
The decision by Britain to concentrate its fleet in the North Sea pro-
foundly affected Australia and New Zealand. They soon began to cooperate
more closely on political and military matters. It began with Rear Admiral Fan-
shawe, commander of the Australian Station, warning Wellington about a war
with Japan—“Real and Only Danger from an Enemy”—one month after
Tsushima.22 In both countries the process of detaching themselves from the
mother country’s political apron strings began, as did the search for new, com-
mon allies against the “Yellow Peril.” The Australian prime minister, Deakin,
invited the American fleet without informing the Colonial Office. The prime
minister of New Zealand joined in the initiative. When the American 16th
Fleet, significantly known as the Great White Fleet, arrived in New Zealand in
August 1908 before going on to Australia, popular emotions overflowed. Thou-
sands of people turned out to welcome the American sailors. In Sydney and
Melbourne between four to six hundred thousand people turned up.23 It was
almost as if the white Australians and New Zealanders were applauding their
future “liberators.” In all speeches, the Yellow Peril was more or less openly
castigated. The commander of the fleet, American Admiral Charles Sperry, did
not restrain himself. The coarsest invective, however, came from the host coun-
try. In New Zealand, MP Hornsby said: “I am thankful that Uncle Sam has
come into the Pacific to keep the yellow and brown men busy if there is to be
any trouble. . . . I would rather live in the most abject manner under Uncle
Sam’s flag than I would tolerate the monkey-brand any time.”24
In Australia, the arrival of the Americans coincided with the publication of
a new thriller. Previous stories of this type, strongly influenced by Britain, had
cast Germany as the aggressor. This one, however, centered on a Japanese inva-
sion of Australia. Its scenario had Japanese soldiers attacking Australia in 1912–
1913, Britain standing aloof and refusing to help, and the Aborigines acting dis-
loyally while white Australians of British origin fought alone against the Asiatic
hordes, defending “Aryan ideals” in a war that lasted until 1940. The story, ini-
tially serialized in newspapers, was such a success that it was also published as a
book.25
When Japan annexed Korea in August 1910, the Australian public’s fear of
an imminent Japanese invasion escalated into hysteria. Australian journalists
quite openly asked the new Japanese consul-general, on his arrival in Sydney in
October, about the likelihood of a Japanese attack.26 Early in 1911, one of the
largest New Zealand dailies, the New Zealand Herald, sent a special correspon-
dent to New Caledonia, where Japanese workers were employed in the French
nickel mines. The general view was that the Japanese on the site were using
this as a cover for spying, and that they were turning the area into a base from
which to realize their political and military ambitions in the region.27
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Australia’s and New Zealand’s fear of Japan and misgivings about Britain’s
withdrawal from the Pacific set in motion an armament and military policy that,
within a relatively short time, made Australia militarily the strongest of the
British dominions. In 1909 military training was made compulsory for all white
male Australians from the age of fourteen. Men aged between fourteen and
twenty had to perform sixteen days of military exercises every year. In addition,
on the insistence of the Labor Party, whose leader, Hughes, “at once the great-
est labor man, the greatest Imperialist, the greatest nationalist and the greatest
militarist in the country,”28 had long advocated the introduction of military ser-
vice, men between twenty and twenty-six had to do seven days of military exer-
cises annually. In the parliamentary debate the minister of defense, Joseph
Cook, justified the bill on the grounds of white Australia’s geopolitical position:
“We are surrounded by nations hungry for room and breathing space.” The
only nation mentioned in the debate, where it recurred frequently, was Japan.29
Armaments and munitions factories sprang up quickly, and an Australian navy,
which was only indirectly dependent on Britain, was created. By 1914 the
“Australian naval unit” was practically ready. The Australian fleet comprised
three destroyers, two light cruisers, the supermodern battleship Australia, and
two submarines. An Australian military academy was founded to train Austra-
lian and New Zealand officer cadets. Australia was the only one of the domin-
ions to experiment with military aircraft before the First World War.
Between 1902–1903 and 1913–1914 Australian defense spending in-
creased more than sixfold, from £ 750,353 to over £ 4.7 million. In the last
national budget before the war, defense spending accounted for almost 31
percent of total expenditure. This was a higher percentage than in any other
dominion, and more in both absolute and per capita terms than was spent by
comparable European countries such as the Netherlands, for example.30 New
Zealand relied more strongly than Australia on direct support from the British
navy. Its isolated position gave it a strategic advantage over Australia. New
Zealand’s defense strategy of June 1913 assumed that, in the event of a war
between Germany and Britain, it was unlikely that German warships would
attack New Zealand. It was regarded as much more likely that Germany would
attack trading ships in the Pacific. In fact, a surprise attack on New Zealand “of
any form” was regarded as “beyond all reasonable probabilities.”31 Never-
theless, New Zealand doubled its defense spending in just under a decade,
from £ 257,562 in 1902–1903, to £ 512,307 in 1911–1912. On 15 July 1914
New Zealand also acquired its own cruiser.32 Most importantly, however, New
Zealand, like Australia, had introduced compulsory military service in 1909.
Applying to males between the ages of twelve and thirty, it was even more
comprehensive than in Australia. Kitchener’s assessment, during a visit of
inspection, was: “splendid material for creating a first-class fighting
machine.”33
The widely held view that there could be no peace before the whole of the
southern Pacific was in the hands of people of British origin was the basis on
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which a specifically Australian and New Zealand imperialism flourished.
Although both countries were themselves still in relationships of colonial
dependence, a subcolonial imperialism emerged in Australia and New Zealand.
Since the 1870s, Melbourne, Sydney, and Wellington had sent a constant
stream of annexation requests to the Colonial Office. There was hardly an
island in the southwest Pacific, and no colonial power in the area, that was not
the object of Australian and New Zealand greed.34 From as early as 1870, the
idea of a British Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific, proposed by various Austra-
lians and New Zealanders, was in the air. In 1894 the government of the Aus-
tralian state of Victoria supported New Zealand’s demand that Britain should
annex Samoa, referring tersely to the “manifest destiny of Australasia to be the
controlling power in the Southern Pacific.”35
Under these circumstances, Germany’s expansion into the Pacific stirred
up a hornets’ nest of Australian and New Zealand ambitions. Both countries
wanted to defy Germany by confronting it with a fait accompli. On 4 April
1883, Queensland annexed New Guinea; and on 9 February 1885, under the
influence of New Zealand MP Lundon, the Malietoa government declared
Samoa to be part of New Zealand.36 When London, going over the heads of
Queensland and New Zealand, canceled both initiatives and Germany dug
itself ever more deeply into its Pacific positions, the tension grew. Britain’s
withdrawal from Samoa and the division of the islands between Germany and
the United States was the last straw. An indignant New Zealand prime minister
demanded, as “compensation” for the loss of Samoa, the extension of New
Zealand’s borders to include the Cook Islands, Tonga, Fiji, and the French
Society Islands. When the German flag was hoisted in Apia, Seddon was on a
tour of the Pacific, looking for further places to annex. Without previous
announcement, the prime minister put a bill for the annexation of the Cook
Islands before a half-empty Parliament, at 2:30 a.m. on 28 September 1900. It
was rushed through in one sitting like an emergency decree. Toward the end of
April, the Cook Islands chiefs had unsuccessfully tried to prevent the threat-
ened annexation by New Zealand.37
In 1901 the Australian states had come together in a federation, the Com-
monwealth of Australia. One reason for seeking political union was to create a
joint administration for the British part of New Guinea. In March 1902 Austra-
lia took over the southwestern part of New Guinea from Britain, renaming it
Papua in 1906. Thus New Zealand and Australia, without themselves having
attained political independence, had become imperial powers. Their main
interest, however, was simply to eliminate foreign influence in the Pacific. They
had little concern for the people of the territories under their control; neither
schools nor hospitals were set up. The amount allocated annually for the
administration of Papua was exactly twice as much as the governor-general of
Australia’s salary.38 Yet Australia was the richest country in the British Empire.
Its gold reserves were so high that one of the current invasion scenarios, con-
tributing to the hysteria, was that a few cruisers might one day appear off the
CH1  Page 17  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:14 PM
18 Chapter 1
coasts of Sydney and Melbourne and hold the towns for ransom until the gold
had been carried off into the ships.39
Nor did domestic policy prevent greater investment in Papua. Australia’s
development was confined to the coastal regions. Australia’s and New Zealand’s
imperial interests were based on strategic objectives. And if the territories
acquired could be made to yield a profit, so much the better. In Papua, Austra-
lia demonstrated how to maximize yields with minimum investment. Since
1888, four years after the Union Jack was raised there, gold had been mined in
Papua and exported to Australia. When Australia took over the administration
of the colony on its own, gold accounted for almost three-quarters of Papua’s
exports. Between 1900 and 1914, gold to the value of to £721,343 had been
exported. In the same period, only a little over ten miles of road were built.
Australia’s behavior in Papua is a classic example of colonial exploitation.40
The takeover of Papua and the Cook Islands was only the beginning of
increased efforts to gain more Pacific territories. Mostly, geostrategic reasons
were cited as “forcing” expansion.41 In principle, Britain was prepared to sup-
port Australia’s and New Zealand’s annexation demands. However, Australia’s
attempt to take over the New Hebrides and the British Solomons and New
Zealand’s attempt to take Tonga failed. Possible reasons were mutual rivalries,
Australia’s categorical refusal to accept the financial responsibilities arising
from annexation, or antipodean administrative incompetence.42
This failure, however, did not discourage the two smallest British domin-
ions: in 1912 Australia’s population was just under 4.8 million; New Zealand’s,
just over 1 million.43 On the contrary, they redoubled their efforts to change the
status quo in the Pacific by extending their own spheres of influence there.
New Zealand concentrated mainly on Tonga and Rapa, a small French Polyne-
sian island; the opening of the Panama Canal, it was claimed, had given it spe-
cial strategic significance. Australia kept mulling over plans to acquire the
Portuguese part of Timor, the Dutch possessions in New Guinea, or even the
whole of the Dutch East Indies. Both Australia and New Zealand were inter-
ested in the New Hebrides.44
What role did Germany and its Pacific colonies play in Australia’s and New
Zealand’s ideas? Both had regarded Germany’s penetration of the Pacific as
interference in their internal affairs. They had tried everything to prevent Ger-
many from acquiring New Guinea and Samoa. Australia and New Zealand
never recognized Germany as a Pacific power and never gave up their claims to
Germany’s Pacific possessions. Although in Europe, whether by chance or
design, Germany was undermining the status quo and fomenting political
unrest, the opposite was the case in the Pacific. Here Germany made desperate
efforts to preserve the situation of 1900, while Australia and New Zealand tried
with all their might to change the status quo. No attempt was made to conceal
opinions. Press campaigns directed against the German presence in the Pacific
and in favor of an Australian or New Zealand annexation of German posses-
sions were a regular feature of public life before 1914. The highest political cir-
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cles took part in them.45 At times, the tone of these campaigns was extremely
aggressive. It was even publicly claimed that a European war was necessary so
that Australia and New Zealand could realize their political ambitions in the
Pacific.46
One man, James Burns, stood behind almost all of these campaigns. A colo-
nel with a dubious past in the Boer War, he owned Burns Philp, the largest Aus-
tralian company trading in the Pacific. Burns’ personal connections with the
leading Australian politicians and regular government subsidies guaranteed his
company a unique place in the Pacific region. The way in which Burns Philp
conducted itself in certain Pacific islands must have increased the impression
that its private interests were identical with Australia’s Pacific policy.47
Before 1914, however, public opinion in Australia and New Zealand had
more or less come to the conclusion that it was not so much Germany as Brit-
ain’s ally, Japan, that posed the greatest military threat to their security.48 The
ministers of defense in Britain’s two Pacific colonies, Pearce and Allen, both
members of the Labor Party, were extreme hawks, militant advocates of their
own subimperialism and fanatical supporters of the Yellow Peril theory.49 Yet,
on sober reflection, it was only the German colonies in the South Pacific that
were threatened by the aggressive subimperialism of Australia and New
Zealand. Japan had no Pacific colonies. And whatever was felt about France,
military action against French possessions seemed to be out of the question as
long as Britain depended on France as an ally against their common rival, Ger-
many. And there was no chance at all of persuading France to withdraw from
the Pacific voluntarily.
The hardening of the Anglo-German antagonism in Europe made the pos-
sibility of Australia and New Zealand taking military action against the German
colonies in the Pacific seem ever more likely. A memorandum drafted early in
October 1912 by the New Zealand military commander, Major General God-
ley, presented Germany as the most likely enemy in a future war. The plan for
mobilizing New Zealand’s troops completely ignored the possibility of using
them to defend New Zealand, instead concentrating from the start on potential
lines of attack. It specifically included the seizure of Samoa and New Guinea.
Godley quite realistically pointed out that the geographical proximity and
unarmed state of the German colonies meant that they could be taken with rel-
atively few soldiers, in a subsidiary campaign. This would not affect the sending
of New Zealand troops to Europe and Egypt. The minister of defense, Allen,
approved the plan and authorized Godley to start building up a New Zealand
expeditionary force for the war.
Only one month later, Godley discussed the plan with his Australian col-
league, Brigadier General Gordon, at a joint conference in Melbourne. It was
firmly agreed that in the event of war between Germany and Britain, New
Zealand would occupy German’s Pacific colonies east of 170\ longitude; Austra-
lia, those lying to the west. Thus New Guinea would fall to Australia, Samoa to
New Zealand. This coincided exactly with the long-term subimperialist ambi-
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tions of the two colonies. Armed with this plan, Allen went to London and col-
lected the official approval of generals Henry Wilson, John French, and
L. E. Kiggell in the War Office.50
This indirect blessing given to New Zealand’s long-held desire to annex
Samoa did not stop Allen from returning to old themes and making further ter-
ritorial demands. In talks with Colonial Secretary Harcourt, Allen called for the
annexation of Tonga. Harcourt agreed that the end of Tongan self-rule was only
a matter of time. But it would be wise to wait, he suggested, until the king of
Tonga “did something which could be taken exception to.” When this hap-
pened, Britain would remember New Zealand’s wishes.51 In the Admiralty,
Allen demanded the annexation of Rapa. Churchill agreed with Allen that a
German attack on New Zealand was “almost unthinkable.” The German Reich
and, possibly, the Netherlands, on the other hand, he pointed out, were “the
only probable European enemies of Great Britain in the near future.” New
Zealand, he said, would have to accept this. Thus peace was all that stood in the
way of Australia’s and New Zealand’s plans to invade Germany’s Pacific colonies
in the event of a deterioration in relations between Britain and Germany.
Churchill tried to calm Allen’s fear of a Japanese attack by sketching the likely
scenario that all the European powers in the Pacific, including the United
States, would undertake a joint action against Japan.52
Japan’s imperialist ambitions were concentrated on the mainland of East
Asia, Korea, Manchuria, and China. It is true that toward the end of the 1880s
there was a wave of enthusiasm in Japan for expansion into the Pacific. In 1884
the Japanese flag briefly flew over a small atoll in the Marshall Islands. This
“South Seas fever” was a temporary phenomenon, but “Nan’yo” was always
there as an alternative to expansion northward.53 With the financial support of
the Japanese government, Japanese samurai had been trading in western
Micronesia since 1890. The biggest Japanese enterprise in the islands, Nan’yo
Boeki, had been expelled from the German protectorate in 1901 because of
arms trading with the Truk islanders. But since 1907 it had been licensed again
in Palau and Ponape. At the beginning of 1913 there were seventy-three Japa-
nese in the Western Carolines, the Mariana, and Palau islands. In absolute
terms this was a very small number. But in comparison with the Germans (105
on 1 January 1913), the Japanese could certainly hold their own. Most impor-
tantly, however, the smallness of their number bore no relation to their influ-
ence on trade in western Micronesia. On some islands, the Japanese practically
had a monopoly.54
THE WAR AMONG THE EUROPEANS
The outbreak of war in Europe came as a great shock to Germany’s totally
unprepared possessions in the Pacific. Unlike in Germany, the main reaction
there was consternation. The fact that no instructions had been received for
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what to do in the event of belligerent action in the Pacific increased the per-
ceptible uncertainty of the administration and the German colonists. In Samoa,
where news of the deterioration in the European situation arrived relatively
early because of the new radio station, the governor complained about a lack of
information. The famous Solf telegram, which had given the colonies the all
clear, was quickly overtaken by events, but no new instructions were issued.55
The island of Angaur in Micronesia received a number of telegrams in cipher
from Berlin, but no one had a key with which to decode them.56 The large dis-
tance separating them from home and the impossibility of offering military
resistance made any efforts to defend the colonies seem practically hopeless
from the start. Even if the German East Asia squadron were to stay in the
Pacific for the rest of the war, the colonies could not hold out for long, because
both the European population and the plantation laborers were totally depen-
dent on food supplies from Australia, New Zealand, and Eastern Asia.
It is therefore not surprising that on 5 August 1914 an expanded governing
council decided, with only one dissenting vote, to accept the expected military
occupation of Samoa without offering resistance.57 The islands’ colonial popu-
lation of British background were allowed, after giving their word of honor, to
continue their normal daily lives in freedom. The Amtmann (district officer) of
Savai‘i, a British citizen, naturally had to give up his position, but he was not
subject to any restrictions on his movements either. The Germans in Samoa
quite clearly believed that the good relations between the different nations
which had existed so far could continue in the future, even under changed cir-
cumstances.58 In any case, there was no alternative to this course of action.
When the war broke out, the acting governor of New Guinea was on a tour
Trying to defend the empire: German settlers hastily mustered for military service,
Apia, August 1914. (Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Samoa Bildarchiv. Sammlung Demandt)
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of inspection in the southeast of the mainland, several days’ journey from the
capital Rabaul. Eduard Haber, like the governor of Samoa, had not done mili-
tary service. On his return, the call-up of German men began. Anybody who
was more or less capable of marching was put into some sort of uniform and
hastily given basic military training. It soon became apparent, however, that the
colonialists, who were unaccustomed to this sort of activity, had no stamina,
and that in the event of a military confrontation they would do more harm than
good. All hopes were now pinned on a few officers of the reserve in the admin-
istration and the Melanesian police-soldiers. The majority of these, however,
had been deployed in the interior of New Guinea as an escort for those survey-
ing the border between German New Guinea and Australian Papua, and they
could not be ordered back quickly enough. Of those left in Rabaul, there were
hardly fifty men who had served more than six months. None of them had ever
faced an enemy with firearms. Their ranks were hastily filled with plantation
workers. The only weapons available were 280 extended ’98 carbines. As in
Apia, the cannons were only for firing salutes, and there was no live ammuni-
tion. There were no machine guns or other automatic weapons. It was clear
that in New Guinea, too, resistance could only delay the occupation of the
colony, not prevent it.
In order to allow the German defenses to be organized more effectively,
the administration of the colony was moved from Rabaul, which was com-
pletely exposed to attack from the sea, a few kilometers inland to Toma. Plans
for the government to withdraw even farther into impenetrable country, for
example the Baining Hills or the Sepik District, were given up as impractical.59
According to their arrangement, New Zealand occupied Samoa, and Aus-
Samoa’s youth meets the occupying force. Apia, 29 August 1914. (Ross Collection,
Alexander Turnbull Library)
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tralia took over New Guinea. On 29 August, New Zealand troops marched into
Apia without meeting any resistance. Samoa was the first German territory to
be occupied in the First World War. Thus a dream that New Zealand had har-
bored for decades came true, and Britain’s threat, made after the agreement of
1899, that it would get Samoa back, was fulfilled.60 New Zealand’s move had
been preceded by a British order to put the radio station on Apia out of com-
mission. An official request of this sort had long been a fixed part of British
wartime planning. The New Zealand government thus knew what was expected
of it on the outbreak of war.61
The same applied to Australia. The Australians were annoyed that New
Zealand had beaten their troops in the race to occupy German territory.
Despite the breakneck speed of Australian armament over the past few years,
the planned invasion of New Guinea posed a number of difficulties. The expe-
ditionary force was badly equipped, and what equipment it did have was totally
inadequate for fighting in the tropics. The troops did not receive light tropical
clothing until after they landed, when they obtained it from German stores. A
chest of replacement parts for their machine guns was stolen from the expedi-
tionary ship during the journey.62 The force itself contained many completely
unsuitable men. A large number of those who had volunteered in the hope of
adventure were young greenhorns who had obviously never held a gun before
in their lives. There were also men with highly dubious pasts, and many former
convicts.63 The Queenslanders were the worst behaved. Five hundred of them
had hurried ahead to Port Moresby in order to await the arrival of the Austra-
lian fleet and to join the expeditionary force. As the Australian flagship Austra-
lia was first required in Samoa, however, the departure of the troops from
Sydney was delayed. In the capital of Australian Papua the tension grew
unbearable. A German invasion was feared daily. On his arrival, Holmes, the
leader of the expeditionary force, found a panic-stricken and hysterical Euro-
pean population. The five hundred men from Queensland were totally undisci-
plined. When the stokers on their troopship, Kanowna, heard that they were to
enter the German combat area, a mutiny broke out. The leader of the expedi-
tion immediately sent the Queenslanders home.64
Nor did the occupation of New Guinea turn out to be as simple as
expected. The last meeting with Admiral Patey had concluded that no resis-
tance was to be expected from the German side.65 Yet Australia put together a
mini armada: the battleship Australia; the cruisers Melbourne, Sydney, and
Encounter; three destroyers; two submarines (the only two that Australia pos-
sessed); the 11,000-ton troopship Berrima, which had been converted into an
auxiliary cruiser; and several coal and supply ships. The expeditionary force
consisted of many more than the originally planned fifteen hundred men.66 The
entire Australian fleet was sent out to occupy the German colonies. This course
of action, which left Australia’s coasts totally exposed to any enemy attack,
shows how little a German attack on Australia was expected. All Australia’s
efforts were channeled into an expedition of conquest.
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War scare in Port Moresby. Public notice, Port Moresby, 16 August 1914. (Australian
Archives Canberra)
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The Australian unit lulled itself into a false sense of security. The where-
abouts of the German Pacific fleet was unknown, but all reports agreed that the
German squadron was somewhere north of New Guinea. An Australian
advance guard, led by the cruiser Sydney, which landed in Herbertshöhe on 12
August, encountered no resistance and saw no German defenses. After they
had destroyed the telephone wires, they left again.67 When Australian troops
landed in Blanche Bay on 11 September 1914, there were no German naval
formations waiting for them in the harbor. On land, however, they met a small
but determined troop of German and Melanesian soldiers. Although badly
trained, it engaged the Australian soldiers in a tough bush fight and held them
at bay. A short but fierce battle for the radio station at Bitapaka cost the lives of
six Australians (including two officers), about thirty Melanesians, and one Ger-
man NCO. Four Australians, ten Melanesians, and one German were injured,
some seriously.68
This unexpected German resistance, the mobilization of indigenous auxil-
iary troops whose aim may not have been very accurate but whose activities
certainly troubled the Australians,69 and the difficulties the Australians had
with the unfamiliar climate and country were the main reasons for the signing
of a treaty of surrender on 17 September. Its terms were highly favorable to the
Germans in New Guinea. Haber, a shrewd negotiator,70 managed to put
through the provision that German civilian officials who wished to leave were
to be repatriated to Germany at the Australian government’s expense, and
without having to declare themselves neutral. Those who wished to remain had
the choice, after swearing an oath of neutrality, to remain in their jobs “in an
advisory capacity.” They were to continue receiving their salaries, and were to
work under Australian supervision. The property of German settlers and plant-
ers was guaranteed, and the Australians promised that local laws and regula-
tions would remain in force.71 The capitulation of the German “troops,” with
military honors, on 21 September, was the end of the war in New Guinea. Only
the leader of the German border surveying expedition, Captain Detzner, con-
tinued to play cat-and-mouse with the Australians, who never found him, in the
hinterland of Morobe, until the armistice in Europe in November 1918. It is
astonishing that he had such good relations with the local tribes, and that his
hideout, which was known to the indigenous people, was not betrayed until the
end of the war. But without the help of the Neuendettelsauer Mission, which
built him a house in the forest and kept him supplied with food, books, and
English newspapers, Detzner could not have survived. The stories he spread
after the war about his heroic deeds, his attempts to breakthrough against the
Australians, and his journeys across New Guinea were all manifestly untrue.72
The treaty of capitulation referred explicitly to the whole of German New
Guinea, and to all the districts that were administered from Rabaul. This
included Micronesia. On 12 August, the British battle cruiser Hampshire, one
of two that had remained at Britain’s China station, had shot at the radio station
on Yap and severed deep-sea international cables, without occupying the
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island. The same happened in Nauru, where the Australian cruiser Melbourne
bombarded the radio station on 9 September. Instructions from London had
specified that Nauru and Angaur, the two phosphate islands in the German-
controlled area, were to be occupied as quickly as possible. Commercial lob-
bies in London and Sydney were impatient to be presented with a fait accom-
pli.73 But Australia made no progress in this respect. The German Pacific fleet
continued to sail the Pacific unmolested. On 14 September, Count Spee lay off
Apia with the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, but left the island on the same
day, his business unfinished. In the absence of enemy ships, the expected battle
did not take place. Spee, however, had insufficient troops and ammunition to
take Samoa. The option of bombarding the harbor was rejected because of the
damage it might have caused to German property and the danger it might have
posed to the Samoan civilian population, which was highly esteemed by Ger-
man naval commanders. Instead, he bombarded Tahiti eight days later.74
In this situation, Japanese intervention could no longer be prevented. Up
to this time Britain had done all it could to stop the Japanese government from
intervening in Micronesia and to encourage it to limit its activities to Tsingtao.
Under the pretext of hunting down the German squadron, the Japanese fleet
occupied all the islands of German Micronesia between 29 September and 21
October 1914. On the small islands of Micronesia, German resistance was even
less likely than on Samoa and in New Guinea. Except for the Bezirksassessor of
Ponape, who withdrew inland for a few days and marched around in the bush
until he saw the hopelessness of his position, all the German officials surren-
dered immediately and without resistance. An offer made by the last Spanish
governor of the Caroline Islands, Eugenio Blanco, to make available five thou-
sand trained Filipino volunteers, without pay and with responsibility for their
own rations, was refused by the German Foreign Office and the German naval
staff. It is hardly conceivable that Blanco’s offer was made without the knowl-
edge of the American officials in the Philippines. It is well known that the
Americans were highly concerned about the imminent Japanese actions in the
Pacific.75 We cannot exclude the possibility, therefore, that the Americans were
looking for an opportunity to stop the Japanese advance without being directly
involved themselves. Blanco seems to have been exactly the right man for this
purpose. He was a curious eccentric, whose escapades and brutality were well
known. (These would make it easy for the United States to distance itself from
him at any time.) On the other hand, he was a tough old veteran, a daredevil
who did not lack courage.76 But the German Foreign Office got cold feet pre-
cisely because the Philippines were under American administration. It was
feared that accepting this offer of help could place Germany in opposition to
the neutral United States, and Blanco’s proposal was therefore rejected.77
In Micronesia the Japanese successfully combined careful tactics with
rapid and decisive action when the opportunity arose. Their campaign was a
model of its kind. They first occupied Jaluit, the Micronesian island most dis-
tant from Japan and where Australian influence was strongest. Rota, closest to
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Japan, was taken last. The occupation took place in a number of steps. On
Jaluit, the head of the German station was at first informed that Japan had
decided to put Jaluit under Japanese administration for as long as the German
fleet was in the Far East. A few days later, the Japanese landed again and
explained to the puzzled official “that the Japanese government had changed
its mind.” Only at this stage was the Japanese flag raised and possession offi-
cially taken of the island.78
Tokyo was quite clearly pushing forward to a certain point from which it
could withdraw without losing too much face while keeping all its options open.
When Britain, whose reaction was probably being awaited, signaled its acquies-
cence by remaining silent, Japan went ahead. For more than a week after the
occupation of Jaluit, Japan took no further action. Then it occupied Ponape and
Yap. Thereafter everything happened quickly. But even now the Japanese pro-
ceeded with great caution. On Yap, their behavior was the most curious. As the
center of an international cable, this island was of special importance. More-
over, a British cruiser had already taken up position there briefly in mid-
August. Here the Japanese raised a Union Jack along with the Japanese flag.
Later, the British flag was taken down, and thereafter only the Japanese Rising
Sun fluttered over Yap.79
The Australians arrived too late. By the time another expeditionary force,
this time for Micronesia, had been put together in Sydney, most of German
Micronesia was already firmly under Japanese control. All that remained for
the embittered Australian commander, Pethebridge, was Nauru, which was
occupied on 6 November.80
Relations between the Australians and New Zealanders and their unloved
allies in the Pacific remained strained until the end of the war. Their fears were
not exactly calmed by Japanese behavior. In mid-December 1914, two Japa-
nese cruisers were sighted off Nauru. On 28 December a Japanese convoy con-
sisting of two cruisers and two destroyers under the command of Captain
Sakamato arrived in Rabaul. It did not receive a hearty welcome. In February
1915 the Japanese 7,820-ton cruiser Nisshin visited Samoa. A total of 560 Japa-
nese troops patroled Apia. Their officers ordered meat from the German
butcher and secretly passed him a letter with questionnaires printed in Ger-
man. They contained “enormous numbers of questions, going into the smallest
detail.” These asked for information about factions or parties among the Samo-
ans, the size of plantations, and Samoa’s revenues. Other German tradesmen
received similar questionnaires, and the Japanese offered to pay large sums of
money to those who filled them in.81 On its way back at the beginning of April
1915, the Nisshin also called in at Rabaul and Madang. For their part, the Aus-
tralians sent a lieutenant from Nauru on a holiday aboard a Pacific Phosphate
Company recruiting ship. On the orders of the head of Australian Naval Intelli-
gence, Captain Thring, Lieutenant Sawyer went on the Pukaki to the Japanese-
controlled Caroline Islands, where the British Phosphate Company had
recruited some of its workers before the outbreak of war. Under the suspicious
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gaze of the Japanese officials, those laborers who had served their contracts
were disembarked, and new workers were even taken on board. In the mean-
time, the “holiday-maker” Lieutenant Sawyer kept his eyes as wide open as
possible.82 Melbourne and Wellington were well aware of the secret agreement
London and Tokyo had arrived at early in 1917, recognizing the Equator as the
line dividing their respective spheres of interest. They were not happy about
this arrangement, but it helped to calm the mutual distrust between Australia
and New Zealand, and Japan.83
THE INVOLVEMENT AND BEHAVIOR OF THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
Except for New Guinea, Germany’s colonies in the Pacific followed a policy of
offering no resistance to the threat of invasion. This protected the indigenous
people from involvement in military action. Only in the coastal areas around
the capital of German New Guinea were indigenous civilians among the vic-
tims of the bombardment by the Australian cruiser Encounter.84 The outbreak
of war in Europe, which the authorities generally announced to the indigenous
population through their chiefs or headmen, revealed at a stroke the weak-
nesses of the colonial system. Similarly, it showed where the Germans had suc-
ceeded in gaining the cooperation of the indigenous people. The dependence
of the Germans on the local population was made clear overnight, for suddenly
an alternative existed that made it possible to question existing patterns of
behavior. To this extent, the European war considerably increased the room for
maneuver of the “German” Polynesians, Micronesians, and Melanesians. They
could now exploit the obvious conflict of interests among the Europeans and
use them to achieve their own aims even more than before. Early in Septem-
ber, a rumor was circulating in northern Friedrich-Wilhelmshafen that the peo-
ple of Ragetta (on Kranket Island) who, after a two-year exile in the Baining
Hills had been led back to the village of Megiar, about 40 kilometers north of
their old home, were waiting for the arrival of the British in order to kill the
Germans in Madang (Friedrich-Wilhelmshafen) with their help, and return to
their old homelands.85 It is possible that the Ragetta people, embittered
because of the treatment they had received, saw a glimmer of hope in the out-
break of the European war. They certainly knew that the Australians had
briefly been in Herbertshöhe in mid-August and had destroyed the post office.
However, there were indigenous interests other than those of the Ragetta peo-
ple. The source of the rumor that the Ragetta wanted to ally themselves with
the British against the Germans was the luluai of Sarang. He had complained
several times, so far without success, about the presence of the banished Rag-
etta in his district. This time his denunciation was successful. On 14 September
1914, the Ragetta man Malai and his father, Lawetat, were sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment with hard labor for “treasonable conspiracy.” Perhaps the
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Ragetta people did want to play the British off against the Germans. But it is
quite certain that on hearing news of the war between the Germans and the
British, the Sarang people developed a successful strategy for getting rid of
strangers who, on government orders and against their will, lived in their midst
at their expense, made advances to their women, and, moreover, as rain sorcer-
ers, seemed to be responsible for the extreme drought.86
The war between the Europeans acted like a magnifying glass: the attitude
of the indigenous people toward the German colonial administration suddenly
stood out much more clearly than before. Local people were most willing to
help the Germans where German officials had laid the foundations for the
development of a relationship that went beyond pure coexistence and had pro-
duced a symbiosis between new forms of behavior that were profitable to both
sides. The heart of this mutually advantageous relationship was always German
acceptance that local measures and traditions would take priority over the
European demand for innovation and change, and, on the other hand, the tacit
agreement by the local people not, in principle, to question German-European
moral or intellectual leadership. The result was as unbalanced as the relation-
ship between partners in a marriage. What was important was not a general
leveling out and constant balance, but that the pendulum of influence and
drive did not swing too far, or too often, in one direction. Where this was
achieved, the legacy of German colonialism was not disharmony but something
like mutual respect for the Other. Thus it is no coincidence that some of the
local population were prepared to take up arms, unasked, to defend the Ger-
man administration on the Mariana Islands, where the long-serving district
administrator, Fritz, had developed an exemplary relationship with the local
people, and on Samoa, where relations between the Germans and the local
people were proverbially good. In both cases reactions to the rejection of these
offers were highly emotional.87
Conversely, when the compulsion to work was removed in a number of
parts of New Guinea, it became apparent that the obligation to work, which the
Germans had not decreed by law but had tried to encourage by their regula-
tions, had not been internalized as a new, positive achievement of culture con-
tact. Workers on the big plantations on the Bismarck Archipelago initially ran
away in droves. “Mi no laik” (I’m fed up) was the response of Melanesians
when they were told by Australian soldiers that much higher rates were paid in
Australian-controlled Papua than in German New Guinea.88
In a number of areas, plantations burned down either because there were
no workers to put out the regularly occurring bush fires, or because the work-
ers themselves deliberately lit them. A drought such as had not been known for
many years made the situation worse. On top of this, the Melanesian plantation
workers now faced starvation. Almost all of them came from far distant parts of
the colony and had no means of getting home. Strangers in their own land, they
roamed through country unknown to them, and with a potentially hostile popu-
lation, in the search for food. Some were armed. Their daily ration of rice,
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tinned meat, and tinned fish had stopped when the plantation economy came
to an abrupt end and merchant shipping collapsed as a result of the war. The
Australian commander-in-chief therefore quite correctly described the distur-
bances caused by runaway plantation laborers in parts of Neupommern (New
Britain) as bread riots.89
The situation was similar when the Australians arrived in Friedrich-Wil-
helmshafen. Workers ran away from European plantations by the hundreds
and, leaving a trail of blood behind, forced their way through unfriendly vil-
lages to reach their homes in the Sepik district. They were joined by Melane-
sian police-soldiers who came from the same area and whose leadership
structure and raison d’être had collapsed with the colonial order. 90
The Melanesian policemen who had been employed in the Micronesian
islands faced exactly the same problem. With the coming of the Japanese, all
their previous ties and hierarchies had become irrelevant. The whole system on
which their work was founded had broken down, and it seemed unlikely to be
continued under a different leadership. Most of them were taken back to
Rabaul during the war. On the Marshall Islands, fourteen police-soldiers
refused a Japanese offer of continued employment.91
The behavior of the Melanesian police-soldiers in the battle for the Ger-
man radio station deserves special mention. It is quite astonishing that at Bita-
paka a hastily assembled indigenous troop of former plantation laborers and
Melanesian soldiers who fought for the Germans as prisoners on board the Australian
battleship Sydney, 12 September 1914. (Australian War Memorial P 0316/03/02)
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half-trained policemen, numbering just under forty, together with five Ger-
mans, could hold four hundred Australians armed with machine guns at bay for
five hours. In the clash between German and Australian interests, Melanesians
paid the highest toll in lives.92 Finally, however, they were no longer prepared
to die for others. Even the threat of execution could not persuade them to
leave the protection of the trenches to shoot. After the first defeat of a Ger-
man-Melanesian “unit,” Melanesians in other formations mutinied. “They said
it was a fight between the whites, and was nothing to do with them,” noted the
German officer in charge.93 In any case, it was the deployment of Melanesian
police-soldiers which allowed the Germans in New Guinea to gain favorable
terms for the treaty of surrender. Without the support of the indigenous police,
the Germans would not have been able to offer any resistance. The high Aus-
tralian losses had convinced the Australian commander that they could not win
a protracted bush war.94
The indigenous police were undoubtedly under the greatest pressure in
the colonial system. As a rule, they alleviated this pressure by means of a peck-
ing order which ensured that those who were beaten could in turn beat others.
At the moment when the tip of this hierarchy broke off, the long and carefully
repressed hatred erupted. When the arrival of the Australians in Friedrich-
Wilhelmshafen changed the situation, a Melanesian NCO spat in front of his
German police chief.95 Such cases were, however, isolated. The announcement
that a war had broken out among the Europeans led to a certain amount of
short-term unrest in some areas. But with the exception of Melanesian planta-
tion laborers, who had been temporarily displaced from their homes by the
colonial economy, the population in general remained calm.96 In contrast to
German Africa, where the outbreak of war intensified regional tensions
between the local population and the Germans,97 nowhere in the “German”
Pacific did the news of war among the Europeans cause a revolt against Ger-
man rule. This cannot be emphasized enough, given that the Germans in the
Pacific were totally undefended, and that there were so few of them that their
survival depended entirely on the toleration of the local population. Indeed, it
was often the indigenous people who first warned the Germans of an impend-
ing attack by Germany’s enemies in the European war. Outstanding taxes were
even paid.98
However, regional outbreaks of hatred against people of other ethnicities
and nationalities were not unknown. After the outbreak of war between Ger-
many and Japan, the people in the Palau islands vented their anger against the
Japanese traders, who had completely dominated trade with the Palauans. In
all seriousness, a number of Palauan men asked the head of the station for offi-
cial permission to throw the Japanese living in Palau into the sea.99
The non-German colonies in the Pacific seemed, at first, to be less affected
by the outbreak of war than the German colonies. But here, too, the European
war opened valves which had previously seemed to be firmly closed. An apoca-
lyptic mood spread. And just as after the Second World War cargo cults began
CH1  Page 33  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:14 PM
34 Chapter 1
to blossom, so now indigenous prophets appeared, preaching the imminent end
of European norms. In Fiji and New Zealand, prophecies centered on a Ger-
man victory over the British. In Fiji, Ratu Sailose stirred up the indigenous pop-
ulation when he claimed that his familiar spirit had revealed to him that Britain
had surrendered unconditionally to Germany. The British governor had been
removed from office, he announced, and the people of Fiji no longer needed to
pay taxes.100 In New Zealand the prophet Rua Kenana was even suspected of
arming his tribe, the Tuhoe, in order to enter the war on Germany’s side. Such
anxieties were probably grounded in the war hysteria that was especially rife in
Australia and New Zealand. Doubts about the loyalty of the Maori had been
fostered in particular by the behavior of the Waikato tribe, which obstinately
refused to comply with the call-up. It is unlikely that Rua ever really planned to
enter the European war, but it seems certain that he was in favor of a German
victory, believing that it would lead to the “emancipation” of the Maori from
British rule in New Zealand. After a skirmish between the New Zealand police
and Rua’s supporters, Rua was arrested. Convicted of rioting, he was sent to
prison. Maori who refused to do military service still openly supported the Ger-
mans because they hoped that after a German victory they would get back their
land, which had been expropriated by the British settlers.101
It was not only the Maori who were caught up in the military conflicts of
the European war. In New Caledonia, France enlisted Melanesians for service
on European battlefields. The local response was a rebellion.102 The governor
of the Australian part of New Guinea also sent a division of Papuans to the
European war.103 The people in the now occupied German colonies were
unlikely to be called up for active service in Europe, but not completely
immune. When the military administrator appointed by New Zealand, Colonel
Logan, took his first home leave at Christmas 1915, he brought a dozen “volun-
teers” from Samoa with him. They had enlisted for active service in the war—
“the idea being to show that Samoa was loyal.”104 This was a hastily assembled
and racially mixed group consisting of Samoans, Anglo-Samoans, Anglo-Fijians,
and Tongans. Together with other Polynesians, most from the Cook Islands
under New Zealand administration, the Samoans were allocated to the Maori
units. A subsequent review of the troops revealed a naturalized American and
an underage youth. Two more Samoans could not tolerate the climate in New
Zealand and were sent home. Early in May 1916, finally, just eight “Samoans”
left Wellington for Europe with the Fourth Maori contingent.
Their time in Europe turned into a nightmare. In training camp, a Samoan
had written:
When munitions run out, our boys will not scruple
If stones and sticks are handy, they are experts at the game
Their war cries will resound like the bellow of a fierce bull.105
However, it quickly became apparent that sticks and stones were not much
use on the Somme. Two Samoans died in the inferno at Flers, and the rest soon
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had to be evacuated from the front. Even more than the barrage of the shells,
the thundering cannons and whine of projectiles, it was the clammy fog and the
jarring cold in the trenches that smothered the war cries of a handful of Samo-
ans. Heavy colds, bronchitis, and tuberculosis repeatedly put them in the mili-
tary hospital. Finally, they were sent to Egypt, where they were employed in
munitions depots with the Rarotongans, doing extremely dangerous work. The
unfamiliar routine of night shifts, malaria (which was unknown in Samoa), and
sandfly fever took their toll. One Samoan died there. The five survivors
returned to Samoa as invalids. Within a few years, two more had succumbed to
the mental and physical aftereffects of the European war.106
At least the Samoans were volunteers. The Melanesian crew of the Cormo-
ran, by contrast, was trapped by the outbreak of war. In mid-December 1914
the German gun boat Cormoran, with 33 officers and a crew of 340, took shel-
ter in the neutral harbor of Guam, the American part of the Mariana Islands,
now controlled by Japan. There the ship and crew were detained. After the
United States entered the war—the scuttling of the Cormoran on 7 April 1917
was the first hostile act between Germany and the United States—the Ger-
mans were taken to POW camps on the American mainland. The four Chinese
ships’ laundrymen from Shantung were distributed, on the spot, among the
“upper class” of Agaña as domestic servants.107
The twenty-eight Melanesian crewmen were also detained on Guam, offi-
cially classified as POWs on the basis of a legal expert’s report.108 They were the
only Pacific Islanders who were confined in this way for being part of the Ger-
man Empire. The difference between their treatment and that of white POWs,
however, soon became apparent. On the instructions of the secretary of state
for the navy, the usual monthly benefit of three dollars was cut in their case.109
In addition, their rations were cut, “because it was more than they were accus-
tomed to. They went to sleep after meals and could scarcely be aroused for
work. They do better on smaller ration.”110
On the small island of Guam, the Melanesian POWs from German New
Guinea caused a sensation. Horror stories of their treatment on board the Cor-
moran circulated, as did rumors that they were all cannibals and that one of
them had eaten his own grandmother. Their quarters were nicknamed Canni-
bal Town. One died on Guam. On 2 January 1919 the survivors were put on
board a Japanese schooner and sent back to Rabaul, where they arrived nine
days later. Their war, too, was now over.111
THE “PACIFIC GERMANS” DURING THE WAR
Under the terms of the treaty of surrender of 17 September 1914, the Germans
in New Guinea started from a relatively favorable position. Most of the mea-
sures for the protection of the civilian population were adopted from the
Hague Convention. On paper, they did not look like special concessions on the
part of the Australian military government. In the everyday reality of war, how-
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ever, they proved to be extremely important, especially when what happened in
New Guinea is compared with events in the other German protectorates in the
Pacific. When the conditions of the surrender were made public in Australia,
they caused an outcry. Colonel Holmes, who had negotiated the treaty, was
blamed for not having held out for an unconditional surrender.112 Criticism of
Holmes eventually reached such a pitch that his career was seriously threat-
ened. At this moment, a scandal broke. Innocuous in itself, a more prudent
man with a greater natural sensitivity would have been able to deal with it
quickly and decisively. Under the pressure of Australian public opinion, how-
ever, Holmes decided on a course that was justified neither by the behavior of
the Germans in New Guinea nor by the military situation. It made a mockery
of any legal process.
The essence of the Cox Affair, as it became known, was bad relations
between European planters and the Australian Wesleyan Methodist Mission in
New Guinea. The Germans accused the Australian missionaries of being
largely responsible for the fact that so many of their plantation laborers had run
away, claiming that they had turned them against the Germans. The northern
Bismarck Archipelago, the area in which most of the “desertions” took place,
was in fact the territory of the Wesleyan missionaries. But it would be wrong to
assume that after the arrival of the Australians, the behavior of the Melanesian
plantation laborers could be explained by the actions of the Wesleyans alone.
We need look only at the parallel case of Friedrich-Wilhelmshafen, where
exclusively German missions were active. On the other hand, it is quite clear
that the Australian Methodists did try to set their indigenous clientele against
the Germans. As in Samoa, the invading troops used indigenous adherents of
the Australian mission as guides and spies.113 The head of the mission, the Rev-
erend William Henry Cox, a Briton, had taken the oath of neutrality before the
German administration and had thus been allowed to go free. This did not pre-
vent him from making himself available to the Australians immediately after
their arrival and revealing German military secrets.114 The Germans were
unaware of the precise details, but the rumors going around were enough to
provoke the plantation owners, who were already angry with the mission. One
evening a group of drunk planters lay in wait for Cox and beat him up.
On receiving news of this incident, Holmes thought he should make an
example of the case. The accused planters were given short shrift. They were
not granted a trial, not to mention a defense council. Not even a court martial
took place. Instead, given “that the German laws in force here do not provide
adequate punishment for the offence,”115 Holmes ordered a public whipping,
which was administered to four offenders on 30 November 1914. On the
express orders of the Administrator, all German men in Rabaul had to attend.
The missionaries, too, were invited to view the proceedings.116 All the Austra-
lian occupation troops were present. Each man was given ten shots, bayonets
were fixed, and arms presented. The Union Jack was run up, the national
anthem was sung, and three cheers were given for the king. Then the punish-
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ment was administered. One after the other, the accused, secured by manacles
and leg irons and unable to move, received twenty-five or thirty lashes of the
whip. Two further alleged accomplices were whipped on 5 December. Ironi-
cally, one of these was a Belgian citizen. This, however, did not spare him the
Administrator’s revenge; nor did the attempted suicide of the other save him
from public humiliation.117
The legality of the Australian Administrator’s action was questionable. The
Manual of Military Law that he cited explicitly forbade corporal punish-
ment.118 Cox himself had been able to identify only one of the accused.119
Nonetheless, the Australian public registered the incident with deep satisfac-
tion. The governor general had doubts but ran up against a brick wall when he
tried to express them. He communicated them to the minister of defense, who
dismissed him with the brusque comment that he himself had sent Holmes his
personal congratulations that morning.120 The Cox Affair was one of those rare
moments in the history of a people when emotions are deliberately given free
rein and quickly and recklessly break down all the barriers raised by reason. Yet
such moments reveal a great deal about the soul of a people. Holmes’ action,
the Australian reaction, and the obstinate defiance that international, and espe-
cially British, criticism of the incident evoked,121 all need to be explained in
psychological terms. Many factors were involved. The most important seems to
be the experience Australians themselves had had of corporal punishment,
which had been one of the main instruments of colonial justice in the convict
colony. An Australian administering corporal punishment to members of a
nation that itself used beatings to assert its colonial interests lifted a little of the
trauma that cast its shadow over British Australians. The fact that it was Ger-
mans who suffered under this was convenient, for without the war this form of
Australian emancipation would not have been possible. The common aversion
of Britons and Australians to Germans provided a shield under which autono-
mous interests and objectives could shelter. Decades of pent-up rage against
Public caning of Germans, Rabaul, 30 November 1914. (Australian War Memorial
P 0095/03/03)
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non-British imperialism on Australia’s doorstep—in its own “duck pond,” as the
governor general was aptly to describe the Australian attitude122 —was part of
it, as was a rejection of British tutelage. The call to occupy New Guinea came
from Britain, although it had been expected and hoped for in Australia. The
Australian colonel’s idea of making a demonstration of military and political
power in Rabaul while parading the national symbols of empire, by contrast,
was a purely Australian decision. As it turned out, the whole country supported
it. When Holmes returned to Sydney in January 1915, there were already post-
cards in circulation depicting the whipping of the Germans. This was one of the
first autonomous foreign-policy decisions made by the Australian Common-
wealth; it was not going to let anyone, especially not from London, interfere.123
The Cox Affair had immediate repercussions on relations between the
Germans in New Guinea and the Australian occupiers. One day after the inci-
dent, all the German officials who had remained in Australia’s service resigned.
Without their voluntary resignation, it would have been difficult, in the long
term, to fulfill in more than name only the provisions of the surrender (and
Article 43 of the Hague Convention) concerning the continued employment of
German officials. As early as 15 October, the German language was forbidden
for official use. Given the state of war, however, Germans in New Guinea con-
tinued to live relatively unmolested even after the Cox Affair. They were gener-
ally left in peace by the occupying Australians and could pursue their own
affairs unhindered. After the majority of laborers had returned, the European
plantations functioned “normally” again, and little changed in the operations of
the missions. The most important factor in this was certainly that their property
rights remained untouched. Except for minimal military requisitions and plun-
dering by Australian soldiers, property belonging to Germans remained
untouched until 1918. There were no sequestrations. The German market,
which had been important for New Guinea, had of course disappeared over-
night, but businesses in Sydney and Brisbane were only too glad to fill the gap.
The problem of how the Germans would have survived in an unoccupied New
Guinea in which practically no supplies could have been imported from outside
was quickly solved by the occupation. On occasion, the Australian military gov-
ernment even helped them out with loans.124 Colonel Samuel Pethebridge,
Holmes’ successor who was responsible for this policy, had farsightedly recog-
nized that the economic value of New Guinea as a future Australian colony
depended on the German plantations continuing production with as few inter-
ruptions as possible. He did not allow himself to be deterred by an aggressive
propaganda campaign of hatred directed against the Germans in Australia.125
The Germans could move around New Guinea relatively freely, but post
was censored in the colony. At first, all contact with Germany stopped com-
pletely. From 16 September 1915 communication with the German Reich was
possible via neutral third countries and subject to censorship. Compared with
their compatriots in other colonies, the Germans in New Guinea could not
complain of harsh treatment by the occupying power. In cases involving Euro-
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peans that came to court, sincere efforts were made to comply with interna-
tional law, which stated that in colonies under military occupation the law of
the colonial power continued to be valid. No attempt was made to conceal the
official symbols indicating that New Guinea was a German colony, although
now under Australian military occupation. The military government stamp
showed the German imperial eagle with the imperial crown, surrounded by the
words “British Military Occupation.”
Although relations between the German colonists and the Australian mili-
tary authorities in New Guinea cannot be described as good between early
1915 and 1918, they were tolerable. In Pethebridge’s absence, however, a seri-
ous incident took place. It was of brief duration, but this time almost all Ger-
mans were affected. The peace and quiet of the country aroused the Acting
Administrator’s suspicions that the indigenous people were preparing a danger-
ous conspiracy under German leadership. Lieutenant Colonel Fred Toll does
not seem to have been able to cope with the tropical heat. Nightly practice
alerts were intended to whip the Australian soldiers, who had been bored since
the sinking of the German Pacific fleet, back into shape. All applications for
leave were temporarily stopped. Each man received one hundred extra rounds
of ammunition, and two machine guns were installed above the building hous-
ing the government. Sandbags were heaped up in front of the treasury so that it
“Reprisals,” by Norman Lindsay. The cartoon is typical of the racism prevalent and
excessive anti-German mood that swept Australia during the war. The text states:
“Reprisals in kind are urged in return for repeated German raids on England.” “Repris-
als? Don’t worry! Germany has supplied civilisation with an eternal one.” (The Bulletin,
19 July 1917)
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could be protected against a full-scale attack. All private telephone calls were to
be tapped and reports written about them. A search of the houses of the Ger-
mans turned up German flags, a broken Mauser, binoculars, “6 dry cells
(exhausted)” and a “large magic lantern.” Toll regarded the dispatch of a war
ship as essential.126
On his return, the Administrator, to his surprise, found the colony a hive of
activity. Martial law had been declared, and the Germans of Rabaul and Her-
bertshöhe, including women, had been interned behind barbed wire. Even the
French bishop of Rabaul had been taken from his house at 2 a.m. Germans
from the neighboring islands were to be taken to the “concentration camps” of
Rabaul and Herbertshöhe as soon as possible.127 Pethebridge immediately can-
celed the warlike measures introduced by his overzealous deputy, but did
deport a number of Germans to Australia. On the whole, the number of Ger-
mans deported to Australia as POWs during the war was not large. Apart from
a few spectacular cases, only Germans who had refused to take the oath of neu-
trality were deported.128
Nauru, which was occupied by Australian troops in November 1914, was
part of German New Guinea. The administration of the island was therefore
subject to the conditions of surrender negotiated by Haber and Holmes. In the
case of Nauru, however, Australia did not observe these conditions. The forty-
five Germans on Nauru were deported in three stages, and Australian officials
completely ruled out the possibility of their return during the war. Behind this
was the Pacific Phosphate Company, which wanted to continue trading with
the people of Nauru and mining phosphate without being observed by the Ger-
mans. Thus the British colonial secretary ordered the expulsion of the last
remaining Germans, a Catholic priest, and four nuns, on 1 November 1915, “at
the expressed desire of the Company.”129 It early became apparent that private
business interests, with the help of high politics in London and Melbourne,
were to be given free rein in Nauru.
All the German employees of the Pacific Phosphate Company had already
had to leave Nauru on 8 November 1914. It seems more than a coincidence
that exactly one week later, the Germans on the second “German” phosphate
island in Micronesia, Angaur, received orders to pack their belongings and
leave the island within twenty-four hours.130 Angaur was now under Japanese
control, and the Japanese were obviously waiting to see what the Australians
did in Nauru before they implemented their own measures against the Ger-
mans. On various islands, the Japanese commanders had previously issued
decrees which, like the German–Australian treaty of surrender, in principle
gave the Germans the right to remain and guaranteed their private property.
On all the larger islands, the Japanese had also asked the German officials to
continue working in Japanese employment.131 In Angaur, this policy was
reversed. After the Germans were deported from Angaur, it was “suggested” to
the Germans on the other islands that they, too, might like to return to Ger-
many via Japan. The reaction to this “offer” was so muted that from the begin-
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ning of January the Japanese issued expulsion orders. They came into effect at
different times because of the difficulty of transport. The last German settlers,
among them the last officials, were dispatched from the Marshall Islands in
June 1915.132
In general, the Japanese were courteous to the Germans. Officers and men
conveyed the impression that it was only the Anglo-Japanese mutual assistance
pact that had forced them “to take action against Germany in this way.”133 In
Japan, the Germans were asked to sign an oath swearing that they would not
take part in any enemy actions against Japan during the war. No mention was
made of Japan’s allies.134 Thereafter the Germans were set free and were able
to return to Germany unhindered, with the help of the American consul, via
the United States. The government doctor in Yap, Ludwig Kohl-Larsen, even
managed to save most of the Yap station funds, about 20,000 marks.135
Köhler from Ponape, who had held up the whole Japanese squadron for
two days by marching around in the interior of the island, received rather
rougher treatment. The Catholic missionaries in the Palau islands were
treated worst of all. The fathers were kicked and beaten; the nuns were
molested by Japanese soldiers. After a show trial, they were taken away from
Palau at the end of November 1915, under the threat of violence. The reason
for this behavior by the Japanese was that the official government funds had
been hidden in the mission. As the money had been walled in behind the altar
in the church, the Japanese could not find it despite much searching and
vented their anger on the mission staff. In March 1916 the Capuchins of
Saipan were also deported, and at the same time the number of Protestant
and Catholic missionaries on Truk was considerably reduced. Truk became the
Japanese general headquarters, and the Japanese presence was especially
strong in Saipan. The Japanese there quite clearly did not want any uninvited
German onlookers.136
Until the end of the war, German missionaries stayed on Ponape and Yap,
and on some of the smaller islands. Contact and any communication among
individual islands was strictly forbidden. It was almost impossible to have any
contact with home by letter. Occasionally mail did arrive in Germany from
Micronesia, having gone by some strange route. But hardly anything ever got
through in the other direction. With special permission, Protestants and Catho-
lics were able to get the funds they urgently needed to continue their work via
America; the apostolic curate of Ponape even received permission to travel to
America for this purpose.137
The Germans in Samoa had the worst time of all. The fact that the island
had been occupied so quickly did nothing for relations between Germans and
New Zealanders. In the absence of an official treaty of surrender, the guide-
lines for the military administration of an occupied territory laid down in the
Hague Convention applied to relations between the German civilian popula-
tion and the occupying troops. The New Zealand Administrator, Colonel
Logan, interpreted these guidelines in a highly unconventional way. Their basic
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idea was continually diluted, until all that remained of the German law theoret-
ically still in force was marriage law. For the rest, the colonel ruled by means of
proclamations, military decrees, and courts martial.
From the destruction of the German Pacific fleet at the latest, Samoa was
a complete backwater as far as the European war was concerned. Relations
between the German and the British colonists had been affected by the war,
but in general good personal relations stood up to its strains. The Samoans gave
no cause for concern. Nonetheless, Colonel Logan ruled the islands with
extraordinarily coercive measures that were otherwise used only in direct war
zones. All Germans, including those who lived in the remote parts of the island,
had to report once a week, and they had to observe a complete blackout
between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. A general curfew was in force from 6 p.m. The post
to and from Germany came to a complete halt from 6 November 1914. Even
censored letters were no longer carried, and the last consignment of German
mail that reached Samoa was burnt in sight of the Germans.138
Higher German officials, including the governor, were sent to New
Zealand as POWs immediately after the occupation of Samoa. They were
interned on the island of Motuihi off Auckland. The wooden barracks in which
they were housed were dirty, not weatherproof, and unheated. Almost all the
Germans therefore suffered from skin diseases and rheumatism. Complaints
were punished by confinement in the dark and not being allowed to wash. The
German governor, accustomed to special treatment, suffered especially. There
had already been tension between him and his deputy, who came from German
South West Africa; under these conditions it simply exploded. After the United
States entered the war, the situation was made even worse by the fact that the
Swiss consul in Auckland was an Englishman who did not pass on any com-
plaints made by the civilian POWs.139
Gradually, the remaining German officials on Samoa were also sent to New
Zealand as POWs. They were taken to Somes Island in Wellington Bay, where
the suspect New Zealand Germans were also interned. More and more Ger-
man civilians from Samoa joined them there. They had fallen victim, for vari-
ous reasons, to the rapid mood-swings of the unpredictable colonel. Conditions
on Somes Island were even worse than on Motuihi. A public investigation
undertaken on the request of Count Luckner, who was widely admired in New
Zealand and himself detained on Motuihi, revealed extremely harsh conditions.
The Samoa Germans, accustomed to the tropical heat of Samoa, were forced to
sleep on muddy floors in clammy rooms, which were freezing cold in winter.
Little straw was provided. Just under three hundred prisoners140 were exposed
to constant harassment by the warders. Their speciality was ordering the pris-
oners to do “physical exercises.” This included the prisoners bending over
backwards to pass under sticks that the warders held at a higher or lower level,
depending on their view of the prisoner, leapfrogging, and running around in a
circle. They were kicked, shoved, and slapped—“to make them move at the
proper speed.” The judge who was reporting on this found nothing strange.
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“None of the exercises described seem to me to be unreasonable; they would
not be unreasonable if applied to schoolboys.”141
Nor did the Germans who remained in Samoa have an easy time. Their
businesses were sequestered in 1915. If anyone complained about the extreme
application of martial law in Samoa, Colonel Logan replied that compared with
what the Germans were doing in Belgium it was nothing. He pointed out that
he could personally shoot every German with his own revolver.142 Legal pro-
ceedings against Germans accused of crimes were a farce. There were cases
where the Administrator set the maximum penalty by proclamation only after a
trial. Among the most unfairly treated were three employees of the German
Handels- und Plantagengesellschaft (trading and plantation company) who
were stopped by a military patrol on their way home and subsequently sen-
tenced to six months of prison with hard labor for breaking the curfew. In
Auckland Prison they spent their time breaking stones with ordinary criminals.
Thereafter they were taken into captivity as POWs. During their trial, in which
they were denied a defense counsel, the presiding military judge refused their
application to call witnesses for the defense. When they insisted, they were
threatened with an additional punishment for “contempt of court.”143
So many POWs were sent from Samoa to New Zealand that the govern-
ment eventually refused to accept any more. A special prison camp was there-
fore set up in Samoa. Men who had hung German flags from their windows or
had been caught singing “Heil Dir im Siegerkranz,” “Die Wacht am Rhein,” or
Count Luckner (waving to German prisoners-of-war) escapes Motuihi internment
camp on board the prison-commandant’s launch. Luckner, later recaptured,  was instru-
mental in improving the conditions in the camps. (Sammlung Karl Brenner)
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“Deutschland über Alles” were sent there. Toward the end of the war, the situ-
ation in Samoa escalated. An unsuccessful attempt by German POWs to escape
from Sogi, the internment camp, gave Logan occasion to issue a special decree
placing all Germans, including children, under house arrest. He wanted to exe-
cute the POWs by court martial. When Wellington telegraphed that according
to international law an attempt by POWs to escape was not a statutory offense,
Logan reacted by deciding to intern all Germans in Samoa, including Samoans
of German descent.144 Before Samoa could be transformed into a giant POW
camp, however, the armistice was signed in Europe.
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The German South Pacific under
 the Shadow of War
australia  and  new guinea
 (1914–1921)
Despite the geographical proximity of New Guinea to Australia, Australians
had little interest in the island and its population. The number of Australian
explorers before 1914 can be counted on the fingers of two hands, and there
were certainly no large-scale expeditions. This striking lack of interest did not
change after Australia took over the British part of New Guinea. Although
news from Papua was reported regularly in the Australian press, it dealt almost
exclusively with internal squabbles between the few settlers and the adminis-
tration, which were of little general concern. Only occasional reports about the
discovery of gold caught the attention of the Australian public. A sporadic
enthusiasm for the unknown country up north broke out at regular intervals
but generally subsided as soon as it appeared. The average member of the
German public was certainly far better informed about the country’s far-distant
colony than were Australians of British origin.
It was only when the Australian armada arrived in Rabaul that a wider Aus-
tralian public became aware of New Guinea. Hundreds of reports about an
idyllic South Pacific paradise were sent to Melbourne, Sydney, and the other
Australian towns, pointing a sharp contrast with conditions in Australia’s own
colony of Papua. Favorable comparisons with Papua now became a fixed part
of Australia’s image of New Guinea, which, until the outbreak of the Pacific
War (1941), was increasingly equated with the former German part because
Australians were ashamed of the “under-development” of their own colony of
Papua and preferred to ignore it.1
THE MILITARY
The majority of Australians who went to New Guinea between 1914 and 1921
were soldiers—men of widely varying origins and family background. A con-
quering mentality was common to most of them. It expressed itself mainly in
looting and plundering, and in an almost anarchic frenzy of destruction. No
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doubt this sort of thing happens in all wars at all times, but the behavior of the
Australians deserves special mention because, especially during the first six
months of the occupation of German New Guinea, it was not the exception but
the norm. Drunken hordes of looting Australian soldiers, reminiscent of today’s
hooligans, regularly created an uproar and stole everything that was not nailed
down. Their officers, themselves not above plundering (even the provost mar-
shal was involved),2 could not hold the troops in check. Drunkenness and
brawls “were the orders of the day—men punching each other and blacks and
chows [Chinese] generally. When so many get on it, we cannot deal with them
properly as there’s nowhere to lock them up and if we attempted to put the lot
in the guard room it would mean a shooting match. . . . I’ve never struck such a
crowd before. They take all sorts of spirits and drink them neat—get as much
down as they’ve got and then seem to go half-mad.”3
Especially notorious were the militias, which had already acquired a repu-
tation as “farm burners” during the Boer War.4 At first, courts martial were an
almost daily occurrence. But even this did not stem the tide of violence, for
there were too many upon whom they made no impression. The looting did not
stop until early June 1915, when there was simply nothing left to loot.5 At first,
the Australians concentrated on the belongings of the German settlers, but
then they turned more and more to the property of non-Europeans. Pigs and
chickens were stolen and gardens wantonly destroyed. Several armed raids
were made on the Chinese quarter of Rabaul. In one case, on the pretext of
looking for opium, military police broke open a strongbox and stole 5,200
marks.6 After the first troops returned to Australia early in 1915, the behavior
of the Australian soldiers in New Guinea was the subject of a heated debate in
Parliament. It centered on the charge, made publicly, that whereas ordinary
soldiers were being prosecuted for their deeds, officers had been let off scot-
free. As no agreement could be reached about taking proceedings against the
officers—even the highest-ranking officers such as Colonel Paton and Com-
mander Bracegirdle were implicated—the soldiers who had already been sen-
tenced were let off and all prison sentences for troops were canceled. The
governor-general had to report “a good deal of whitewashing” to the king.7
The Australian soldiers who followed the “champion looters”8 were not
much better,9 but open refusal to obey orders was less common.10 However, a
destructive, exploitative mentality continued to be the norm, and it did the
administration and the country itself a great deal of harm. The heads of the
post offices in Rabaul and Herbertshöhe misused their positions to withdraw
from public circulation the highly prized German colonial stamps, overprinted
with the military government stamp, and sell them for huge private profits.11
Nor was embezzlement of government money and the abuse of official posi-
tions and official symbols for personal gain uncommon in other areas as well.12
Much more serious for New Guinea was the attitude of many Australian sol-
diers, who wanted to take as much as possible out of the country, without
regard for the law and ignoring any moral scruples. The Rabaul Record, a
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monthly newspaper established and edited by the military government’s press
officer, initiated and supported this sort of attitude. It described in detail
exactly how Australians in New Guinea could make their fortunes. It was no
coincidence that the Rabaul Record focused on gold mining. This obsession
with gold was not the result of wishful thinking but rested on solid facts. For
years, gold had been the main export from Australian Papua to Australia.
Shortly before the outbreak of the European war, Acting Governor Haber, a
trained mining engineer, had undertaken scientific investigations that verified
rumors of enormous gold deposits in German New Guinea. Such rumors had
been circulating for years.13
An “insider,” who was obviously aware of what was going on in Papua, pub-
lished articles in the Rabaul Record telling Australian soldiers exactly how to go
about things in order to be successful. “It is usually necessary to fight,” he
wrote, “and it is as well to be prepared.” As a rule, he suggested, the local peo-
ple would not tolerate penetration of their settlements, but this had to be
brushed aside. “You must be . . . inevitably tactless with a rifle . . . teacup tact
and the small amenities of civilization are usually quite out of place when pros-
pecting in hostile country.” It was advisable to attack villages strategically, and
“to do some strafing. . . . Having strafed the hillmen into acquiescence, the
next thing is to find the gold.” It should be remembered that the stakes were
high. After all, since 1888, £2.5 millions-worth of gold had been taken out
of Papua.14
 The inaccessibility of the region and the attitude of the military officer
who had been given responsibility for it prevented the potential goldfields from
being overrun by soldiers under the very eyes of the Australian Military Gov-
ernment. The district officer of Morobe allowed only a small number of
selected prospectors to enter his territory. Under his care and protection, they
found out which were the most profitable mining areas. When military govern-
ment was replaced by a civil administration and legal claims could be made to
these fields, the district officer posted the first claims in his own name and then
resigned from office. As a private citizen he became one of the most successful
miners in the gold rush that quickly developed around the Waria and its
tributaries.15
The bird of paradise was the “gold” of the ordinary Australian soldier in
New Guinea. At the end of 1914 the unsuccessful Australian Expeditionary
Force, whose original objective had been Micronesia, was rerouted to the Sepik
district. The admiralty suspected that German warships were hiding out there.
The grain of truth at the heart of this wild rumor turned out to be a camp and
canoe belonging to the Austrian anthropologist Richard Thurnwald. In his
absence, part of his equipment was destroyed and the rest taken away, along
with the results of his research.16 Whether out of disappointment over their mil-
itary failure or for other reasons, the members of the expedition transformed
their venture into the Sepik district into a hunt for native birds that degenerated
into a mass slaughter. Every day, the soldiers led by Lieutenant Commander Hill
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went to the bush to hunt birds—birds of paradise, crowned pigeons, and white
herons. They were fully aware that these species were protected according to
German law.17 When the first expeditionary troops returned to Australia, thou-
sands of bird skins with the feathers attached were smuggled out of New Guinea
and into Sydney, circumventing customs regulations, which prohibited the
import of birds. These transactions yielded 200 to 300 percent profit. The Aus-
tralian soldiers thus laid the foundation for a new women’s fashion in Sydney.18
On 15 May 1915 the German regulations, which were valid only for a lim-
ited period, expired. Thereafter the Australian Military Government permitted
the indiscriminate shooting of birds. If they were not already aware of the
opportunities, soldiers could read all about them in the first issue of the Rabaul
Record.19 In theory, German settlers could also now hunt, but limited amounts
of ammunition were given out, and the use of guns was subject to wartime reg-
ulations. By mid-September 1915, twenty to twenty-five thousand skins lay in
Madang alone, waiting to be exported.20 As import into Australia continued to
be prohibited, most of the birds were taken across the border illegally via
Dutch New Guinea. Early in 1916, the Administrator estimated that about
thirty thousand were waiting in the colony to be exported. He had no moral
Hunting birds in New Guinea. A member of the Royal Australian Navy with three
slaughtered crown pigeons, c. 1915. (Australian War Memorial J 03341)
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scruples: “The question is one of sentiment as it affects bird life, and while war
continues to be waged against human life, its importance seems rather
obscure.”21
At the end of the European war, Melbourne insisted on stopping the bird
hunting in New Guinea. A ban that was to come into force on 2 March 1921
was canceled by the military government, which was still in office. Instead, it
raised the export duty from one to two pounds per bird.22 In mid-November
1921, export duty was surprisingly dropped to 10 shillings per bird in order to
allow the last officers of the military government to export the birds they had
killed as cheaply as possible on their departure. Although there was a national
law prohibiting the import to and transit through Australia of birds of paradise,
the birds were shipped via Sydney to France and South America, where they
could be sold legally.23 On 31 December 1921 the export ban came into force.
Nonetheless, another 1,279 birds were exported in the new year.24 According to
a conservative estimate, 80,000 birds of paradise were shot under the auspices
of the Australian Military Government in New Guinea between the end of
1914 and the beginning of 1922; a more likely figure is 100,000. This was twice
as many birds as were killed in the German bird of paradise boom, before they
were protected in 1914.
In theory, birds of paradise and crowned pigeons were protected by the
civil administration from January 1923. In reality, however, hunting continued
near the border with Dutch New Guinea, with officials playing a leading part.
Table 1. Number of Birds of Paradise Killed 
in New Guinea under the German 
Colonial Administration
Year
Number of Birds
of Paradise killed
1908 [1,000?]a
1909 3,268
1910 5,706
1911 8,779
1912 9,837
1913 16,691
Total 44,281
aThe fashion began in 1908, and birds of paradise were first 
killed in large numbers in this year. The figure given is a very 
rough estimate, representing a maximum. It is impossible to 
be more precise, because the birds were not listed separately 
in the statistics but were included under the column 
“Miscellaneous.”
Source: Jahresberichte über die Entwicklung der deutschen 
Schutzgebiete. Statistischer Teil.
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As the birds were being shot anyway, argued the Australian Administrator in
1926, it would be better to lift the protection ordinance; the colony was losing
valuable customs duties on them.25 Neither in theory nor in reality, however,
did the status quo change. Hunting birds of paradise in New Guinea was pro-
hibited until 1941 but nobody took any notice of the ban.
THE ADMINISTRATION
The exploitative mentality of a number of soldiers occupying New Guinea
could be given such free rein because the new administration was recruited
exclusively from military personnel. The resignation of all the German officials
in the wake of the Cox Affair saved the military governor the embarrassment of
having to dishonor one of the provisions of the surrender treaty. On 22 Novem-
ber the Australian Ministry of Defence had telegraphed orders to the Adminis-
trator that on no account were German officials to be kept on.26 Hence officers
were employed as administrative officials. At the head of the military adminis-
tration was the Administrator of the occupied German colony. By the time a
Table 2. Number of Birds of Paradise Killed 
in New Guinea under the Australian 
Military Administration
Year
Number of Birds
of Paradise killed
1914–1915 c. 3–5,000a
1915–1916 c. 30–40,000b
1916–1917 125c
1917–1918 not known
1918–1919 100 c
1919–1920 34,704 c
1920–1921 5,811c
1921–1922 6,000d
Total c. 80–92,000
aEstimate; includes white herons and crowned pigeons.
bEstimate; see Chap. 2, nn. 21 and 22.
cFigures based on export duty duly paid (£1 = 1 bird); 
Memorandum Officer in charge of Trade and Customs, E. 
Featherstone Phibbs, Rabaul, 17 July 1920; AAC: A 1–23/
18422. For 1916–1917 and 1918–1919 these figures certainly 
show only a tiny fraction of the actual number of birds killed.
dAdministrator Wisdom, Rabaul, 18 November 1921, to the 
Office of the Prime Minister; AAC: A 518/1–A 846/1/77. 
According to official statistics (AAC: A 1–23/18422) export 
duty was paid on only 2,354 birds.
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civil administration was introduced on 9 May 1921, a total of five high-ranking
Australian officers had held this post. Colonel Holmes was succeeded by Briga-
dier General Pethebridge, who was transferred straight from his position as
secretary in the ministry of defense to Rabaul, then by Johnston and Griffiths,
also brigadier generals, and finally, Major General Wisdom. Wisdom symbol-
ized the seamless transition from the military administration to the mandate
period. He was both the last military Administrator of German New Guinea
and the first governor of the civil administration of the Australian-mandated
territory of New Guinea.27
Much more than in the German period, administrative measures
depended on the personal whim of individual officials. The idea that Rabaul
could exercise any control over local administrations seemed a utopian dream
for a number of reasons. Officials lacked administrative experience, the mili-
tary had no interest in developing certain parts of the country so long as law
and order were not threatened, and the state of war meant that circumstances
were exceptional. Added to this was the fact that officials received relatively lit-
tle guidance concerning their behavior on the site. Only general political deci-
sions on basic principles were known and binding. Apart from this, individual
military officials in the colony had a relatively free hand. This could make the
exceptional circumstances of war more tolerable because ad hoc decisions were
possible, and their effectiveness was not blocked by paper regulations. On the
other hand, military officials had a large amount of responsibility, and this
encouraged them to abuse their authority. It also favored the exploitative men-
tality mentioned above. A number of other factors also increased the room for
maneuver of individual officials. There was a high degree of turnover in the
staff of the military administration because of the war, and it was practically
impossible to hold individuals accountable for their administrative work after
the event. In extreme cases, a district officer, the new designation for Stations-
leiter (head of station), could, on taking office, completely ignore what his pre-
decessor had done and completely reverse policy without encountering any
serious resistance. There was no opportunity for civilians to appeal against the
decisions of a military official. The consequences of complaining about officials
were potentially more serious than suffering in silence, because the official to
whom the complaint was addressed was almost always the subject of the com-
plaint. In theory, the district officer’s power was limited in that he could impose
prison sentences only up to six months’ duration and fines only up to fifteen
pounds in value. Anything beyond this had to be confirmed from Rabaul. In
practice, however, the district officer could do whatever he pleased, at least
outside the law, as the center hardly bothered about what was going on in the
outlying stations. In Madang, the district officer threatened his critics by telling
them that he could convict someone “if only he personally was convinced of
their guilt, even if all the evidence pointed in the other direction.”28 A charac-
teristic of the military administration was a high degree of uncertainty regard-
ing the law. Together with the irregularity and instability of administrative
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decisions, this resulted in a growing uncertainty among the population. As we
shall see, this had lasting consequences for the attitude of Melanesians toward
Europeans.
One of the main directives for the Australian-occupied colony was that the
status quo was to be preserved in the area of property ownership. The owner-
ship of land remained untouched, and attempts by Australian private citizens to
change the legal status of 1914 were unsuccessful.29 With one important excep-
tion I shall return to, all applications by Europeans to buy land were deferred
until the end of the war. Until 30 June 1916 the German mark remained the
official currency. Its replacement by the pound was a direct consequence of the
fact that the Commonwealth Bank opened a branch in Rabaul on 14 April 1916
—the first bank ever in New Guinea. Thereafter, however, German silver coin
was still in circulation. Only from 31 July 1919 were German coins no longer
accepted as legal tender.30
British attempts to influence Australia’s economic policy in New Guinea
were rejected. The military administration and the Australian federal govern-
ment refused to comply with two requests from London to liquidate German
firms, as had happened in Samoa. The official explanation was that there was
no military justification for such drastic intervention in existing circum-
stances.31 The real reason had already been given by Holmes, the first Adminis-
trator. The value of New Guinea lay in its coconut plantations. But as most of
them were still young, it was necessary to protect this “embryo wealth” from
any harmful influence. At the end of the war, they would have “bright and valu-
able possessions.” Things had to be kept going until then.32
Holmes’ successors continued this policy. The longest-serving Administra-
tor, Pethebridge, justified this action in the face of growing criticism in Austra-
lia. It would be unwise, he argued, for Australia to damage the colonial
economy growing under Australian military protection: after all, it was pretty
certain that at the end of the war all the profits would end up in Australian
hands. The Germans presently working to produce these anticipated profits on
their plantations, unmolested by the military government, would not, of course,
be able to share in them: “Before that hope can be realised every acre in the
Colony must cease to belong to Germans, and every enemy subject must be
required to leave the country.”33
During the war, the military government was already able to achieve large
balance-of-trade surpluses. The German export duty on copra—10 marks per
ton—was raised to the equivalent of 10 shillings; then in stages to 15, 20, and
finally to 25 shillings per ton. New Guinea’s revenues from duties had been
£18,300 in 1913 and £19,950 in 1914. Rising almost continuously, they
amounted by 30 June 1920 to £108,682.34 This meant that Australia’s objective
of making the occupied colony financially independent of outside sources was
soon achieved.35
The fact that Australia’s long-term goals were most likely to be achieved by
minimal administration and a laissez-faire attitude was a result of the wartime
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situation. Above all, the administrative costs of the occupation could be kept to
a minimum. But the longer the war lasted, the more clearly the negative
aspects of this policy emerged. The lack of continuity in administration that
had begun as a temporary response to an exceptional situation began to estab-
lish itself as the rule in the Australian administration. Similarly, it became more
and more apparent how much the Australian administration was living off its
capital. What is accepted in wartime as politically expedient—investing as little
as possible in a country under military occupation—increasingly jeopardized
the potential benefits which, it was hoped, the colony would bring Australia
after the conclusion of peace. In the humid tropical climate, roads and public
buildings suffered first.36 Vandalism and a mentality of exploitation were the
final blows.37
Australia abdicated responsibility for many areas that had previously been
regulated by government. This was most drastic in relations with “free” indige-
nous people, who were not employed by Europeans. At the end of February
1915, the government station of Angoram was given up after having been
manned for three months. Thereafter the people living in the catchment area
of New Guinea’s biggest river, the Sepik, were abandoned to the laws of the
jungle. This did not mean, however, that contact with the outside world came
to an end. On the contrary, the encroachment of outsiders on the basis of the
local people’s existence increased during the war. Precisely because the Sepik
district now lacked a well-ordered colonial administration, it became an El
Dorado for unscrupulous bird of paradise hunters and European, Asian, or
nonlocal Melanesian recruiters of labor. Four years later, when a patrol from
the administration visited the region again, the whole area was like an angry
wasps’ nest. Even where tribal warfare had stopped during the German period,
Table 4. Public Revenue from Occupied German New Guinea, 
1914–1921
Date
Public Revenue
in Pounds
From occupation to 30 June 1915 55,542
1 July 1915–30 June 1916 88,449
1 July 1916–30 June 1917 115,559
1 July 1917–30 June 1918 139,921
1 July 1918–30 June 1919 143,636
1 July 1919–30 June 1920 202,158
1 July 1920–30 June 1921 193,957
Total 939,222
Source: Memorandum Piesse, 23 September 1921: “Notes for a ministerial statement 
of policy”; AAC: A 2219 vol. 19. Memorandum, Administrator Johnston, 10 March 
1920; AWM: 33–57/2. Data on public expenditure over the same period is incomplete.
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it had revived. The people living near the old government station of Angoram
were in a permanent state of war: several villages had been razed; evidence of
terrible massacres was discovered.38 Superficially, the action taken by the patrol
resembled the German measures dating from before 1914. Acting on the
administration’s instructions to impose law and order, the patrol set fire to the
huts of the most warlike villages and destroyed their gardens. But as the admin-
istration’s measures ended there for the time being, it is more than likely that
local unrest increased rather than decreased. The confusion in the interregnum
between the end of the war and the appointment of the civilian authorities
(1919 to 1921) did, in fact, further aggravate relations among the local people,
the Europeans, and the administration.
As well as Angoram the “flying” station, Burgberg in the Markham valley,
which was just being developed in 1914, was also shut down. Similar com-
plaints about anarchic conditions caused by the withdrawal of the administra-
tion came from all other parts of the colony. The few cases in which the
administration tried to assert its claim to sovereignty ended in military conflicts
with the local people, who pointed out that there was no government any more
and that they could do what they liked.39
The Australian Military Administration’s influence on the local population
can best be gauged by looking at the head-taxes collected. By the end of 1915
the tax was being raised only from Melanesians in the direct environs of
Rabaul. Thereafter, too, tax gathering was clearly concentrated in the northern
Bismarck Archipelago. Except in 1920, its population continuously provided
more than 80 percent of all revenues from taxation. Little was raised in taxes
from the mainland; sometimes nothing at all. The influence of the military
administration seems to have been minimal here.
The strange fluctuations in the tax revenues raised in individual regions are
striking. In Kieta, for example, the yield from taxes decreased steadily from
£1,883 in 1916, to £1,087 in 1917 and £827 in 1918. The method of collecting
taxes by the district officer or his often ad hoc agent left the door wide open to
abuses. It is therefore hardly surprising that after the end of the war, but before
the civilian administration was installed, the government auditor accepted as a
fact that those who were responsible for tax collecting were guilty of embezzle-
ment on a massive scale. All the officials involved, however, were in reserved
occupations in Australia and could no longer be called to account.40 The fact
that Australian officers had accepted a certain responsibility as officials of the
military administration does not seem to have deterred a number of them from
enriching themselves at the expense of the occupied country and its people.
The unusually long duration of the military administration helped to maintain
and conceal irregular practices. As late as mid-1920, the officer who had been
appointed to supervise the native hospital in Rabaul found nothing wrong with
withholding their rations and secretly selling them to a Japanese merchant.41
It is not only when we consider the military administration’s retreat to the
centers of German administration that the amounts of taxes paid by the
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Melanesian population between 1914 and 1921 seem rather strange. Between
September 1914 and June 1921, a period that corresponds pretty exactly to the
military administration of New Guinea, indigenous people paid a total of
£80,652 sterling in tax. At contemporary exchange rates (£1 = 20 marks), this
was the equivalent of 1,613,040 marks. Compared with tax revenues before
1914, this is an incredible sum. It can be explained only by assuming that taxes
were raised, that plantation workers who had been exempt from taxation under
German administration were now being taxed, and/or that some people were
taxed twice.42 Even if we also assume that in certain regions the administration
did nothing but collect taxes, we cannot avoid concluding that local people had
amassed a considerable amount of wealth. We can only speculate about to
what extent this can be attributed to Governor Hahl’s policy of compulsory
planting.
Collecting the head-tax was only a continuation of established German
administrative practice (although it was probably implemented in a completely
new way). It thus fits into Australia’s general policy of maintaining the status
quo ante in occupied New Guinea. Australia’s policy of continuity concentrated
on areas in which German decisions had laid the foundations for the successful
economic development of New Guinea in the future. In other fields, Australia
was rather more reticent in interpreting the provisions of the surrender treaty
and of international law. Least notice was taken of German regulations in the
whole area of general living conditions. Here the aim seems to have been to
bring in Australian practices, even if this meant that previous principles were
turned upside down. One of the military administration’s first measures was to
introduce driving on the left.43 The decimal and metric systems were increas-
ingly replaced by British weights and measures.
The Australian attempt to shape even the natural environment into famil-
iar Australian patterns on the British model was in complete opposition to Ger-
man policy. When introducing new species into the colony, the Germans had
always had long-term economic benefit in mind. The Australians, in contrast,
were trying to transfer Australia to New Guinea by importing nonendemic spe-
cies. Australian birds (kookaburras, peewits, and magpies) were released in the
Botanic Gardens in Rabaul. The military administrator had them imported
especially, in order that “the presence of such birds will tend to Australianise
the Colony in a way that will appeal to Australians.”44 Though native birds
could be killed with the permission of the director of the Botanic Gardens,
Australian birds were protected by strict regulations. The penalty for merely
injuring an Australian bird was one month in prison.45
The attempt to Australianize the colony amounted, in part, to a blatant
destruction of the environment. The well-known Australian dislike of tropical
trees was especially marked.46 In Rabaul as well as Madang, the military gov-
ernment ordered the felling of large numbers of trees. Shortly before the end
of the military administration, Rabaul’s famous tropical avenues, which had
contributed largely to its reputation as a jewel in the Pacific, were systemati-
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cally cut down. Since September 1914, the Botanic Garden had been used by
the garrison as a firewood reserve. Every month, between sixteen and twenty
tons of wood were cut there. By September 1919, 110 acres of what had origi-
nally been 200 acres of cultivated ground had been totally cleared.47
The decision to permit fishing with dynamite, which had been prohibited
by the German administration, led to further despoliation of the environment.
The German administration was initially responsible, having suspended its ban
on the outbreak of war, presumably to alleviate the food supply situation, which
threatened to deteriorate when relations with the outside world were broken
off.48 What was intended as a temporary measure became a permanent state of
affairs under the Australian Military Administration, with all this implied for
humans and animals, long after food was regularly being imported again.49
THE INFLUENCE OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY:
THE “BURNS PHILP COLONY”
On 17 October 1914, exactly one month after Germany and Australia had
signed the treaty of surrender in New Guinea, the Moresby steamed into the
bay of Rabaul. This ship belonged to the Australian South Pacific trading com-
pany, Burns Philp, and on board was its islands manager, Lucas. The company
had expanded during the Pacific labor trade period, when it was involved in the
dubious business of recruiting Melanesian workers for Queensland’s sugarcane
plantations.50 When the Australian Commonwealth was founded, and govern-
ment and opposition unanimously announced that their main objective was a
white Australia, Burns Philp secured for itself a contract with the federal gov-
ernment that gave it the exclusive right to deport Pacific workers. Burns Philp
earned a fortune from the forced repatriation of Melanesians. The ministry
official who prepared the ground for this campaign in the ministry and super-
vised its implementation was Atlee Hunt. A close connection developed
between him and Burns Philp. Their relations went far beyond what was usual
between a private company and a government official. In order to keep Hunt in
a good mood, Lucas and Burns regularly gave him contributions from the com-
pany’s current business ventures: valuable pearls from Torres Strait were espe-
cially acceptable.51 Hunt reciprocated by using all his influence to ensure that
the cabinet regularly awarded Australian government contracts for postal ser-
vices with the Pacific Islands exclusively to Burns Philp.52
Colonel James Burns, director and owner of the company, was associated
with the highest political circles in Australia. His connections with the gover-
nor-general of Australia proved to be of the most practical value. Whenever the
governor-general was in Sydney, he stayed at Burns’ home in Paramatta. For
the crafty businessman Burns, the letters of recommendation that opened the
doors of the most important London offices to him were more important than
the honors and title for which the governor-general successfully nominated his
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personal friend. Before Burns, Foreign Secretary Grey had never entertained
an Australian with a personal letter of recommendation from the governor-gen-
eral.53 During the war, the company’s influence spread far beyond the Pacific
Islands under Australian influence. It was easy for its manager, Lucas, to place
his own people as officials in the Western Pacific High Commission. The selec-
tion of staff was entrusted to him.54
Australia’s conquest of Rabaul gave Burns Philp & Co. an opportunity to
start trading with a colony that they had had to leave in 1906. The company had
been unable to compete with the Norddeutsche Lloyd, which was subsidized
by the German government, and had been forced to give up its shipping routes
between Australia and German New Guinea as unprofitable. However, when
Lucas arrived in Rabaul on the Moresby, he found that traders there were not
prepared to pay the inflated prices which he demanded. The company had mis-
calculated, expecting such severe shortages as a result of the war that the white
colonists would simply accept the prices it asked without question. But before
the end of the German administration, the manager of the Neuguinea-
Kompanie, Georg Täufert, had gone to Dutch New Guinea and brought the
colony urgently needed food and supplies.
Burns Philp’s attempt to gain a foothold in New Guinea looked as if it was
going to fail until it was rescued by the Australian Administrator. Colonel Wil-
liam Holmes requisitioned all the rice and food the Neuguinea-Kompanie
had brought over from the Dutch part of the island and pressurized the Ger-
Burns Philp’s Matunga in Alexishafen, close to Madang, October 1914. The Matunga
was the first ship to arrive after the Australian occupation of Madang. She was later cap-
tured and sunk by the German raider Wolf. (Australian War Memorial J 03109)
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man traders into buying the goods offered by Burns Philp at fixed prices. In
order to be quite sure, he had the general manager of the Neuguinea-
Kompanie—“a disturbing factor in this place”—put aboard the departing
Moresby and taken to Australia as an “undesirable.” Täufert was the first Ger-
man civilian to be deported to Australia from occupied New Guinea. The
obviously satisfied Administrator noted that this measure “has had a very
decided effect, as practically the whole of the cargo brought here by the
‘Moresby’ has been disposed of.”55
Above decks, on board the ships that had been requisitioned by the occu-
pying power, traveled Australian soldiers on their way to occupy other centers
of the colony besides Rabaul. Below decks was stored Burns Philp cargo. It was
taken ashore, along with the Union Jack, in Friedrich-Wilhelmshafen,
Käwieng, Manus, and Bougainville. Thus the military expedition was, at the
same time, always “a business trip” which, “in addition to achieving its object of
Military occupation,” resulted “in a sound profit as a commercial venture.”
According to the Administrator, the net profits amounted to over £865.56 Rates
for the transport of Australian troops from New Guinea to Australia on Burns
Philp’s ships were personally negotiated with the manager of the company by
the Administrator, although he had not been authorized to do this by the rele-
vant authorities. Afterward the Administrator informed his superiors that he
had taken this step “in order to facilitate the passing of Burns, Philp & Coy.’s
account when presented in Australia.”57
How did it come about that the military governor could adopt as his own
the aims of an Australian private trading company, and even boast about this at
home? To the present day, little is known about the personal career of William
Holmes before his appointment, seemingly out of nowhere, as leader of the
Australian expedition and first Administrator of the occupied colony. Holmes
seems to have held no prominent position in military or civilian life. At the
beginning of the expedition he appears to have been given a remarkable degree
of freedom. He received no detailed instructions on how to proceed once the
colony was occupied—this was left to his discretion. The most important offic-
ers were all related to him. His personal adjutant was his son, Basil Holmes,
who directed the occupation of Käwieng and Kieta; and the head of military
intelligence was his son-in-law, Captain R. J. (“Jack”) Travers. Finally, the mili-
tary secretary and supervisor of government stores, Keith Heritage, a man who
had been promoted very quickly from lieutenant to captain to major, was
Holmes’ nephew. Allegedly, in civilian life all were employees of Burns Philp.
William Holmes himself was said to be an authorized signatory of the company;
according to other accounts, he was the son-in-law of a partner who had a con-
trolling interest in the company.58 The occupation troops called those who
arrived first in New Guinea simply “the Wallingfords—Burns Philp,” after Fre-
derick Wallin, the manager of the company’s Island Department.59
On the face of it, it is almost unbelievable that all these interests—military,
political, and commercial—should be combined in the hands of the most
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important individual in occupied New Guinea. Surprisingly, however, Holmes’
activities obviously had the protection of his superiors. Burns Philp, however,
did not stop there. On arrival in Rabaul, Manager Lucas claimed that the
Australian authorities had agreed to grant Burns Philp a monopoly on supply-
ing goods to the military administration in Rabaul from Australia. Burns Philp
had been given the green light, he claimed, to mark up Sydney prices by 10
percent. On the other hand, the company gave no concession for government
freight for the troops and in Rabaul could decide independently whether it
would accept cargo for Australia or not. Although Lucas had no official letter, it
turned out that his claims were true.60 During the entire Australian Military
Administration, that is, from 1914 to 1921, Burns Philp had a monopoly on
transport, and practically also on trade, with occupied New Guinea, under con-
ditions that benefited the company but not Australia, and certainly not New
Guinea.
Burns Philp succeeded in pulling off another surprise coup early in 1916,
which turned it into the largest Pacific trading company at a stroke. Until this
date, the transit trade in goods from German New Guinea had been handled
by Lohmann & Co. and Justus Scharff Ltd. In 1915 Lucas had tried, unsuccess-
fully, to persuade German merchants in New Guinea to use Burns Philp not
only to transport their products to Australia but also to market their goods.
Lohmann and Scharff seemed to some extent to be protected against the con-
sequences of the war because they had acquired British citizenship. In order to
achieve his aims Burns exploited his behind-the-scenes connections with cabi-
net and the Australian press, which had been stirred up against the Germans to
an extraordinary degree. At the end of 1915 Lohmann, Scharff, and the other
German-Australian owners of businesses and their employees were interned.
As early as 14 January 1916 Lucas appeared in Rabaul and showed a surprised
Administrator Pethebridge a letter from the Australian prime minister,
Hughes, addressed to Burns Philp, dated 6 January, which more or less
amounted to a blank check for the company: “You may take what steps you
think proper to secure the trade which was until recently in the hands of
Lohmann & Coy. and Justus Scharff Ltd.” Behind this was an attempt to pre-
vent other agents, especially British ones, from securing for themselves the
transit trade between New Guinea and world markets. With astonishing open-
ness, it was admitted that, in this case, “the objects of the internments will be
largely defeated.”61 The Administrator was far from pleased about this develop-
ment, which gave Burns Philp a practical monopoly on trade in addition to
their monopoly on transport. As an old officer, Pethebridge was above suspi-
cion of being involved in shady deals. His aim was undoubtedly to hand over a
flourishing colony to Australia at the end of the war, and he was obviously well
aware that the preferential treatment given to one private trading company
seriously jeopardized this objective. Its monopoly on trade and transport gave
Burns Philp so much control over New Guinea’s economic power that the
prices at which German New Guinea’s products were purchased were dictated
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by Burns Philp, not the world market. In order to escape this stranglehold,
Pethebridge worked out a plan by which the occupied colony’s most important
export crop, copra, was to be bought by the Administration at a price it had
fixed. It was then to be transported by government steamer direct to Japanese
and British harbors. This scheme, however, got stuck somewhere in the
bureaucratic machinery of an Australian government department.62 Thus the
colonel had no option but to give in to Burns Philp’s invisible accomplices and
come to terms with the all-powerful company. The transport agreement dating
from Holmes’ period of office was recognized, but with the proviso that Burns
Philp would give the administration special rates to compensate for the monop-
oly now officially acknowledged.63 As Burns Philp consistently refused to
accept German tax regulations, which were still in force and applied to all other
businesses, and the authorities in Australia could not be persuaded to put pres-
sure on the company to observe existing laws, the Administrator concluded an
agreement with the company that exempted it from income tax. Instead, a spe-
cial arrangement was made. Regardless of the company’s turnover or profits, it
was to pay the administration the paltry sum of £300 “business tax” annually.64
Burns Philp knew how to exploit any loopholes in the existing law in its
own favor. Whenever the company clearly overstepped the limits, it always
found helpful protectors who shielded it. There seemed to be no question
about Burns Philp, during the war, using German trading ships that had been
detained in Australia.65 The military administration in New Guinea strictly
observed the rule of not permitting any land to be sold until the position was
clarified under international law—with one exception. It concerned Burns
Philp. Governor Hahl, ignoring his own guidelines, had already granted the
company 10,000 hectares on Bougainville. In June 1918 the Australian Military
Administration allowed the Solomon Islands Development Company—whose
sole owner was Burns Philp, Sydney—to acquire 12,500 acres of freehold land
on the island of Buka. Burns Philp had claimed that all the necessary formali-
ties to do with buying land had already been completed, in principle, during
the German period. Although there was no entry in the land register, and no
documents could be found about the alleged sale of land, the military adminis-
tration allowed itself to be persuaded to ratify and complete the sale.66 Martial
law did not prevent the company from supplying large quantities of weapons
and munitions to civilians—here, too, the hands of the military administration
were bound.67 One of Burns Philp’s specialities was supplying alcohol to Pacific
Islanders, which had been the basis of the company’s growth during the Pacific
labor trade at the end of the nineteenth century. The practice of selling large
quantities of alcohol to local people in exchange for cheap copra and other
products had been made impossible by the administration in the German-con-
trolled areas of the Pacific. But outside the German area, the trade with cheap
spirits flourished. To a certain extent, the war facilitated the continuation of
these practices because it extended existing gray areas. In mid-1917 Britain
suggested that, given the negative effects of the sale of alcohol on the Pacific
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Islanders, the Australian Commonwealth should pass a law against it. The Aus-
tralian governor-general responded without mincing his words: “I think it
extremely doubtful that the Commonwealth Government would take up this
matter in any way, seeing that it would to some extent provide for prolonging
the lives of the coloured races.”68 At stake were not only the profits of Austra-
lian trading companies—above all, Burns Philp; to white Australians, Pacific
Islanders were also unwanted competitors for work and seemed to threaten
their own social achievements.
By the end of 1920, when the military still set the tone in the occupied
German colony and martial law was still in force, the preferential treatment of
Burns Philp & Co. had become so ingrained that attempts by the then Admin-
istrator even to inquire about the conditions governing Burns Philp’s postal
contract, again due for renewal, and the offers they had submitted, were in
vain. (In the event, the contract was once again extended without opposition.)
Two telegrams from the Administrator to the Prime Minister’s Department,
asking for information about the freight and passenger rates proposed by Burns
Philp, remained unanswered.69 The responsible official in the Prime Minister’s
Department was Atlee Hunt. There are few other historical cases in which the
connections between politics, or individual politicians, and the commercial
interests of a private company are so clearly documented. Late in 1914 a Ger-
man ship’s captain who had fled to Dutch New Guinea sent a report home,
mentioning the strange coincidence between the Australian military occupa-
tion of the colony and Burns Philp’s seemingly unchallenged supremacy, which
began immediately afterward: “The whole Australian campaign against New
Guinea seems to be a business trick by the firm Burns Philp & Co.”70 There
was probably little reaction to his report in Germany. Germany had other con-
cerns, and reports from its distant, now occupied colonies in the South Pacific
were of interest to few. In the German Colonial Office the receipt of this, as of
every piece of information, was carefully recorded. The report was placed in a
file and stored in the archives, but its contents were ignored and finally forgot-
ten. Such information was too inconsistent with the official view of the primacy
of politics and military concerns—if not always in times of peace, then certainly
during wartime. In addition, the report has the feel of having been written by
an unsuccessful business rival. Surely the activities of Burns Philp alone cannot
explain Australia’s moving against German New Guinea and its behavior there
from 1914 to 1921. But although the statement quoted above sums up events
very briefly, there is more than a grain of truth in it.
An account of Burns Philp’s activities in Australian-occupied New Guinea,
and its influence there, would be incomplete without some mention of the
enormous profits the company made out of the war. The company’s monopoly
meant that it could set practically any price for the goods it brought to the col-
ony. The prices it demanded were exorbitant. For example, an imperial pound
of powdered arsenic cost 49 shillings in Madang; in Sydney, 50 (sic!) pounds of
the same medicine cost only 40 shillings.71 Truly fantastic profits, however,
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were made on selling copra from New Guinea. After the company managed to
break into the transit trade, its profits escalated. From 1916, the company’s
profits increased in every financial year in which New Guinea continued to be
under martial law. At the turn of 1918, yields skyrocketed. Until this time, a net
profit of £1,000 per shipment from buying, transporting, and selling copra was
the norm. Now it increased more than sixfold. In January 1918 a single con-
signment of copra weighing 1,450 tons yielded a net profit of £11,015 on the
sale alone.72 On 31 March 1914, Burns Philp’s total turnover was £4,628,019;
in 1917 it was £5,884,972; and in 1918 £7,197,527. This was the highest turn-
over in the company’s history so far. It was a direct result of the occupation of
Germany’s colonies in the South Pacific, as the company’s partners were confi-
dentially informed.73
Profits rose strongly with turnover. At Burns Philp’s thirty-seventh annual
meeting in May 1919, shareholders were informed that in addition to a new
record turnover (£8,085,550) the company had made a gross profit of over
£625,664. After deduction of taxes and salaries, officially more than £215,013
net profit remained. The true figure was much higher, but the exact amount of
profit was kept secret even from shareholders.74 Once again, the company had
proved to have a good nose for business, access to reliable information, and an
extraordinary feel for economic necessities. Six months before the conclusion
of the armistice, Burns Philp’s head office in Brisbane instructed all its
Table 6. Burns Philp Net Profits between 1910 and 1920
Year
(Ending 31 March)
Net Profit
(After Deducting
All Taxes, Levies,
and Salaries) in Pounds
1910 78,137
1911 86,141
1912 113,542
1913 120,228
1914 131,281
1915 83,655
1916 125,594
1917 157,725
1918 195,295
1919 215,013
1920 249,886
Total wartime profits 1,027,168
Source: Private and confidential reports nos. 20–30; Burns Philp Archives 
Sydney, Box 21.
Note: See also Table 8 in Buckley and Klugman 1983, 74, in which lower profits 
are given (but see the explanatory remarks ibid., 73).
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branches in the Pacific to sell whatever could be sold. It correctly anticipated
that after the armistice the transport situation would improve, and that prices
would temporarily drop.75 In 1920, with the end of the military administration
in New Guinea, Burns Philp could see that the special conditions which they
had enjoyed in the area would also come to an end. The most profitable
branches of the business were separated from the parent company and a new
company was founded—Burns Philp South Sea Co. Ltd.—with a capital stock
of two million pounds. The company headquarters were in Fiji. This decision
allowed Burns Philp to kill two birds with one stone. At the center of the
Pacific island world, they were close to potential trading areas. Most impor-
tantly, however, they could also circumvent Australian regulations that forbade
the employment of nonwhite ships’ crews. In public, Colonel James Burns had
always been one of the most vociferous supporters of the White Australia Pol-
icy, which had contributed to the company’s expansion. But when it came to
maximizing profits, it was of course cheaper to employ nonwhites because the
company could not be compelled to offer them the same social conditions of
employment.76
THE AUSTRALIAN VIEW OF MELANESIANS
When white Australians occupied New Guinea in 1914, they had had contact
with the indigenous black people of their own country, the Aborigines, for just
under 125 years. It is well known that this relationship was characterized more
by conflict than by cooperation. The encounter between two extremely differ-
ent worlds showed that the sphere of the Aborigines was incompatible with the
scientific and technological thinking and individualistic concepts of the British
settlers, and vice versa. Of all the Pacific peoples, the Aborigines were the least
prepared to make concessions to the invaders in order to share in any possible
innovations through exchange. Similarly, of all the Europeans in the Pacific, the
British in Australia proved to be the least tolerant of indigenous traditional
ways of life. The Aborigines were not regarded as human, but as animals to be
hunted and killed without penalty. In Queensland, “game licences” were issued
for this purpose. The legal basis for this was a clause in the Australian constitu-
tion specifying that Aborigines were not considered human.77
This record promised little for relations between white Australians and
Melanesians. The treatment of Pacific Islanders during the period of the
Pacific labor trade and under the White Australia Policy was an aggravating cir-
cumstance. Superficially, what happened in Papua under the direct supervision
of the Australian government seemed more humanitarian. Nonetheless, it was
teeming with racist decrees and punishments.78
At first, however, white Australians expressed a completely different, and
more positive, aspect of their character in occupied German New Guinea. No
strong class differences had yet developed in Australian colonial society. Social
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safeguards and gratifications strengthened the fundamentally egalitarian
nature of Australian society. Trade unions had a strong place within the social
system, and they contributed to the fact that the image of the open-hearted
Australian, always ready to help, did in fact define certain areas of Australian
life. This type of Australian was certainly also in evidence on arrival in New
Guinea, giving the local people tinned meat, biscuits, cigarettes, and shillings,
or exchanging these things for local food and souvenirs.79 The leaders of the
expedition had perhaps encouraged the troops to behave in a friendly fashion
toward the local people. On their first stop in Port Moresby, where they
encountered Melanesians for the first time, the troops were instructed: “do not
bully but bribe with tobacco.”80 In Rabaul, however, cooperation between Aus-
tralian soldiers and the local people soon wandered from the prescribed paths
and took its own forms. While they were looting, Australians sometimes sent
local Melanesians into the houses of Germans to fetch out for them the objects
they wanted. In one case, when two Germans caught the putative Melanesian
rogues and started to beat them up, some of the soldiers intervened and taught
the Germans that beating was by no means a race-specific punishment.81 But
such solidarity did not last for long.
“Bloody Niggers!”—Racism as a Constituent Part of 
Australian Indigenous Policy
The military surrender of German New Guinea on 21 September 1914 in Her-
bertshöhe was accompanied by the rituals with which Europeans assure each
other of mutual respect, even if one side has been defeated by the other: in
spite of everything that separates them, they are united by something funda-
mental that is common to both. The Melanesian police-soldiers, by contrast,
who had been wounded in the fighting, risking their lives so that the Germans
did not lose the respect of other Europeans, had been left to their fate, while
the local policemen who were fit for work were passed on from one European
master to the next under the terms of the surrender. They quite clearly
belonged to the inventory that was unhesitatingly handed over to the new rul-
ers, because if circumstances had been reversed, the Germans would have
expected the British to behave in exactly the same way. The Melanesians them-
selves were not consulted. Some regarded their duties as having come to an
end with German rule and went home. They were shot by the Australians—“a
useful and much needed lesson,” as the new European leader in New Guinea
put it.82 Australian soldiers were quick on the draw, and their guns went off eas-
ily, even if they merely suspected that the Melanesians did not have the neces-
sary respect for their European masters. A large number of local men fell
victim to attempts by the Australians to show the locals that the end of the rule
of these white men did not mean the end of rule by white men in general. Most
died in a hail of bullets, without even knowing why they were being shot at.
The cynical banality with which Australians recorded these events and passed
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on to the day’s business—“We shot a few niggers,” soldier O’Hare noted on 11
September 1914—indicates that Australians in New Guinea were beginning to
revert to the patterns of behavior that were notorious at home in Australia.83
The stereotype of the dangerous black man who could never be trusted
because the wild animal in him could break out at any time was the leitmotiv of
the Australian Military Government from the start. It influenced the adminis-
tration’s attitude toward the occupied colony. Fear of Melanesian unpredict-
ability was closely linked with anxiety that the local people might rise up in
support of the Germans. This was one of the reasons why more German colo-
nists were not deported to Australia; the Australians feared that if this hap-
pened, the bomb might go off.84
As the Australians stayed in New Guinea longer and the exceptional cir-
cumstances of military rule became permanent, they perceived greater differ-
ences between themselves and the local Melanesians. They separated them-
selves more and more, condemning Melanesian customs and ridiculing and
mocking the people. The negative side of Australian egalitarianism now
became apparent. To everyone, from privates to the highest officers, the
Administrator, senators, and the governor-general, all Melanesians were indis-
criminately “niggers.”85
The Australian mililtary administration’s descent to the depths of linguis-
tic-racist rhetoric marks a clear stage in relations between Europeans and
Melanesians. To be sure, the same basically racist principle was accepted dur-
ing both the German and the Australian administrative periods—namely, that
the Europeans’ technological superiority justified the whites adopting an atti-
tude of moral superiority most visibly expressed in the master–servant relation-
ship. (The everyday colonial reality of German New Guinea, where black house
servants came running at every call, was quickly adopted by the Australian sol-
diers.) Nonetheless, the difference between the German and the Australian
interpretation of this principle was not merely a matter of form.
The German system rested upon an established framework of reference,
known to all. It defined duties and responsibilities under the umbrella of Ger-
many’s supreme authority. This framework was prescribed by the German colo-
nial administration, and any attempt by the local people to place it in question
was regularly suppressed. Within these constraints, however, the local people
enjoyed certain freedoms—prerogatives that normally could not be touched by
whites. The administration ensured that these “taboos” were respected and
recognized the legal right of indigenous people to appeal against European
encroachment upon their areas. For all the Germans’ clear feelings of superior-
ity, they had something like respect for the otherness of the Melanesians, rec-
ognizing that despite their primitiveness, they, as humans, had a right to it. And
there was a subliminal feeling that any attempt to change this otherness by
force could not be morally justified. This attitude was most clearly expressed in
the discreet, judicious German treatment of Melanesians engaged in tradi-
tional feuding, in the cautious expansion of the limits of European-German
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priorities, and above all in the fact that the Melanesians’ right of domicile was
never disputed, at least after 1900.86
Australian-occupied New Guinea lacked both this fixed framework of
duties and prerogatives, and a vigilant authority to ensure that they were
observed. Officially, German law was still valid and continued to apply to the
Melanesians. But the few who could read German regulations were even less
aware of how the colonial order was in fact implemented before September
1914. For the Germans who remained in New Guinea—planters and mission-
aries—the indigenous people represented either direct competition or purely a
target group. The interests of both planters and missionaries had turned them
into the fiercest opponents of German local administrations. If they had been
asked, they would have expressed no interest at all in prolonging the German
rule of New Guinea, provided that their own “rights” were guaranteed. The
exceptional circumstances of war favored quick, ad hoc decisions. But the rapid
turnover among officials meant that many ad hoc decisions had a strictly lim-
ited life span. Often they were overturned and replaced by others without
apparent reference to any clear guidelines. Contradictory regulations and
directives were common. This left the indigenous population in a deeply inse-
cure state: they could no longer discern any rules governing behavior. To Aus-
tralians, the word nigger may suggest a kind of presumptuous, racist
familiarity,87 but in any case it lowered the threshold of resistance to brutality.
The limits of the German system had been deliberately and clearly signaled to
all. The lack of such limits under the Australians, who behaved much more
arbitrarily than the Germans anyway, increased the tendency to react in an
extreme manner.
This predisposition was reinforced by another typically Australian feature.
The Germans and the Australians both accepted that the “otherness” of the
Melanesians was an obstacle to their assimilation to European-dominated
modernity. But whereas the German colonial administration assumed (and
worked toward this goal) that, with patience, Melanesians could gradually be
led toward modernization without having to give up the characteristic features
of their own culture that were not inconsistent with the Christian humanitarian
tradition, the Australians equated the otherness of the Melanesians with a seri-
ous congenital defect. They believed that, if it could be eliminated at all, it
would be only with the greatest difficulty. The otherness of the Melanesians,
like that of the Australian Aborigines, was regarded not as having any intrinsic
value but merely as a stain. Thus the Australian view of Melanesians oscillated
between absolute condemnation of them as nonhuman (and thus unreform-
able) and the belief that they must be quickly and rigorously assimiliated—if
necessary, by force: “the natives of these Islands are unprogressive and lazy.
Still there must be either progress or perish, there is no third alternative.
. . . they must advance—progress in spite of themselves.”88 This system did not
allow for Melanesian characteristics to be preserved but, rather, to be regarded
with contempt and disgust or ridiculed. A good measure of cynicism and malice
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was usually involved, together with a feeling of gratitude for not being like the
Melanesians. A great deal of evidence can be cited for these attitudes.89
One of the features specific to New Guinea is its lingua franca. The struc-
ture and vocabulary of Tok Pisin provided the raw material for jokes—always
the same ones—among generations of “enlightened Europeans.” The Germans
had at first strongly disapproved of Tok Pisin, but becoming accustomed to its
irresistible advance, they had eventually come to appreciate the advantages it
offered for the administration of the colony. From the start the Australians con-
sidered it bastardized English that should be eradicated. Their contempt for
the people and the language they used reached a peak in the names Australians
gave to newborn babies and under which they entered them in village rolls—
“pek pek” (excrement), “pis pis” (urine), and “push push” (Tok Pisin paraphrase
for sexual intercourse).90 Young workers were universally called “monkey,”91 a
word that entered Tok Pisin as “mangi.” Today the word is used simply for
indigenous young men, and the majority of the population is unaware of its rac-
ist origins. The Australians also bragged that the vocabulary of the local people
had been increased by Australia’s most important swear words.92
Contempt for the Melanesians was so general that it is astonishing the Aus-
tralians differentiated among them at all. But they perceived degrees of primi-
tiveness. “If he is more than usually stupid and clumsy we take it for granted
that he belongs to the New Britain inland tribes known as Baininges,”
explained Press Officer Lyng.93 It was often denied that Melanesians were
human beings at all. Comparisons were drawn with animals, or words were
used that by definition were reserved for animals.94 When defending corporal
punishment for Melanesians, Administrator Johnston went so far as to say:
It must be remembered that
1. The native is a primitive being, with no well developed sense of duty or
responsibility. . . . With a native as with an animal—correction must be of a deter-
rent nature. Would a man imprison his horse for offering to bite him?95
Attempts were also made to provide scientific proofs for the assertion that
Melanesians were more like animals than human beings. Australian military
doctors insisted that Kanakas felt less pain than Europeans, because “the cen-
tral nervous system of the Kanaka is comparatively poorly developed, and
accordingly one would expect that the peripheral nerves are in a like state, the
result being that pain which in a European would be acute, would be less
marked in the Kanaka, owing to the slower and less active transmission of
sensation.” Their conclusion was that “there is no possible doubt that the
Kanaka makes an excellent patient.”96
Melanesians who put themselves at the mercy of the doctors in the hospi-
tals for local people in Rabaul and Kokopo had to be patient indeed. Often,
they were treated simply as guinea pigs. During the influenza epidemic toward
the end of the war, an American doctor, with the permission of the Australian
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authorities, used Melanesian “patients” in the hospital in Rabaul to try out vari-
ous remedies against hookworm. The Melanesians survived this torture, but it
weakened their immune systems to such an extent that they were unable to
cope with another wave of influenza. The person responsible for the experi-
ments justified himself by pointing out that they would have died anyway. They
had been condemned to hang as cannibals, he said—at least he had saved them
from a death by hanging.97
Most of those who had come to the hospital for locals during the German
period had been outpatients, seeking plaster and bandages from the government
doctor. At the end of 1920, while New Guinea was still under military adminis-
tration but it was clear that it would become an Australian mandate, the way in
which the local people preferred to seek medical advice and help was made
practically impossible. Sick people were given a form and told that they could
not be treated until all the details had been filled in. As few could read (and even
fewer could read English), this prerequisite served the purpose it was probably
designed to fulfill, and outpatients could no longer be treated in the hospital.98
This measure was almost certainly prompted by the right of military doctors to
run their own private practices. Though local people received free treatment at
the hospital, or were asked to make a nominal contribution, the government
doctor could demand high fees in his capacity as a private practitioner.99
During the German period, government doctors were expected to under-
take tours of inspection into remote jungle areas. The Australians gave up this
practice. The system of Heiltultuls was on the point of collapse because the
local assistants to the white doctors no longer received supplies of medicines.
The German regulation that all Melanesian workers had to be immunized
before starting work had not been adopted by July 1919, despite the fact that
the number of indigenous workers had grown significantly since 1914.100 A con-
fidential report prepared in 1922 by order of the prime minister was scathingly
critical of the health system in what was now officially Australian New Guinea.
In 1914 the Germans, “in regular German fashion,” had handed over hospitals
with inventories, instruments, and medicines to the Australians, all in excellent
condition. By the beginning of the Australian civil administration, they were in
a condition that defies description. Some of the furniture, apparatus, and
instruments had disappeared. The buildings themselves were in a state of col-
lapse, as nothing had been repaired during the military administration. The
hospital for locals in Kokopo had been closed during the war, and had not
reopened since. That in Madang was unusable.The hospitals for Europeans in
Kaewieng and Madang were closed at the beginning of the civilian administra-
tion, “considered to be then beyond repair.” In Madang a patient had fallen one
and a half meters through a rotten floor in the building; here, too, the hospital
had to be closed down. The best-preserved hospital for local people, that in
Rabaul, was shifted on the ground that it was “a danger to the white commu-
nity”; in addition, the land on which it stood was a valuable commercial build-
ing site. The report also criticized the Australian staff of the hospitals. Not a
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single Australian doctor in New Guinea had been trained in tropical medicine.
Drug and alcohol dependency was common among the doctors. Without the
mission hospitals, which were rated as exemplary, the local people would have
had practically no access to medical care.101
The fact that the Australian military administration cared little about the
physical well-being of the local people, primarily for racist reasons, also
became evident in areas that lay beyond the direct control of the health author-
ities. Reference has already been made to the practice of fishing with dyna-
mite. The dangers associated with it were well known. The indigenous people
were left to take all the risks. The following statement by Officer Lyng betrays
an unbelievable cynicism: “Now and again a would-be fisherman is blown to
pieces, for which reason the throwing of the dynamite is entrusted to
natives.”102 Thus it is hardly surprising that the sale of alcohol to the local popu-
lation by the troops was tolerated.103
In education for the local people, as well as in health, a specifically Austra-
lian form of racism made itself felt. The Australians had closed the German
government school for Melanesians soon after the military occupation. Any
potentially elitist feelings harbored by its ex-pupils were driven out of them by
putting them on street-sweeping duties.104 It is not reasonable to expect educa-
tion to be a high priority for a temporary military administration. But when
things had settled down and it was clear that New Guinea would remain Aus-
tralian, it became obvious that the Australians’ rejection of education was the
result not of a temporary organizational problem but of a more fundamental
attitude. Captain Tennent, the Australian official with responsibility for native
affairs, actually said that teaching Melanesians to read and write was “a waste of
time.”105 The general Australian view was that the only point of educating
Melanesians was to provide “cheap skilled labour.”106 To be sure, the aim of the
school set up by the German colonial administration had also been to create a
relatively cheap supply of local government employees. But precisely this was
now regarded as undesirable. Atlee Hunt, the secretary for Home and Territo-
ries, the ministry responsible for New Guinea, categorically refused any sug-
gestion that Australia should again set up a government school in New Guinea
to educate local children to become government employees. Melanesian gov-
ernment employees were not wanted; nor was education for Melanesians going
beyond the elementary level: “We should not teach too much of that class of
learning which trains a man to be a mere clerk. We do not want to develop a
race of Pacific Island Babus. It is far more important that a native should know
how to drive a nail straight or use an axe or an adze than to work a sum in prac-
tice or solve a quadratic equation.”107
All that was left was primary teaching by the missions, which the German
colonial administration had regarded as completely inadequate. Its plan to
expand the existing school (Regierungsschule) in Rabaul from 1915, and to
integrate it into an education system spanning the whole country with a
Regierungsschule in each district, remained no more than a piece of paper. Not
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even the status quo of 1914 was maintained. In July 1921 all teaching was done
by the missions. By 1921 the education of Melanesians had regressed to pre-
1909 levels. In addition, the missions were no longer to teach in the vernacular,
which had so far been preferred. An order issued toward the end of the military
administration and adopted without change by the civil administration pre-
scribed English as the only language of education. Here, too, methods of
assimilation displaced the more associationist approach that had been practised
by the Germans before September 1914.108
MELANESIAN WOMEN AS TARGETS OF RACISM
AND OBJECTS OF DESIRE
The attitude of the Australians toward Melanesian women deserves separate
investigation. Through the filter of gender-specific perceptions, racist precon-
ceptions of Melanesian men were exaggerated when applied to local women.
Opinions were even stronger and more negative, and behavior expressed even
less respect for the “other.” Racism was combined with a fundamental hatred
of women, and the result was a mixture of extreme misanthropy, misogyny, and
machismo.
Melanesian women were “about the most miserable bits of humanity you
could run across . . . indeed the source of all evil in these islands,” Warrant
Officer Lance Balfour Penman confided to his diary.109 District Officer Major
Balfour Ogilvy, by contrast, did not think it necessary to conceal his contempt
from the other soldiers, and wrote in the Rabaul Record: “I have seen far more
fascinating pigs than most of the ladies, and I’m certain I’d sooner kiss a pig
than a native woman, because the pig would not understand.”110 Australian
officers most frequently came into contact with local women in their capacity
as magistrates. In this function, Major Ogilvy vented his full hatred of Melane-
sian women. Two young women whom he had convicted of “immoral acts”
were ordered to undress and parade naked before the local police for several
hours.111 In Kokopo, the Australian district officer did not condemn the local
practice of paying a bride-price as such; but he did introduce a completely new
criterion for assessing the amount. Traditionally, the level of bride money var-
ied according to the region from which the woman came, but was also influ-
enced by her individual skills, knowledge, and capacity for work. As her family
would have to do without these qualities in future, the bride-price was
intended to be some form of compensation. It is doubtful whether the Austra-
lian official understood this system at all. If he did, he placed no special value
on it. For him, the only crucial factors were appearance and price, which
seemed to him exorbitantly high. On closer inspection, he was convinced that
the woman was not the equivalent of the two pigs demanded; at most, he con-
cluded, she was worth one.112
Sexual attacks and the raping of local women by Australian soldiers began
almost on the very day on which they marched into Rabaul. The first victims
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were girls at mission schools, women patients in hospitals, and women prison-
ers—women who could hardly run away.113 In remote areas, above all, Austra-
lian patrol officers used the local police to procure women for them from
villages in the bush. Punitive expeditions against “insubordinate” Melanesians
were often transformed into raids for tracking down indigenous women. There
is clear evidence of this happening in the westernmost part of the colony
(Sepik), the east (Bougainville), the south (Morobe), and the north (Manus),
and there are indications from almost all other regions. On Manus, the district
officer abducted and raped a local woman during a punitive expedition, after
driving away her husband. A number of women and children were taken to the
government station in Lorengau as hostages. “Lieutenant Singleton, who was
in charge there, selected the best-looking of the women, and divided them
amongst the white soldiers who were willing to sleep with them.”114 The offic-
ers responsible did not deny the accusations but did not feel they had “done
anything very wrong in violating the women held by us as hostages.” In order to
avoid a scandal, they were encouraged to retire, and both were sent back to
Australia. They were never directly punished for their behavior. The Australian
soldiers who had committed the rapes could not be brought to account at all
because no replacements for them were available.115
An almost analogous case took place under District Officer Lieutenant
Hunter in Kieta early in 1917. A woman was raped in the village of Ungano
during a “visit” by the district officer. Two other women, whom he had taken
away to his official residence on the coast as hostages, escaped under cover of
night.116 In Morobe, the district officers used the jail as a convenient place to
get rid of indigenous rivals or relatives who had tried to protect their women.
In Wanimo, Police Master Pole used the native police under his command to
round up local women for him from villages in the bush and take them to his
station. As the Sepik people would not tolerate this sort of behavior toward
their women, bloody clashes took place, and there was a massacre of the local
population in April and May 1921.117 Here, too, there was a parallel. The first
Australian police master in the southwest of New Britain had used the native
police to hunt down Melanesian women. His successor found a completely ter-
rified population. Where they had already had contact with Europeans, local
women ran screaming into the jungle whenever they caught sight of a white
man.118 In none of the cases mentioned were the guilty punished. Officials
were either quietly sent back to Australia or found their own way to more
southerly climes where no questions were asked.
THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION AND MELANESIAN LABOR
The Australian military administration in New Guinea had to deal with local
people who could be divided into three categories based on their actual and
legal relationship with the Europeans: Melanesian workers who were
employed by Europeans; “free” indigenous people who had been absorbed into
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the colonial administration and “pacified” (and were thus subject to European
jurisdiction); and free indigenous people who were not yet part of this system.
The first Melanesians from German New Guinea with whom the Austra-
lian soldiers came into contact were plantation workers, domestic servants, and
the native police. The reactions of Australian troops ranged from abhorrence at
the obvious exploitation of the Melanesians to admiration for a system which,
although it disregarded elementary human rights, seemed to function smoothly,
thus stirring a neurotic desire to project an image and awakening instinctive
longings to dominate and give orders. For most Australians it was a completely
new experience for blacks to accept orders from their white “masters” and gen-
erally to set about fulfilling them without any obvious protest. Australian
Aborigines behaved very differently in this respect. They could be punished,
pursued, even killed—nothing had proved effective in persuading them to
enter into a settled relationship of employment for any length of time in one
place: Australian Aborigines continued in their primarily nomadic way of life.
During the whole period of the Australian military administration, the
pendulum swung wildly between rejection of and admiration for the German
system. At first, the social conscience mentioned above, especially strongly
developed among Australians, predominated. In a number of cases, they inter-
vened against harsh treatment of Melanesians, responding at a purely emo-
tional level. In Madang, the district officer dismissed the Malay foreman for
being too brutal, explaining to the plantation owner that, for him, humanitarian
concerns outweighed economic considerations: “it is better your plantations
are rotten than your boys are ill treated.”119
On 15 July 1915 Australian intervention was placed on a firm legal footing.
The new labor ordinance issued on that day was typical of the attitude of the
early military administration under Pethebridge. The first attempt by the Aus-
tralian administration to take an active part in the affairs of the colony, typically,
affected social welfare legislation. On the other hand, it did not violate the
principle, based on international law and recognized in the treaty of surrender,
that German law continued to be valid. In fact the Australian military govern-
ment put into force the last German labor regulations, which had been drafted
shortly before war broke out. They had been submitted by Governor Hahl to
the Gouvernementsrat (governing council) on 5 March 1914 and forwarded to
the German Colonial Office at the same time. They were meant to come into
effect on 1 January 1915.120 Hahl’s intended reforms had aimed to eliminate at
last some of the serious weaknesses in the labor regulations of 4 March 1909,
and in the regulations of 31 July 1901, which had formed part of the later legis-
lation. Among the new measures that were long overdue were the introduction
of compulsory cash wages, the prohibition of payment in goods, a ban on the
common practice of deducting the cost of tobacco and loin cloths from wages
and retaining another part of the wages until the expiry of the labor contract,
limiting working hours to nine (instead of ten) hours per day, and various regu-
lations designed to protect workers against the many excesses perpetrated by
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recruiters. The recruitment of Melanesians for work outside the colony was to
be banned altogether, and an end was to be put to the privileges of the German
trading and plantation company in Samoa.121
With the Australian ordinance of 15 July 1915, most of these regulations
came into force. For a short time New Guinea experienced the conditions, at
least in theory, which Governor Hahl had long wanted to introduce. It is ques-
tionable whether this could have been achieved had the German colonial
administration continued in office undisturbed.122 But it soon became clear
that the Australian military administration was either no longer willing, or sim-
ply not able, to enforce the improvements for local workers. The regulations
were first diluted as early as October 1915; in August 1917 the regulations
passed in July 1915 were completely replaced by a new ruling, which was much
more open to interpretation.123 The old provisions were progressively watered
down until conditions were worse than they had been in September 1914.
There were a number of reasons for this. First, there was the pressure of actual
events. The labor regulations were generally disregarded, and almost all Euro-
pean employers in the colony (including the missions) boycotted them. The
military administration possessed neither the staff nor the means to enforce the
progressive aspects of the ordinance. It lacked the essential experience of how
a colonial administration could realize its objectives in agreement with the col-
onists, although these objectives were diametrically opposed to the colonists’
primary interests. The institution that had previously given the colonial govern-
ment most support in such undertakings, the Governing Council of German
New Guinea, had been dissolved by the Australians after the occupation. Sec-
ond, racism was breaking through and exerting more and more influence over
the decisions of the military administration. The desire to gain profits in Ger-
man New Guinea was also an important factor. If the colony was to be profit-
able, as all the Administrators hoped, for the benefit of Australia after the
conclusion of peace, then not much notice could be taken of alleged or real
abuses in relations between European employers and Melanesian workers,
especially if any change might reduce profits.
Sooner or later, every Australian soldier had an indigenous servant, and the
methods of treating them that had been used by the Germans—bawling out
and shouting—were soon adopted by the Australians. By 1919, when another
new labor ordinance had been issued,124 payment in goods and deferred pay—
that is, retaining most of a worker’s wages until the end of his contract—had
long since been legal again. And if a worker ran away and was caught, the cost
of this procedure was deducted from his pay and the length of any prison sen-
tence he received was added to his work contract—just as it had been before
the Australian intervention. In fact, the position of Melanesian workers was
worse by comparison with September 1914. At that time, the monthly average
pay of plantation workers had been five marks. In 1919, the sum of 5 shillings
(1 shilling was equal to 1 mark) was established as the maximum legal pay. And
after the expiry of his second work contract of three years, a worker was no
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longer automatically sent home but was permitted to conclude a third contract,
which bound him to his employer for life.125
The recruitment of workers suffered most. The German administration
had not been able to put an end to the excesses of the so-called labor recruiters
by 1914. Now the situation escalated, assuming almost chaotic proportions.
This development was fostered by a number of factors: the confusions of the
war, the military administration’s shortage of officials on the site, their lack of
experience, the quick turnover in district officers, and probably also the will-
ingness of quite a few military officials to turn a blind eye in return for a “con-
sideration.” The only constants in this situation were the use of armed force
and the ruthlessness of the recruiters, competing with the ability of the
Melanesians to take to their heels in time. The recruitment of Melanesian labor
had become completely divorced from legal guidelines and taken on a life of its
own that was no longer controlled; in fact, it had probably become uncontrolla-
ble, at least with existing means. The view that the Melanesians must be forced
to provide labor for the European plantations—a view the German governor
had successfully rejected to the last—now had influential advocates within the
Australian military administration.126 The German administration had banned
the recruitment of unmarried women because of the obvious abuses to which
they were subjected. Now they could be recruited with as little trouble as
underage children.127
The recruitment of Melanesian labor is reminiscent of slaving expeditions
in Africa or of serious organized crime. A plantation company that needed a
new supply of labor would turn to a “recruiter,” usually a planter, who passed
on the order to an agent of his selection, generally a Chinese or Malay. The
agent would take a troop of indigenous bearers and thugs into the jungle, and
“recruit.” The delegation of responsibility from top to bottom made it possible
for companies and planters to pretend to be unaware of the conditions under
which their workers had been recruited. At the same time, the procedure faith-
fully reflected the racist pecking order in the colony. At the end of 1919 the
company paid the planter it had commissioned to supply laborers six pounds
per worker delivered. Of this, he passed on three pounds per “head” to the
Chinese recruiter, who gave his indigenous troop 5 shillings for every Melane-
sian “caught.” The system was well known to the authorities, who did nothing
to put an end to the inhuman practices.128
There was a sort of inner compulsion which increasingly drove the recruit-
ers into hitherto unknown regions in order to complete their missions success-
fully. Melanesians who had witnessed the behavior of the recruiters and their
men, and experienced the methods they used, took good care not to come into
contact with them again. They fled from their villages when the guard set up
for the purpose reported the arrival of the recruiters. Thus the labor recruiters
penetrated ever more deeply into remote areas that had not yet come into con-
tact with Europeans. Violence was the automatic consequence. Local men
were killed, women raped, and children abducted from their parents—the
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whole scenario of ancient and modern slave hunting seemed to have been
revived. Complete areas were in turmoil. Under Pethebridge, the excesses
were to some extent restrained.129 But in the period of transition after his
death, and especially under his successor, Johnston, the last restraints were cast
off. Everybody, it seemed, wanted to have a share in the business of recruiting.
After hunting birds of paradise, capturing black workers now became the most
profitable business in the occupied colony. In some areas, the two activities
could be combined. Suddenly the European war no longer loomed large in
relations between Germans and Australians. The worst German and Australian
characters came to an understanding that allowed them to vent their aggression
on the backs of the Melanesian population. Without hesitation, German plant-
ers cooperated with Australians and vice versa. Patrol and district officers req-
uisitioned luluai to supply more local workers, and soldiers demanded their
severance pay in order to increase their income by recruiting. Everywhere in
New Guinea, but especially in Kaiser-Wilhelmsland, “a vast unexploited labour
reserve,”130 a gold-rush atmosphere, prevailed. The Administrator himself
boasted that during his period of office, recruiting had penetrated much far-
ther inland than ever before. He claimed that the recruiters not only brought
work but were also bearers of civilization.131
There are reports from all parts of occupied German Melanesia about the
unrest that gripped the local population as a consequence of the unrestrained
behavior of the recruiters. Early in 1918 the Japanese trader Komine reported
that all the places on the south coast of Neupommern (New Britain) which he
had visited had been deserted for a distance of 160 miles. Fearing the recruit-
ers, the local population had sought refuge in the interior. A little later, a Swede
had a similar experience—“always the same story”—when unsuccessfully try-
ing to find workers in twenty-two places in the same area.132 Local eyewitnesses
gave him an account of the “working methods” of the men accompanying the
recruiter Patterson: “Shot some native pigs. . . . Creeping cautiously into the
village, they met a native who on sighting them ran for his life. The boat’s crew
gave chase, and catching up with the man, struck him in the back with a toma-
hawk—the man fell and was left bleeding on the ground.”133
Most of these incidents are not known to posterity because what happened
deep in the jungle rarely came to the attention of the white public. Only when
Europeans—traders, other recruiters, or missionaries—were shocked by the
negative consequences of these events was some light thrown onto what had
taken place in the bush. Sometimes the Melanesians who were affected also
turned directly to Europeans and asked for help. Typically, in the cases of
which we know, the Melanesians turned to the missions and not to the military
administration. The Azera from the southeast of Kaiser-Wilhelmsland
informed the Neuendettelsauer Mission that, in the hinterland of Morobe, the
recruiters had mounted proper campaigns to abduct people. At least fourteen
bush people had been shot, and many women and girls had been raped. Vil-
lages had been burnt, and huts and gardens plundered. During the whole oper-
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ation and the forced abduction of the captured Melanesians, the Chinese and
Malay recruiters, with their Melanesian troops, had secured the assistance of
the neighboring enemies of their victims.134
A few months later, the responsible district officer personally visited some
of the destroyed villages and met the intimidated population of his district.135
Reports about the recruiters’ excesses were coming in from everywhere.136
Nonetheless, the first reaction was to sweep the matter under the carpet. The
minister of defense personally ordered that the censors were to be instructed
that no news about this or similar incidents was to reach the international pub-
lic: “These reports would be calculated to seriously endanger our position at
the Peace Conference and should not be permitted circulation or publica-
tion.”137
During and after the peace conference, the excesses of recruiting went on
in New Guinea, which continued to be under military administration. One rea-
son was that the Australian district officers, if they themselves were not directly
or indirectly involved in the business side of recruiting, did not regularly patrol
the districts under their care (as had been the case under the Germans), and
thus left the field open to criminals. The first large patrol undertaken under the
auspices of the Australian military administration, in July 1920, discovered pro-
foundly disturbed and frightened people deep in the bush in the south of New
Britain. They complained bitterly about the recruiters and their behavior. The
recruiters had brought measles and influenza with them, and the patrol saw
evidence of the many fatalities which these had caused.138 The new Administra-
tor, Brigadier Thomas Griffiths, acting in response to reports by his district
officers, at last decided offically to close at least two areas for recruiting
because of the “present unsettled state of affairs.”139
The extent to which the people of former German New Guinea were
pressed to enter European service as workers under the Australian military
administration can be statistically illustrated. On 1 January 1913, 17,930
Melanesians were employed by Europeans in the “old protectorate” (New
Guinea excluding Micronesia); 14,990 of these (83.6 percent) were plantation
laborers.140 On 1 January 1914, there were 17,529 plantation laborers out of a
total of about 20,000 Melanesian workers.141 There is no data for the total num-
ber of Melanesian workers under the Australian military administration, but
the statistics for plantation workers demonstrate the large increase in their
number during the final years of the military administration. By 1919 the num-
ber of Melanesian plantation workers of both sexes had risen to 22,622, an
increase of 29 percent as compared with 1914. Between 1913 and 1919 the
number of workers and police employed by the government increased from
1,040 to 2,819—that is, by 171 percent!142 On the last day of the military
administration, 9 May 1921, 27,428 Melanesian men and women were
employed by European planters—almost 10,000 more than in 1914.143 The
overwhelming majority of these workers were men. Given that a census in 1920
counted a total male indigenous population of only 70,581 (including children
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and old people), in 1921 about 35 percent of the total male population of the
area of New Guinea that had been opened up was in permanent European
employment. Of an estimated total population of 167,000 under the influence
of the administration, about 16.5 percent were in European employment.
Toward the end of the effective German administration, this figure had been
between about 10 and 12 percent.144
In a number of regions, more than alarming figures were reached. In the
colony’s Mecca, Rabaul, the figure for workers employed was 25 percent higher
than the original male population of the area. Thirty percent of all New
Guinea’s workers were concentrated in the area of Rabaul/Kokopo. At most, 10
percent of men lived with their wives; the rest increasingly developed homo-
sexual tendencies.145 In Talasea, in the southwest of New Britain, 84 percent of
the male population was in European employment; in Madang the figure was
67.2, and in Manus, 66 percent.146
Hahl had intended to regulate the recruitment of workers more strongly
and to abolish abuses because he was convinced that there was a connection
between the excessive employment of Melanesians by Europeans and the
noticable decline of the population in many areas of the protectorate.147 After
Pethebridge’s unsuccessful attempt to implement Hahl’s plans, the business of
labor recruitment in New Guinea had cast off all regulation and had gotten
completely out of control. The German planters and settlers who had been
restrained, with difficulty, by the colonial administration under Hahl, sud-
denly saw a chance to realize their dreams, which had never been crushed, of
New Guinea as a colony that was there exclusively for their personal use, and
of the Melanesians as objects freely available to them for use in achieving their
aims. In real terms, New Guinea became a different colony between 1917 and
1921. It was a colony in which the high priority given to economic success
swept away almost all the barriers that had been erected between 1900 and
1914 to protect the indigenous population. The procedure, typical of the Ger-
man colonial administration, of systematically but carefully expanding the
areas in which European ideas took precedence, was submerged in the
onslaught of the unleashed labor recruiters. For many segments of the
Melanesian population who had hitherto been unaware of the European pres-
ence, this sort of cultural contact was a considerable shock. The Australian
prime minister’s special commissioner for New Guinea, comparing the census
results of 1914 and 1920/1921, believed that they demostrated precisely what
Hahl had suspected in 1913: the decline in the Melanesian population in some
parts of the country was attributable to excessive labor recruitment. From the
statistics available to him, he calculated that the population had fallen by 1.9
percent annually between 1914 and 1921. The ratio of adult women to adult
men, which had been calculated as 100:123 in 1914, had declined to 100:164
by 1920.148 The change was particularly dramatic in Neu Mecklenburg/New
Ireland, where 12,000 fewer people (or one quarter less) were counted in
1920 than in 1914.149
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PUNISHMENTS
The history of Australia as a British penal colony, where flogging was an every-
day occurrence, had made the white population highly aware of this type of
punishment. A central plank of the German plantation economy, however, had
been the right of employers to administer disciplinary corporal punishment to
their Melanesian workers, with the permission of the authorities. The fact that
many plantation laborers ran away after German rule effectively stopped
seemed to ring in the end of the plantation economy. On the instructions of the
first Administrator, Holmes, workers were forced to return to their employers.
The officers involved indulged in downright orgies of beating.150 After the
return of the workers, everything on the plantations at first continued to run as
it had before the occupation. The only difference was that planters received
authorization to flog their workers from the military administration instead of
from the German local authorities. The labor ordinance of July 1915 limited
the number of strokes to ten, but did not, in principle, change the old proce-
dure.151 When the new ordinance was made known in Australia, the minister of
defense in the Labor government, Pearce, instructed the Administrator, by
telegraph, to abolish corporal punishment immediately. On 15 August 1915
Pethebridge abolished flogging as a disciplinary punishment administered by
employers, but reintroduced it immediately as part of the repertoire of criminal
justice. The minister indicated that he accepted this solution, on the condition
that flogging was the penalty only for the same offenses as in Australia. There-
upon, in September 1915, the Administrator issued a proclamation that per-
mitted the flogging of indigenous people to be authorized by district officers,
the officer in charge of native affairs, and the judge in Rabaul only for the most
serious crimes, such as murder and rape. Such cases were to be preceded by a
detailed investigation, and twenty strokes could now be administered.152
Since the New Guinea Company had introduced a criminal code for indig-
enous people in German New Guinea, the sanctions it prescribed had not
changed: fines; prison sentences, with and without compulsory labor, of up to
five years; and the death sentence. In theory, the same punishments could have
been imposed on Europeans, with the exceptions that there was no time limit
on prison sentences for them and that sentencing a white person to death in
the colony was simply impossible. Pethebridge’s decision officially made flog-
ging an instrument of criminal justice specifically for the indigenous population
for the first time in the German Pacific. A racist criminal law, which did not
exist before, was introduced. It represented a considerable deterioration in the
legal position of the “free” indigenous people, in particular. Although they had
theoretically been under a European code of laws before, they had not been
exposed to the whip as had the Melanesian laborers. The situation was similar
to that in neighboring Australian-administered Papua and approached that pre-
vailing in Germany’s African colonies.
In theory, the position of the Melanesian contract laborers, however, fun-
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damentally improved overnight. If the abolition of flogging as a disciplinary
punishment for Melanesian workers had been permanent, and the whole
enterprise had not been exposed as a fraud, the Australian Labor government
and the military administration in Rabaul would rightly have gone down in his-
tory as dragon-slayers, eradicating the degrading labor conditions in German
New Guinea. But it soon became apparent that the regulations existed only on
paper, because officials in the outer stations interpreted them as meaning that
flogging could continue but could only be administered by them, or with their
express approval.153 In addition, the same factor that had already frustrated
attempts by the early military administation to remedy abuses in the recruit-
ment of labor came into play. If the colony was to be economically productive,
then mechanisms to suppress the indigenous workers were indispensable; and
corporal punishment was the alpha and omega of the functioning European
colony of New Guinea.
The large German plantation companies, missionaries, and the Australian
officer in charge of native affairs, Ogilvy, argued for the reintroduction of flog-
ging for labor offenses.154 Early in December 1915 the Administrator submit-
ted an official request for this. As well as the oft-cited reason that more and
more Melanesians were refusing to obey orders, Pethebridge pointed to the
practice of corporal punishment on the British Gilbert Islands and also men-
tioned the allegedly growing danger of white women being molested by indige-
nous men. The minister of defense, Pearce, officially sanctioned the procedure
suggested by Pethebridge. Under its terms the military administration and the
district officers could, from January 1916, administer “corporal punishment of
a more merciful kind” in cases of theft, desertion from work, offenses against
women, “gross insubordination,” arson, or assault.155 Nominally, all that had
happened was that the offenses punishable by flogging had been extended. But
they had not merely been multiplied; qualitatively different offenses were now
liable to corporal punishment, compared with September 1915. For example,
running away from work, previously a disciplinary matter, had now become a
criminal offense. The catch-all phrase “gross insubordination” revealed the real
intention behind the measure. Gross insubordination covered everything for
which a worker had been flogged in German times. The prohibition on corpo-
ral punishment as a disciplinary measure for offenses at work lasted less than
five months, even in its theoretical form. The situation thereafter was worse
even than that of July 1915, against which the minister of defense had inter-
vened in the first place. At that time a maximum of ten stokes could be admin-
istered. Now it was twenty again, just as in German times.
Overshadowed by the war and protected by press censorship, occupied
German New Guinea increasingly developed into a colony in which the inter-
ests of the planters and the colonial companies were given the priority they had
always demanded but had never yet fully achieved. In March 1918 the list of
offenses punishable by flogging was extended to include adultery and lying to
an official authority.156 The war was already over when the new labor ordinance
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of 1 January 1919 again extended the list of offenses subject to corporal punish-
ment. It could now be imposed in a total of eighteen cases, which can be
divided roughly into one-third sexual offenses, one-third labor offenses, and
one-third serious criminal offenses. Employers had the additional right to put
their workers under confinement in chains.157 The end of the war had turned
Australia’s attention more than before toward the mysterious tropical north,
where a German colony seemed about to be transferred into Australian hands.
On 27 February 1919 the Sydney Bulletin published a cartoon of a German
planter beating a Melanesian victim while an Australian soldier stood guard.
The artist was the most famous Australian caricaturist of his day, Norman Lind-
say. There was an outcry among the Australian public. Pressure on the govern-
ment became so strong that on 10 March 1919 the Australian cabinet ordered
the abolition of flogging in New Guinea, which was still under military adminis-
tration.158
Thereupon the Administrator in Rabaul almost outdid himself in defend-
ing corporal punishment—“the best possible and most effective means of
enforcing discipline, obedience, and drilling into the minds of our natives who
are not ill treated nor illused by such canings any more than a horse which
requires a certain amount of corrective control with a whip”—and demanded
drastic alternative punishments, for the “calaboose” (Kalabus: Tok Pisin for
prison) “is the native’s paradise.”159 Three hundred pairs of handcuffs and 100
leg irons were to be sent to New Guinea immediately by the next ship. Experi-
mental models of a type of pillory had already been produced in Rabaul.
“Staining the Australian flag,” by Norman Lindsay. (The Bulletin, 27 February 1919)
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Melanesian prisoners sentenced to labor were to work in chains and be forced
to break stones; their working hours were to be considerably increased; and in
order to make their status more clearly visible, in the future their hair was to be
close-cropped and they were to wear a brightly colored lavalava.160 The equip-
ment of a medieval chamber of horrors was to offer a substitute for the corpo-
ral punishment that had been abolished.
Johnston introduced the pillory as the favored replacement for flogging.
He had two models to choose from. In one, the offender with legs stretched
apart was strapped onto a seat; in the other, he had to stand on a public plat-
form where his hands and head were tied. The Administrator decided in favor
of the public platform. This type of punishment seems to have been used from
as early as mid-March 1919, but did not become legal until the issuing of
Administration Order No. 636 on 3 December 1919.161 It became known as
Field Punishment No. 1 for Natives. In New Guinea, however, this punish-
ment, as it was applied in practice, did not comply, in one detail, with the Brit-
ish military penal code on which it was based. The Melanesian fastened to an
iron bar with outstretched arms did not have full foot contact with the ground.
In a complete perversion of an already perverted punishment, offenders were
attached to the bar in such a way that their full body weight was taken by the
Field Punishment No. 1 in its mild form. The date given (1915) is probably too early, as
this form of punishment seems to have been introduced after Administrator Johnston
was in charge of the colony. (Marie von Hein Collection, Mitchell Library, State Library
of New South Wales)
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wrists. A special procedure was used to ensure that only the tips of their toes
could touch the ground. In this way, unfortunate Melanesians were exposed to
the tropical heat for up to three days at a time. Because of their loud cries, the
victims were called “birds” by their tormentors.162
A Methodist pastor hurrying past on 1 December 1919 saw four Melane-
sians strung up in this manner. Four more lay on the ground, waiting to be tied
to the bar. He went to fetch Administrator Johnston, who had introduced this
procedure, although he was not personally responsible for the perversion of the
perversion. Johnston called what he saw “really a species of torture, which was
revolting.”163
Captain Tennent, the officer in command responsible for native affairs,
was dismissed and sent back to Australia. Field Punishment No. 1 for Natives,
however, was not at first abolished. In Geneva, the Australian representative on
the mandate commission claimed that this sort of punishment was “confined to
military discipline.”164 A German planter who used Field Punishment No. 1 on
his own plantation later justified himself by pointing out that he had only done
what the administration had been doing for a long time. His argument must
have been convincing, for although the worker he had punished in this way did
not survive the consequences of the ordeal, the planter left the central court in
Rabaul a free man after paying a fine of £100. “Field punishment” does not
seem to have been abolished in New Guinea until 1922.165
Corporal punishment itself was removed from the indigenous labor ordi-
nance by an amendment of 23 May 1919. The political change of direction,
however, took place only on paper. Those who continued to flog were, if a
charge was brought against them, declared to have contravened the labor ordi-
nance; but they were rarely fined.166 Even these “show trials,” however, soon
stopped. After a short period of reflection, the whipping of indigenous workers
gradually began again. At first individual district officers beat workers them-
selves or authorized floggings.167 Bit by bit, planters too went back to using the
old method in full. In 1921, during the transition from military to civil adminis-
tration, an Australian eyewitness in New Guinea did not come across a single
planter or district officer who had not used physical violence against a Melane-
sian at some time. Officially, locals could complain to the district officer, but in
practice they did not.168 Nor did the civil administration, which abolished the
other types of punishment the employers could use,169 do anything to put an
end to this situation. A great deal of evidence exists that flogging, as the punish-
ment that whites preferred to administer to their Melanesian dependents, con-
tinued to exist in Australian New Guinea.170 Even after 1914/1921, New
Guinea remained a colony in which the whip dominated relations between
Europeans and the local population. The only difference between the German
and the Australian method was that, under the Germans floggings were offi-
cially permitted, and the historian can find documented statistics about offi-
cially authorized and approved brutality. As corporal punishment officially no
longer existed from 1919, there are, of course, no statistics for the Australian
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period. The German mania for bureaucratizing brutality was replaced by Aus-
tralian hypocrisy, intent on maintaining a facade of humanity but tolerating
brutality on the spot. Its degree and frequency were now, in practice, left up to
district officers in each case. As an integral part of the Australian code of native
criminal justice, flogging in New Guinea continued from its introduction in
September 1915 until after the Second World War.171
THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION AND THE RIGHTS OF
“FREE” MELANESIANS IN PACIFIED NEW GUINEA
Those Melanesians who lived in their villages and had become part of the sys-
tem governed by the German colonial administration fell outside the scope of
the special labor regulations. Cooperation between them and the administra-
tion was based on the system of indirect rule through luluai and tultul intro-
duced by Hahl. The point of this system was less to transmit official orders via
local agents of the colonial goverment than to relieve the German colonial judi-
ciary. Most intra-Melanesian disputes could be settled by the luluai on the basis
of the Melanesian principle of compensation, without European intervention
and without court proceedings.
At first, even after the Australian occupation, little seems to have changed
in this procedure for that part of the local population of New Guinea which the
Germans, interestingly enough, called “free” (in contrast, presumably, to the
“unfree” Melanesian workers). The Australians registered surprised disap-
proval at the existence of the indigenous institutions of luluai and tultul, which
Governor Murray had firmly rejected for neighboring Papua and which the
Australian Aborigines did not possess. Pethebridge mockingly called them “loo
loo eyes” and “tool tools.”172 As long as the district officers limited their activi-
ties to the immediate surroundings of the government stations, as was generally
the case during the European war, there was little encroachment on the space
the Germans had granted the Melanesian model of conflict resolution. But
with the end of the war the situation changed. Although the military adminis-
tration was to stay in office for a further two and a half years, greater efforts
were now made to bring the affairs of the indigenous free people more firmly
under Australian control. At the end of 1920 the positions of luluai and tultul
were officially recognized by the new colonial masters. Their functions, how-
ever, were reduced to administrative tasks. The luluai became the first assistant
to the colonial administration in village society; the tultul, as his Pisin-speaking
translator, the deputy assistant. In principle, the luluai retained the role, which
the German colonial administration had given to him, of arbitrator in everyday
Melanesian disputes, but his judicial authority was considerably reduced. In
particular, he lost the right to treat any resistance to his position as contempt of
the existing order and to punish it accordingly. This undermined the luluai’s
authority, and the system of internal arbitration began to collapse. The position
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of the district officer had been strengthened at the expense of the luluai. The
luluai now also had to pass on to the district officer the shell money which he
had imposed in fines, and which, under the Germans, he had been permitted
to keep as remuneration for his work. Only one year later, a special native
administration ordinance revoked all the luluai’s remaining legal prerogatives.
The only semilegal task left to him was to act as the police bailiff, whose job it
was to ensure that an indigenous defendant appeared before the European
court.173
It is not clear whether the Australian administration was fully aware of the
significant differences between the system in force at the time of the German
colonial administration and the situation under their rule. At any rate, this fact
has so far escaped Australian historians.174 Yet the end of official toleration of
an autonomous area of Melanesian legal authority was one of the crucial turn-
ing points separating the Australian from the German colonial administration.
To be sure, this change in everyday reality was probably not so acute and
abrupt as it seems if we merely look at the regulations. In many areas, the Aus-
tralian aspiration to deal with all intra-Melanesian conflicts at first lay far
beyond the administration’s actual means. In fact, the Melanesian model of
conflict resolution by internal arbitration and compensation continued, even in
the already pacified regions, without the luluai who prescribed the compensa-
tion payments immediately getting into trouble. However, the fact that his
behavior now, unlike before 1914, was officially no longer permitted, made the
functioning of Melanesian legal autonomy highly dependent on internal accep-
tance and on simply being far enough away from the centers of administration.
The closer a village was to a center of European administration, the less likely it
was that the luluai could continue to exercise his old legal functions. In time,
the Australian administration penetrated ever more deeply into the hinterland
of the pacified zone, and thus the areas of Melanesian legal autonomy con-
stantly decreased. In these terms 1920/1921, not 1914, was a turning point in
Melanesian–European relations.
Compared with this crucial difference between the German and the Aus-
tralian approach to “native questions,” all other interventions by the Australian
military administration in local affairs were of secondary significance. The
noticeably more assimilationist Australian approach toward the Melanesian
population was also in evidence here. But in this context, another point must
be emphasized. The complete transfer of intra-Melanesian disputes to Euro-
pean colonial justice increased the tendency toward bureaucratization. Previ-
ously, the compensation payments prescribed by the Melanesian “judge,”
equipped with the full authority of the German colonial administration, had
restabilized the system of social interaction. One advantage of this procedure
for the administration had been that public order had been reestablished with-
out great expense. The other cases had been decided relatively quickly by the
Bezirksamtmann, at little cost and involving few staff. All in all, it was an
extremely cost-efficient system, which was free for the local population. Dur-
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ing the military administration, cases that could not be settled by the district
officer (the highest fine he could impose was £15), went before the officer in
charge of native affairs in Rabaul. The local people had to contribute one
pound per person to court costs. After the abolition of corporal punishment,
the Administrator introduced an additional translation fee of two shillings and
sixpence for each local person who needed the services of an English transla-
tor.175 This was, quite obviously, an attempt to keep to a minimum actions for
mistreatment brought by local people against Europeans: the right to justice
was dependent on the income of the plaintiff. This was, indeed, a completely
new experience for the people of New Guinea.
THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION AND
THE LIMITS OF “CIVILIZATION”
The military administration at first had very limited contact with Melanesians
outside the areas subject to the administration. The German administrative
region shrank; the stations at Angoram and Burgberg were given up. Typically,
the military administration made its first contact with Melanesians who were
not, or no longer, subject to the administration in connection with its efforts to
put the plantation economy back on to its feet. In December 1914 native
policemen in Manus who had been sent into the bush to recapture runaway
plantation workers killed a villager and took a number of hostages. Two of the
hostages were shot while trying to escape. In May 1915, three indigenous peo-
ple lost their lives while being pursued as deserters from the Forsayth planta-
tion in northern Neupommern (New Britain).176 From early 1915, there was
permanent unrest in the south and west of Neupommern because of the activi-
ties of the recruiter Samuel McKay and his Melanesian troops. When McKay
and his companions were murdered, the unrest got as far as the offices in
Rabaul. Two punitive expeditions in May killed five Melanesians, took women
and children hostage, burned houses, destroyed gardens, and gave the pigs
belonging to the inhabitants to the local police as booty.177 This did nothing to
calm the local population. The officer in charge of native affairs, Captain
H. Balfour Ogilvy, now thought he should take matters in hand himself. Again
villages were burned and gardens destroyed. He had instructed the police boys
to continue shooting into the villages until they heard his whistle. Moreover, he
had offered five shillings per head for every male Melanesian caught. When
Ogilvy finally blew his whistle and the police were supposed to capture the
Melanesians, the police preferred to make short work of it. At least sixteen
Melanesians were killed. As a further deterrent, Ogilvy had the body of a dead
Melanesian strung up in a main street. With the retrospective agreement of the
Administrator, two other bodies were decapitated and the heads put on display
where the recruiter had allegedly been murdered.178 This procedure is reminis-
cent of German New Guinea’s earlier colonial past, when it was still adminis-
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tered by the Neuguinea-Kompanie and the administrator of this company, Curt
von Hagen, was murdered in 1897; his murderers, the native policemen Ranga
and Opia, were decapitated and their heads put on public display.179 However,
the colonial administration that had been taken over by the German govern-
ment in 1899 had always avoided such excesses.
In November 1915 Ogilvy repeated the whole process on Bougainville. At
the request of the manager of the Soraken Plantation, which belonged to Burns
Philp, neighboring tribes into whose villages plantation workers had escaped,
and who had not sent them back after having been ordered to do so, were
“taught a lesson.” Again the native policemen continued to shoot into the vil-
lages until the white officer blew his whistle; four Melanesians were killed. One
of them was shot dead on the police officer’s orders while he was lying defense-
less on the ground. Pethebridge had given the instruction beforehand to carry
out the death sentence on the spot. Another man, accused of cannibalism, had
his head cut off for identification.180 The manager of the Burns Philp plantation
summed up his opinion of the Australian punitive expedition’s actions thus: “I
have seen some smart police patrol work in various parts of the world but noth-
ing smarter than that of Capt. Ogilvy and his merry men.”181 In 1916 and 1917,
District Officers McGregor and Hunter undertook further punitive expeditions
against the indigenous people in the south of Bougainville. Locals were ill
treated and shot, apparently at random. Hundreds were intimidated and fled to
the neighboring British Shortland Islands. On the mainland of New Guinea,
Ogilvy’s brother, Captain W. M. B. Ogilvy, as district officer of Madang, led a
number of punitive expeditions against the people of the district in August and
September 1915. There were also deaths in Madang, but the bodies seem not
to have been mutilated.182
Under Johnston, conflicts between the local people and the military
administration escalated as a result of unsupervised recruitment. The Adminis-
trator had direct responsibility for this policy, which practically gave the
recruiters a free hand, making abuses the rule, not the exception. Most puni-
tive expeditions were revenge campaigns by the administration for the murders
of recruiters. It was almost always Germans whose unrestrained methods pro-
voked resistance among the local population, thus giving cause for punitive
expeditions by the government. In May and June 1918, two German recruiters
were killed in the Sepik district when, despite a warning, they had assaulted a
local woman. Captain Hunter led two punitive expeditions to discipline the
local population, but the people did not calm down, because the unrestrained
recruiting continued. In another punitive action, at least twelve Melanesians
were killed in November 1918.183
The largest punitive expedition mounted by the Australian Military
Administration was again to the Sepik district. And again, the cause was a Ger-
man recruiter, who complained to the Administrator in Madang that his troops
had been attacked while recruiting. Although Johnston was aware that the
behavior of the recruiter had caused the disturbance—he did not deny that he
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had shot between twenty-five and thirty Melanesians—the Administrator sim-
ply accepted that it was only the Melanesians who had to be brought to see rea-
son. A steamer equipped with a cannon, two machine guns, fifteen Australians,
and seventy-five Melanesian police soldiers steamed up and down the Sepik,
bombarded villages, destroyed a tambaran (mens’/ancestors’) house, collected
the human heads displayed there for an Australian museum, and took hostages.
This expedition apparently cost only a few human lives.184
Retrospectively to excuse Administrator Johnston, who was primarily
responsible for the uncontrolled explosion of recruiting because he had given
orders to the expedition as far as possible to avoid spilling blood,185 is both
unjustified and historically untenable.186 Either Johnston was extremely naive,
or he simply did not want to know what was constantly happening in the colony
under his control. In either case, he was a most unsuitable person to fill the
post of Administrator. During his period in office, the central administration
lost the last vestiges of the authority it had still retained under Pethebridge.
Anarchy and chaos were the result. Under the arbitrary rule of individual dis-
trict officers and the unrestrained behavior of recruiters, the indigenous popu-
lation suffered as it had not done since the days of the Neuguinea-Kompanie.
In fact, much that happened in the Johnston era is reminiscent of the New
Guinea Company’s period of administration: the intemperate, uncontrolled
behavior of the whites toward the Melanesians, the frenzy of exploitation, and
the taking of justice into one’s own hands.
How did German and Australian punitive expeditions against the local
people differ? At first glance, they seem similar in many respects: the idea that
conflicts could be resolved by the superior arms technology of the Europeans;
the way in which expeditions were mounted, rather like organized campaigns
against an enemy power; the taking of hostages; and the destruction of life and
property. The difference between the German colonial and the Australian mili-
tary administrations lies elsewhere. Under Hahl, the Germans developed a
purposeful policy of pacifying New Guinea. Working from its bases in Her-
bertshöhe/Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago and Friedrich-Wilhelmshafen
on the mainland, the German administrative organization aimed gradually to
extend its borders. Any resistance to European rule was to be met with force. It
is pretty certain that, at the beginning, German punitive expeditions were more
extensive and cost more human lives than those mounted by the Australian
Military Administration. But the excessive brutality that was not uncharacteris-
tic of the period 1914/1921 was practically unknown during German rule after
1900. In addition, as time went by, German punitive measures increasingly lost
their original character as campaigns of revenge. The traditional form of Ger-
man punitive expedition as retaliation for the murder of Europeans was
replaced more and more by action to put an end to purely intra-Melanesian
tribal warfare and blood feuds. This frequently began to happen in response to
Melanesian requests, and it increasingly replaced the old warlike behavior. The
area subject to German administration, which had largely been expanded by
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punitive expeditions, was secured by the establishment of government stations.
Local station leaders had a great deal of freedom in building up relations with
the indigenous population, but the basis of this policy was decided by the gov-
ernor in Herbertshöhe/Rabaul, not by individual local officials. By 1914 the Pax
Germanica had developed an impetus of its own, which carried it out into areas
not yet under its control, almost without the government itself having to do
anything.
No system is recognizable in the Australian campaigns undertaken
between 1914 and 1921. The military administration did not develop a policy to
pacify the Melanesian population. If the administration had really limited itself
to maintaining the status quo, it would presumably have got by with pure
administration. But from Administrator Johnston’s period in office, if not
before, individual Europeans were constantly overstepping the official limits
set, without the administration doing anything about it. Conflicts with the local
people were an inevitable consequence. The situation was not made any easier
for the administration by the fact that the European intruders were motivated
by private interests, not by any interest in pacifying hitherto unopened regions.
The position was now exactly the opposite of what it had been in the period
before the outbreak of the European war. During the German period, the
administration was pushing ahead, securing its organization by appointing
tultul and luluai, and building up government stations. Only at this stage were
recruiters allowed in. Now the order was reversed: the recruiters came first,
followed by the administration. The latter limited itself to purely punitive mea-
sures. The Sepik was a typical case. The German station at Angoram was
closed, and constant reprisals seemed necessary. This was a regression to condi-
tions in the period before and shortly after the turn of the century, when puni-
tive expeditions had been acts of revenge by Europeans. Almost all Australian
punitive expeditions were a reaction to the murder of Europeans, who had
overstepped official limits and invaded by force hitherto unpacified regions.
The Australians hardly began to arbitrate in intra-Melanesian community dis-
putes as the German colonial administration had done.187
Punitive expeditions were not dictated by any policy toward the actions
that undermined the limits set by the administration. They were more an outlet
for day-to-day political problems and the result of ad hoc decisions than the
outcome of long-term political planning.188 For the indigenous people, the cen-
ter of European power was no longer Rabaul but the local district officer. He
had almost unlimited authority to make decisions, as there was practically no
control from Rabaul. Power was often abused, as this account has tried to show.
Thus the impression was established that Australian rule was arbitrary rule,
because it depended on the mood of a few individuals. The high-handedness of
the officers was, at times, shocking. Self-criticism hardly existed. The only peo-
ple who occasionally dared to criticize the officers were the missionaries. In
Manus, a Catholic priest complained to the district officer that after the killing
of a planter, two punitive expeditions against the Drukul had only produced
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even greater unrest. Thirteen villages had been reduced to ashes, thirteen peo-
ple had been killed, and the district officer had abducted eighty-two young
people. For a fee, he had given them to the big planter Hernsheim for three
months. “That you should aspire to criticise the action taken by the District
Officer . . . is really outrageous. . . . I am not used to disobedience to my orders.
. . . It would perhaps be as well to say right here, Father, that I am the
appointed custodian of the natives of this District.”189 Soon thereafter the dis-
trict officer started another punitive expedition against the Drukul. In this
action, the white men on the expedition raped the women taken as hostages.190
The German administration had been remarkably restrained in applying
European legal norms to Melanesian blood feuders, cannibals, headhunters,
and poisoners. Exile with forced labor had become established as the usual
punishment; the length of the sentence rarely exceeded three years, and never
five. Death sentences were extremely rare, and were most likely to be imposed
and executed in “political” cases. The Australian soldiers streaming into the
country were well aware of this “soft” German approach, which was noted as a
feature characteristic of the German colony.191
Australian practice toward the Aborigines was completely different. In the
Northern Territory, one of the last refuges of the original inhabitants of the
continent, executions were certainly nothing unusual.192 We do not know for
sure when the first Melanesian was executed by the Australian Military Admin-
istration; but we can be sure that it happened on an outlying station, where
officers did not hesitate to take decisions concerning life and death on their
own authority. The administration found out that this was so merely by chance.
A police master who had been brought to Rabaul for drunkenness while on
duty and fighting with another soldier admitted that on the orders of his supe-
rior he had had a local man, Kaipath, shot in Namatanai. No trial had taken
place. Even less had the regulations of the German law still in force been
observed. These prescribed the presence of two assessors (Beisitzer) in the
case of a death sentence being passed against an indigenous defendant, and the
governor’s consent had to be obtained before the sentence was carried out. The
clause concerning the presence of two assessors was ignored until mid-August
1918, although the Australians were aware of its existence.193 Not even the
Administrator had been informed in the case mentioned above. The only evi-
dence available was a confession by Kaipath, transcribed by a priest, that he
had practised cannibalism. Kaipath had been lured to his execution by the
promise of a new hat, stick (he was evidently luluai), and lavalava.194
The Administrator immediately issued instructions that, in future, death
sentences were to be carried only with his explicit written permission. There-
upon reports began to come in from all over New Guinea about death sen-
tences that had recently been imposed and carried out. The official responsible
for Neu Mecklenburg (New Ireland) even had two Melanesians shot after the
Administrator issued his instructions. He justified himself by claiming that he
had received the instructions too late. The deed of which the two Melanesians
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were accused was a classic example of traditional Melanesian pay-back. But
only one of them had committed the crime; the other had not even been
present. Two more Melanesians were unlucky enough to have been seen in the
company of the culprit. Although there was no evidence of their complicity,
they were sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for aiding and abetting.195
The cases we know about are certainly only the tip of the iceberg. They
provide one more illustration of high-handed rule by the Australian officers in
all areas outside Rabaul. This behavior also demonstrates a completely differ-
ent attitude toward Melanesian actions from that expressed during the German
period. Traditional behavior was no longer regarded as a mitigating circum-
stance in cases of violent death, which were now condemned as straightforward
murder and punished by execution. Under Administrator Johnston, at the lat-
est, the death sentence became a general tool of native policy in the Australian
Military Administration. Strikingly, Johnston had the first execution during his
period of office carried out only after the abolition of corporal punishment. It
took place at the scene of the alleged crime, before 430 onlookers, including
300 women and children. This guaranteed, according to the Administrator, that
it was “most impressive.” The reason for the execution was almost certainly the
result of a Melanesian blood feud.196
After Johnston, Griffiths, and Wisdom, the common models of Australian
criminal justice for the indigenous people included public executions—which,
by the end, the German administration had given up—and execution at the
scene of the crime, a procedure the German administration had prohibited
before the turn of the century because it feared that it would only perpetuate
the cycle of blood feuding.197 The method of execution preferred by the Aus-
tralians was hanging. Because of bad experiences with this method, the Ger-
man administration had replaced hanging with shooting.198 It was not un-
common for the Australian Administrator to grant reprieves, but even here the
German criminal law that was still in force was not always observed, and the
longest sentence that could be given to Melanesians was increased from five to
ten years.199
In a little over a year, between 1 January 1920 and 8 May 1921 (the end of
the military administration) alone, the Australian Military Administration pro-
nounced almost as many death sentences as the German administration of New
Guinea had throughout its whole period in office from the turn of the century.
In any case, the number of death sentences given by the Australians between
September 1914 and February 1921 in New Guinea exceeds the total of all
death sentences imposed in the whole of Germany’s Pacific sphere of influence
(New Guinea, Micronesia, and Samoa) between 1900 and 1914. Between July
1918 and February 1921 at least as many Melanesians in New Guinea were
executed as between 1900 and 1914.
If we also take into account that by far the majority of the German death
sentences and executions were “politically” motivated—such as the emergency
regulations directed against the alleged fomenters of the Friedrich-Wilhelms-
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South Wales)
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hafen conspiracy and the murderers involved in the Baining massacre—then
the huge difference between German practice and that of the Australian mili-
tary administration becomes even clearer. As far as we know, in none of the
Australian judgments were Melanesians accused of murdering Europeans. In
the majority of cases, the offenses were typical Melanesian pay-backs, for
which the accused would have received three years’ exile with hard labor from
the German administration. In twenty months the Australian military executed
more than eight times as many people for intra-Melanesian acts of violence as
the German colonial administration had done in the fourteen years during
which it had been in office.
On 31 March 1921 the new Administrator, Major General Wisdom, the
last military and the first civil governor, celebrated his appointment by giving a
party for officers in the Baining district, where he attended the public hanging
Table 7. The Death Sentence in the Criminal Justice 
Administered to the Indigenous Population of 
New Guinea by the German Colonial Govern-
ment (“Old Protectorate,” excluding Micronesia)
Years
Number of Death
Sentences Imposed
Number of
These Pardoned
1899–1900 1
1900–1901 0
1901–1902 0
1902–1903 0
1903–1904 a 1a 1
1904–1905 b23b 5
1905–1906 2
1906–1907 0
1907–1908 0
1908–1909 1
1909–1910 0
1910–1911 c0 c
1911–1912 1
1912–1913 6 d3d
Totals 35 9
aPlus one Chinese (pardoned; Hahl, 23 October 1903, to the Colonial 
Department; BAP: RKolA no. 4949).
bFifteen death sentences imposed by courts-martial in connection with the 
Friedrich-Wilhelmshafen “revolt.”
cNo indigenous people, but one Chinese.
dStationsleiter Arbinger, Eitape, 20 January 1913, to the Bezirksamt Friedrich-
Wilhelmshafen; AAC: AA 1963/83 Bun 64.
Source: Jahresberichte über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete. 
Statistischer Teil.
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of two Suvlitt people. Two weeks later two more Suvlitt people were executed
in their home district, in front of two hundred people. One of the two tried to
escape, but was recaptured by the police. However, a number of attempts had
to be made before the Suvlitts were hanged. Heavy rain made the ropes slip-
pery, turning the hanging into a long-drawn-out and difficult matter.200 It was
the worst start imaginable for the new man in Rabaul. The background to the
executions carried out with such difficulty is remarkable in every respect,
because it casts light into the shadows surrounding the way in which the mili-
tary administration treated the Melanesians who lived outside its administra-
tive organization.
Ruthless recruiting had deeply unsettled the people in the Baining district,
as everywhere in New Guinea. The beneficiaries of the uncontrolled recruit-
ment tolerated by the Johnston Administration included the Catholic Sacred
Heart Mission, which needed labor for its plantations and mission grounds. It
had already come into conflict with the Melanesians during the German period
Table 8. The Death Sentence in the Criminal Justice 
Administered to the Indigenous Population
of New Guinea by the Australian Military 
Government (September 1914–8 May 1921)
Year
Number of Death
Sentences Imposed
Number of
These Pardoned
1914 ?
1915 a5a
1916 1 1
1917 ?
1918 9 (?) 9(?)
1919 13 8
1920 28 16
1921 (to 8 May) 5
Totals 61 (?)34(?)
aPlus a Chinese; Namanula Times, no. 2, 1 January 1916, 4 (mockery of an 
obituary).
Sources: Pethebridge, Report nos. A 4 and A 15; AWM: 33/12–10. District 
Officer Charles Cork, Kaewieng, 17 April 1916 to the Administrator; AAC: AA 
1963/83, Bun 245: 259/16. Intelligence Reports Administrator Johnston, 
Griffiths, and Wisdom, nos. 4A, 6, 9, 15, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, and 
32; AAC: CP 103/11—NG Reports 2/15. Central Court, Rabaul. Criminal Cases 
(Gerichtsbuch 1919/1920); AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 239. Native Affairs 
Correspondence 1915–1918; AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 240. Government Gazette 
Rabaul, 5 (1918)–8 (1921). Cf. Nelson 1978.
Note: This data represents minimum figures. Lack of standardized material and 
gaps in the statistics mean that no complete overview can be given.
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because of its practice of removing children and young people from the influ-
ence of their parents and relations to bring them up as Christians on the
mission station.201 The Catholic mission exploited the military administration’s
inactivity in order to continue their old policy by tougher means. Led by
Garuki, the Malay overseer of the mission plantation in Mandras, a group of
ten Melanesians forced their way into a Suvlitt village at the end of 1917 to
coerce young villagers into going with them to the mission as workers. In a
bloody clash, five of the attackers were killed, but twenty-four young Suvlitt
people were abducted, including a number of children. Two children each of
the Melanesians Kaining (Kaning) and the Bikman Aluaite (Aluet) were
abducted.202
For the abducted children and young people, the Catholic Sacred Heart
mission station was not only an alien world but a prison. Within a short time fif-
teen of them had died. When the news reached the Baining district, the Bik-
man Aluaite urged Kaining to take revenge. Both had lost a child in the
mission. Local custom dictated that Kaining had to obey his Bikman. Even if
Kaining had refrained from blood vengeance despite the loss of his own child,
it would have been impossible for him to ignore the order he had been given.
Such an action would probably have led to his own death. In September 1919
Kaining killed the Baining man Sanganieki, who was paid by the mission to
provide Melanesian recruits. Sanganieki had obviously also been involved in
the raid led by the Malay in 1917, for before Kaining struck the fatal blow with
his axe, he called out to his victim: “You have abducted my two children and
given them to the Mission. I am very angry with you. You have abducted other
peoples’ children also; I am going to kill you.”203 Soon after, the Suvlitt man
Kaminarvet killed Sanganieki’s wife. Kaminarvet, who had also lost his children
to the mission, had similarly been ordered to do this by Aluaite. The Melane-
sian verdict of “guilty”—because she was the wife of the man who was respon-
sible for the abduction of the children—was again called out to her before
Kaminarvet struck her down.204
When the Catholic mission heard of the death of its informer, it notified
the military administration of “unrest” among the Baining. A punitive expedi-
tion, led by Lieutenant Hanlin and consisting of two police masters and fifty
Melanesian police soldiers, rushed to the Baining district. Although Hanlin
soon discovered that the real reason for the unrest was the illegal acts by the
mission and its Malay and Melanesian recruiters, he did not see any reason to
cancel the expedition. On the orders of the Australian officer, the police
stormed a Baining village with fixed bayonets and shot off 120 rounds of
ammunition. A German Catholic priest continually spurred them on. The
unholy alliance between German missionaries and Australian soldiers cost the
lives of six people. “The Natives have been taught a good lesson,” reported the
lieutenant.205
It is unlikely that the expedition actually identified the village from which
Aluaite, Kaining, and Kaminarvet came. In March 1920 Aluaite and his son
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Malbrinkkapokman were brought to court in Rabaul and sentenced to death
for the violent resistance offered to the Melanesian and Malay hunters of men
who had penetrated their village in 1917. Administrator Johnston reprieved
them both. One received five years in prison, the other a three-year sentence.
The rationale behind this decision was not so much the exceptional circum-
stances of the case, but the political consideration that the natives needed to be
shown that the administration, not the mission, had the authority to pronounce
judgments, and to repeal them.206 Neither the court nor the Administrator ever
considered that the two Baining might have acted in self-defense. The murders
of Sanganieki and his wife were not mentioned.
This was precisely why Kaining was brought to court late in 1920, and
Kaminarvet early in 1921. The whole case was reopened. Two German asses-
sors argued “that it is a dangerous thing to interfere with the native customs
and particularly to recruit the young children,”207 and ensured that their mis-
givings were placed before the Administrator. Nonetheless, the judge and
Administrator agreed unanimously that the Melanesians should be sentenced
to death. It is true that both judge and Administrator were critical of the mis-
sion, and Administrator Griffiths immediately issued a regulation that was
intended to prevent missions from acting in this way in the future.208 But the
ease with which he and others brushed aside serious doubts when passing judg-
ment and sentencing people to death was indicative of the self-righteousness
and racism that the civil administration had inherited unchanged from the
military administration.
THE MELANESIAN VIEW OF AUSTRALIANS
Ethnological studies of New Guinea now number in the hundreds, and a histo-
rian, in particular, can hardly keep up with them. What is still lacking, however,
is a study of how Melanesian New Guineans perceived Europeans. The appro-
priation of the term racism by political interest groups and its undifferentiated
use as a term of abuse for assorted political (and academic?) opponents has
perhaps prevented anthropologists from taking a closer look at something that
is of vital importance in explaining Melanesian reactions to Europeans. Despite
a general reluctance to grasp this nettle, it is quite clear that present-day
Melanesians differentiate both between European and Melanesian, and among
different types of European behavior.209 For Melanesians, cultural contact with
Europeans was no reason to change their traditional, dualistic worldview, char-
acterized by sharply contrasting categories.210 Europeans as such were initially
and frequently identified as bearers of technological progress.211 Probably the
most universal Melanesian interpretation of the basic difference in behavior
between themselves and Europeans refers to their different attitudes toward
time and its use—although no scholarly verification for this statement yet
exists. In any case, conversations with the people of Papua New Guinea repeat-
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edly reveal their astonishment at Europeans’ apparent ability to separate social
relations and responsibilities from, or even to subordinate them to, their per-
sonal work (or, conversely, their inability to recognize the significance of “social
time” as opposed to “economic time”).
It is unlikely that Melanesians differentiated among Europeans on the
basis of real or alleged national characteristics before 1914, because the Ger-
mans dominated the administration, the economy, and the missions almost
completely. In the systematization212 that is the usual response to personal
experience of the “other,” however, Europeans were placed into three con-
trasting groups: planters, missionaries, and administrative officials. The arrival
of the Australians in 1914 added a fourth category that was different from the
other three and deliberately set itself off from them. “No more ’um Kaiser,
God Save ’Um King,” read the Australian proclamation explaining what was
new to the local people. More than the words of the national anthem had
changed.213 Nonetheless, its impact on a people highly aware of symbols
should not be underestimated. For the first time they had a chance to attach
national characteristics to another type of European behavior. The first time
most Melanesians came into direct contact with Australians—excluding for the
moment the special experience of some of the native police—they encoun-
tered the willingness of Australian soldiers to share their tinned meat and bis-
cuits or to swap food for local products such as wood carvings. “Planti Inglis
man gutpela, planti kaikai i giv” (Many Englishmen are good, because they
give us a lot of food). Such comments are typical of the first phase of contact
between Australians and Melanesians.214 The suspension of communications
with the outside world that began with the war affected the Melanesian popu-
lation, particularly plantation workers, much more than it did the European
population of the colony. The impact of the end of food deliveries was exacer-
bated by the unusual drought. Some Germans had made the Melanesians
additionally insecure by spreading dreadful apocalyptic visions of the Japanese
coming to New Guinea and burning everything down.215 For many Melane-
sians the presence of Australian soldiers was a truly liberating experience. Not
only was their behavior very different from what the Germans, with their arti-
ficially inflated fears of the end of German rule, had led the Melanesians to
expect, but the Australians also relieved them of real concern for their usual
daily ration of rice and tinned fish.
The positive assessment of the Australians in New Guinea and, based on
this, of Australians in general went hand in hand with a negative view of Ger-
man behavior. In this case, criticism was also generalized to Germans as such:
“German—no good—push face—kick man back—English no do.”216 The fact
that the Europeans were not all the same—that many of the Germans kicked
and beat the Melanesians whereas the Australians did not (yet) do so—left a
big impression. However, careful observers such as the missionaries (this was
part of their job), noted that “free” Melanesians reacted differently from those
who were in European employment. The latter were friendly with the Austra-
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lian soldiers, calling them “Kanaka bilong Sydney,” which can be interpreted as
a gesture of fraternization.217
In the remote stations, particularly where German officials had built up a
special relationship with the local people, reactions could be quite different.
When the Australians occupied Bougainville and it was announced that all the
Germans had to leave the island on 8 December 1914, the Solomon Islanders
wanted to get rid of all Europeans at one stroke. But when they noticed that
the Germans in Kieta were only to be replaced by armed Australians, some
shouted: “We want the Germans back. We want Döllinger. . . . He was our
father, he was good to us.”218 Döllinger, head of the German station, was a colo-
nial official who had married a woman from the Pacific. Although his wife was
not a Melanesian but was descended from the Samoan clan of “Queen Emma,”
through her he had much greater insight into (and much better emotional
access to) local patterns of behavior than most of his colleagues. Personal ties
and loyalties that had developed between “the German” and his former
Melanesian subjects survived, on the Melanesian side, all the tensions and
vicissitudes of the war, as Germans who visited the area many years after the
end of the war discovered.219
The head of the German station in Morobe was married to a local woman,
and the German influence remained stronger there than elsewhere. Captain
Detzner was roaming the jungle, but the strongest factor was the presence of
the Neuendettelsauer mission. Here the local people were soon critical of the
Australian occupation. On a patrol late in 1915, the Australian district officer
was told in many villages “that the English were no good and that they could
easily kill the kiap [district officer].”220 As late as mid-August 1915, a different
Australian patrol found a village south of Madang still flying a number of Ger-
man flags over its huts. They were attached to high poles, and the luluai
assured the Australians that they had been fluttering there for several months.
It seems unlikely that this was a political demonstration by the villagers against
Australian rule; but this cannot be totally ruled out if we remember that
although the village was relatively far away from the nearest administrative
center, it could be reached from there without great difficulty. We can be sure
that the villagers were aware of the Australian occupation of Madang, and they
certainly knew of the high value Europeans placed on coats of arms, emblems,
and other national symbols. Nonetheless, the more likely explanation is that the
luluai did not remove the flags for fear of punishment by returning Germans.221
It was not only the German residents who repeatedly warned the local
people that the German colonial government would come back soon and pun-
ish them if they cooperated too closely with the Australians. The losers of the
war in the colony also included Asians, who were the object of especially racist
prejudice on the part of the Australians. Malays who came from what is now
Indonesia were not very happy about the loss of their former privileges as fore-
men, plantation overseers, and government employees. Quite a number of
them wanted the Germans to return. At the end of May 1916, Rabaul wit-
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nessed a confrontation between Malays and Melanesians, when Melanesians in
a boisterous mood mocked some Malays they met and the annoyed Malays
threatened them with the return of the Germans in two or three months. The
Malays suggested that the Germans would soon wipe the grins off the Melane-
sians’ faces.222
Although the first phase of Australian rule had a “liberating” effect on
Melanesian workers in the European centers, in time this exclusively positive
image of the Australians acquired more and more cracks. It is not surprising
that the plantation workers were the most enthusiastic about this political
change. By the same token, the free Melanesians were the first to experience
its disadvantages. The Melanesians who had been included in the German
administrative organization and had come to appreciate the benefits of the Pax
Germanica, openly criticized the Australian military administration for giving
up the practice of regular patrols, thus tolerating incursions into the pacified
zone both by locals and Europeans.223 In the region between Madang and
Morobe, local functionaries who had been appointed by the former German
colonial administration took advantage of the legal vacuum left behind by the
military administration. On their own authority, they put an end to the anarchic
conditions by usurping rights that had belonged to the European administra-
tion. Luluai and tultul punished local men and women by administering whip-
pings, after having established their “guilt” in a brief trial. In some villages,
twenty to twenty-five whippings per day were not unusual. They threatened to
flog a German planter as well, if he dared to recruit workers in their district
again. The acting Australian district officer in Morobe was totally ignored, and
all indigenous disputes were resolved internally. The neighboring (Neuendet-
telsauer) mission supported this procedure, which the district officer of
Madang, W. M. B. Ogilvy had approved because he was unable to deal with the
area himself. His colleague in Morobe now launched a crusade against the
behavior that seemed to have established itself.224
The constant turnover in district officers, their frequently contradictory
policies, and in general, the lack of clear and lasting guidelines for action
caused a deep insecurity among those members of the local population who
had welcomed pacification. This feeling was exacerbated by the behavior of a
number of Australian police and station officials, whose arbitrary rule over the
local population under their control could almost be called a reign of terror.
There was no lack of local strategies to cope with the worst excesses, but they
were rarely successful in these cases. In order to prevent the women of his vil-
lage from being sexually intimidated, the tultul Karkilami of Marklow ordered
them to hide from the Australian officers who were carrying out a census. Dur-
ing a census, it was normal practice to line up all the inhabitants of a village in
front of the district officer. This made it easier for the official to register all men
who were liable for taxation (and facilitated recruitment). Obviously, it also
made it easier to take note of the best-looking women. The district officer pun-
ished the tultul for his behavior by officially sentencing him to a whipping,
CH2  Page 100  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:15 PM
The German South Pacific under the Shadow of War 101
which was administered on the spot, although corporal punishment had already
been abolished.225
Other Melanesians who regarded submitting to German rule as a loss of
traditional freedoms endeavored to make the most of these developments by
attempting to restore their lost hegemony over tribes that had previously been
subject to them. In Potsdamhafen, north of Madang, and on the Sepik, near
the old government station in Angoram, tribal fighting broke out. In both cases,
those who benefited from the breakdown of state order let it be known that
there was no longer a government, and that they could now do as they liked.
On the island of Karkar the old tactic revived of attaching oneself to govern-
ment forces as an armed local escort in order to attack traditional enemies in a
European-legal way.226
In general, it is clear that many of the Melanesian strategies for coping
with Europeans which had already proved themselves during the German
period were now applied to the Australians. Once again, the Melanesians’ pri-
mary aim was to manipulate the Europeans to their own advantage or to adopt
European ways in order to manipulate other Melanesians. A Melanesian
dressed up as a police boy collected the head tax, allegedly in the service of the
Australians.227 In a number of cases, the Australian military administration
clearly scored points over the German administration. In Manus, the district
officer was officially asked to use his weapons to shoot dead evil spirits. And
when Melanesians had disputes with German settlers, appealing to British
authority certainly did them no harm.228 Under the German administration the
missionaries had had to be treated with kid gloves out of a constant fear of
Erzberger’s public criticism of colonial affairs in the German parliament, the
Reichstag. Even the missionaries’ power could now be shaken by playing the
card of their problematic nationality. Wood carvings with exaggerated sexual
organs had, from the start, been a source of conflict between Melanesians and
missionaries. In the area around the Sepik River the Catholic missionaries of
the Divine Word regularly raided the “Tambaran” or spirit houses where stat-
ues and masks of this sort were generally kept. When one of the priests once
again wanted to remove an “obscene” figure on the ground that the German
official had tolerated this sort of behavior before, the tultul argued that “Maski,
German Kiap he go finish” (I don’t mind; it’s all up with the German district
officer). The missionary soon received the necessary support from the Austra-
lian “kiap.”229 Melanesians also occasionally appealed to a common background
in order to achieve a favorable judgment, like the luluai who told the Australian
magistrate that, after all, he was a really a Queenslander too, as he had worked
on the plantations there for years.230
Certain trends from the German period continued, or were strengthened,
under the Australians. One was the tendency of the Melanesian population to
decrease in a number of areas. Up to twenty different methods or herbs were
used as contraceptives. Sick children were frequently killed. “He sick—he no
good—I made him die quick,” replied a woman on one of the northern islands
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of the St. Matthias group when a European came across her stoning her
child.231 We have already referred to a probable link between European
employment and a decline in the Melanesian population. Evidence is mount-
ing that Melanesian women deliberately chose not to give birth, in order to
prevent their children from being forced to work for Europeans. An Australian
official was convinced that women refused to have children out of fear that
they would bear sons who would be taken away from them to work for the
Europeans. “Mary no like” (The woman does not want to), a Melanesian Bik-
man replied when a district officer asked him why they had only one child.232
Another Australian heard a Melanesian say: “What for me make him picanninie
for white man—he no more can live all same father belong him” (Why should I
father a child, just for the whites? He would no longer be able to live like his
father did.)233
We should not seek to devalue these statements by pointing out (correctly)
that they fit in exactly with the thinking in categories practised by the social
Darwinist theoreticians of earlier times (who believed that Pacific Islanders
were inferior to Europeans, and would, as a “lower race,” inevitably have the
worst of the clash between cultures and die out). Similarly, they fit equally well
into the arguments put forward by modern critics of colonialism, who see the
indigenous population as pure sacrificial lambs, the Europeans as the incarna-
tion of evil, and backward-looking traditionalism as a panacea for the salvation
of non-European cultures. To be sure, the conflict between European and
Melanesian priorities also revealed a fatalistic attitude of resignation—maski in
Tok Pisin, meaning “I don’t mind.” (This, incidentally, suggests that another
view often indiscriminately applied to the Third World—namely, that popula-
tions increase in an uncontrolled fashion as a consequence of cultural con-
tact—needs considerable qualification in terms of period and region.) Fatalistic
resignation, however, was not the only or even the usual or majority attitude of
Melanesians to the consequences of forced contact with Europeans. If this had
been the case, there would no longer be an indigenous population in Papua
New Guinea. On the whole, the people of New Guinea, with regional varia-
tions, came to terms astonishingly well234 with the changes in their world
wrought by the German and then the Australian colonial administration. This is
less a retrospective justification for the behavior of the Europeans than an
admission of the superior adaptability of the Melanesians.
GOLD MINE AND STRATEGIC SHIELD:
NEW GUINEA IN THE EYES OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICIANS
On the question of the future of Australian-occupied New Guinea, most Aus-
tralian politicians had no doubt about the essential point. They agreed that
after the war New Guinea should be transferred into Australian possession
under international law. Almost exactly one month after German New Guinea’s
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military surrender, Atlee Hunt, acting on the instructions of the prime minister
and the foreign minister, Hugh Mahon (Labor), asked the foremost Australian
authority on Melanesia, Murray, the governor of Papua, to present his ideas on
the future of New Guinea to cabinet. Hunt enclosed with his letter a summary
of his own reflections, in which he made four main points. New Guinea, Papua,
and the Solomons, which Britain was to cede to Australia, were to form a single
Australian colony. The islands were to be administered by one governor. He
was to be based, not on the islands, but in northern Australia (Townsville). A
royal commission was to develop detailed suggestions for future policy. As
members of the commission, Hunt named himself, Murray, and his own bosom
friend, Lucas, general manager of Burns Philp. Hunt tried to dispel any possi-
ble reservations Murray might have about such obviously favorable treatment
for one company: “Of course his firm is financially interested but that is no real
drawback. . . . Moreover I do not think we could find anyone of real knowledge
who is not in some way or other financially interested.” And finally, the Austra-
lian government had already agreed that, unlike Germany, it would not subsi-
dize the administration of New Guinea: the colony would have to be financially
self-supporting. In order to achieve this, the system of head-taxes would have
to be expanded (and if possible extended to Papua and the Solomons). Govern-
ment control would have to increase, to allow better access to local labor.235
Thereupon, in mid-December 1914, Murray developed his ideas on the amal-
gamation of New Guinea and Papua, still working on the assumption that he
Administrator Pethebridge and staff, Rabaul 1917 (from left: Colonel C. L. Strangman,
P.M.O.; Lady Pethebridge; Administrator Pethebridge; and Lieutenant Colonel Mac-
kenzie, the judge). (Photograph by Thomas J. McMahon. Australian Archives Canberra)
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would be governor of the united Melanesian territories. He did not believe in
the incorporation of the British Solomons but assumed that what was left of the
German possessions in the Solomons, the islands of Buka and Bougainville,
would be given to Britain.236
The first Australian to develop ideas for the future of the colony on the
basis of his own experience in the military administration of New Guinea was
Pethebridge. For the Administrator, the cornerstone of an Australian takeover
of the colony was the expulsion of the Germans after the conclusion of peace
and the expropriation of their property in New Guinea. In a detailed memoran-
dum dated late in 1915, the former secretary of defense was one of the first to
justify imperialist ambitions in terms of strategic considerations. He pointed
out that Australia and New Zealand were the only British dominions vulnerable
to attack only from the sea, and that they both had almost purely British popu-
lations. The main consideration in the acquisition of Papua had already been
that it would form a buffer zone between Australia and “the millions of the
East.”237
Pethebridge’s reasoning is one more example of the fear, universal in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, of the “yellow peril.” On the fifth continent, this fear
amounted to more than the grandiloquent statements, effectively staged for
the media, made in Europe on the same subject. In Australia and New Zealand
the near-hysteria seemed less artificial. It was not that fear of the Yellow Peril
there was based on historical experience reaching back, as in Europe, into the
obscurity of their own past. Rather, it was the immediate past and, strangely
enough, their own actions, not those of Asians or others, which had given Aus-
tralians and New Zealanders such a shock that almost the only explanation is
psychological. The ease with which the Britons had taken Australia from the
Aborigines and brought the Aboriginal population to the brink of extinction
was the fundamental historical experience of white Australians. Since then,
they had lived in constant fear that one day they might suffer the same fate.
Their own racist policies that excluded Asians only fueled these fears, because
they implied that the Asian “hordes” would one day take bitter revenge for the
discrimination they had suffered.
If New Guinea was joined to Papua, there would be an effective buffer
between Australia and Asia. In addition, at least part of the toll of lives to be
paid in a military confrontation with China—or, as seemed likelier, with
Japan—in which the only thing that still seemed uncertain was the timing,
could be paid by a non-British population. As early as December 1914 the Aus-
tralian navy had already advised the Ministry of Defence to develop Rabaul
into a naval base after the war.238 And Pethebridge himself described the main
task of a future Australian colonial administration as being “to preserve the
racial stamina of the mountain tribes for military resources most of all. Their
courage and physique make them splendid raw material.”239 Thus the belliger-
ent qualities of the Melanesian hill tribes were to be preserved in order to
deploy them against the Japanese in case of war. The coastal tribes, by contrast,
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were to be forced to work. In Pethebridge’s view, “forced labour . . . is the most
beneficial kind of taxation.” Cheap labor and large plantations were the two
most important prerequisites for the desired economic success: “To work the
gold and petroleum deposits also, no less than to cultivate the copra, rubber,
sisal hemps and other products, the native must be exploited.” Australia had
the advantage, he pointed out, that Germany had not so far attempted to
extract quick profits from New Guinea. As only one-third of the cultivated
plants in the plantation were mature, a great economic future lay ahead of Aus-
tralian New Guinea. Therefore, he suggested, all the land that was still in the
possession of the indigenous people should be confiscated as Crown land.240
Of all the Australian concepts of New Guinea, the most widespread was
the notion of the colony as a natural strategic shield for Australia that could, in
addition, generate fabulous profits without large investment. Not least, Prime
Minister Hughes furiously defended both positions and Australia’s claim to
New Guinea in several fiery speeches during the war. The best known of these
were his lectures in the Savoy Hotel, New York, and at the Pilgrim Club in
London. In these lectures, given at the end of May and in mid-July 1918,
respectively, he summed up the old Australian dream of a Pacific Monroe Doc-
trine in the slogan Hands Off the Australian Pacific.241
A secret memorandum, produced by the Australian chief of the general
staff, Brigadier General Hubert Foster, in May 1917 at the request of the min-
ister of defense, Pearce, confirmed the strategic significance of Rabaul for Aus-
tralia in a future war with Japan. Micronesia, by contrast, was strategically
unimportant and too far away from Australia to represent a real danger.
According to the report, there were no military reasons to object to the equator
as the de facto border between Japan and Australia.242 At that time not even
Foster knew that at a meeting with Grey in London as long ago as April 1916,
Prime Minister Hughes had already designated the equator as the postwar
demarcation line. Pearce had advised Hughes before this meeting that except
for Nauru, which was of economic value, the Micronesian islands were eco-
nomically and strategically unimportant for Australia. Exactly the opposite
applied to the islands south of the equator. New Guinea, “a shield to the North-
ern portions of our continent,” and Melanesian soldiers—these were Pethe-
bridge’s precise thoughts in the mouth of the minister of defense.243
In the whole of Australia, only one person of any public standing
expressed doubts about a New Guinea under Australian rule. Behind the
scenes, and without the cabinet discovering what he was doing, the governor-
general, Ronald Munro Ferguson, worked against Australia acquiring any new
colonies. Instead, he advocated that the Pacific islands under British control
should be united under two high commissioners answerable directly to the
Crown. One commissioner, to be based in Auckland, should take charge of
New Zealand’s sphere of influence in Fiji and Samoa; the other should reside
in Sydney and administer the rest of Melanesia plus Tonga, as well as New
Caledonia and the New Hebrides, which were to be acquired from France. In
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Munro Ferguson’s opinion, the simplest solution would be for the existing
governor-general of Australia to assume the functions of this high commis-
sioner as well.244
In the governor-general’s view, there were many reasons why responsibil-
ity for the British-controlled Pacific Islands should not be given directly to the
Australian federal government. The most important factors in his view were:
first, Australian lack of sympathy for black people, as demonstrated in the
“blackbirding” scandal of the Australian-dominated Pacific Labour Trade, in
the Queensland government’s infamous practice of issuing white settlers
licences to hunt—in fact to kill—Aborigines, and in the White Australia Pol-
icy, implemented in response to pressure from the trades unions; second, the
lack of trained officials; and finally, Australia’s obvious inability to develop
tropical regions like its own Northern Territory.245 In the crucial hours of the
Versailles negotiations, the Australian governor-general wrote to the British
colonial secretary, Milner, saying that for these reasons Australia should be
denied the mandate for New Guinea.246 Almost at the same time, he wrote
down his own ideas of the policy for the indigenous population, which would
be implemented in the Pacific Islands under his leadership. In this document,
the English nobleman revealed that his indignation toward Australian ambi-
tions was prompted less by a principled humanitarianism than by royalist and
imperialist convictions. The guidelines governing Munro Ferguson’s “native
policy” can be summed up in one sentence: “it is essential that the native
should be made to respect and fear his white master.” In order to realize this
categorical imperative of colonial policy, Ferguson believed it was absolutely
necessary to adopt the German system of corporal punishment unchanged.
And in order to underline the difference between the white masters and the
natives, natives would not be permitted to wear European clothing but would
be compelled to go naked.247 In the governor-general’s view, the pressure to
conform to European patterns of behavior should be replaced by a prohibition
on adopting European models. Perhaps this is an appropriate place to point
out that racism and antiracism are defined, not in terms of refusing or approv-
ing of tradition, but of rejecting or accepting the indigenous decision, what-
ever it may be.
Munro Ferguson’s colleagues, the British high commissioner for the West-
ern Pacific, Bickham Escott, and the governor-general of New Zealand, Liver-
pool, put forward similar notions. All their ideas were based on the assumption
that Britain would directly administer Germany’s Pacific colonies, which it had
occupied during the First World War.248 Although these men had good connec-
tions with the highest circles in Britain, their proposals never had the faintest
chance of being adopted. In London, too, the times when policy was made in
order to satisfy a few lords were past. Too much was involved. Nothing less
than the future membership of Australia and New Zealand in the empire was at
stake. And what these two Dominions were worth to the mother country had
just been demonstrated by the war.
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Despite the private policy being pursued by Britain’s highest representa-
tives in Australia, expectations of the commercial value of New Guinea as a
future Australian colony grew among the Australian people and their politi-
cians. Hopes were focused on the coconut palms the German settlers had
planted and continued to cultivate, in spite of the war. Reports about an eco-
nomic wonderland that could supply Australia with practically everything it
needed filled the space left in the Australian newspapers by bad news from the
war.249 Early in 1916 a commission was founded on the instigation of the Aus-
tralian minister for trade and customs. The commission’s main aim was to
secure Australian–British control over the copra trade in the South Pacific. In
addition, it was instructed to investigate the economic potential of other tropi-
cal plants. In principle, this was simply a government contract to investigate the
agricultural and economic prospects held out by a political takeover of the Ger-
man colonies in the South Pacific.
Speculation about New Guinea’s fabulous mineral wealth, however, gener-
ated far more enthusiasm among Australian politicians and people alike than
did all its agricultural produce taken together. Rumors about secret German
discoveries of gold and oil did the rounds of Australia’s pubs, their credibility
and the deposits of mineral wealth constantly growing. On the express wish of
Prime Minister Hughes, a scientific expedition left Australia for New Guinea
late in 1920 “to take stock of what the country possesses.”250 It was led by Dr.
Campbell Brown, a mineralogist who had already explored osmiridium depos-
its in Papua. Brown, however, got no farther than the river Ramu, where he
found photographs of “undiscovered” tribes more interesting than the mineral
wealth upon which the Australian government had pinned its hopes. Finally, he
ran out of funds. Thereupon an incensed Hughes had everything relating to the
case, including Brown’s pocket-watch, seized.251 The one-sided orientation of
Australia’s trade toward Britain during the war and the transfer of capital to the
motherland had destroyed Australia’s flourishing economy. The country and its
politicians were desperately seeking a financial solution. The minister for the
navy, Joseph Cook, speaking to Australia’s student elite early in 1920, pointed
out that if oil were to be discovered in New Guinea, “it would be a source of
infinite financial gain for Australia.”252 At the beginning of January 1921, when
the League of Nations was just in the process of confirming the mandate but
the military administration was still in office in Rabaul, the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, which had already unsuccessfully drilled for oil in Papua, began to
prospect for the mysterious German oil finds in the area around Eitape. Once
again, Prime Minister Hughes was the driving force behind the venture.253
Hughes, who had practically tied his political career to Australia’s takeover of
New Guinea, had to satisfy an expectant Australian people. At first, however,
only promises could be made, and an increasingly anxious population had to be
kept going with propaganda. New Guinea was “a land fertile and rich in all
products . . . a land of abundance,” the prime minister claimed in mid-Septem-
ber 1922 at the showing of an advertising film for the new Australian colony
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made from what had been salvaged from Campbell Brown’s disastrous expedi-
tion.254 Those for whom these words were not merely comforting mood music
were already preparing to gather in their wealth.
THE INFLUENCE OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
During the war, nobody was more active and persistent in agitating for Austra-
lian control of German New Guinea than James Burns. From November 1914,
Australian and British politicians were inundated by a constant flood of memo-
randa from Burns Philp, attempting to influence the political future of the
Pacific Islands in the company’s favor. All of Burns Philp’s demands were based
on three basic assumptions: (1) German New Guinea must remain Australian
and the Germans should not be allowed back; (2) the Germans remaining in
the colony were to be expelled, their property expropriated, and its value set
against the compensation that Germany would have to pay to Britain after the
war, “leaving it to the German Proprietors to recover the value from their own
German Government”; and (3) only Australian ships were to carry on trade
with New Guinea.255 The flag of Australian imperialism barely disguised the
company’s real goal, which was to secure and retain the monopoly on trade and
transport it had gained during the war: the Australian nationalism that Burns
Timid Melanesians halfway up the river Ramu. The Campbell Brown expedition, 1920.
(Photograph by William J. Jackson. Australian Archives Canberra)
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Philp promoted with enthusiasm was nothing but a means to an end. The com-
pany rejected the idea of a British administration for the Pacific Islands
because they feared that British colonial officials might place the welfare of the
local people above that of the company. For exactly the same reason, they
wanted Australian rule after the war to cover not only former German New
Guinea but also the British islands of the western Pacific, the Solomons, and
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The company operated in all of these islands.256
Burns spent August and September 1915 in London in order to win over
to his cause the really influential people, those who held the reins of power in
the empire. He had prepared his mission thoroughly. The governor-general of
Australia had always been well disposed toward him. Burns had apparently
gained his favor by supporting a central island administration based in Sydney,
while playing down the obvious discrepancy between Munro Ferguson’s idea of
a purely British and his own of an Australian hegemony. The Colonial Office
was already aware of Burns’ memorandum on the future of the Pacific, as the
governor-general had passed it on to Harcourt early in 1915. All the officials in
the Colonial Office and all British MPs had received a copy of the pamphlet
“British Mismanagement in the Pacific Islands,” originally written by Burns in
1907. This polemic had first been serialized anonymously in the Sydney Morn-
ing Herald, Australia’s highest circulation newspaper, where it had successfully
mobilized Australian public opinion against the German presence in the South
Pacific.257 Now an expanded version appealed to the mother country’s bad con-
science. Britain, the pamphlet’s author pointed out, had “betrayed” its colonies
in the Pacific for the sake of an agreement with Germany and France. This
argument did not fail to make an impression at a time when the mother coun-
try urgently needed the help of its colonies.
Without the knowledge of the Australian foreign secretary, Mahon, but
equipped with personal recommendations from the governor-general, Burns
found all doors open to him in London. He had detailed talks with Bonar Law,
Harcourt, and John Anderson, in which he vigorously pushed his political and
economic ideas, and presented a complete “Australian” shopping list. In addi-
tion to German New Guinea, he said, the Solomons, the Gilbert and Ellice
Islands, and Tonga should be entirely administered by Australia. Australia and
Britain should come to an agreement on the phosphate islands of Nauru and
Ocean Island. The New Hebrides should be divided between Australia and
France. The Dutch part of New Guinea should at least be under British con-
trol. New Zealand, which was to come off badly in large areas of the Pacific,
should be compensated by getting Samoa and the French part of Polynesia
(nothing was said about compensation for France). Above all, however, the
Germans should be removed from New Guinea at the end of the war, and Aus-
tralian companies should take over the German plantation companies.258
In general, James Burns was well received by the people to whom he
spoke, and in one matter his listeners were more than sympathetic. They noted
the hegemonial ambitions of a greater Australia but passed over them without
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discussion because they were aware that, even with British support, most of
them were totally unrealistic.259 But things were different when it came to the
Scottish-Australian’s economic and political fantasies concerning Germany’s
Pacific colonies. While Burns was packing his suitcases in Munro Ferguson’s
private residence in Scotland, which the governor-general had put at his dis-
posal, Bonar Law was already writing to Australia with instructions to set up a
new Australian company to take over German property in New Guinea and
Samoa, “so as to get rid of the German element together.”260 This suggestion
was Burns’ contribution to the general shadow-boxing during the war. Such
ideas came and went. What remained was Burns Philp.
The most important result of Burns’ visit to Britain was the assurance that
German New Guinea would become Australian after the war. Any objections
that settlers or officials could raise would, in the final analysis, have little
effect.261 In the meantime, it was hoped that Britain would fight hard to make
the desired goals possible. After all, the present struggle was nothing less than a
“battle for commercial supremacy,” as Walter Lucas, the company’s manager,
put it late in 1915.262 With British support, Burns Philp could concentrate on
the next steps. One of these was to prevent New Guinea from being adminis-
tered jointly with Papua. Burns Philp argued that New Guinea would be better
off under an independent, autocratically led Australian administration. Other-
wise the labor potential of New Guinea would be at risk, as workers for Papua
could be recruited from New Guinea, thus damaging the commercial interests
of the plantations in New Guinea. The same argument now suddenly made it
seem less favorable for the British Solomons to join Australian New Guinea. In
this case, too, an outflow of Melanesian labor from New Guinea was feared.263
Exactly ten days after the armistice came into effect in Europe, James
Burns went to see the acting Australian prime minister, Watt. In order to
ensure that the future control of New Guinea would really benefit Australia,
Burns insisted, the Australian government would have to pass a formal resolu-
tion to expel the Germans from New Guinea immediately after the conclusion
of peace and to transfer their property to an Australian company to be set up
for the purpose. The cabinet resisted making an official commitment so
quickly, but Watt told Burns that, in principle, his suggestions had been posi-
tively received. In Britain, the London director of the company, Lord Inch-
cape, bombarded the colonial secretary with the same demands. The colonial
secretary informed Lord Inchcape that he was “very sympathetic” to the model
proposed by Burns Philp.264 By the end of December 1918, a majority of the
Australian cabinet had come down on the side of Burns Philp.265
Even Burns Philp could not allow itself to drop its mask entirely. The sug-
gestion of founding a new Australian company to take over German property
was the necessary sheep’s clothing for the wolf hiding underneath. In January
1919 James Burns warned the company’s London representatives that “it would
be unwise to have the appearance of limiting the scheme to one or two capital-
ists—Doing so would invite criticism all round. . . . It would be the old story of
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the War having been fought in capitalistic interests etc. etc. We want the con-
trol, in the interests of all concerned. . . . We have the whole thing well in
hand.”266 The main thing was to get rid of the Germans first, and then to buy up
all the German property before the other interested parties got to it—“then we
hold the key to the whole position.”267 At the same time, he suggested, any
attempt by the Australian government to take the economic development of
New Guinea into its own hands must be blocked. Officers on duty there now
should be forbidden to start up businesses of their own.268
In P. B. O’Connor the company gained a successful lobbyist, who consider-
ably stepped up the pressure behind the scenes. O’Connor was Burns’ neigh-
bor in Paramatta, a lawyer, and vice president of the New South Wales
parliament. He tirelessly lobbied ministers, and above all, Acting Prime Minis-
ter Watt. Journalists who were prepared to write articles supporting Burns
Philp received a free tour of the islands.269 As early as 22 January, Watt prom-
ised O’Connor that he was “entirely” behind Burns Philp’s plans.270 In London,
it would be necessary to be rather more careful, “so as not to appear to put for-
ward our requests as it were for the aggrandizement and interests of our com-
pany, but to put them forward more in the interests of the Empire’s and
Australia’s trade.”271 At the end of May 1919 the London branch of Burns Philp
could report a decisive breakthrough. On 23 May its director had met with the
Australian prime minister, Hughes, who had just returned from Paris. It was a
highly sensitive meeting, held at a secret location and with all the precautions
dictated by Hughes’ fear that the matter could become public—“the quieter
this matter was handled, the better.” Burns Philp had summed up its main
demands again in a memorandum: the elimination of all foreign influence, the
takeover of German property, and all shipping connections with New Guinea
to be exclusively Australian. Burns Philp was aiming for a monopoly on the
transport of Australian manufactured products and food to New Guinea and on
shipping copra from New Guinea to Australia. It wanted the government to use
its influence to keep potential competitors out of the country—especially the
Japanese, who were waiting for their chance and were prepared to pay higher
prices for copra than the firm from Sydney. After all, the colony could be eco-
nomically developed for Australia’s benefit only “if sufficient cheap labour is
obtainable.”272
To the prime minister, it almost seemed as if what the company put before
him summed up his own thoughts. Hughes gave Burns Philp’s London repre-
sentative detailed information about the decision taken at Versailles to expro-
priate enemy property and set its value against the reparations owed by
Germany. The German government would have to compensate its citizens
itself. He advised Burns Philp that the most practical course of action for it to
take would be to set up a new private company in which the Australian govern-
ment would have a small interest. Although he had no intention of the state
exercising greater economic influence, the prime minister explained: “the rea-
son for the Commonwealth desiring some interest is to be able to give the lie to
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any statement which might be made that the Government had given a monop-
oly of this trading over to such a Company as B. P. & Co., by stating that the
Government had an interest in the Company. . . . You know I am a Socialist and
have been all my life and believe in Socialistic trading, but I am not foolish and
unless Socialistic trading makes for profits it must be cut out.”273
Burns congratulated his London representative on his tactics—“the more
quietly we work the better, and all things considered we seem now to be fairly
safe.”274 The company now really needed the influence of the prime minister,
as with the end of the war, competition had revived. On 30 May 1919 the
Administrator in Rabaul had permitted a Japanese ship to load copra for the
Australian company W. R. Carpenter and transport it to Sydney. Thereupon all
the larger German firms canceled their contracts with Burns Philp because
they no longer wanted to pay its high freight rates. In a hastily convened meet-
ing on 31 May, the Australian cabinet approved Shepherd’s (the secretary to the
prime minister) request that only British ships be permitted to transport
freight from New Guinea. The Administrator was immediately informed of this
decision by telegraph, and the Japanese ship had to leave Rabaul empty.275
Not quite three weeks later, on 18 July 1919, the Australian cabinet
appointed Lucas, the general manager of Burns Philp, to a royal commission
that was to work out proposals for future arrangements in New Guinea. After
all, as Shepherd argued, it was important “that lines should be laid down to
ensure that the Commonwealth will reap to the fullest extent possible some
real benefit from the acquisition of the Territory,” and nobody was better
equipped to do this than Walter Henry Lucas.276 The commission was chaired
by the governor of Papua, Murray, and the Australian government was repre-
sented by the secretary for home and territories, Atlee Hunt. Everything was
developing just as Hunt had predicted at the beginning of the war. Even
before his nomination, Lucas had provided a slogan for the commission: Hob-
ble the Hun.277
With the nomination of Lucas and the presence of Burns Philp’s old family
friend, Atlee Hunt, the company was halfway to achieving its goal. “There
seems to be a good chance of German New Guinea being treated somewhat in
the manner we previously suggested,” rejoiced the company’s founder.278 In
New Guinea, in the meantime, a division of labor emerged within the commis-
sion. While his colleagues were interesting themselves more in administrative
questions and the missions, Lucas was left undisturbed to collect detailed data
about German property in the colony. Working for the firm, he concentrated on
finding out how much the property owned by the Germans had originally cost
in marks. Armed with this information, the company intended to make its offer
for the property in marks at the moment when the German currency was at its
lowest value.279 Officially, Lucas had left the company when he was called to
serve on the commission. As a member of the commission he was not permitted
to pass on information, but he nevertheless kept Burns Philp well informed
about the state of the commission and every confidential discussion.280
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In their closing report the majority of commissioners, Lucas, and Hunt,
recommended to the Australian government a plan that was practically identi-
cal with Burns Philp’s war aims. All Germans, including missionaries, were to
be deported from New Guinea. German plantations should be sold to private
individuals; German businesses and companies liquidated and replaced by
Australian firms. New Guinea should continue to be administered separately
from Papua (commercial reasons were given, whereas considerations of inter-
national law were considered unimportant); Australian subsidies would not be
necessary, as the colony would pay its own way. All shipping should continue to
operate exclusively via Sydney, as had been the case during the war. The Aus-
tralian Navigation Act, which discriminated against all non-British ships, was
not enough. Preferential tariffs that advantaged Australian ships above British
ships also had to be introduced.281
The commission’s chairman, Papua’s Governor Murray, saw himself
pushed to the wall, with all his suggestions. He had developed alternative mod-
els on almost all points: the unification of Papua and New Guinea under one
administration and the nationalization of the four big German plantation com-
panies and larger plantations over 400 hectares, while keeping as many Ger-
man colonists in the colony as possible. As in South West Africa, they were to
be granted full citizenship, including the right to elect a government council,
which was to be reintroduced. Finally, he suggested founding a government
shipping company so that the colony would not be dependent on a private ship-
ping line (naturally, this referred to Burns Philp). Moreover, Australian sub-
sidies for the colony of New Guinea would be unavoidable.282 Military
Administrator Johnston supported Murray on many points. Although Johnston
rejected the idea of combining Papua with New Guinea—“New Guinea is in
every way much more advanced than Papua”—he, like Murray, supported the
idea of a continuing German presence. And he was more critical than the gov-
ernor of Papua of the planned auction of the large plantations, which he saw as
something that would benefit only capitalists and syndicates. He argued that
the right to buy should be dependent on an obligation to settle in the colony; in
that way, interested parties could come to New Guinea from all over the world.
Johnston was most critical of the colony’s lack of access to world markets. The
regulation that all of the colony’s trade had to go through Sydney, he argued,
would benefit only a few businessmen in Sydney, while the colony as such
would suffer and its development be checked.283
Murray and Johnston had good reason to fight so vigorously against Burns
Philp’s monopoly on transport. Since the beginning of the war Dutch steamers
from neighboring Dutch New Guinea had no longer been able to put in at Pap-
uan ports. With the conquest of New Guinea, the interest of Australian traders
had shifted, and even Burns Philp’s government-subsidized ships called at Port
Moresby ever more rarely.284 In New Guinea the disadvantages of a lack of
competition and dependence on Burns Philp steamers had long since become
clear. When dockworkers in Australia went on strike from late 1919 to early
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1920, the colony’s trade collapsed completely. Between 20 December 1919 and
20 March 1920 only a single ship—a British one—went to New Guinea. Thou-
sands of tons of finished copra simply rotted.285
Johnston found it difficult to make anyone listen to his opinion. All his sub-
ordinates were questioned by the commission; only he was passed over. Even-
tually he decided to put his views before the commission in writing. Later,
Murray was convinced that the whole commission had only been a front to con-
ceal the fact that decisions had already been made much earlier.286
While official representatives examined New Guinea from administrative
and commercial points of view and ignored the local population (except as a
cheap labor force), members of the missions drew up alternative scenarios for
the indigenous people. Most of their suggestions, however, reveal the familiar
condescending attitude. The Methodist leader, Pastor Cox, called for all land to
which the Melanesians did not lay claim to be taken from them and declared
Crown land. He also advocated raising the head-tax. The Catholic bishop,
Couppé, demanded a ban on recruiting single women but endorsed the rein-
troduction of corporal punishment for local workers. Both Cox and Couppé
wanted to drive the Chinese out of the country.287
The Australian government accepted the advice of the majority of the
commission and sent Lucas to New Guinea again to implement its suggestions.
As the prime minister’s “technical adviser” for New Guinea and chairman of
the Expropriation Board, he became the most powerful man in the colony,
ranking above even the Administrator. Nothing could be done without him,
and certainly not against him, as even Australians were to discover.288 The
expropriation of German firms and private individuals began on 1 September
1920. Australia had not yet officially received the mandate over New Guinea,
and, strictly speaking, this procedure was against international law. But Ger-
many was in no position to complain, and Lucas had pressed the Australian
government, pointing out that the rise in copra prices on the world market
made it imperative to expropriate the Germans as quickly as possible.289 The
liquidation was backdated to 10 January 1920, the day on which the Versailles
treaty came into effect. During the war, it had been impossible to send profits
out of the country or to invest outside New Guinea. Between 1914 and 1920,
therefore, the Germans had put all their capital into expanding existing planta-
tions and creating new ones. Between 1914 and the end of 1918, the area of
New Guinea planted with coconut palms almost doubled, increasing from
76,847 to 133,960 acres.290 On the day of their expropriation, the four large
German plantation companies, Neuguinea-Kompanie, Hamburger Südsee
Aktiengesellschaft, Hernsheim, and Wahlen, possessed a total of 2,366,532
coconut palms, of which only 780,812, or one-third, were fully mature. The rest
had been planted as an investment in the future; 687,972 trees were between
one and six years old. Thus more than 29 percent of their palm trees had only
been planted during the Australian military administration. Between 1914 and
1918, the net profits of these four companies amounted to £365,451. Early in
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1919 the military administration’s chief surveyor assessed the total value of
German property in New Guinea as at least £4,894,900. What Administrator
Pethebridge had always predicted now came true: Australia collected the prof-
its that German planning and Melanesian labor had produced.291
The backdating of the expropriation order to 10 January 1920 did not pre-
vent the confiscation of German income earned after this date. The Expropria-
tion Board ordered the German planters to continue working their old
plantations for the board, under threat of punishment. All their personal prop-
erty was confiscated. Many who were left destitute were looked after by
Melanesian and Chinese friends. Those who could still afford it were permitted
to buy back some of their personal possessions, such as wedding presents, at
public auction of their property. In Sydney, where most of them began their
journey back to Germany, they were permitted to keep fifty pounds in cash, but
anything more in their possession was taken away.292 Under Lucas’ leadership,
the Expropriation Board auctioned the German businesses between 18 May
and 31 August 1922. Bidders had to be “natural born British subjects.”293 Here
at last was the opportunity for which Burns Philp had waited so long, and
toward which it had so purposefully worked.
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Micronesia and the War
a special case of divide and rule
IN PURSUIT OF WHITE GOLD: NAURU, 1914 –1922
Northeast of New Guinea, a few degrees south of the equator, lies the small
island of Nauru (about one-third of the size of San Marino). The people who
live on Nauru are Polynesian, but they have many Melanesian characteristics.1
Germany declared the island a protectorate on 14 April 1888. Administratively,
Nauru was part of the Marshall Islands and the protectorate of the Jaluit Soci-
ety. On 1 April 1906 the Micronesian island group comprising Nauru and the
Marshall Islands became part of German New Guinea, but Nauru remained
under the district office of Jaluit. When this office was dissolved on 1 April
1911, the station of Nauru became subordinate to the headquarters of German
Micronesia, the district office in Ponape.
Life on Nauru had continued relatively undisturbed by the colonial admin-
istration. All this changed with the discovery of phosphate deposits on the
island. The Pacific Phosphate Company took over the organization and sole
exploitation of the mines on the island. This unique situation, in which a British
company exercised a monopoly in a German colony, was the result of an agree-
ment with the Jaluit Society. With the permission of the German chancellor,
the Jaluit Society had granted the Pacific Phosphate Company a monopoly on
the guano in Nauru early in 1906. In exchange, the society held three of seven
directorships on the board of the London company and received a share of the
profits from the phosphate deposits on Ocean Island, a neighboring island
belonging to the British protectorate of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. On 1
January 1901, Britain had leased it to the Pacific Phosphate Company for
ninety-nine years. For its concession, Germany received the relatively modest
sum of 25,000 marks annual tax. The Pacific Phosphate Company paid an addi-
tional duty of 50 pfennigs for every tonne of phosphate over 50,000 exported,
direct to the German Colonial Office. The Nauruans received the least of all.
In principle, their rights of ownership were not questioned. The Pacific Phos-
phate Company had to pay the indigenous owners 5 pfennigs per tonne of
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phosphate exported as compensation for the destruction of their land, and they
received a one-off payment of 20 marks for every copra palm that was felled.2
On Nauru the war began on 9 September 1914, when the battleship Mel-
bourne destroyed the radio station. The island was not occupied because the
Australian navy regarded Nauru as strategically useless. It also wanted to avoid
the consequences of such a step under international law—namely, “the respon-
sibility of feeding the inhabitants.”3 Immediately thereafter, the Pacific Phos-
phate Company began to negotiate with the British government and the
Australian navy with the aim of resuming phosphate mining, interrupted on the
outbreak of war, as soon as possible. At the instigation of the company, the colo-
nial secretary instructed the Australian governor-general to remove the com-
pany’s German employees from the island immediately. The company’s
representative in Australia managed to persuade the government to deport the
German officials as well, on the ground that otherwise “the matter becomes
more complicated.”4
When the Australian expeditionary troops eventually occupied Nauru on 6
November 1914, their commander, Colonel Holmes, the Administrator of
occupied German New Guinea, had written instructions to deport all Germans
to Australia as POWs and to leave the administration of the island in the hands
of a representative of the Pacific Phosphate Company. In future, the British
high commissioner for the western Pacific in Fiji was in charge politically.5 The
Australian soldiers in Nauru, 1917. (Photograph by Thomas J. McMahon. Mitchell
Library, State Library of New South Wales)
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Germans were removed from the island under heavy guard and in a closed col-
umn. In order to calm the Nauruans, Australian officers had let it be known, via
the chiefs, that the Germans would return in three months.6
Holmes left behind a garrison with fifty-two men under Captain
E. C. Norrie as an Australian occupying force. The arrival of the British high
commissioner’s representative, Charles Workman, on Christmas Day 1914
marked the beginning of what was, in fact, joint rule by Australia and Britain.
The British high commissioner in Suva was responsible for the civil administra-
tion of the island; in military matters, however, the island was dependent on
Rabaul.7 The Australian government refused a request from London to with-
draw the Australian garrison. The Administrator of Rabaul argued that behind
the request lay a cold-blooded, calculated attempt to eliminate Australian influ-
ence, and that this must be prevented at all costs. After all, he pointed out,
Nauru was worth several hundreds of millions of pounds. On the other hand,
the military government in New Guinea gave in to British pressure and with-
drew a proclamation about post and quarantine regulations in which they had
included Nauru. Both sides were jealous of their respective rights.8
Workman distinguished himself by renaming the island Pleasant Island.
He persisted in this, even after the Colonial Office informed him that under
international law the name could not officially be changed until after the end of
the war.9 Otherwise, Workman gave the Pacific Phosphate Company a pretty
free hand. When a company employee, Pope, was appointed administrative
assistant, the company was even given access to the administration’s confiden-
tial information, with the explicit consent of the colonial secretary.10 The Pacific
Phosphate Company tried several times to persuade the administration to give
it permission to acquire land. Like Burns Philp in New Guinea, the company
also claimed that it had already gained the verbal agreement of the German
administration. At first, the request was rejected on the usual grounds that the
applicants must wait until the end of the war.11 However, while Workman was
on holiday in January 1917, the Pacific Phosphate Company went on the offen-
sive. The Administrator’s deputy in his absence, S. F. Anderson, was the com-
pany’s bookkeeper on Nauru. Now Pacific Phosphate could copy the German
land registers undisturbed and establish the names of the indigenous owners of
phosphate-bearing land. Under the aegis of Anderson, the company drew up a
document stating that the land claimed by the company had been bought by it
between 1907 and 1914, with the permission of the German government and
the Nauruan owners. As supposed proof that Nauruans had given their
approval, their “X” had been added. But anyone who knew the Nauruans was
aware that they, like the Samoans, had long since become literate. The whole
process was clearly a swindle, a fraudulent attempt on the part of the Pacific
Phosphate Company to seize the phosphate-bearing land of the Nauruans. The
British high commissioner was not informed.12
The company resumed work in the phosphate mines soon after the Austra-
lian occupation of the island and before the British high commissioner’s repre-
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sentative arrived. Instructions from London to await his arrival were ignored,
with Australian connivance.13 German influence in the company had in fact
already come to an end. Late in July 1917 it was completely eliminated offi-
cially when all the shares that had been in German hands—four-ninths of the
company’s capital—were publicly auctioned in London.14 Phosphate mining,
however, continued uninterrupted throughout the war, although levels were
reduced by the difficulty of transport. The labor problem was solved when the
Japanese government, in response to a British request, permitted the contin-
ued recruitment of workers for Nauru from the Caroline Islands. During the
war, as well as immediately after it, the Pacific Phosphate Company hired its
workers from the Japanese-occupied Caroline Islands. Chinese coolies had
worked on Nauru since 1907, but no further reinforcements arrived until early
in 1920.15
The “Battle for Nauru,” 1919–1922
At the end of the war, a battle for Nauru began between Britain and its allies in
the Pacific. It was far fiercer than the quarrels about the future of German
New Guinea, Samoa, or the rest of Micronesia. Behind the scenes, all manner
of wrangling took place, using all possible means to jostle for the best position.
The main actors in the struggle were the prime ministers of Australia and New
Zealand, Hughes and Massey, and the British colonial secretary, Milner. The
setting for this fraternal feud was the British Empire Delegation, which met
regularly in London and Paris. Here attempts were made to find a common
position that the representatives of the British Empire could all endorse in
order to ensure that, as far as possible, British demands were accepted at the
forthcoming peace conference.
Hughes registered the first claims. Almost as soon as he arrived in Europe,
Table 9. Phosphate Mining on Nauru during the Military 
Administration, 1914–1921
Calendar Year
Quantity of Phosphate
Exported in
Imperial Tons
1914 53,740
1915 85,808
1916 105,012
1917 101,267
1918 76,440
1919 69,336
1920 to 30 June 1921 364,424
Source: Annual Report Nauru 1916: ANL: G 21152. Report on the 
Adminsitration of Nauru during the Military Occupation and until 17 
December 1920; AAC: A 2219–22. 1920/21: AAC: A 6661–396.
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he began agitating vigorously for Nauru to be given to Australia. In mid-Febru-
ary 1919 Massey put New Zealand’s argument on the table: phosphate from
Nauru was indispensable for the New Zealand agriculture. Early in March,
Milner also got involved. The British memorandum he presented to the
Empire Delegation suggested that the mandate should go to Britain; the island
was to be administered through the British high commissioner in Fiji. The
colonial secretary did not conceal his opinion from Hughes: “Britain wanted it,
as it was valuable.” Five days later the Australian prime minister retaliated in
kind. In a meeting of the Empire Delegation he openly demanded that Austra-
lia should be given the mandate for Nauru—“the other islands are a liability,
this is an asset.”16
As no decision could be arrived at, the matter was postponed. During this
period, the Australian cabinet, at the suggestion of its prime minister, prepared
a detailed statement outlining why Australia had to have Nauru. It is typical of
the Australian obsession with the Yellow Peril that the issue of acquiring Nauru
was imported into the chain of argument about Australia being defenselessly
exposed to potential invaders. Nauru, argued the Australian cabinet, was vital
to the people of Australia (meaning Australians of British origin), because with-
out its phosphate the interior of Australia would remain empty and unpopu-
lated while the majority of the population clustered around the coast, “where
they will be a comparatively easy prey to any predatory power, . . . League or
no League, we must always remember that more than half the people of the
world look with hungry eyes across narrow seas at our great empty land.”17
One day before the Council of Four met to announce how the mandates
over the former German colonies had been distributed, the British side had
still not come to an agreement about the political future of Nauru. Neither the
United States, Japan, nor any other victorious power disputed the British claim
to Nauru. At a meeting of the ministers of the British Dominions on 5 May, the
established fronts hardly changed. Hughes again expressed Australia’s claim to
a mandate; Massey protested vigorously. From time to time, the Australian and
the New Zealander let fly at each other. The old rivalry between the two Anglo-
Saxon colonies in the Pacific broke out again, and there was a full-blown
domestic argument. Hughes raged: “New Zealand has absolutely no claim or
standing in the matter at all. Massey’s opposition to us . . . is an intolerable
insult to Australia. I am going to stand fast for our just rights. . . . to be robbed
of Nauru that is for me the end. I will not sign Treaty. I will not accept the man-
date for other islands.”18 One day later, the Supreme War Council announced
its decision on the mandates. The mandate for Nauru was given to the British
Empire. The British were to sort out for themselves what this meant on the
ground.19
Intense negotiations went on for the whole of May and June. The Austra-
lian delegation’s legal expert, Robert Garran, suggested how the deadlock
could be broken. He explained to his prime minister that all Australia needed
was to secure actual control of the island. Apart from that, they could share:
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“There is plenty for all in Nauru.”20 Another moderating influence on the Aus-
tralian prime minister was a resolution by his own cabinet formally instructing
Hughes not to refuse to sign the peace treaty under any circumstances. “We
are grabbing at valuable asset,” Watt calmed the prime minister.21
By 4 June it was clear that the three governments would reach agree-
ment. Access to the phosphate deposits on Nauru was to be divided among
the three on a percentage basis, and each country was to nominate a commis-
sioner to represent its interest. An Administrator, with no influence over the
actions of the commissioners, was to have sole responsibility for the civil
administration. He was to be appointed by Australia for the first five years,
and then in turn by the other governments involved. Agreement was finally
reached on Thomas Griffiths, a former Australian military governor of New
Guinea. He assumed office on 10 June 1921. All that remained to be decided
were the quotas. Massey finally accepted 16 percent as New Zealand’s share,
while Australia and Britain were to receive 42 percent each. On 28 June 1919,
Hughes and Massey signed the agreement and passed it on to Milner for rati-
fication by Lloyd George.22
In the meantime, Milner negotiated with the management of the Pacific
Phosphate Company for rights to be transferred to the three governments. The
company’s management was personally closely connected with leading mem-
bers of the English upper class and also with the Colonial Office. The founding
managing director of the Pacific Phosphate Company, Baron Stanmore, had, as
Arthur Gordon, been the first British high commissioner in the Western
Pacific. He made use of his local knowledge and personal connections to have
the annexation of Ocean Island, another phosphate island, accepted by the
Colonial Office, and to advance the company’s interests instead of those of the
indigenous Banaban people. His successor was his nephew by marriage, a man
who was believed to be an intimate friend of the king and who had great influ-
ence over Milner.23 Within a short time, he had developed the company into
one of Britain’s most profitable enterprises. In the period from 1902, when
phosphate mining began on Ocean Island, to the end of 1918, it had made
enormous profits from its phosphate works on Ocean Island and Nauru. Aver-
age net profits were 13 shillings, 3 pence per ton of phosphate exported. This
was 265 times the sum that the Nauruan landowners received. Total net pro-
ceeds amounted to £2,125,045.24
Around the middle of July 1919, Milner sent the text of the agreement,
dated 2 July, to the governments involved. At Milner’s request, the haggling
among Britain, Australia, and New Zealand was to remain secret, “as it is unde-
sirable that its existence should become known publicly before the whole ques-
tion of Mandates has been finally settled.”25
The situation was highly peculiar. The League of Nations had not yet laid
down the conditions governing the mandates, but Britain, Australia, and New
Zealand had already divided up the spoils on their own authority. The matter
was to remain secret from the international public, but to be put into effect the
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treaty had to be ratified by three parliaments. New Zealand’s most eminent
legal scholar of the day, John William Salmond, summed up his view in two
words, “exceedingly obscure.”26
In September 1919, after many personal meetings, Milner negotiated the
price for which the Pacific Phosphate Company would be prepared to transfer
its right to exploit phosphate deposits on Nauru and Ocean Island to the three
governments. The sum was £3,540,000—according to Milner, “a good bargain,”
for as a result of rising demand after the end of the war, profits had jumped to
one pound per ton of phosphate exported.27 The Australian prime minister’s
well-known temper—“the price named far too high . . . the copingstone of
their impudence”28—brought the price down a little. On 1 July 1920 the privi-
leges of the Pacific Phosphate Company on Ocean Island and Nauru were
finally transferred to the governments of Great Britain, Australia, and New
Zealand for a sum of £3,539,000, after the three governments had agreed
among themselves to divide the purchase price in the same proportions as their
respective phosphate quotas.29
In the House of Commons, the reading of the Nauru agreement in mid-
June 1920 unleashed harsh criticism. But it was artificially whipped-up
indignation that served only as a demonstration of hypocrisy, as it was clear
from the start that the agreement would not come to grief. Nor was it the
eloquent silence of the agreement on the rights and the future of the people
of Nauru that was criticized. Only a few months before, the introduction of
the mandate system had been justified by claiming that it protected the peo-
ple from exploitation. Now this was ignored both by the representatives of the
British people and by their government. No one even asked to what extent
the mining of phosphate would impair the quality of life and limit the rights
of the Nauruans, or whether the agreement violated their right to self-deter-
mination. Rather, opponents criticized the open disregard shown for the
international agreements governing the League of Nations’ prerogative in
defining mandates. Most of all, they revealed their concern that the treaty
would run counter to liberal trade policy. The bill was finally passed by 217 to
77 votes, that is, by a majority of almost two-thirds. The arguments put
forward by Leslie Wilson, parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Ship-
ping, could hardly be contradicted: “there was never a more sound invest-
ment for this country and the Empire, not only from the financial point of
view, but also from the point of view of securing for all time . . . an all-impor-
tant raw material.”30
Of all attempts to undermine the original principle of the so-called sacred
trust over the former German colonies, the cattle trading over Nauru among
the British, Australians, and New Zealanders was probably the most brutal vio-
lation of the mandate idea. The impotence of the League of Nations and the
commissions responsible for mandates was clear even before they met. Their
first meeting almost ended in a row when the Australian representative
quashed any criticism of what had happened in Nauru by declaring that he
CH3  Page 122  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:16 PM
Micronesia and the War 123
would not put up with it. The final report to the Council of the League of
Nations was a whitewash, and the hypocrisy continued in Geneva.31
The fact that, in the event, the League of Nations just ignored such a bla-
tant infringement of the principles it had been entrusted at Versailles to uphold
simply encouraged the three phosphate representatives to push ahead in a
direction that was completely contrary to the spirit of the mandate. The Treaty
of Versailles had confirmed Japanese rule over Micronesia. The Japanese policy
of sealing Micronesia off from the outside world meant that laborers could no
longer be recruited from the Caroline and Marshall Islands. British control
over Hong Kong appeared to guarantee a source of Chinese labor for Nauru
for the foreseeable future. But as the Australian phosphate commissioner
Harold Pope, former chief accountant of the Pacific Phosphate Company on
Nauru, pointed out, it was important to be able to fall back on Pacific Islanders
for labor in addition to the Chinese. He stressed that conflict between the two
different racial groups among the phosphate workers could only facilitate
exploitation, for one could be played off against the other. This would be espe-
cially useful if the Chinese were to make trouble.32
In April 1921, on the suggestion of the Australian representative on the
phosphate commission, the Australian prime minister instructed the Adminis-
trator of the Australian mandate in New Guinea to support fully the recruit-
ment of two hundred Melanesians for Nauru. Apparently no consideration was
given to the fact that this might violate the conditions of the mandate for New
Guinea. On the Administrator’s recommendation, the labor recruitment com-
mando from Nauru was accompanied by “experienced” recruiters from the
mandate, all former soldiers in the occupying force, plus a number of luluai,
who had been instructed by the district officers to use their influence in favor
of the recruiters. Government ships were used in order to impress the official
nature of the expedition even more clearly upon the indigenous population.
Nonetheless, by June 1921 only forty-one Melanesians had been persuaded to
go to Nauru. In October, they were joined by a further sixty-nine young
Melanesians from Morobe, Manus, and the Sepik district. When it became
clear that nothing further could be achieved, the expedition left New Guinea
directly for Nauru, ignoring all customs and recruiting regulations, and without
putting in at Rabaul, as required.33 One year later, the process was repeated.
This time Pope asked for special police protection, as the coasts were deserted
and it was necessary to penetrate farther into the interior in order to recruit.
Again, labor regulations were blatantly violated. And again, the target was
two hundred Melanesians; but in the end no more than seventy-one were
recruited.34
The men from New Guinea, completely unused to regular work, were
forced to work at the same rate as the Chinese. The daily quota of piecework
was loading five one-ton trucks with phosphate. But on the special request of
the Administrator of New Guinea, Wisdom, they were paid according to New
Guinea regulations. Whereas the Chinese received 32 shillings per month,
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Melanesians received only 5 shillings, which the labor regulations in Austra-
lian New Guinea specified as the maximum wage. The average wage of a
Melanesian plantation worker in German New Guinea in 1914 set the piece-
work rate for Melanesian phosphate workers in Nauru until 1924. And, as
in New Guinea, the system of deferred payment applied. Of their already
meager wages, 3 shillings per month were retained until the end of their
three-year contracts.35
Removed from their familiar environment and deprived of the protection
of their small-scale societies, the men from New Guinea had to perform
extremely strenuous work that posed a high and immediate risk to their
health. The food they were used to, kaukau (sweet potato), taro, yams, and
sago did not grow on Nauru and was not imported. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that the Melanesians fell ill of tuberculosis in droves. Two-thirds were
additionally weakened by a dysentery epidemic in March 1922. Of the total of
181 Melanesians recruited for work in Nauru, twenty-two were sent back
early because they were unfit for further work. Most of them died on the way
back, or shortly thereafter. This meant that the official mortality rates could
be massaged. Nonetheless, by June 1924, when the contracts of the first batch
of Melanesian workers expired and came up for extension, twenty-six
phosphate workers from New Guinea had died on Nauru. This represented a
mortality rate of over 16 percent. It is extremely doubtful whether their fami-
lies ever received the “deferred pay” that was now due them. Given that a
meeting of the Mandate Commission in Geneva was imminent, the Australian
New Guinea laborers working phosphate in Nauru, early 1921. (Mitchell Library, State
Library of New South Wales)
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cabinet, in agreement with the Administrators of New Guinea and Nauru,
decided to stop recruiting for Nauru from New Guinea and to remove all
Melanesians from Nauru. On 25 July 1924 the survivors left the small Pacific
island.36
The Role of the Nauruans
For the people of Nauru, the arrival of the Australians was not a liberation.
However, shortly before the flag was hoisted on 7 November 1914, Colonel
Holmes had promised their chiefs, who had been assembled with the support
of the head of the German station, Wostrack, “that as long as they and their
people did what was right the King of England would protect them.” German
rule had come to an end, he went on, and the British flag would never be
taken down.37 But the king of England was a long way away when, a little later,
the Australian soldiers left behind by Holmes shot the Nauruans’ dogs and
pigs out of boredom.38 Nor did the change in the ruling power do the local
population much good in other respects. Nauruan landowners had received
minimal compensation for the mining of phosphate on their land; this was
reduced even further by the introduction of British currency and British
weights and measures. Instead of 5 pfennigs per tonne of phosphate exported,
the Nauruans now received a ha’penny, which at contemporary rates was a lit-
tle more than 4 pfennigs. In addition, the metric tonne was replaced by the
imperial ton overnight, without the Nauruans being aware or informed of this
change. Because the imperial ton was more than 16 kilograms heavier than
the metric tonne, the amount of compensation received by the landowners
was reduced again. In April 1916 the British high commissioner for the West-
ern Pacific decreased the value of the mark, which was still official currency
on Nauru, to 6 pence, amounting to a devaluation of 50 percent. This in-
creased the value of the compensation the Nauruans received. But because
almost all they owned was in marks—in 1915 the Administrator estimated
their holdings as 300,000 marks—the money in their hands was devalued by
50 percent from one day to the next. There was considerable anxiety among
the Nauruans as a result of this, but they were unable to influence the deci-
sion in any way.39 It seemed that the people of Nauru were among the losers
of the war.
A new situation arose with the end of the war in Europe. The news of Ger-
many’s defeat and the definitive end of German rule in Nauru was followed by
a long silence concerning the future of the island and its people. Throughout,
the Pacific Phosphate Company continued to work as it had done before 1914.
In mid-July 1919 the Nauruans sent a petition to the king of England referring
to this peculiar situation. The Germans, they said, who had cheated them by
paying only 5 pfennigs per tonne, had gone. But why was the same company
that had worked in Nauru before the war, under the German administration,
still there?
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Ever since the wresting of the Island from the Germans this same Company is still
carrying on and perpetuating the same iniquity by paying us a halfpenny per ton of
phosphates. A great part of our island from which phosphates had been dug is now
absolutely useless. Nothing remains except rocks and stones. It is so badly ruined
that no tropical tree of any kind could grow on it. We never received a penny for
these spoiled acres of land above mentioned. We have been robbed of our lands by
the Germans and we now, as British subjects, are hoping that these lands will be
restored to us.40
The people of Nauru used exactly the line of argument the British had
adopted during the war. Germans were presented as the source of all injustice
in the world, Britons as the standard-bearers of fairness. The people of Nauru
had been promised the protection of the king when the British flag was
hoisted in November 1914. Thus, for them, as British subjects, to appeal to
this promise, and at the same time to point out that it was only a matter of
removing the last relics of German injustice, was only just and fair. Local self-
determination over the land that belonged to them was the Nauruans’ primary
demand. The demand for compensation for damage to the environment was
secondary. Criticism of the environmental damage done by phosphate mining
was closely connected with the hope that the actual power of disposition over
the land would be given back to them. The only way to stop the environmental
damage was to restore the Nauruans’ right of usufruct. The demand for use of
the land to revert to the local people implied a desire on the part of the Nauru-
ans to put a halt to the environmental damage done by phosphate mining. It is
likely that the people of Nauru, using a method of arguing characteristic of
many Pacific cultures, were aiming for nothing less than to stop the phosphate
mining altogether.
While the people of Nauru were appealing to the king’s sense of justice in
order to put right an injustice perpetrated in the past, or at least to put a stop to
it, the king’s colonial secretary was negotiating for the state to take over those
privileges which the local people had clearly declared to be theft. The contract
that enshrined official British disregard for the Nauruans’ right of disposition
and ensured the continuation of environmental destruction on Nauru had
already been signed. When it became clear to the Nauruans that only the
actors were to change, and that the situation they had criticized would never-
theless continue, they enquired of the Administrator whether they could at
least be compensated for the damage and deceptions of the past, and in future
receive higher rates.41 This request was more comprehensible to the new phos-
phate hunters, implying, as it did, indigenous acceptance of the status quo.
In an agreement of 1 July 1921, Nauruans for the first time ceded land for
phosphate mining. It was a leasing agreement that provided for a one-off pay-
ment of twenty pounds per acre of phosphate-bearing land to the indigenous
owners of the land. In exchange, the British Phosphate Commission received
the right to mine phosphate until 31 March 2000. It was free to do what it liked
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with the trees, bushes, and fruits growing on the leased land. As a consequence
of this agreement, further serious environmental damage was done. In addi-
tion, it was inconsistent with the traditional Pacific legal understanding that
separated rights over land from the right to use the plants growing on the land.
The special compensation that had originally been offered for every coconut
palm destroyed now lapsed. Compensation for every imperial ton of phosphate
exported, however, was increased from a ha’penny to three pence. One-third of
the amount paid was deposited with the Administrator, who used this fund to
finance the introduction of compulsory schooling, which he had decreed.
When the colonial secretary pointed out that the written consent of the chiefs
was not adequate, efforts were made to obtain permission from all the individ-
ual owners of the land. Finally, 244 signatures were collected.42
There is no doubt that in real terms the “agreement” between the British
Phosphate Commission, supported by the Colonial Office and the Administra-
tor, and the local landowners improved the economic situation of the people of
Nauru compared with their position before the war. In legal terms, however,
their position was considerably worse. It was never disputed that they were the
owners of the land, but this fact was simply ignored. The right of disposition
was “temporarily” acquired by means of a compensatory payment. Now the
indigenous owners had, for the first time, agreed to a leasing contract that
legally sanctioned the exploitation of their land. For the moment, so long as
the Nauruans had no chance to protest against the actions of the strangers, the
difference between tolerating the violence that was actually happening and
giving their formal consent may have seemed irrelevant. However, when the
Nauruans were recognized as independent subjects under international law,
the situation was different, because in a Europeanized world only legal formal-
ities opened the door to historical reparations. Before 1921 the local popula-
tion in principio contested the actions of the Europeans in Nauru. Thereafter,
with the creation of a precedent, all that remained to be disputed were the
details of an extension of the term of the contract, its expansion, and the level
of remuneration.
This fact has no bearing whatsoever on the justified question of the ethi-
cally binding force of a formal agreement that was possibly legal but morally
dubious—“the natives are simple-minded people, not versed in land values,”
wrote the Administrator later.43 There is absolutely no doubt that without con-
siderable pressure the Nauruans would not have consented to a change in their
constitutional rights. Even without their formal agreement, their existing rights
were being altered. Land that was not phosphate-bearing could now be leased
to Europeans for the first time. Granting the opportunity to acquire cheaply
land that had originally been declared nonphosphate-bearing was in the gift of
the Administrator alone. In some cases, phosphate was later mined on this land
after all. The Administrator possessed sole authority to classify land as phos-
phate-bearing or nonphosphate-bearing, and to make it available for lease.
The owner’s consent to the leasing agreement was not required.44 The people
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of Nauru became increasingly dependent on an Administrator who ruled over
them almost arbitrarily per administrative order.45 The German administration
had prohibited contact between foreign workers and the Nauruans. Now the
tables were turned and the local population was forbidden to leave its strictly
delimited areas between sunset and sunrise. The chiefs had the privilege of
making sure that the Nauruans did not break these rules.46 The colonial order
on Nauru depended heavily on the cooperation of the chiefs. When the Chi-
nese coolies went on strike because of the excessively high prices the shops in
Nauru charged non-Europeans for food, the Administrator demanded that the
chiefs of Nauru provide 250 men to risk their lives for the interests of the
Pacific Phosphate Company (which, although it had transferred its phosphate
rights to the three governments, had been permitted to keep its stores on
Nauru). Together with the police and the Administrator, they marched to the
Chinese settlement, where the Administrator delivered an ultimatum. Either
the Chinese went back to work or his forces would open fire on them.47 As for
the Nauruans, the Administrator banned a cooperative venture they had
planned in order to break their dependence on Australian and British traders.48
In September 1920 a serious influenza epidemic broke out on Nauru. It
was probably brought into the country from China by the newly recruited coo-
lies. Although alarming news was coming in from all over the world about the
devastating effects of a flu epidemic, especially on non-European populations,
the administration of Nauru proved to be incapable of preventing the illness
from gaining a foothold. Given the island’s isolation and the difficulty of landing
on it at all, more stringent health policies could easily have prevented the ill-
ness from entering the country. Influenza again demonstrated its deadly
nature. “Only” 301 inhabitants of the island (including two Chinese) died of the
illness. But because the number of Pacific Islanders living on Nauru was not
particularly large, this represented a considerable proportion of the population.
The worst affected were the phosphate workers from the Caroline and Mar-
shall Islands on Nauru. More than one-third (exactly 36 percent of the popula-
tion counted in 1919) did not survive the illness. The indigenous population
was reduced by 18 percent.49 The spread of the disease was facilitated by a
change in the behavior of Nauruans since 1914. During the war, they had given
up their traditional clothes in favor of European textiles.50 The habit, common
to many Pacific Islanders, of wearing European clothes day and night, it has
been shown, reduced their natural resistance to colds. In addition, the excep-
tional circumstances of the war had made it possible for Burns Philp to sell
whisky illegally to the indigenous people.51 New Zealand’s phosphate commis-
sioner blamed the Nauruans themselves for the tragic impact of influenza. He
claimed that they were “extremely lazy,” and that this was the greatest obstacle
to living longer.52
As soon as the influenza became less virulent, the first Nauruans were
afflicted with leprosy. Weakness caused by the flu epidemic had, it seemed,
made them susceptible to leprosy, which was almost certainly also imported
CH3  Page 128  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:16 PM
Nauruan woman with leprosy at the Leper Station Nauru, September 1922. (Mitchell
Library, State Library of New South Wales)
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from China. In March 1922, up to 10.3 percent of the indigenous population in
certain areas was affected by leprosy. The Administrator had tried to get medi-
cal assistance from Australia or London, but apparently the only thing of con-
cern there was profit from phosphate. In the absence of any medical aid, the
proportion of the population suffering from leprosy constantly grew. By Octo-
ber 1922, 12.5 percent of all Nauruans were afflicted; in one particularly badly
hit area, the percentage was 20.3. This was the highest rate of leprosy in the
world for a single administrative district. Only at this stage did medical aid
reach Nauru.53 The drastic reduction in the local population inspired the
Administrator to take up an idea put forward by the British resident commis-
sioner for the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. He had suggested deporting all the
inhabitants of Ocean Island to Nauru, because phosphate mining on Ocean
Island required more and more land. “There is certainly ample room in Nauru
for the Ocean Island Natives,” claimed Thomas Griffiths, supporting his col-
league.54 But the steady resistance of the Banaban people prevented their
forced deportation from Ocean Island at this stage.
THE JAPANESE IN MICRONESIA
Japanese rule in occupied German Micronesia differed greatly in style from
either British or Australian rule in New Guinea and Samoa. The only superfi-
cial similarity between them was that they were all administered by the mili-
tary. The military administration of Micronesia was responsible to the Japanese
naval ministry. Japanese administrative headquarters in Micronesia, under the
control of a naval commander, were at first located in Truk (not in Ponape,
where they had been before the war) and from July 1921 in Koror on Palau. In
June 1918 a civil administration had been appointed under Rear Admiral
Tezuka Toshiro, but this was a merely nominal change, because control
remained with the naval ministry. Not until 1 April 1922—that is, a year later
than in Nauru, New Guinea, and Samoa—were naval units withdrawn from the
islands and a civil South Sea administration, Nan’yo-cho, set up. Its governor
was responsible directly to the Japanese prime minister.55
On 8 October 1914, when the Japanese captured the administrative center
of German Micronesia, the Japanese commander had reassured the Capuchin
mission, in German, that nothing would change.56 This statement was true, if at
all, only of the first few months of the Japanese occupation, that is, until about
the end of 1914, when it gradually became clear that the islands would not be
handed over to British or Australian troops as the Japanese had feared. From
1915, however, the Japanese began to pursue an almost tempestuous occupa-
tion policy that had little in common with German practice, and next to nothing
with that followed by the Australians and New Zealanders farther south.
What made Japanese practice so different was the extraordinary determi-
nation and sense of purpose apparent in every action. There is nothing to sug-
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gest that the Japanese occupiers had any doubts about Micronesia remaining
Japanese, but even if they did have such doubts, they spared no effort to ensure
that Japan could present a fait accompli on the day peace was declared. Three
chronological phases can be distinguished in the activities of the Japanese in
occupied Micronesia: the assessment, the development, and the exploitation of
resources. During the first period, which lasted from the end of 1914 to around
the early autumn of 1915, the Japanese systematically investigated what the
islands of Micronesia had to offer. Almost every ship brought more Japanese
scientists, agricultural economists, and medical doctors. Scholars and experts in
all sorts of specialized areas methodically set about surveying the potential of
the islands. As a German eyewitness noted, “there was not a house or a tree
that was not photographed.”57 Some of these Japanese researchers were so pre-
occupied by their task of mapping and surveying the country that they took no
notice at all of the indigenous population and the few Europeans who had
remained.58
By about the middle of 1915 the scientific survey of Micronesia was more
or less complete. Yamamoto Miono, a young professor at the Imperial Univer-
sity of Tokyo, submitted the research group’s final report to the Japanese gov-
ernment. It seems that the scientists had not been able to discover any exciting
economic prospects, for several Japanese newspapers began a detailed debate
about Micronesia’s doubtful economic value to Japan and questioned whether
it was worth keeping the islands at all. Suggestions were made that are familiar
A Japanese dentist at work in the Marshall Islands, 1917. (Photograph by Thomas J.
McMahon. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales)
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from European colonial history, such as allowing a trading company to adminis-
ter the islands.59 As in the case of Australia’s presence in New Guinea, however,
strategic considerations suddenly became more important than economic
interests. The most common argument, and one Yamamoto himself endorsed,
was that the islands were an important springboard for further Japanese expan-
sion south.60
The second phase of Japanese military rule was marked by energetic
attempts to develop the little potential that did exist in Micronesia. For this
purpose, the infrastructure was developed to an extent unprecedented under
German rule. New harbor installations, wharfs, roads, and public and private
buildings were built. The setting up of radio stations on all the important
islands was primarily a military measure, but private communications also ben-
efited from the establishment of a public telephone network (for example, on
Saipan toward the end of the war). All the sources document a highly aggres-
sive and resolute push by the Japanese to make the Micronesian islands eco-
nomically more profitable, and at the same time, more “Japanese.” These two
goals were so closely intertwined that often they cannot be separated. This also
makes it relatively difficult to pass judgment on Japanese actions. The extraor-
dinary energy of Japanese initiatives, the development that they achieved, and
their early economic successes undoubtedly inspire some respect. But the
force and speed with which the Japanese modernized the islands make us think
again. There is little to suggest that any account was taken of indigenous inter-
ests or traditions, and the whole exercise begins to look like a violent and brutal
rape by Japan of Micronesia’s original character.61
The Japanese took up the economic development of Micronesia where the
Germans had left off. As early as 6 November 1914 representatives of the Japa-
nese South Sea Company, Nan’yo Keiei Kumiai, landed on Angaur to investi-
gate the chances of continuing phosphate mining under Japanese control. The
director of the company, Nishizawa Kichiji, had allegedly concluded an agree-
ment at the end of September 1914 with Admiral Akiyama Saneyuki, director
of the bureau for military affairs in the Japanese naval ministry, giving the com-
pany exclusive phosphate mining rights on Angaur. When the Germans there
refused to cooperate in any way with the Japanese company, they were imme-
diately expelled, and the Nan’yo Keiei Kumiai started work straightaway. In
mid-June 1915, about a year after the last German phosphate ship had left
Angaur, the first Japanese consignment of phosphate left the island. After the
company had transported about six shiploads of phosphate (roughly 35,000
tonnes) to Japan, however, a huge scandal broke out there because of the pref-
erential treatment given to one company by certain high-ranking naval circles.
On 1 September 1915 the naval ministry revoked the company’s exclusive
rights on Angaur. Thereafter the phosphate was mined under the supervision
of the ministry and, under the terms of a Japanese government resolution of 8
October, publicly auctioned in Japan. Public discussion of the preferential
treatment of a single company by certain high-ranking “patrons” in the navy,
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and the cancellation of this arrangement by the Japanese government, separate
this from such cases as Burns Philp, which was backed by Australian politicians,
and the Pacific Phosphate Company, supported by the British. The phenome-
non of Japanese speculators attempting to make quick profits by exploiting the
new and sometimes confusing conditions in the wake of Japanese colonial
expansion had long been known from Korea and Taiwan.62
Japanese innovations for the economic development of Micronesia were
astonishingly imaginative and versatile. Although the Germans had maintained
experimental gardens and plantations, they had been rather halfhearted ven-
tures, as if to prove—against the German local administration’s convictions—
the old theory that colonies provide economic benefits for the mother country.
The few Germans working in the experimental botanical station in Ponape
were like amateur gardeners cultivating flowers—well aware that a thing well
done cannot be done quickly, especially in the tropics. Japanese efforts, by con-
trast, displayed an internal drive and a need to succeed which can be explained
only by assuming that they grew out of the feeling that things had to be set in
motion in Micronesia as quickly as possible, in order to have concrete achieve-
ments to support Japan’s territorial claims after the conclusion of peace. Facto-
ries and industrial plants appeared, seemingly overnight and out of nowhere. In
Ponape experiments were made with rice; in Kusaie, with cotton. Almost every
island supported its own small experimental program. The best known,
because most successful, ventures were the sugarcane plantations on Saipan
and Tinian. Under the Germans, Tinian had been completely uninhabited and
was declared a reserve for wild cattle. From 1917 every male Chamorro on
Saipan was compelled to plant at least one hectare with sugarcane, and every
woman at least half a hectare.63
On the Mariana Islands sugar was a major factor in the relatively quick
transition from development and investment to exploitation. Sugar production
began shortly before the end of the European war and developed into a success
story in the early 1920s. From 1921 the value of exports from Micronesia,
excluding phosphate from Angaur, exceeded that of imports. In 1920 sugar
accounted for 24 percent of the total value of all exports from Micronesia
(excluding phosphate). In the first six months of production alone, 442 tonnes
of sugar were exported from Saipan, while even Ponape managed eight. The
long domination of copra monoculture was increasingly being broken down.64
There is no doubt that the Micronesians also benefited from the economic
development work done by the Japanese (and their laborers from Korea and
Okinawa).65
Where their own methods held out no prospect of success the Japanese
adopted German practices, but took them to extremes. The Japanese adapta-
tion of the compulsory planting program introduced by the German colonial
administration in the Marshall Islands is a typical example. The Marshall
Islands had the most limited economic potential in Micronesia. For this rea-
son the German administration had retained an exceptional tax in kind, pay-
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able in copra. The Japanese adopted the compulsory planting law introduced
by the Germans but combined it with an ultimatum that made its observance
practically a matter of life or death. In May 1918 the chiefs were instructed
that any land that had not been planted with coconut palms within three years
would immediately be declared government land.66 The Japanese strategy of
threatening the indigenous population with the loss of their land if they did
not work to support Japanese economic goals was also applied elsewhere. In
Ponape the managing director of the Japanese sugar factory, a former naval
officer, had imposed a contract on the indigenous landowners that provided
for automatic confiscation of their land if they did not keep it weeded. Finally,
a Japanese decree of 1920 declared that any land in Micronesia which had not
been cleared and planted by 1921 would pass into the ownership of the Japa-
nese state.67
Compared with the German colonial administration, the Japanese system
was more totalitarian. The Japanese administration’s attempt to force develop-
ment in a particular direction was more pressing, comprehensive, and direct.
Japanese practice invites comparison with a steamroller, inexorably flattening
everything in its path and compelling the front line of people fleeing before it
to remove the rankest weeds. It may be that, to Micronesians, who had a strong
sense of tradition, German methods also resembled the progress of a steam-
roller. But it was a different one; or, at least, its drivers were different. Its
progress was slower, more careful, and less decisive. The driver took account of
the changing landscape around him, often hesitating in his forward march,
making a detour, or even changing direction. Occasional use of reverse gear
was not unknown. From the start, the Germans lacked the Japanese determi-
nation to stick rigidly to a particular route. By the end, it is doubtful whether
the German driver even knew where he was meant to be going. Above all, how-
ever, there were many fewer steamrollers during the German period than
under Japanese rule. The impression left by a handful of German officials, dis-
persed throughout the whole of Micronesia, was certainly out of all proportion
to their number. But compared with the impact of the hundreds of Japanese
military officials who poured into Micronesia after 1914, it was marginal. One
fact is undisputable: under Japanese rule there were many fewer niches for
those who rejected the directions given by the traffic policeman, or who
wanted to get out of his reach altogether.
This does not mean that the Japanese control extended to every corner of
Micronesia. How the indigenous population came to terms with the Japanese
will be discussed below. Europeans commonly regard Japanese-controlled
Micronesia as a hermetically sealed, impenetrable, monolithic empire. This is a
popular exaggeration of an important aspect of historical reality which, how-
ever, obscures the fact that between the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1922
there were a number of areas where Japanese influence was limited. It is true
that communications with the non-Japanese outside world were almost com-
pletely broken from the end of 1914. This affected American missionaries in
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the Marshall Islands as much as the few Germans who had remained. The situ-
ation did not change until the secret agreement of 1917, under which the Brit-
ish, Russian, and Italian governments promised to support Japanese claims to
Micronesia in a peace treaty. Thereafter, the mail between Micronesia and the
United States officially resumed, and the Marshall Islanders who had been
stranded in San Francisco since 1914 could at last return home.68
But even before 1917 there were two important exceptions to the embargo
on contact with the outside world that the Japanese had declared in Microne-
sia. Both cases involved existing Australian–British trade in Micronesia, which
was allowed to continue. The Pacific Phosphate Company in Nauru was per-
mitted to continue returning its workers to the Caroline Islands in its own
schooners after expiry of their contracts, and even to recruit new labor from
there. And in mid-February 1915, Burns Philp, with the support of the British
government, received official Japanese permission to continue trading in the
Marshall Islands; it even managed to expand during this period. In 1915 its
turnover in the Marshall Islands doubled by comparison with average figures
for the five years before the war. Burns Philp benefited above all from the elim-
ination of German competition when the Jaluit Company (Jaluitgesellschaft)
was forced to cease trading on 31 March 1915. Early in 1917 the Australian
“There’s Australia.” Marshall Islands children discover Australia on a Burns Philp calen-
dar, c. 1917. These calendars showed Micronesia as being “under British occupation”
long after its conquest by Japan. (Photograph by Thomas J. McMahon. Mitchell Library,
State Library of New South Wales)
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company was permitted to open an official branch office in Jaluit and ten trad-
ing stations in the Marshall Islands. Before the war it had only sent its ships to
call regularly; now it had agents on the spot. In the shadow of the war, business
boomed for Burns Philp, even in the remotest corners of Japanese Micronesia.
From mid-1917 at the latest, agents of the American trading company Atkins
Kroll & Co. were also permitted to travel through the islands of Micronesia
from bases in Guam and San Francisco.69 None of this detracts from the image
of the Japanese steamroller in Micronesia; it merely adds a further dimension.
Atkins Kroll, Burns Philp, and the Pacific Phosphate Company were officially
sanctioned speed limits imposed on the steamroller drivers—all in all, more
annoying than alarming. In any case, the general speed was not affected by
them, and the Japanese were aware that these warning signs could be removed
as quickly as they had been set up.
The Japanese evidently regarded Burns Philp as an official representative
of the Australian government. Early in 1915 the Japanese consul-general vis-
ited James Burns and proposed that Japan and Australia conclude a separate
treaty to delimit their mutual interests.70 However, neither Burns nor the Aus-
tralian government was prepared to consider this. Despite Japan’s remarkable
openness toward Australian economic interests, Australia maintained an anti-
Japanese policy of exclusion. New Guinea was to remain “a closed colony” to
the Japanese. Japanese concessions toward Burns Philp had to be compensated
by the British, who permitted the Japanese trading company Nan’yo Boeki Kai-
Australian traders weighing and buying copra for Burns Philp. Marshall Islands, 1917.
(Photograph by Thomas J. McMahon. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South
Wales)
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sha to open a trading station on the Gilbert Islands.71 Between the Australians
and the Japanese, however, relations deteriorated visibly. Japanese secrecy in
Micronesia increased the mutual distrust. Added to this was the White Austra-
lia Policy and Australia’s phobia about the Yellow Peril, and on the Japanese
side an excessive self-confidence that sometimes took aggressive forms. Each
country harbored highly racist ideas about the other. Thus it is hardly surpris-
ing that rumors were soon circulating about secret Japanese military installa-
tions and the construction of defenses in Micronesia. Stobo, captain of the
Pacific Phosphate Company’s recruiting ship the Pukaki, and Handley, captain
of a Burns Philp steamer in Micronesia, fanned the flames of this speculation.
Handley was a covert informer for the British admiralty, whereas Stobo was a
lieutenant in the Australian navy and a special agent. Their reports about secret
Japanese military preparations in Micronesia must be viewed with skepticism,
for their method of gathering information was to feed rumors rather than to
find out whether there was any truth behind them, typically by asking leading
questions and spreading anti-Japanese propaganda.72
The uneasiness felt by Micronesia’s European neighbors was largely
caused by the increasing “Japanization” of the islands. Anxiety was caused less
by the permeation of Micronesia by aspects of Japanese culture, which will be
described in the next chapter, than by the sudden increase in the size of the
Japanese population in the area. One of the points made by the Japanese com-
mission of inquiry in 1915 was that Micronesia’s economic efficiency could be
increased by settling Japanese in the colony. A steadily growing stream of Japa-
nese settlers had gone to the colony during the early years of Japanese rule. In
1918 the Japanese government seems to have officially adopted a program of
encouraging settlement in Micronesia. The state-funded Nishimura Coloniza-
tion Co. took settlers to Saipan—mostly small farmers from Kiushu and Hachi-
jojima, but also fishermen from Okinawa, and Korean laborers. Micronesia
began to change demographically. In 1920 Japanese made up more than 6 per-
cent of the total population of Micronesia. More than three thousand Japanese
were highly visible in a population of not much more than fifty thousand peo-
ple. In Saipan, 28 percent of the population was Japanese, and more than 5
percent Korean. Chamorros and Caroline Islanders made up just under two-
thirds of the total population. This was a revolutionary change that went much
deeper than any other Japanese colonial measures, however much they may
have differed from comparable models in the same region. Micronesia was
beginning to be a Japanese settler colony; and, in the British settler colonies of
Australia and New Zealand, the only European colonists in the Pacific who had
a similar experience behind them grew more and more agitated.73
Japanese Cultural Influence and Indigenous Responses
When European visitors went to Micronesia soon after the end of the First
World War and before the introduction of the official mandate administration,
they were astonished at how much the islands had changed. Garapan, the capi-
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tal of Saipan, felt like a Japanese town.74 Public and private buildings in the
Japanese style dominated the townscape in all the Micronesian administrative
centers, but especially in the Mariana and Palau Islands. The Micronesian way
of life had been remarkably transformed within a relatively short time. An Aus-
tralian journalist who traveled through the Marshall Islands in September and
October 1918 on a Burns Philp steamer noted that Micronesians almost every-
where were wearing the kimono instead of the traditional loincloth (lavalava)
and that Micronesian women were pinning up their hair in the Japanese fash-
ion. Japanese fans and umbrellas were “in.” Japanese dishes and ways of eating
were popular among the islanders. In Palau new dances were influenced by
Japanese styles, and Japanese methods had been adopted by islanders in build-
ing their own homes.75
Under certain circumstances, however, Japanese innovations could also
revitalize Micronesian forms of behavior. Nowhere was this clearer than in
the introduction of the geisha system into Micronesia in the early autumn of
1915. The timing coincided so precisely with the beginning of the second
phase of Japanese rule in Micronesia that it is tempting to see this innovation
as a response to a suggestion made by the Japanese commission of inquiry. In
any case, the geisha system was such an important part of Japanese life that
the decision to make the islands more Japanese made its transferral to Micro-
nesia inevitable. In mid-September 1915 two brothels were opened in Truk,
one for Japanese and one for indigenous men. As far as the people of Truk
were concerned, this was a Japanese variation on the traditional im en lisau.76
Because there were no geishas in Ponape, the Japanese commander, Ida,
asked a Japanese trader and two headmen to supply local girls. The chiefs
most likely saw this as an opportunity to establish closer social ties with the
military governor via the well-known practice of exchanging women. The
Ponapeans, too, regarded this as a reintroduction of the im en li kirip.77 In the
late 1920s the governor of Saipan, Goto Juzo, openly led a life dominated by
Japanese prostitutes and alcohol abuse.78 In Palau a whole street, Geisha
Road, was reserved for geishas. At its busiest time, toward the end of the
1930s, this street is said to have had about twenty establishments housing up
to three hundred women. Officially, only Japanese men were allowed to visit
these, but it was apparently not difficult for local men to bend the rules and
gain access.79
This illustrates another way in which Japanese rule was totally different
from that of the Germans. However determined and severe the Japanese could
be in implementing their economic and political objectives, there were certain
areas in which they tolerated local infringement of the rules in an amazingly
relaxed manner. When speaking of the difference between the Germans and
the Japanese, older Micronesians always come back to three things: alcohol,
fishing with dynamite, and the possession of firearms. All three were forbidden
by both the German and the Japanese administrations (the Japanese prohibi-
tion on alcohol was not introduced until the mandate), but the Germans seem
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Adopting the Japanese fashion. King Jebrick and his Queen of Majuro Lagoon, 1917.
(Photograph by Thomas J. McMahon. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South
Wales)
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A Marshall Islands woman dressed à la Japan, 1917. (Photograph by Thomas J.
McMahon. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales)
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to have been much stricter than the Japanese in enforcing the rules. Some of
the islanders were under the impression that Japanese negligence in these
areas was deliberate.80 This is understandable if we remember that both alco-
hol and firearms were among the traditional staples of the Japanese trade with
the South Sea islands, and that this trade was first prohibited by the German
administration. The Japanese also used alcohol to control Micronesian forced
laborers in the phosphate works on Angaur.81 Firearms were sold under the
counter by Japanese or Korean retailers. Fishing with dynamite was normal
practice in Japan itself, and the Japanese did not seem to regard it as a particu-
lar offense.
However, the Japanese were not so tolerant when it came to respect for
their values in the Pacific. To disseminate these values, the Japanese estab-
lished schools for indigenous children all over Micronesia from late October
1915. The large-scale development of an educational system for the indigenous
people is another feature typical of Japanese rule and was an innovation, at
least in the western Pacific. The Germans had repeatedly planned to expand
their only government school in Saipan, but action was always postponed for
financial reasons. The Australians in New Guinea, as we have seen, actually
took a backward step in this area. The Japanese, in contrast, spared no cost or
effort to organize an educational system in Micronesia that was as comprehen-
sive as possible. Compulsory schooling for Micronesians was never introduced
as such, but the system of taking children from the smaller islands to school on
the larger islands by government boat came close to it. Schools, including
Saipanese boys imitate Japanese sumo wrestling; their Japanese teacher stands nearby,
c. 1921. (Fritz Collection, Frankfurt a.M.)
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books and materials, were free for Micronesians. By the end of 1918 there
were twelve schools in the Japanese part of Micronesia, and 1,370 indigenous
students. Two years later the number of schools had risen to seventeen, and the
number of students to about 2,000.82
The Japanese cultural mission was clear and strictly defined. The youth of
Micronesia were to learn the Japanese language as quickly as possible and in
addition were to adopt the Japanese life-style. As Kurita, the Japanese com-
mander on Ponape, explained, the aim was “to be civilized, according to the
Japanese style. Japan has her own soul which must assert itself over all require-
ments and she is capable of doing so.”83
On Truk it was said that the purpose of the school was “to train the people
to work.”84 Teaching was limited to the most elementary level, and schooling
was normally completed in three years. As a rule, only the simplified katakana
system of Japanese ideograms was taught. In some schools, children were not
even taught multiplication and division. Great stress was placed on order and
discipline, and corporal punishment was common. Very old Micronesians who
can still remember both colonial regimes unanimously agree that the Japanese
teacher beat the students even more than the German teacher. Girls were not
exempt. In western Micronesia this was tolerated because traditional education
specified a number of strict punishments to be administered in the case of dis-
obedience.85 For the central Caroline Islands, where traditionally children
Pupils at the Japanese school Jaluit, 1917. (Photograph by Thomas J. McMahon. Mitch-
ell Library, State Library of New South Wales)
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were never physically punished at all, we unfortunately have no records of
interviews with the people.
The Japanese did not set up any secondary schools for Micronesians, not
even after 1922. Graduates of the former German school in Saipan were favored
for administrative jobs, while apprentices from Tsingtao were employed in tech-
nical positions. It is quite clear that the main task of the Japanese schools was to
transmit Japanese ideology to the Micronesians and thus stabilize Japanese rule.
Although this concept deserves harsh criticicism, it cannot be denied that it was
the Japanese who first introduced Pacific Islanders to a more general education,
even though the attempt was limited and ideologically motivated. Pacific Island-
ers had now begun to gain access to some of the mysteries associated with Euro-
pean (or Japanese) “progress.” What use they would eventually make of this
knowledge lay only partly in the hands of the Japanese. It should also be men-
tioned that there were exceptions to the rule. Individual Micronesians were per-
mitted to attend the shogakko school for Japanese children, and it was not
completely unknown for Micronesians to study at a Japanese university. Con-
versely, Tsukamoto, the Japanese governor (secho) of Saipan, chose to send his
two children to the school for indigenous children (kogakko).86
Of all the criticisms which can be leveled at Japanese cultural activities in
Micronesia in retrospect, the gravest is that Japanese schools not only incul-
cated Japanese ideology but also tried to destroy the identity of the Microne-
sians. In school and outside it, young people were forbidden to use their
mother tongue on pain of punishment.87 Any rival ideology was eliminated.
When the Japanese opened their schools, the German Catholic and Protestant
missions were forbidden to continue teaching, with the exception of practical
domestic science for girls. Religious instruction was subjected to ever more
restrictions, until it was permitted only in conjunction with mass on Sundays.
On Ponape the Japanese teacher, accompanied by soldiers, entered church
after the service and dragged the children out. Finally, religious instruction was
completely banned.88 Catholic services could be held only on Sundays. When
the Catholics of Ponape celebrated Assumption in 1916, the Japanese com-
mander held discussions with the headmen. Thereupon the Catholics were
informed that in future no more services were to be held at all, on pain of
imprisonment. The messenger was Henry Nanpei, leader of the Protestant
Ponapeans. At a stroke, the Japanese ruling seemed to have put an end to the
long-standing conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants of Ponape.
The Catholic mission, however, did not observe the ban and, strangely enough,
registered more people attending mass than before.89 The traditional Ponapean
spirit of opposition to orders from outside had been aroused. In the face of
such blatant nonobservance, the Japanese administration backed down. After
the end of the war, in mid-June 1919, orders of expulsion went out to all Ger-
mans remaining in Micronesia. At this time the ban on religious services was
reimposed. The Japanese obviously feared the consequences of a final German
sermon and influence on the people of Ponape, for the Ponapeans were not
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even permitted to go to confession. The Germans were threatened with ban-
ishment to the Japanese-occupied parts of Siberia as punishment. Thereupon a
large delegation of Ponapeans marched on Japanese headquarters and urged
the Japanese to revoke the order. When the mission rejected a compromise
suggested by the Japanese, according to which a Ponapean-speaking Japanese
official would be present at mass and for the sacraments, the Japanese finally
gave in.90
On Saipan, which had already been forced to give up its Catholic mission
in 1916, the Chamorros also remonstrated with the Japanese authorities.91 The
Mariana Islands had, after all, been Catholic for centuries. But a similar thing
happened even on Palau, where Catholic missionaries had been active for less
than a generation. The priests, lay brethren, and nuns who had been expelled
at the end of October 1915 had been particularly badly treated by Lieutenant
Bandai and his men, who suspected, correctly as it turned out, that they had
concealed German government funds. Despite open chicanery, physical
maltreatment, and the strictest prohibitions, many Palauans continued to sup-
port the mission. When the missionaries were forced to leave, Japanese soldiers
lined the road all the way to the harbor. Behind them stood Palauans, who
cried and called out to the missionaries in German, “Komm wieder zurück!”
(Come back again). Immediately after the deportation of the German mission-
aries, a delegation of Christian Palauan men, led by Ibedul Louch from Koror,
one of the most important men in the indigenous hierarchy, appeared at the
Japanese offices and demanded that the governor provide new Catholic
priests.92
This behavior on the part of the Ponapeans and Palauans is striking. It
becomes even more remarkable when we take into account that the repeated
interventions on behalf of the missions are the only occasions we know of on
which relatively large numbers of the indigenous population resisted any orders
issued by the Japanese administration. To ignore the significance of these inci-
dents would be absurd. The records of Ponape Mission demonstrate that the
mission by no means interpreted the behavior of the local population too favor-
ably. It was noted that the missionaries, as the only remaining Germans, were at
first treated icily. The indigenous elites were a constant source of danger, imme-
diately informing against every German who said anything against the Japanese.
Nor did the popularity which the Germans had expected to gain among the
nonaristocratic Ponapeans ever fully materialize.93 It would not be improbable
to see this as a reaction by the local people to the German suppression of the
Sokeh uprising.94 However, the mission records also document a change in the
people’s attitude toward the missionaries. Surprisingly, the more the Japanese
tried to limit their influence, the more the public mood swung in the missionar-
ies’ favor. In any case, we have only indigenous sources for events on Palau.
How can we explain the behavior of the Ponapeans, Chamorros, and
Palauans described above? Despite the relatively short time they had been
active in the area (less than a generation in the case of Palau), the Catholic mis-
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sionaries seem to have established personal and emotional links with large seg-
ments of the indigenous population. But there was more to it than this;
otherwise the local people would have demanded the return of familiar faces,
rather than immediately demanding new priests. Explanations from religious
psychology, both optimistic (a need for faith) and pessimistic (fear of punish-
ment in the afterlife), suggest themselves. But a political motive is also possi-
ble. The mission was the only institution that could provide a counterweight to
the power of the Japanese administration. The very reason that made the Japa-
nese close down the mission may have been enough to make the indigenous
population want to keep it.
The Japanese clearly treated Protestant missions better than Catholic
ones. On Truk, the Liebenzeller were allowed “to work more or less undis-
turbed, and even to hold baptisms” until 1918.95 Like the Catholics, they were
deported in June 1919, but this had nothing to do with their missionary activ-
ity. Rather it was an attempt to eliminate German influence. A number of facts
suggest that the Japanese placed a high value on the work of the Protestant
missionaries. The first Protestant Japanese missionary arrived in Ponape at the
end of April 1917 in order to support the Liebenzell mission there. The Japa-
nese commander sent out official invitations to his sermons. Shortly after the
end of the war, more Protestant Japanese missionaries from Nan’ yo Dendo
Dan followed, and they began work in Truk and Ponape.96 Catholic priests did
not return to Micronesia until 1921, after protracted negotiations between the
Japanese commander Yamamoto, a Catholic (a former student at the Marist
Brothers’ school in Tokyo), and the former nuncio in Australia, Archbishop
Cerretti. As the indigenous Catholic population was becoming increasingly
restless over the delay, Japan was finally forced to telegraph for the departure
of the new missionaries to be brought forward. The Japanese government sub-
sidized their journey from Europe to Japan, and from there to Micronesia they
traveled free. Tokyo and the Vatican had agreed on Spanish Jesuits. The return
of Germans and Austrians was deliberately excluded.97 The German Lieben-
zeller, by contrast, were able to return to Micronesia from 1927. Even mission-
aries who had been expelled in 1919 were permitted to resume their work.
The suggestion that the Japanese regarded the German Protestant ethic as
useful for colonization because it inculcated in the Micronesian population a
duty to work is certainly not far wrong.98 In the case of the Catholics, the Japa-
nese seem to have feared that they would use the confessional, which was
beyond the control of the Japanese administration, in the service of nationalist
propaganda.
From 1919 a Buddhist missionary in Saipan, where a temple had been
built, supported the Japanese cultural mission. Buddhists and Shintoists among
the indigenous population were mainly in Palau. The headquarters of the Japa-
nese South Sea administration and the proximity of the phosphate island,
Angaur, attracted so many Japanese to Palau that the indigenous population
gradually became a minority.99 However, the missionary activities of Japanese
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Buddhists and Shintoists should not be overrated. Their main target group was
the steadily growing stream of Japanese; “converting” South Sea islanders was
at most a secondary goal. The aim of the Japanese colonization was not to
spread religion in the European way. The Micronesians were “Japanized”
through school. Banzai, bowing daily in the direction of Japan, singing the
“Kumiyaio,” and reciting by rote, “I am a good citizen of Japan,” were adequate
substitutes for religion. Japan and the Japanese in Micronesia were not con-
cerned about the fate of the Micronesians in an afterlife; nor were they inter-
ested in saving their souls. What counted was making them recognize, and
submit to, the overlordship of the Japanese in the here and now.
In order to underline the lesson of Japanese cultural superiority, selected
groups of Micronesians were regularly taken to Japan starting from July 1915.
The first group to be targeted for this treatment was the indigenous elite—
male and female chiefs from all over Micronesia. In Japan they were taken to
architectural monuments, temples, sights of interest, museums, theaters and
musical performances, Japanese cavalry maneuvers, and flyovers of warplanes.
They traveled by train to Yokohama, Osaka, and Nikko, where the program
included city tours. Visits were arranged to schools, fortifications, wharfs, and
factories—at first, mostly sugar factories. Large numbers of gifts were distrib-
uted. These were public relations exercises which, given that they were
intended to dazzle Micronesians with Japanese culture, could not have been
bettered. Those who had been left behind were shown a film about the experi-
ences of their chiefs in Japan. They had already been impressed by the
accounts of the returned travelers, and this reinforced the impact of the trips.
Kanko dan tours were repeated annually and became a fixed part of Japanese
colonial policy in Micronesia. Gradually the target group was expanded, and
the principle of a free advertising trip was given up in favor of participants
bearing part of the cost themselves. These propaganda trips for Micronesians
were supplemented by equally methodical exchange programs for Japanese:
while Micronesian chiefs toured Japan, members of the Japanese upper house
traveled through Micronesia. One month later they were followed by the first
group of Japanese high-school students.100
There can be no doubt that the Micronesians who took part in these trips
were highly impressed by the display put on by the Japanese. All those who
went have positive memories of their travels. In most cases we can only guess
to what extent they were inwardly changed by their experiences. In one case
the Japanese “conversion” had a direct impact immediately after the end of the
kanko dan. After his return from Japan, Chief Uong Ngirateuid from Ngiwal
on Palau turned the local society that was subordinate to him inside out. On his
orders the village was moved from inland to the coast, and straight streets were
built. All the men had to cut their hair short, like the Japanese, and landowners
were instructed to transfer part of their land into the possession of nonland-
owning clan members.101 The distribution of land was probably prompted less
by the desire to introduce a democratic system per se than by the idea, put
CH3  Page 146  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:16 PM
Micronesia and the War 147
about by the Japanese, that it would make more effective economic manage-
ment possible.
A number of factors facilitated the Japanization of Micronesia. By far the
most important was Japan’s determination to incorporate the islands into the
Japanese Empire, with all the consequences this would entail for their inhabit-
ants. Formal Japanization was achieved in two steps, after the military occupa-
tion and before the final decision was taken about the political future of the
islands. In mid-1915, Japanese time and the Japanese imperial calendar were
officially introduced in Micronesia; and from the beginning of 1918, the islands
were systematically renamed. Toloas Island in the Truk Archipelago, for exam-
ple, was renamed Natsushima (Summer Island), and Wela became Harushima
(Spring Island). As the number of indigenous island people was small, it was
argued, they would be unlikely to insist on their traditional names.102
As we have shown, the Japanese made a much greater effort to win over
the Micronesians than any of the European colonial powers in the Pacific
before 1918. At the start of the Japanese administration, the local people were
treated astonishingly well. Japanese efforts amounted to much more than the
Australian food handouts in New Guinea. Although the Japanese occupying
troops also gave out crackers and biscuits on their arrival, the manner of giving
reveals a different attitude. Whereas the Australian soldiers all behaved indi-
vidually, apparently acting out of sympathy for the Melanesians, the Japanese
food distributions took place at specified times and included the whole of the
indigenous population,103 suggesting that this was less a spontaneous expression
of Japanese concern for the local people than a systematic attempt to gain the
sympathy of the Micronesians. Applied to the Japanese strategy of “brotherly
racial equality,” which was soon introduced, this interpretation rests on pretty
firm ground. Sources for the Marshall Islands, Ponape, Truk, and Palau all
claim that, at the start, the Japanese tried to convince the Micronesians that
they and the Japanese were of the same race, and therefore practically broth-
ers.104 Here we see the idea of equality being used as a political weapon in the
arsenal of Japanese colonization. It is true that during the first phase of their
rule the Japanese hardly interfered in the internal concerns of the local people.
This began to change at the beginning of the second period of their military
administration, the phase of development, when it soon became apparent that
the Japanese by no means regarded the Micronesians as equals with the same
rights as themselves.
The claim that the Japanese and Micronesians were of the same race was in
fact an ideological preparation for the total and unconditional assimilation of the
Micronesians. Being of the same race does not necessarily mean being at the
same stage of development, and there was no doubt about who was at the top.
The aim was for the Micronesians to develop into Japanese, not merely ideolog-
ically and culturally, but above all physically and racially. Every specifically
Micronesian feature was an obstacle, and thus had to be eradicated. The right to
become more Japanese therefore included the duty to relinquish one’s Microne-
CH3  Page 147  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:16 PM
148 Chapter 3
sian identity. The Japanese policy of theoretical equality thus resulted in a policy
that was no less racist than the German-European policy of insisting on a funda-
mental difference among the races. Japanese policy turned out to be even more
ruthless than German policy. Whereas the German colonial administrators
debated about which features of Micronesian culture should be preserved in the
face of European modernism, and which should be rejected as “unethical” or
“inhumane,” no such discussion took place among the Japanese. In their view,
anything Micronesian that was un-Japanese was also unethical. The Japanese
did not, like the Germans, regard Micronesian “underdevelopment” primarily
as a cultural problem to be overcome by education, but as a racial problem. In
the Japanese view, the Micronesians had gone their own way racially, but their
separate existence was not worth preserving because it represented a primitive
retrogression or lateral offshoot of Japanese development. The Japanese “civiliz-
ing” mission in Micronesia assumed that the physical identity of the Microne-
sians would come to an end. In fact, this was probably its goal.
Sexual relations between Micronesian women and Japanese men were
encouraged, but relationships were legitimized only in the case of Japanese
traders, farmers, and fishermen. Officials were permitted to have Micronesian
mistresses, but not to marry Micronesian women. The custom, common on the
Micronesian islands, of raising the social status of a group by means of a sexual
connection between a woman from the clan and a higher-ranking man made
sexual contacts easier, even if they remained extramarital. Girls were encour-
aged by their families to approach Japanese men.105 The administration put
pressure on Micronesian women to produce a mixed Japanese-Micronesian
population. On Kusaie the Japanese naval secretary, called “governor” by the
local people, assembled all the island women and told them that it was their
duty, and the duty of the women of all the other islands, to do everything they
could to produce “half-caste Japanese.”106
At least as long as Micronesians and Japanese were still physically differ-
ent, there was no question of the Micronesians’ achieving the privileged posi-
tion of the Japanese. Increasing immigration from the north produced a four-
class society based on race, consisting of Japanese, Micronesians, Okinawans,
and Koreans. It is not clear exactly what the pecking order was in Japanese
eyes. Probably it varied from region to region. In western Micronesia, where
the Japanese were numerically strongest and the Japanization of the indige-
nous population had advanced furthest, the majority of survivors agree that the
Micronesians took second place before the Okinawans, while the Koreans
came last. This may well be an accurate representation of everyday life. In any
case, there is evidence of brutal Japanese exploitation of Korean workers.107
Things were probably different on the more remote islands and in eastern
Micronesia, where the local people were called tomin by the Japanese, a
word—as ambiguous as the term kanaka—meaning both “South Sea islander”
and “savage.”108
The Japanese deliberately used violence to achieve their colonial aims.
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During the second half of the Japanese military administration, reports from all
over Micronesia document the fear the islanders had of physical punishment
by the Japanese or their subordinates.109 Japanese rule was not one of arbitrary
terror, but the use of force was an integral part of their colonial policy, demon-
strating Japanese determination not to let any doubts arise about their “path.”
The stick used to discourage anyone from straying from this path was the
equivalent of the carrot of cultural propaganda tours through Japan. Fear of
Japanese harshness encouraged a certain fatalism among some Pacific Island-
ers: “I always went along with what the Japanese said. It is not that deep in my
heart I believed everything they said, but why go against their wishes? We
would be punished if we did that.”110 Japanese orders had to be obeyed; the
question “Why?” did not exist. Workers for the phosphate mines in Angaur
were no longer recruited but simply “enlisted.” A man from Palau who was told
that he had to go to Angaur to work did not have the option of saying no.111 The
Japanese possibly made an exception of Ponape. Henry Nanpei informed for-
eign visitors that the Japanese had good reason to treat the Ponapeans better
than the people of the other Caroline Islands; they knew that if they did
not, “there would be more fighting than under the German and Spanish
Regime.”112 Outside of Ponape the Pax Germanica had made such a deep
impact that any revival of Micronesia’s warlike past was out of the question. As
the Micronesians had become accustomed to the positive side of the German
presence, their old belligerence had gradually faded until to all intents and pur-
poses it no longer existed. Germany’s successful pacification of Micronesia had
deprived the islanders of an effective weapon of defense. On the other hand, it
made it easier for the Japanese to take over the islands, for which they later
duly expressed their gratitude.113
Organized indigenous action against the Japanese was nonviolent, at least
during the period of Japanese military government, and only the Palauans
themselves can inform us about it. Of all the Micronesians, the Palauans were
most affected by the change of regime. The Japanese transferred their head-
quarters to Palau, which then attracted large numbers of immigrants. The men
of Palau were also ruthlessly exploited as phosphate workers on the neighbor-
ing island of Angaur. One year after the Japanese took over the administration,
a nativistic movement arose that became increasingly anti-Japanese. Neverthe-
less, it would be wrong to label the Modekngei (literally: “being or coming
together”) as a group of Palauan traditionalists. It is unlikely that the Mode-
kngei had any connection with the “sorcerers,” a resistance group that had
aimed to preserve their traditional privileges during the period of German rule.
The founder of the Modekngei was a Palauan noble named Temedad.
Employed as a policeman on Angaur during the German administration, he
represented both the new and the old elites. After experiencing a vocation as a
prophet and allegedly raising someone from the dead, Temedad gathered a
growing number of disciples around him from 1915. At the heart of his ser-
mons was a non-Christian monotheism based on the cult of the village god,
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Ngirchomekuul of Chol, combined with apocalyptic visions of the future.
Temedad preached that everyone was equal before God, and that a time was
coming when the Palauans would be recognized as the equals of others. He
also claimed that his influence could cause traditional Palau money to multiply,
in other words, that faith in him could raise one’s status within Palau society.
This feature points forward to the post-1945 Melanesian cargo cults. Like
them, the Modekngei also adopted various elements of Christianity.114
Temedad preached against a number of old Palauan customs, such as
chewing betel nut, and against adultery. But his campaign against Palauan food
taboos was the most successful. After all, he argued, God had made food for
everyone to use. This suggestion obviously fulfilled a long-felt need, and the
change was quickly adopted. Temedad also revived the old notion that the sick
could be truly healed only if they regained a sense of inner and outer peace.
Therefore they had to compensate anyone they had harmed by making pay-
ments of money.115
The movement founded by Temedad was thus by no means antimodern—
it can be described as syncretistic with a holistic tendency—but it was certainly
anti-Japanese. The Japanese presence and their cultural mission were not only a
threat to the physical existence of the Palauans, but their work ethic was also
diametrically opposed to Temedad’s ideas. At a meeting with all of Palau’s
chiefs, Temedad asked them for their help against the Japanese. Temedad’s
openly anti-Japanese strategy was directed at the pillars of Japanese ideology:
the school and Japanese–Palauan relationships. He wanted to destroy the
school and to dissolve all marriages between Palauans and Japanese, as well as
purely Palauan marriages in which one partner worked for the Japanese.116
Before the Modekngei could become militant, the Japanese stepped in. They
accused Temedad of what, in their eyes, was the Micronesian original sin: his
teachings discouraged the Palauans from working. In addition, they claimed
that his cures were totally unscientific and unhygienic. Temedad and two sup-
porters were imprisoned for three years on the island of Angaur until Japan
took over the mandate in 1922 and they were freed. After another period of
imprisonment in 1924, Temedad died. Under his successor, Ongesii, the Mode-
kngei finally turned into a covert resistance movement, becoming more and
more reactionary and racist. At its height, about half of the people of Palau were
members of the movement. Today it has a following of about eight hundred.117
In areas where the Japanese presence was relatively small, they began by
trying to ignore the power of the chiefs. This led to passive resistance by the
locals, whereupon the Japanese returned to the German method of indirect
rule. German administrative methods were adopted almost unchanged. Chiefs
continued to collect the head-tax as before, and the exemptions recognized by
the Germans remained in force. After the German criminal justice system was
abolished in October 1915, Japanese penal legislation was supplemented by
local regulations and customs for the punishment of local offenders.118 Were
these the officially recognized “niches” in “Japanized” Micronesian society?
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How did the Japanese treat areas where the Germans had left traditional
Micronesian social structures more or less untouched?
In the Marshall Islands, the last stronghold of oligarchic feudalism, the
Japanese government acknowledged the special position of the chiefs in a
decree issued one year before the introduction of the civil administration. The
Japanese presence in the Marshall Islands was the smallest, except for that on
Yap. The economic potential of the islands was limited, and copra was the only
export worth mentioning. The judicial functions of the chiefs and the indige-
nous judges (now called dri-kien) were preserved, and the penalties they could
impose on their own responsibility were actually increased. The conduct that
the chiefs now had to enforce was a mixture of traditional, Western, and Japa-
nese ideas—any violations of Japanese etiquette, such as swearing or deliber-
ately turning one’s back, were punished by five to ten days’ imprisonment.
Marriage law is a good example of how these varied elements came together.
Long-term cohabitation was recognized as legal marriage, but the Western
notion of free choice was accepted as the basis for marriage. Thus there was no
longer a role for the traditional matchmaker. The ruling that after marriage the
woman belonged to her husband’s island had the greatest impact on the tradi-
tional way of life; the Marshall Islands societies had previously been matrilin-
eal. Now this form of organization was practically destroyed at a stroke. The
intention was probably to create a more disciplined economy. In general, the
aim of Japanese regulations was to increase copra production. They introduced
a new law, based on an old island custom, that particular ceremonies and cer-
tain anniversaries were to be marked by the planting of coconut palms. The
1918 ultimatum according to which unplanted and unsettled land would be
confiscated if it was not planted with coconuts within three years was extended
for another year. The chiefs were to take away the land of anyone who still did
not plant it at this stage and distribute it among those who were willing to work.
Women were also encouraged to work: “The women are not to do washing only,
they are also to help the men on work.” The chiefs were not to sit around lazily,
but were to make sure that the land was being worked. Instruction in health
and hygiene was to keep the working population healthy.119 The Japanese had
continued the German health system, including monthly tours of inspection by
government doctors, throughout Micronesia. In addition, they considerably
increased the number of hospitals and the number of beds in them.120
Japanese control in the Marshall Islands was largely exercised by the com-
mercial agents of the Nan’yo Boeki Kaisha (NBK). This South Sea trading com-
pany was founded in 1908 as the result of a merger between two Japanese
companies that had long been active in western Micronesia. Before the war,
NBK was the largest Japanese trading company in German Micronesia. It prof-
ited from the war in much the same way as Burns Philp did in New Guinea. A
contract NBK concluded with the Japanese navy in 1915 gave it a monopoly on
all government shipments between Japan and Micronesia. The closing down of
the Jaluit Company and the expulsion of its general manager in the first six
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months of 1915 enabled NBK to expand from western into eastern Micronesia.
On the Marshall Islands, NBK quickly assumed the semiofficial status the
Jaluit Company had enjoyed: it continued to collect copra via the chiefs, some
of it on behalf of the government as a substitute for the head-tax. In return,
Japanese naval cruisers accompanied the company’s employees on their trading
expeditions, thus creating the impression that NBK was the Japanese adminis-
tration of the Marshall Islands. The practice of selling Japanese goods at exces-
sively high prices and buying copra at low ones soon made the local population
financially dependent on the company, whose methods included extending
credit. The Japanese military administration tolerated such practices because it
also profited from them. As most of the chiefs were deeply in debt, the com-
pany could be used to put pressure on them.121
The Marshall Islands did not really slip through the net of Japanese con-
trol, because the NBK “governed” in place of a largely absent administration.
The real “niches” were found on the small islands where neither Japanese gov-
ernment officials nor traders had settled—for example, the mini-atolls of the
central Caroline Islands. At least until the beginning of 1922 the Japanese
showed little interest in these areas. Thus, compared with the period of Ger-
man rule, the islanders’ “freedom” actually increased. On the other hand, time
had not stood still there either. On Pingelap, for instance, the islanders did not
feel badly treated by the Japanese but regarded themselves as neglected by
them.122 German colonial activity had created dependencies, and the people
had expectations of a colonial government which the Japanese obviously did
not fulfill. Japanese methods veered between two extremes: an attempt to
make territories that seemed economically or strategically important as much
like Japan as possible, and a clear lack of interest in the small islands that had
no direct value but would have been expensive to administer.
The fact that the indigenous population felt neglected by the colonial gov-
ernment does not square with most current theories of imperialism, unless we
assume from the start that this was the reaction, not of a truly autonomous soci-
ety, but of a degenerate colonial one that had already been infiltrated by for-
eigners—which, of course, removes the need to explain anything that runs
counter to one’s own theory. This “feeling” registered by the indigenous island
population, however, was based on concrete experience and very real anxieties
and fears. Almost without exception, the Micronesian population of the smaller
islands lived on atolls that barely stood out above the sea. Typhoons not only
destroyed the islanders’ huts and uprooted the few fruit trees growing on these
islands but also regularly caused flooding, which washed away the thin layer of
humus and could make it impossible for survivors to continue living there.
Measures taken by the colonial administration had not been able to eliminate
these hardships, but they had been able to alleviate them. Between the begin-
ning of the crisis in Europe in the summer of 1914 and the end of the year, the
Mariana Islands in northern Micronesia suffered four cyclones. The worst
damage was done by two typhoons that swept over Rota and Saipan at the
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beginning of October and in mid-December 1914. Almost all the local houses
were destroyed, and the sweet potato fields were spoiled by salt water.
Neither in Saipan nor in Rota did the Japanese administration take any
interest in the plight of the islanders. As a Japanese administrative center,
Saipan was in contact with the outside world and with Japanese traders, and
conditions gradually stabilized. Rota, however, was one of the small islands
which lacked economic or strategic value, and which the Japanese therefore
“neglected.” The island was completely cut off from the outside world, as on
the orders of the military administration no independent interisland traffic was
allowed and all communication was prohibited. No Japanese ships called there.
At the beginning of July 1915, when famine was about to claim its first victims,
the head of the local village and a German Capuchin monk who had stayed on
Rota organized a boat to fetch help from American Guam. The expedition was
successful, but it embarrassed the Japanese government.123 Thereafter commu-
nication among individual islands was made easier, but there is no evidence
that Japanese policy changed.
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Samoa and the New Zealand Experience
 (1914–1921)
MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNDER COLONEL LOGAN:
BUSINESS AS USUAL?
Tiny New Zealand had struck out with a vengeance, going down forever in the
annals of the war. Samoa was the first territory under German sovereignty to be
occupied during the First World War. German companies celebrated along
with the occupiers. This represented “salvation from incalculable calamities
arising out of the war situation,” wrote the representative of the Deutsche
Samoagesellschaft (German Samoa Company). Its founder and co-owner,
Deeken, had given the colonial administration a great deal of trouble by
spreading pan-German propaganda while the administration had been aiming
for a peaceful settlement. If only Samoa would remain British, was the cry now.
This would solve the tiresome labor problem, because the British would surely
bring in Indian coolies, as they had done in neighboring Fiji. Other German
firms shared the German Samoa Company’s positive view of the occupation. To
have remained with Germany would have been “disastrous,” because they
would certainly have been cut off from world trade, the firm Zuckschwerdt
sighed in relief.1
The rejoicing did not last long. In mid-December 1914, German compa-
nies in Samoa were forbidden to import and export; Burns Philp declared itself
the sole importer.2 Thereafter, German commercial influence was cut out, step
by step. From 26 April 1915, German currency was replaced by sterling. One
day later, a branch of the Bank of New Zealand was opened in Apia. The Ger-
man coins and banknotes withdrawn from circulation were exchanged for
pounds on the London money market and the proceeds invested in New
Zealand war loans. The coins alone had a face value of over 812,000 marks, and
filled ninety-two cases for transport to New Zealand. The British notes and
coins imported from New Zealand were charged to the Samoan national budget
and repaid in full to New Zealand at the end of July 1917.3 In September 1915
the largest German firm, the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagengesellschaft
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“Der Conquerors.” The Australian view of the New Zealand occupation of Samoa. (The
Bulletin, 10 September 1914)
CH4  Page 155  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:17 PM
156 Chapter 4
(German Trading and Plantation Company) was sequestered, and on 25 April
1916 the military government closed all German businesses in Samoa, began
liquidating them, and auctioned off their stock. These steps had been preceded
by an intense correspondence with London, and Britain had urged New
Zealand to push ahead. The proceeds of these actions secured New Zealand the
highest budget surplus in its history.4 Once again, Burns Philp’s hour seemed to
have struck. It secured for itself the bulk of the goods and the right to use all of
the German Trading and Plantation Company’s buildings and trading stations,
without having to pay a penny in rent until the end of the war.5 Somehow, Burns
Philp had managed to have the right men in the right spot in Samoa and New
Zealand, as elsewhere. The liquidator of the German Trading and Plantation
Company was an employee of Burns Philp. Consequently, everything ran like
clockwork. Officially declared an auction, few people and even fewer bidders
were present. Burns Philp was also able to buy the premises of the firm
Grevsmühl in the most desirable location on the harbor, with their own wharf
and railway siding, for the ridiculously low price of just under £2,000.6
The state did not, at first, intervene directly in the running of the German
plantations. But almost at the same time as the German businesses were liqui-
dated the military administration introduced an export tax designed to siphon
off as much of the profits made by the plantations as possible.7 Internally, the
military governor advocated concentrating entirely on copra in the future, be-
cause the cacao and caoutchouc plants took too long to become profitable. The
military governor was supported in this by all leading circles in New Zealand. A
commission set up along the same lines as the Australian Royal Commission in
New Guinea opposed any further planting of cacao, caoutchouc, and coffee,
and recommended closing Samoa’s only fruit-processing plant, a pineapple-
canning factory. After visiting Samoa, the governor-general of New Zealand
endorsed the view that in Samoa only copra held out the promise of quick prof-
its, and that the cultivation of other agricultural products should cease.8 In
December 1917 the Samoa Kautschuk Compagnie (Caoutchouc Company)
was compulsorily closed by the Administrator. Seven thousand imperial pounds
(over three tons) of finished caoutchouc was left to rot because the New
Zealand Administrator, Logan, prohibited its sale.9 In 1914 Samoa had been
well on the way to casting off the predominance of copra as a monoculture.
Thus its economic progress was brought to a sudden halt. Logan believed that
after the war the German owners would have to be paid compensation for New
Zealand’s probable takeover of their plantations. It was therefore necessary to
accumulate profits as quickly as possible, while avoiding anything that could
increase the value of the German plantations.10
In terms of economic policy, Australia and New Zealand pursued diametri-
cally opposed goals in the areas under their occupation. Australia tolerated the
expansion of the German plantation economy—indeed, even encouraged it by
ruthless labor recruiting. New Zealand, in contrast, did what it could to damage
the German plantations. In pursuit of his policy (and, as will become apparent,
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for racist reasons), Logan refused to replace the coolies who were repatriated
to China on expiry of their contracts. The plantations became more and more
overgrown. At the end of the war, the flourishing copra plantations fell like ripe
fruit into Australia’s lap. What New Zealand got was not exactly spoiled, but
certainly included a number of rotten apples. The hasty expropriation and
deportation of the Germans, which began four months earlier than in New
Guinea, on 1 May 1920 (that is, after the peace treaty came into effect but
before the handing over of the mandate), could change nothing.
During the war, however, New Zealand removed as much money as possi-
ble from Samoa. From the start it had been established that Samoa would have
to repay New Zealand for the losses it had incurred as a result of exchanging
German currency into pounds, plus interest.11 In 1916 the Administrator advo-
cated charging to Samoa all the costs of occupation and diverting this sum, plus
interest incurred, from Samoa’s national income to New Zealand over a period
of fifteen to twenty years.12 In that year, Samoa paid £50,000 to New Zealand;
in 1917, as much as £78,000. This sum was the equivalent of about 2.5 million
marks and came mainly from the liquidation of Samoa’s German businesses.13
From 1 April 1916, the military governor’s salary was paid directly by the
Samoan administration (and no longer by New Zealand’s military authorities).
In June 1917, the military governor, with the approval of the governor, also
helped himself to £2,000 (40,000 marks), for personal use, from the private
funds of the liquidated German Trading and Plantation Company.14 From New
Zealand, the governor recommended that a start should be made on clearing
the island’s forests as soon as it was established that New Zealand would keep
Samoa. The Germans had not exported any wood from Samoa, he pointed out,
and this was “a national advantage” for New Zealand.15
Colonel Robert Logan had been deliberately selected for the job of mili-
tary governor of Samoa. A farmer who had migrated from Scotland to New
Zealand, he had little military experience; as an internal memorandum pointed
out, he was therefore debarred from an officer’s career. But for Samoa, where
no armed conflict was expected, his “good business ability” made him a suitable
choice.16 As soon as the German East Asian squadron was withdrawn from the
Pacific, the war became something unreal. More than ever, Samoa was a peace-
ful refuge from the turbulence of the world war. However, it soon became too
peaceful for the taste of the fourteen hundred plus soldiers stationed there.
They were bored, and felt useless. On Christmas Eve of 1914, hundreds of sol-
diers rampaged through Apia, plundering the German stores and stealing any-
thing that looked as though it might be drinkable. (In their haste, they even
took bottles of vinegar.) Thereafter about forty drunk soldiers went to the gov-
ernment house in Vailima (formerly Robert Louis Stevenson’s residence) and
shouted to the Administrator that he should go home to New Zealand and look
after his sheep. The commander of the military police could go too, they
added. If he did not quickly go back to hunting rabbits again, they threatened,
they would beat him up one day.17
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When the main New Zealand force began to be withdrawn in stages from
10 March 1915, it became even more boring for the soldiers and officers left
behind in Samoa. No real military tasks remained, and the daily work created
by the mere presence of the soldiers was done by the plantation laborers com-
mandeered for the troops. Melanesian “black boys” did the laundry and
cleaned the latrines, and Chinese coolies did the cooking. Those who had not
been driven out of Samoa by the heat and inactivity were there “to have a good
time.”18 While their comrades bled to death at Gallipoli, they passed their time
playing billiards and bowls. Cricket was given up when their local sparring part-
ners began to beat their teachers.19 The soldiers’ favorite recreation, however,
was drinking. Military communities of all types probably tend to consume large
amounts of alcohol, but if the Guinness Book of Records had existed in 1918,
the New Zealand soldiers on Samoa could have claimed the record for the
smallest occupying force with the largest capacity for drink during the war. As
the beer crates were regularly emptied before the arrival of the next steamer, it
was decided early in February 1916 to draw supplies directly from one of the
largest Pacific breweries in Australia:
We must procure for the men absolutely the best quality beer that is on the market,
at the lowest possible price. . . . In order to satisfy ourselves as to the best beer to
provide for the men, we have tried almost every brand that is on the market here.
Since July 13th we have purchased over £1000 worth of beer for the troops. . . .
At Stevenson’s tomb. Colonel Robert Logan, the first New Zealand Administrator of
Western Samoa, reading the service. At right are the two fautua, Tamasese and
Malietoa, June 1915. (Private Collection, London)
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The men are bound to talk beer to their friends. What better advertising proposi-
tion can you have in Samoa than this! The soldier if given the opportunity will lay
a foundation for the name Resch in Samoa which will remain long after the war
is over.20
The Administrator spent his time playing private war games, issuing one
military regulation after another, and pestering the German settlers. When
most of the German men had been deported to New Zealand, and in Samoa
itself the military governor had successfully created the impression of a perma-
nent state of siege, Logan turned to the “neutral” population on Samoa. His
antipathy toward Americans grew with the commercial success of the U.S.
traders on Samoa, who had also profited from the liquidation of German busi-
nesses and the sale of their stock. In addition, Samoa’s exports were increas-
ingly going to the United States. As most of New Zealand’s ships were being
used to transport troops, mutton, and butter to Great Britain, more and more
Samoan copra ended up on U.S. schooners and in the harbors of America’s
West Coast. Although Logan obstructed the export of copra to the United
States in 1916, and even temporarily banned it, more than half of Samoa’s
exports went there in 1916. There were simply no British ships available to fill
the gap. Instead of copra being diverted to Auckland, Sydney, or London, it was
left to rot in Samoa.21 In 1918 and 1919, when New Zealand’s troops were with-
drawn from Europe, all Samoan copra went to the United States. Before the
war, Samoa had been a German colony politically but commercially an Austra-
lian–New Zealand colony. During the war, New Zealand succeeded in turning
commercial into political dominance, but it increasingly lost its commercial
lead to the United States.
The Administrator vented his anger at the United States’ economic success
not only on the most prominent U.S. trader in Samoa, but also on the U.S. con-
sul. Logan used the fact that the consul’s job included representing German
interests as an excuse to open the diplomatic mail and confiscate post at his dis-
cretion. The consul’s tax privileges were abolished. Even after London issued
direct instructions to Logan to stop this behavior, the military governor
remained obstinate. In his view, the representative of U.S. interests in Samoa
was “typical of the bullying American cowboy type, a type with which thirty
years’ residence on colonial goldfields has made me perfectly familiar.” He was
convinced that a “conspiracy” was being hatched against him.22 Shortly thereaf-
ter, when the United States entered the war on the side of Great Britain and its
allies, Logan’s fury rose to fever pitch. He had an article printed in the Samoa
Times accusing the United States of entering the war after Germany had been
practically defeated purely out of selfish interest in a share of the booty.23 But it
was not only the Germans and the Americans who offended the Administrator:
sooner or later, he came into conflict with almost every European in Samoa.
The dictatorial powers he possessed and made full use of somehow went to his
head. In addition, he was obviously affected mentally by the tropical climate.
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“Bob Up!” New Zealand cartoon alluding to the furious side of the
Administrator, Colonel Logan. (The New Zealand Observer, 24
October 1914. From the collection of the Alexander Turnbull
Library)
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The longer the war lasted, the more Samoa under military occupation began to
resemble a madhouse. The islands possessed a profound natural tolerance and
were able to cope with a great deal. Although not especially big, they were
large enough to absorb the small number of foreigners living there, so long as
they were restricted to the capital; it required a great deal of energy for them to
have any impact beyond Apia. The real extent of the unrest that had emanated
from Apia since mid-1914 can be demonstrated by looking at the true occu-
pants, the Samoans themselves.
SAMOAN SELF-ADMINISTRATION UNDER
NEW ZEALAND MILITARY RULE
New Zealand had inherited the Samoan autonomous administration and a total
of 434 indigenous officials from the German regime. All were paid out of the
income generated by the Samoan head-tax. A number of Samoan officials
received quite handsome salaries. The highest paid among them were the sec-
retary of the Samoan native administration and the highest-ranking Samoan
police officer, each receiving 2,160 marks annually.24 Under Logan some of the
practices put in place by the Germans changed considerably. The New Zealand
military governor proved to rise to the hopes placed in him and implemented a
strict policy of economizing. This had not only financial but also administrative
implications. The office of failantusi, who had acted as the village secretary to
the indigenous village official (pulenuu), was abolished. This undermined the
position of the Samoan local representatives. An even bigger change took place
on 1 April 1915, when the salaries of the remaining Samoan officials were
slightly increased but the dog tax was abolished. The dog tax had been the
de facto local rates and had financed the village administrations. Its abolition
represented a significant change in the system of local self-sufficiency, as
the dependence of the local officials on the colonial central administration
increased while their ties with their local communities were weakened.25 Logan
suspected the Samoan officials of having manipulated the German system of
paying wages. He therefore introduced a card system intended to prevent the
double or multiple payment of salaries. For the Administrator, the financial
aspect was the deciding factor.
Under the Germans, methods of paying salaries had been adapted to
Samoan customs as a direct result of the policy of Samoan self-administration.
When a Samoan regional official paid an occasional visit to the Samoan central
administration, mulinuu, it was customary to pick up a quarter’s salary. Income
from the lafoga, the Samoan head-tax, had by definition been for the exclusive
use of the Samoan administration. The colonial administration had prescribed
the guidelines for distributing this revenue among the Samoan officials; the
practical implementation of this policy was left to the Samoans themselves.
Logan noted the existence of this system with some surprise—“It appears to
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have been the expressed policy to expend for the benefit of the natives all reve-
nue derived from native taxation”—but saw no reason to continue it. From
then on the proceeds of the Samoan taxation were no longer earmarked for the
Samoan administration alone but were used for all sorts of other purposes.
Annual figures showing how Samoan taxes were spent had previously been
published in the Samoan government information sheet, Savali. This practice
now ceased.26 Logan’s measures, which aimed to limit expenditure, placed a
question mark over the continued existence of the whole concept of Samoan
self-administration, because one of its main pillars, financial autonomy, had
been sawn through.
Many of the New Zealand military governor’s decisions were clearly
prompted by his attempts to save money, or to increase revenue, even if such a
stringent finance policy had negative consequences for the Samoans. The only
German official left in office by Logan, Amtmann Osbahr from south Upolu,
was needed to collect the lafoga. By the end of September 1914, Samoan head-
tax had been collected to the value of 77,294 marks. One year later, Osbahr was
deported to New Zealand as a prisoner of war.27 When New Zealand had taken
over from the German administration, there had been more than 279,000
marks in the public coffers. On Logan’s instructions, the money earmarked for
outstanding government contracts—about 44,000 marks for public buildings
and public works—was not spent. A number of positions were eliminated, such
as the health inspector of the harbor police; it was argued that this job did not
keep him fully occupied. It is not clear exactly what happened to the money
thus saved. Some of it went into the governor’s fund. It is suspected that the
rest was sent directly to New Zealand, to compensate the government for the
loss it took on selling German currency and to help pay for the introduction of
British coin and notes.28
A flood of new charges and fees was introduced, inflating the administra-
tive work load and increasing the number of officials without making the
administration as such noticeably more efficient. On the contrary, the opposite
seems to have been the case. Early in 1914, the German colonial administra-
tion employed 46 white officials, and New Zealand had taken over 434 Samoan
officials. On 1 April 1915, the Samoan administration consisted of 59 European
and 452 Samoan officials and government employees; one year later it had
grown to 69 Europeans and 472 Samoans. In one year, between 1915 and 1916,
staff costs rose by more than £2,500, although New Zealand had one depart-
ment fewer to administer than the Germans (Logan had abolished the Educa-
tion Department as early as September 1914).29 The new taxes included court
fees, which had not existed during German times, for the Samoan administra-
tion that led to an increase in the number of white officials; license and stamp
duties—fees for the “declaration of facts.”30 However, these only partly covered
the increased cost of the extra officials. In order to disguise the rise in staff
costs to some extent, resort was taken to a trick. The cost of medical personnel,
which the German administration had included among the civil administration,
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was now transferred to the Health Department, which had previously regis-
tered only operating expenses. This made it look as though New Zealand spent
far more on medical care for the people than the Germans had.31 Logan’s intro-
duction of an export tax for Samoan agricultural produce on 1 April 1916 killed
several birds with one stone. It allowed the administration both to siphon off
the profits made by the German plantation owners and to exploit the spending
power of the Samoans. It was clear to the Administrator from the start that the
Samoans, as the main producers of copra, would have to foot the lion’s share of
the bill: the European traders simply passed on the tax to their Samoan copra
producers and lowered the prices at which they bought.32
The Samoan reaction to lower copra prices and increased prices for Euro-
pean goods was to retreat into traditional patterns of behavior. They refused to
work and imposed trade boycotts.33 The economy of the foreigners suffered,
but the Samoans themselves did not: though a life without European commod-
ities, money, and food required a certain degree of sacrifice, the produce of
their gardens and fields guaranteed survival. Samoan conservatism had been, if
anything, strengthened by contact with the German colonial administration.
The Samoan need for “cultural” possessions was limited. A Europeanized
Samoan consumer society did not exist in 1916, and thus there was no depen-
dence on the European economy. Of course, individual Samoans occasionally
made use of the range of European goods available, but this could always be
reversed. Samoan patterns of behavior had been established long before 1914
and remained constant. As long as copra prices were low, the Samoans pro-
duced no copra and bought no European goods. It made no difference to them
whether the world market or regional factors were responsible. When prices
rose again, Samoans harvested coconuts again, produced copra, and sold it to
the Europeans. Thus the European traders were more dependent on the
Samoans than vice versa. The Samoans deliberately applied and exploited the
basic rules of a market economy.
This sort of independence had always been a thorn in the side of most for-
eigners in Samoa. But as long as Governors Solf and Schultz held the reins,
there had been a guarantee that Europeans outside Apia would not interfere
with Samoan conservatism. The New Zealand military administration, however,
had completely different priorities. Its aim was to increase Samoa’s economic
efficiency. Although this aim had, of course, also existed during the German
colonial period, it had not taken precedence over all other aspects of policy.
There were things on Samoa that seemed more important than economic suc-
cess. Appearances were more important than reality, and the desire for prestige
in foreign policy dictated the need for a smoothly functioning administration
and an absence of local disturbances that would have damaged Germany’s rep-
utation as a would-be world power.
Now, however, any traditional Samoan behavior that stood in the way of
the colony’s economic success was to be ruthlessly swept away. The New
Zealand military administration’s director of Samoan trade, Mulcahy, was con-
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vinced that the Samoans had to be systematically trained to be good consum-
ers: “the first and most necessary aim—in direct opposition to the German
idea—should be, to educate the Natives to adopt as far as is possible our own
manner of living.” If this were to succeed, they could sell the Samoans furni-
ture, crockery, mattresses, and curtains, thus improving New Zealand’s balance
of trade. As most Samoans still went barefoot, he pointed out, there was a huge
potential market for the New Zealand shoe industry. The use of articles of
clothing and goods that the Samoans would be unlikely to understand, such as
scarves and rugs, should be encouraged by sending clothing parcels and exhib-
iting New Zealand goods in Apia, where the prestige of the specially invited
chiefs “would create the most favourable impression” upon the ordinary
Samoan consumer. New Zealand had a right to make money out of Samoa in
this way, he argued, because, after all, it had liberated the Samoans from Ger-
man servitude.34
For the time being, such suggestions existed only on paper. New Zealand
was unable to put them into practice for a number of reasons. Relatively unim-
portant among them was the continued validity, at least in theory, of German
law. In other respects, too, the military administration under Logan ignored
this regulation. Much more important factors were the lack of trained colonial
officials and the difficulty of communication between the New Zealand govern-
ment and the administration on Samoa. Because of the demands the war made
on New Zealand’s ships, the connection between Samoa and New Zealand
depended on one old steamer belonging to the Union Steamship Company. At
best, it chugged between Auckland and Apia every two weeks. At the adminis-
trative level, communication suffered because all correspondence between the
Administrator and the New Zealand government had to go via the governor
(later the governor-general) of New Zealand. Once again wanting to appear
more “British” than its brother and rival across the sea, New Zealand’s loyalty to
London proved to be an obstacle to the development of its own colonial policy
(but thus an advantage to the Samoans). Finally, after the successful occupation
of the Polynesian islands, New Zealand’s interest in Samoa decreased. Much as
in Australian-occupied New Guinea, the colonial administration in Samoa
under New Zealand occupation became less active during the war.
 In New Guinea, this situation had largely negative consequences for the
indigenous population because they were increasingly at the mercy of Euro-
pean entrepreneurs or their agents. The Samoans, by contrast, at first stood to
benefit from it. Logan wanted at all costs to prevent any expansion of German
plantations. New Zealand entrepreneurs, at most, had time to play commercial
war games, but initially lacked the means to put them into practice. Thus,
under the New Zealand military administration, Samoan self-administration
probably had more scope for action in the villages than before. The farther one
got away from Apia, the more likely traditional means of internal arbitration
were used in settling Samoan quarrels and the less the Samoans depended on
the military administration. Moreover, it seemed to the Samoans that it was
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easier to manipulate the New Zealanders than the Germans. Although the Ger-
man administration had given the Samoans independence in a number of
areas, there was absolute clarity on one point: the limits for the Samoans were
as firmly fixed and as clearly marked as those for the European traders. In cases
of doubt, the colonial administration sometimes decided in favor of the inter-
ests of the local population. In fact, it did so much more frequently than in any
other German colony. However, it was under no obligation to do so, and
whether it did so or not depended on the colonial administration alone (that is,
mainly on the personality of the governor), and not at all on the Samoans. On a
number of occasions the Samoans had been made to feel their subordination to
German sovereignty.
But since August 1914 it had seemed as if the New Zealanders had not
only acquiesced in the room for maneuver the Samoans had enjoyed under the
Germans but had even accepted its expansion. The military administration’s
activity—and lack of it—gave many Samoans the impression that it was entirely
up to them whether or not they uprooted the border posts and moved them
forward. The return of Lauati’s supporters who had been exiled to Micronesia
by the Germans was the result of Samoan initiatives, although the military gov-
ernor had approved and implemented them. The seemingly mutual interests of
the Samoans and the New Zealanders, however, in fact had very different sides.
The Administrator was mostly interested in popularizing New Zealand’s policy,
whereas many Samoans saw this incident as demonstrating New Zealand’s
acceptance of the Mau-a-Pule movement, which had been condemned by the
Germans. The Mau-a-Pule, however, had aimed for nothing less than for
Samoan interests to take absolute priority over European interests.35
There were also common interests held by most Samoans and the New
Zealand military administration at other levels. One was Logan’s religious puri-
tanism, supported by the majority of Samoans, who were Protestant.36 Many
Samoans and New Zealanders were also brought together by their attitude
toward the Chinese. Samoan young men were critical of cohabitation of
Samoan women with Chinese men; Anglo-Saxon New Zealanders had a deeply
rooted anti-Asian phobia and an ingrained racism concerning the so-called
Chows. Immediately after the Samoan police had taken the oath to George V,
their new masters set them on the Chinese who had marched from the planta-
tions to Apia. The cause of the unrest was that at the beginning of the war Ger-
man companies had reduced the rice ration without reducing the amount of
work required. New Zealand soldiers and officers chased the Chinese through
the streets of Apia with bayonets and sabers, while the Samoan police beat
them with their truncheons. The Chinese had no chance against the united
hatred of Samoans and New Zealanders (with their German employers as the
third players in the game). A number were beaten up so badly that they had to
be taken to hospital. Some were seriously injured, and one Chinese later died.
“It was something worth seeing,” noted one observer who had obviously
enjoyed the spectacle.37 In July and September 1915 there were more Chinese
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riots, in which troops were deployed. The Administrator made no secret of his
dislike for the Chinese and did everything in his power to expel them from
Samoa. In October 1914 there were 2,184 Chinese in Samoa; by the time of the
armistice in Europe, their number had dropped to 876.38 The repatriation of
the Chinese was prompted by commercial as well as racist motives. More Chi-
nese plantation laborers would have made the German plantations more pro-
ductive, which would have increased their value—something that the
Administrator wanted to prevent at all costs.
Shortly before their departure from Samoa, the coolies returning to China
were forced to exchange their English silver money for German money. In a
procedure reminiscent of the treatment of criminals or prisoners of war, their
luggage was searched for gold or silver coin. This money, which they had legiti-
mately earned on Samoa, was simply confiscated. In the New Zealander gover-
nor-general’s opinion, the Chinese should not complain. After all, if New
Zealand had not occupied the islands the Chinese would have starved.39
Logan’s antipathy toward the Chinese population steadily increased, finally
turning into a mania. At the end of 1915 he indirectly advocated prohibiting
future relationships between Chinese men and Samoan women. In his view,
Chinese men were intent only on depraving Samoan women. In August 1916
the military governor instructed the Samoan police not to allow Chinese men
to enter Samoan huts. Five months later, this instruction was officially declared
a proclamation of war.40 On the Samoan side, the chief agitators against the
Chinese were the local secretary of the Samoan administration, Afamasaga
Maua, and his brother, Toleafoa Lagolago. In the Savali, Toleafoa wrote that
from the moment when a Samoan woman started to live with a Chinese man,
she altered physically—“her eyes change very quickly to those of her Chinese
husband.”41 Afamasaga issued a decree from the Samoan central native admin-
istration ordering all Samoan women married to Chinese men to leave their
Chinese husbands by 18 September 1917 and return to their Samoan relatives.
Through the autonomous local system of justice, Samoan villages passed vari-
ous regulations banning cohabitation of Samoan women and Chinese men.42
We can assume that the Samoan administration did not issue its regula-
tions without the knowledge of the Administrator. A suspicion has even been
voiced that the military governor contributed to the wording of the Samoan
regulations. But it would be a mistake to see the New Zealand military gover-
nor as the sole driving force behind this anti-Chinese policy.43 Under the Ger-
man administration, Samoans had already attempted to prohibit sexual rela-
tions between Samoan women and Chinese men and, if possible, to drive the
Chinese out of Samoa completely.44 How many Samoans were anti-Chinese,
and what social and generational groups they came from, is a matter of dispute.
But there is no doubt that there was a vociferous group of Samoan men who,
on their own initiative, regarded a policy of apartheid between Samoans and
Chinese as desirable. It cannot be totally ruled out that this group skillfully
exploited the military governor’s racism in order to implement their own ideas
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and that they were behind his specific measures, especially proclamation No.
42. Finally, it is important to point out that it was German and not New
Zealand colonial policy which was responsible for bringing the Chinese to
Samoa. Solf had played the “Chinese card” because he wanted to grant the
Samoans’ request to be released from the obligation of working for the Euro-
peans without completely alienating European employers. From the start, it
had been clear that the Chinese were merely a means to an end.45
Samoan women who did not want to leave their Chinese husbands were
forced to do so. Early in October 1917 four Samoan women were arrested
because they steadfastly refused to leave their Chinese husbands. Sina, who
had three children with her Chinese husband, the youngest of which was only a
few weeks old, was brought before the Samoan central native court by Logan.
The Administrator himself subjected her to embarrassing questioning, asking
her: “If you don’t like Samoans, why not marry a white man? If you like to
marry Chinese, you have to go to jail.”46 When Sina resisted this peculiar racist
logic, Logan had her put in prison, together with her baby, for one month. The
police forcibly separated her from her eight-year-old daughter and her five-
year-old son, and placed them in the care of their Samoan relatives. The Chi-
nese husbands and fathers in mixed-race Samoan–Chinese marriages suffered
from the forced separation of their families no less than their wives. One Chi-
nese man committed suicide; another died under strange circumstances.47
The Administrator seemed to suffer no twinges of conscience over all this.
The main thing, he wrote to the governor-general, was to keep the Samoan
race pure. If anything, he stepped up the propaganda campaign against the
Chinese: “The Wily Chinese and His Devious Devices” was the title of an arti-
cle leaked by Logan to the Samoa Times.48 The Administrator’s despotic power,
which he was in fact already exercising, was legally sanctioned from Wellington:
a memorandum from the attorney general of New Zealand confirmed that the
only legal basis existing in Samoa was the will of the military governor.49 Austra-
lia advised its neighbor New Zealand to follow its successful example in expel-
ling the Asians. As though it concerned an Australian and not a New Zealand
colony, the governor-general of Australia, Munro Ferguson, suggested to his
colleague that he implement the Papua Immigration Restriction Ordinance in
Samoa. This would get rid of the Asians.50 The hopes entertained by the Ger-
man plantation owners that New Zealand would replace the Chinese with Indi-
ans proved to be illusory. (Employing Indians as cheap plantation labor was
British policy in Fiji.) As far as New Zealanders with their Yellow Peril psycho-
sis were concerned, Indians, as Asians, possessed the same negative qualities as
the Chinese. They were regarded as “immoral, unreliable, and often lawless
and dangerous” and considered to be full of “evil influences.”51
In addition to the Chinese, there was another group of foreign workers on
Samoa: the Melanesian laborers employed by the German Trading and Planta-
tion Company. Their lot in Samoa was no more enviable than that of the Chi-
nese. Regarded by their German employers merely as yet another means to an
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end, they could be physically punished, like their compatriots in New Guinea.
Most Samoans treated them with arrogance and contempt.52 During the war,
the “black boys” and Samoans came to blows.53 After the liquidation of the Ger-
man Trading and Plantation Company, the New Zealand military administra-
tion took many of the Melanesians away from the plantations and set them to
cleaning latrines and loading and unloading ships as government employees.
Once again, the aim was to ensure that the value of the German plantations was
not enhanced.54 Logan forced the Melanesians, in contrast to the Chinese, to
remain in Samoa. When the last labor contracts had expired in May 1917 and
the Melanesians demanded to be sent back home, the Administrator compelled
them, under threat of force, to continue working.55 He needed them to do the
dirty work that the New Zealand soldiers did not want to do. When New
Zealand occupied Samoa, there were 877 Melanesian workers there. On only
one occasion, just under two hundred of them were sent home. The rest were
obliged to accept new labor contracts that contained little or no provision for
pay increases. The New Zealanders flogged them just as the Germans had
done. When his successor asked, Logan later admitted that alcohol had been
used to keep them under control.56 Nonetheless, there were a number of strikes
and riots because the Melanesians kept demanding to be sent home. With
equal regularity, they were bloodily suppressed. In New Guinea, the Melane-
sians’ relatives began complaining and asking where their relations from Samoa
were.57 After the expropriation of the Germans, exactly four hundred Melane-
sians remained in Samoa. All of them wanted to go back home, but now New
Zealand wanted to keep as many as possible in Samoa to work the plantations
that had been taken over. After many discussions, half were persuaded to stay
for another year in exchange for a small pay rise. These contracts were repeat-
edly extended. In May 1952, after a second European war, relatives from New
Guinea again asked what had become of their “wantoks,” whom they had not
seen for more than forty years. At that time, eighteen Melanesians were still
alive in Samoa. They either could not or no longer wanted to return to New
Guinea. By this time, they had come to terms with their Samoan neighbors.58
Common ground between New Zealanders and Samoans, even if it con-
sisted only of common antipathies, strengthened the feeling, widespread
among Samoans, that they could get along better with New Zealanders than
with Germans. Most Samoans did not notice that identical aims actually con-
cealed different motives. Also, they interpreted the New Zealanders’ inability
during the war to change economic and political priorities and alter the
accepted status quo ante as a type of powerlessness which they could get the
better of more easily than of German behavior. The Samoan elite’s categorical
refusal to accept Polynesian Maoris from New Zealand as replacements for
Anglo-Saxon soldiers was a clear victory for them.59 The experience that
Samoan interests could take priority in foreign-policy matters was quite new.
No German governor would have given Samoans the right to share in foreign-
policy decision making, let alone overturned his own decision. (It is more likely
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that Solf or Schultz would never have dreamed of bringing other South Sea
islanders into Samoa as police or soldiers because they were aware of how
much trouble such a move would cause. Samoa was the only German colony in
the South Pacific in which no Melanesian police were stationed, despite the
presence of Melanesian labor and problems with the Samoan police.) Logan,
however, informed the Samoan chiefs in advance about the New Zealand cabi-
net’s decision. When the local oligarchy protested, the Administrator gave in.
Moreover, it looked as if, together with Logan, the government of New Zealand
was bowing to Samoan dictates. The Samoans saw this as their first foreign-pol-
icy victory over a European power.
It seemed as if Logan was exactly the right man for Samoa. As a governor
officially appointed by a European power, he could represent the views of the
Samoans in a world dominated by Europe better than could any Samoan. (The
fate of the indigenous monarchy on Hawai‘i had not been forgotten.) On the
other hand, his actions seemed to suggest that he was relatively easy to manip-
ulate—at least, easier than the German governors had been. To be sure, the
Samoans were aware of his pettiness in financial matters and his aversion to
certain of the country’s customs. But they were convinced, first, that transport
would improve again after the end of the European war (and thus that copra
prices would rise), and second, that if necessary Samoan ingenuity could easily
get the better of the Administrator’s Scottish hairsplitting. Logan rejected as
too expensive the European traders’ suggestions for checking the plague of rhi-
noceros beetle that damaged coconut palms. Instead, he offered the Samoans
rewards for catching the beetles and their larvae. At first, his initiative seemed
to have worked, for after a short time the Samoans delivered masses of beetles
and larvae. Only when the flood of beetles brought in showed no signs of abat-
ing and the funds allocated to the project were running out was it discovered
that the Samoans were breeding the beetles under rotting palm trees.60 In
another case, the military governor sent the Samoan police to hunt down the
stray dogs belonging to Samoans, which he regarded as pests. Led by a local
corporal, Samoan police were on the lookout for nights on end, but they con-
centrated on shooting dogs belonging to white settlers and officials, which their
owners let out at night. The dogs shot included one belonging to the New
Zealand collector of customs, who had set the whole initiative in motion by
complaining to Logan. On the Samoan side, the dog of the fautua Malietoa
Tanumafili was killed, shot personally by the Samoan corporal. Obviously, a pri-
vate Samoan feud was being waged under cover of European approval. The
New Zealand commissioner of police had given the Samoan police permission
to cut off the ears of their victims. Thereafter, the military governor disbanded
the police division.61
The Administrator’s responsiveness to Samoan wishes was a result only of
the exceptional circumstances governing New Zealand’s presence in Samoa.
This fact, however, was not recognized by the local population. New Zealand
was fighting on two fronts. A military victory by Germany was not the only thing
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that could frustrate New Zealand’s ambitions. The Samoans’ potential friendli-
ness toward the Germans was a real danger, and Anglo-Saxon experts on the
island repeatedly issued warnings about it. Nothing would be more damaging
for New Zealand’s imperial dreams than to alienate the Samoans. It was there-
fore no accident that late in 1917 Logan suggested to his superiors in New
Zealand that “it [is] politic to grant any reasonable request of the Samoans.”62
On the other hand, since the beginning of 1918 the local elite had agreed unan-
imously that in the future a British administration was preferable to a German
one.63 If a referendum had been held in Samoa at this time, and the people had
been asked whether the Germans or the British should determine the fate of
the islands in the future, the result would probably have diverged only slightly
from the opinion of the chiefs. At the beginning of 1918 a majority of Samoans
favored British rule because they believed it would lead to greater Samoan
autonomy. A minority, including Catholics and families that had profited from
German rule, noticed that existing privileges were being restricted, and were
already against the New Zealanders by 1918. Nor was discontent with the New
Zealand military administration unknown among the majority of Samoans. In
the direct environs of Apia the excessive administrative apparatus was criticized;
in the country, the exact opposite was a grievance—a lack of any administrative
control that left the situation threatening to degenerate into anarchy.64 This was,
however, a matter of emphasis. So long as Samoan autonomy emerged stronger
from its encounter with New Zealand, and any negative side effects could be
explained away as the result of the war, the direction in which the Samoan pen-
dulum would swing was clear. Even the flogging of a Samoan offender on the
orders of the New Zealand commander of the military police was tolerated.65
Like the New Zealanders, the Samoans also looked forward to the end of the
war. Whereas the former hoped to have their occupation ratified under interna-
tional law and then to shape Samoa according to their own priorities, the latter
expected official confirmation of the greater autonomy they had achieved dur-
ing the war. They also hoped for what they regarded as the negative side effects
of the war to come to an end. When the armistice was at last announced in
Europe, the dreams of the Samoans burst as quickly as soap bubbles.
THE REALITY AND UNREALITY OF A DREAM:
SAMOAN AUTONOMY AND THE END OF THE WAR
With the end of the war, death came to Samoa. The horrors of the epidemic of
Spanish influenza that spread throughout the world in the summer and autumn
of 1918 reached Samoa with the regular ship from New Zealand, the Talune, on
7 November 1918. Why the ship was not quarantined will remain a mystery
forever. When it called in at Fiji, it was already apparent that the bouts of fever
from which a number of passengers were suffering were not a light flu but a
serious illness. The shipping company asked the passengers joining the ship in
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Fiji to pay a higher fare, because it was counting on being isolated in Apia and
wanted compensation for the financial losses it would incur. When they landed
in Samoa, many passengers could not walk and had to be helped off the ship. A
New Zealand soldier had to be stretchered out of his cabin. Without examining
the patients more closely, the government doctor responsible gave the ship
permission to land. Rumors were soon rife that he wanted to spare from any
unpleasantness the wife of his superior, the first medical officer in Samoa, who
was traveling on the ship. The official New Zealand commission of inquiry
assembled later, however, hushed up rather than got to the bottom of the obvi-
ous contradictions between the statements made by the government doctor
and Samoan eyewitnesses.66
Once it was in the country, the epidemic spread with almost incredible
speed. It is possible that Samoa’s isolation from the rest of the world during the
war had increased the people’s susceptibility to infection. But the crucial factor
in producing a mortality rate later estimated as having been between 20 and 25
percent of the total population was the administrative incompetence clearly
demonstrated during the epidemic by the military administration, and at its
head, the Administrator. No attempt was made to stop the epidemic from
spreading by isolating the infected areas. Something of this kind might very
well have been successful, as a cynical footnote to the catastrophe demon-
strates. The only area to escape the horrors of the epidemic was the leprosy
ward, situated a few kilometers outside Apia.67 Medical help was given to
Samoans only in the immediate surroundings of Apia. Inland, they were left to
their fate. The only European doctor on the largest of the Samoan islands,
Savai‘i, took care only of the few Europeans; Samoans who sought his help
were turned away. In the end, the government doctor locked himself away and
refused to see anybody.68 At least as many Samoans died of starvation and
exhaustion as of the illness itself. As the epidemic struck down whole extended
families and villages almost at the same time, there were not enough healthy
people left to fetch food from the fields and gardens. By 19 November 1918
there were so many deaths in Apia that the military government could not keep
up with the funerals, and Logan telegraphed the New Zealand government for
help. His request was immediately turned down. New Zealand, he was told,
could not send any doctors because they were needed in New Zealand itself.69
Even the departure of the Talune, which was ready to set off for Samoa accord-
ing to the timetable, was delayed. The ship was loaded with food and aid, but
the crew refused to go to Samoa. Attempts to find a replacement crew were
unsuccessful. In the whole of New Zealand, no ship’s crew could be found that
was prepared to set sail for Samoa. In the end, a New Zealand aid expedition
went to help the influenza victims in Fiji instead of to Samoa.70
In neighboring American Samoa, the governor had imposed strict quaran-
tine on receiving news of the epidemic raging in the western islands of the
archipelago. This saved Eastern Samoa—it was one of the very few Pacific ter-
ritories to escape infection. The American governor had offered Western
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Samoa his assistance via the American consul in Apia. For hours, a fully
equipped team of doctors and nurses carrying medical aid was ready in the har-
bor of Pago Pago, waiting for official news from Apia. Colonel Logan, however,
who read the telegram offering American help first (in his function as censor),
simply put it in his pocket. He did not reply when Consul Mitchell asked him
what he was going to do now. Instead of informing Pago Pago, he instructed the
head of the radio station to break off all radio communications with American
Samoa immediately, and without prior warning. The head of the radio station
later testified that Pago Pago had tried several times to contact Apia by radio,
but that the military governor had forbidden him to respond. Logan’s behavior
becomes explicable only if we remember how much he despised Americans.
The fact that it was the Americans who were offering to help him out of this fix
was obviously too much for him. Rarely would anti-American prejudice have
more disastrous consequences than in Samoa under New Zealand occupation.
This seems to justify the view that the authoritarian powers that Logan enjoyed
as a result of the war situation had somehow gone to his head, and that he was
out of touch with reality. His successor in office called him “mad.”71 When
medical help at last arrived in Samoa from Australia, the worst was already
over. Dismayed survivors noted with bitterness that the food unloaded was
intended not for them but for the white members of the aid expedition. They
were told that they were healthy again and could collect fruit out of the gardens
for themselves.72
We shall probably never know how many Samoans died in the influenza
epidemic. The official New Zealand Epidemic Commission put the figure at
eighty-five hundred dead.73 But the real figure was certainly higher, and not
only because mortality was disproportionately high in the first months of 1919.
The New Zealand Statistical Office clearly wanted the first census after the epi-
demic to show as great an increase in population as possible and obviously pub-
lished false figures.74
One special feature of this particular type of influenza had especially disas-
trous consequences for Samoan society. Surprisingly enough, its victims were
not so much children and old people as men and women in the prime of life. It
affected men even more than women. As Samoan society was structured as a
hierarchical oligarchy, the consequences can hardly be overrated. The two fau-
tua survived, but of thirty faipule, only six were still alive to attend the first
council meeting after the catastrophe. The twenty-four dead were replaced by
young, inexperienced men.75 On Savai‘i, every second matai (headman) died;
out of a total of 1,486 matai before the epidemic, only 755 were alive at the
beginning of 1919.76 Similarly shocking were the losses among church leaders,
who enjoyed the greatest authority after the chiefs. One hundred and three of
the 220 Samoan pastors of the London Missionary Society, to which almost
two-thirds of all Samoans belonged, had died. Only one member of the
church’s council of elders (Au Toeaina) survived.77 At a stroke, a new generation
moved into positions of responsibility. Most of them had not had a chance to
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gain the requisite qualifications. Many matai died so suddenly that they took
the family secrets to the grave with them, without having initiated others into
them. Carefully guarded and meticulously handed-down knowledge of geneal-
ogies, and of traditional claims and privileges, was lost in many families. The
influenza epidemic not only inflicted a great deal of personal suffering, it also
represented an irreversible break with the past for Samoan society. It was a
turning point in Samoan history probably more profound than the beginning or
the end of German colonial rule. For a central European, the most obvious
comparison is with the impact of the Thirty Years’ War.
Solf had created the Land and Titles Commission to deal with the most
important intra-Samoan disputes. Instead of drafting new laws, this commis-
sion interpreted existing law on the basis of traditional Samoan principles and
models. As most disputes were settled by internal arbitration anyway, the com-
mission could concentrate on the really difficult cases requiring interpretation.
After the influenza epidemic at the latest, the military government aimed to
have as many Samoan quarrels as possible settled by the Land and Titles Com-
mission. Many conflicts could no longer be resolved internally, because knowl-
edge of the exact extent of established privileges and ancient precedents had
been lost with the victims of the epidemic. The uncertainty created by the lack
of knowledge, and the immaturity of the younger chiefs, turned many of them
into enraged fighting cocks. They attacked each other for titles, privileges, and
territorial borders, which were claimed or defended. The number of disputes
that came before the commission simply exploded.78 Because the interpreta-
tion of past cases had become controversial, factors other than historical cor-
rectness and the observance of parallel cases suddenly became more important
in the decision-making process. The relationship between the plaintiff and the
colonial power moved more and more into the foreground. Sympathy or antip-
athy toward New Zealand could replace missing historical evidence of claims,
or make existing ones worthless. The former Land and Titles Commission con-
tinued to exist in name only. In reality it had changed from an institution cre-
ated in order to settle Samoan disputes because the colonial administration
feared a recurrence of the bloody civil wars of the nineteenth century into an
instrument the European rulers used to play one Samoan party off against
another for their own advantage. The influenza epidemic not only killed peo-
ple; it also, for the first time, shook the firm foundation in tradition that had
long supported the Samoans. Neither Christianization nor contact with Euro-
pean traders, the civil war, German colonial rule, or the New Zealand military
administration had ever constituted a similarly serious threat.
The influenza weakened the Samoan population both mentally and physi-
cally. The military governor argued that the local people themselves were to
blame for the extent of the catastrophe because they had behaved quite
wrongly. They had to be shown that they had no right to complain. But the
present situation, he suggested, provided a good opportunity to reform the
Samoan government. The prerogatives of the Samoan native administration
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should be abolished. Logan proposed that in future the colonial administration
should nominate the faipule directly, and that local influence should be totally
eliminated in their selection. His recommendation that German law relating to
land ownership be changed to make it easier for Europeans to acquire Samoan
land went one step further. Logan wanted to confiscate thirty to forty thousand
acres of “fairly good land” on the main island of Upolu from the Samoans as
quickly as possible and make it available to European settlers. This was twice as
much land as had been planted in the whole of Samoa so far. All Logan had to
do was to take out of his drawer a report by the head of the land registry,
N. H. Macdonald, who was also chair of the Land and Titles Commission.79
Was this the end of Samoan autonomy? If the Samoans had resigned them-
selves to their fate, the days of Samoan self-administration would indeed have
been numbered. The shock of the epidemic unleashed the fatalistic features of
the Samoan makeup. People blaming each other and self-accusations were not
unknown. A number of Samoans were (and some still are) convinced that they
had been punished by God. Members of the London Missionary Society and
the Wesleyans encouraged this belief, thus distracting attention from their own
mistakes. When asked why God should punish them in this way, Samoans reply
that the families affected are well aware of their own sins, but that they natu-
rally do not want to tell the whole world about them.80 According to another
version, this punishment was connected with their behavior toward the Ger-
mans during the war: the Samoans had been punished for leaving the Germans
in the lurch. This view was reinforced by the deaths of the “Lauati conspira-
tors.” None of the chiefs who had returned from exile during the war with the
help of the New Zealanders had survived the flu epidemic. It received further
support from the fact that I‘iga Pisa, who had steadfastly refused to make
moves toward returning without the permission of the German government,
survived. It seems likely that the Germans on Samoa encouraged this interpre-
tation, but there is no direct evidence in support of this view.81
Not all Samoans reacted to the catastrophe by blaming themselves. It was
lucky for Samoa that the horror which befell the people did not paralyze their
energy for long. The surviving representatives of the Samoan oligarchy pulled
themselves together with amazing rapidity. Traditional behavior was swept
away by anger at what had happened. Whereas requests had generally been
made indirectly, couched in a flood of typically Samoan formulae of politeness,
people now reacted directly and decisively. On 4 January 1919, a deputation of
the surviving faipule appeared before the governor, unannounced and without
advance warning. They did not request, but demanded, an official inquiry into
the causes of the epidemic and insisted that in the future ships were to be
investigated more strictly on arrival. Logan rudely dismissed the Samoans,82
which, however, embittered rather than silenced them. More important than
anything else was the fact that the Samoans had demonstrated that they would
not take this lying down. Given the military governor’s ambitious aims, a con-
frontation with him seemed inevitable.
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Logan’s departure for home leave (from which he was not to return),
cleared the air a little but did not calm down the angry Samoans. The new
Administrator, Colonel Tate, was at first appointed only in an acting capacity. A
delegation of Samoan chiefs presented him with their demands on 28 January
1919. They seemed to have chosen this date deliberately. The annual council
meeting (fono) between the governor and the Samoan deputies, the faipule,
had always taken place on 27 January, the Kaiser’s birthday. In order to give the
British claim to Samoa a symbolic dimension, Logan had rescheduled the fono
meetings for the middle of June, the official birthday of the king. Now the
Samoan elite called a fono on their own initiative, without having been sum-
moned by the Administrator as was usual. It was attended by 128 chiefs
(including the two fautua). The surviving Samoan oligarchy was represented
almost without exception. The date and organization of the fono was a Samoan
affront to New Zealand in every respect. It was less a matter of nostalgia than a
clear indication that, under all circumstances, the Samoans wanted to retain
the institution of Samoan self-administration in the form originally accepted by
a European colonial power. New Zealand’s new man in Samoa was presented
with a long list of Samoan complaints and demands, all of which centered on
the influenza epidemic, its causes and consequences. Paragraphs eight and
nine contained the main demands of the petition. In them, the Samoans called
for political union with the rest of Samoa in the east of the archipelago under
American sovereignty. If the Great Powers were to refuse this request, the
Samoans wanted an administration for Western Samoa under the direct super-
vision of the Colonial Office. Under no circumstances did they want New
Zealand to have a share in the administration of Samoa.83
The Samoan oligarchy had moved from the defensive to the offensive.
There is no doubt that the demand, voiced in public by the Samoan elite, for a
change in the political situation reflected the mood of the overwhelming
majority of the Samoan people. The dissemination of the petition calling for
unification with American Samoa developed a momentum of its own that could
not be stopped, even long after the original petition had been withdrawn. In
Samoan style, new songs came into being, criticizing the New Zealand adminis-
tration and praising the American administration. The words were sung to the
tune of the American national anthem. Years later, any appearance of the U.S.
flag in Apia’s cinema, one of the favorite meeting places for Samoans of all gen-
erations and classes, was greeted with rapturous applause.84
There were two main reasons for the desire to be united with American
Samoa. One, stated in the petition itself, was the wish for the whole of Samoa
to be united under a single government again. It was not a matter of creating
something new, but simply of reunifying with relatives in the east who had
been subject to a different political regime since 1899–1900. The second
motive was no less important than the first. Samoans agreed unanimously, it
seems, that the colonial administration in Pago Pago had proved itself more
capable of protecting the Samoan people from harm than the one in Apia.
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When the Samoans in the American sphere of influence heard how their rela-
tives in the west had voted, an indescribable rejoicing broke out.85 It would be
wrong, however, to conclude from the actions of the Samoan elite that Samoa
would voluntarily submit to a European country and renounce its indepen-
dence. The opposite was the case. At stake was the preservation of Samoan
self-administration and the survival of the Samoan people in a world dominated
by European institutions and values. The Samoans had learnt from historical
experience that this was not the right moment to attempt to create a totally
independent Samoan government. This recognition did not imply a renuncia-
tion of autonomous rights; rather, it was dictated by political good sense. To
start with, it was a matter of working to obtain a colonial administration that
would be most likely to fulfill Samoan objectives, and to prevent initiatives that
ran counter to Samoan priorities.
It soon became apparent, however, that the common experience of pro-
found suffering during the influenza epidemic was not enough to remove old
and deep-seated conflicts of interests within the Samoan oligarchy. Even the
greatest unity among the masses about a political future for Samoa without
New Zealand could not obscure the fact that there were opposing positions
within the leading oligarchy that could not be reconciled with this view. The
majority of Samoans could not prevent Fautua Malietoa Tanumafili from
quickly repudiating the whole petition and labeling the “Samoan” objectives as
the ambitions of political rivals. Even while the petition was being presented,
the clause about union with American Samoa was withdrawn. Two weeks later,
both fautua distanced themselves from the rest of the demands without having
sought the approval of the original signatories to the petition.86 There is no
doubt that by 1919 the traditional Samoan social system had become counter-
productive because the political expectations of most Samoans were frustrated
by the people at the top of their hierarchy. If Samoa had been democratically
structured, it would have been easier to gain an international hearing for the
majority of Samoans. As it was, however, New Zealand could always point out
that the “voice” of Samoa was the voice of Malietoa, who repeatedly sided with
the Anglo-Saxons. Why he did this largely lies beyond the reach of European
explanations. In any case, it is too simplistic to assume that it was a purely self-
ish response.87
The main initiators of a consciously Samoan policy were Toelupe, who had
been elected by the faipule as their spokesman and was a well-known tulafale
(orator) from Malie and the Samoan with the longest experience of dealing
with the European colonial administration, and Toleafoa Afamasaga Lagolago,
brother of Afamasaga Maua, secretary of the Samoan self-administration, who
had died during the influenza epidemic. It was Toelupe who greeted the new
Administrator in the name of the Samoans, making it clear that the representa-
tives of Samoa would not accept any blurring of responsibility for the outbreak
of the influenza: “God alone will not send such an epidemic.”88 And it was
Toleafoa who presented the petition. The fact that he was also prepared to give
up the demand for unification with American Samoa makes the whole incident
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even more puzzling. Even the New Zealand Administrator, Tate, did not
believe in such a sudden change of mind, suspecting an especially insidious
Samoan intrigue.89 In private, the Burns Philp representative in Samoa, Allom,
bragged that he had made sure that the relevant passage had disappeared from
the petition.90
At first glance, this story of the manipulation of the Samoan petition of
1919 seems so farfetched that one is tempted to see in it no more than the idle
boast of a company employee who wanted to present himself and his abilities in
the best light. It is indisputable, of course, that Burns Philp tried by all possible
means to influence any political decisions that could be useful or harmful to its
business interests. It is also understandable that the company would by far have
preferred British to U.S. control of Western Samoa. But the question remains
of how it could have influenced the Samoans. Even before 1914, Burns Philp
had its own local agent in Samoa, who was obviously used for far more than
simply to buy up the local copra.91 But even this is not evidence. At best, it
strengthens a suspicion that the Burns Philp representative may not merely
have been boasting. The chain of evidence is incomplete.
The man who presented the petition and had played a prominent part in
drafting it, Toleafoa Afamasaga Lagolago, was in every respect an exceptional
case. His family was part of the Samoan oligarchy; the titles afamasaga and
toleafoa were among the highest in the district of A‘ana, although not among
the four most important in Samoa. During the civil war, his father had sup-
ported the British, while his brother had built a career in the German adminis-
tration, becoming the indigenous secretary and government interpreter under
Governor Schultz, a position which gave him more real influence than that of
the two fautua. Logan, who left him in this position, gave him a great deal of
freedom over “purely” Samoan matters, which increased his power further.
Toleafoa Lagolago himself had worked as a foreman in shipyards in New
Zealand and American Samoa, and for a Samoan he had gained an outstanding
insight into European ways. He spoke excellent English, and the Administrator,
who could not stand him, in private called him “the most intelligent Samoan.”92
As director of the Toea‘ina club, Toleafoa crucially influenced the basic features
of Samoan policy opposing the military administration. Leading members of
the Samoan oligarchy came together in the Toea‘ina club. Under the guise of
pursuing common social and commercial initiatives, this club worked purpose-
fully toward realizing Samoan political independence. It can therefore be seen
as the precursor of a Samoan independence party. A similar enterprise had
already been nipped in the bud by Solf.93 Logan, however, allowed the club to
continue functioning during the war, which the Samoan side saw as yet more
evidence of their increased freedom in the period before the outbreak of the
influenza. For the new Administrator it was clear from the start that nothing
was more dangerous to New Zealand’s colonial ambitions in Samoa than this
club, in which local plans were made and discussed. By August 1919 at the lat-
est, it began to put about the idea of a completely independent Samoa.94
Tate eliminated this crystallization point of Samoan hopes for more politi-
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cal responsibility through a dirty tricks campaign. The Administrator per-
suaded the members of the club that Toleafoa was a gambler who had lost their
money. The club more or less disintegrated under vehement mutual recrimina-
tions and accusations. Financially discredited, Toleafoa also lost his politically
prominent position. The whole affair became such a scandal among the mem-
bers of the Samoan oligarchy that it has left a nasty taste in people’s mouths to
the present day. In fact, Tate was fully aware that the club was not involved in
financial irregularities as he had tried to make out. Toleafoa’s allegedly loss-
making expenditure was the result of putting money into investments that
might have given the appearance of a short-term cash-flow problem but were
sensible in the long term. The official auditor, instructed by the Administrator
to examine the club’s books, protested in vain when newspaper reports, origi-
nating with Tate, claimed that the club was bankrupt. He insisted that the
books were well kept and the balances in order; Toleafoa had demonstrated a
sound understanding of business principles.95
The breaking up of the Toea‘ina club did not mean the end of Samoan
attempts to gain more autonomy. After all, the Samoan administration, recog-
nized by the government, still existed; and under the leadership of Toelupe, the
Samoan opposition, consisting of the faipule, or councillors, organized itself.
Tate’s next objective was to bring this official representation of Samoan inter-
ests into line. In order to do this, he used a suggestion made by his predecessor,
Logan. The existing system of “representative oligarchy”—the matai elected
their village pulenuu, and the pulenuu elected the faipule for their district—
was abolished. In future the faipule were to be directly nominated by the gov-
ernment.96 The privileges of the members of the Samoan administration were
to be cut back to a purely representative level. From November 1919 on, the
Samoa Constitutional Order provided the guidelines to be followed by the New
Zealand administration in Samoa. At a stroke, land hitherto owned by Samoans
became New Zealand Crown land, and only the right of usufruct was left to
them. In the future, whether the previously sovereign owners retained their
land or not would depend on the goodwill of the colonial administration. No
mention was made of Samoan self-administration or the faipule. The council of
faipule with President Toelupe at its head protested against this procedure and
asked to speak to the Administrator. Tate gave them the cold shoulder. Without
even listening to the deputation, he left it to his subordinates to get rid of the
Samoan delegates.97
There were certainly voices within the New Zealand government in favor
of involving the Samoan oligarchy more strongly in the process of political deci-
sion making. The Maoris had the vote, were represented in parliament, and
even had a number of ministers in the New Zealand cabinet. The New Zealand
solicitor general had therefore recommended that the two fautua be included
as unofficial members of the Governing Council of Samoa that was to be
revived; but the Administrator’s veto made this impossible. Tate’s distrust was
not limited to Samoans; he suspected the white settlers of permanently con-
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spiring against the New Zealand colonial administration. They, too, were
denied a role in decision-making within the Samoan administration. Therefore
the Governing Council, officially reestablished on 1 May 1920, consisted only
of Tate himself and his leading officials.98
What was left of the Samoan self-administration? During the European
war, the illusion flourished that the old dream of Samoan autonomy could be
realized with New Zealand’s help. The end of the war seemed to bury all these
hopes. The nightmare of the influenza epidemic drove a huge wedge into
Samoa’s traditional networks of relationships. The loss of social information and
important members of Samoan society made it easier for the New Zealand
administration to turn back the clock and place into question even those auton-
omous rights which already existed. The only cases in which Tate did not put
obstacles in the path of the Samoan oligarchy were those in which he could
turn their independent activities to his own personal advantage. Thus he
allowed the two fautua to inform the New Zealand government directly, by
telegram, that Logan’s presence was no longer desired in Samoa.99 And the
Samoans’ determination not to accept a foreign Polynesian as minister for
Samoa matched the Administrator’s aversion to taking orders from a Maori.100
Tate’s almost desperate attempt to minimize Samoan participation in the
administration should not, however, obscure the fact that the influence of the
Samoans on Samoan politics was by no means marginal; it was possibly even
larger than it had been under the Germans. Solf and Schultz had to some
extent recognized the indigenous desire for autonomy. But the Germans’
acceptance of local self-administration had directed Samoan claims into spe-
cific channels, and these were kept under control. In 1914 Samoa’s traditional
elite had come to terms with the status quo. With the outbreak of the war, the
conditions previously governing the situation became increasingly obsolete.
Everything was somehow in flux. Tate tried to eliminate the Samoans’ influ-
ence in shaping the future of their country as much as possible, while Samoan
demands for greater involvement in politics went far beyond the limits staked
out before 1914. The history of Samoa after 1918 is a permanent tug-of-war
between Samoan attempts to gain greater autonomy and New Zealand’s efforts
to limit Samoan demands. After the influenza epidemic, peace never returned
to relations between the New Zealand administration and the Samoans.
Tate was able to counter the idea of Samoan autonomy, which was gaining
a dynamic and force of its own, only by physical violence. On his insistence, the
Samoa Constitutional Order specified more punishments that could be
employed against the Samoans and increased maximum sentences. Although
he had the foreign minister’s approval, Tate was unable officially to introduce
corporal punishment for Samoans. He could not get a majority in the New
Zealand parliament to support this suggestion.101 The ship that took the last
New Zealand soldiers away from Samoa early in 1920 brought in a unit of mili-
tary police. Later it was supplemented by its own secret service, which Gurr
had urged the administration to set up urgently.102 But none of these measures
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could guarantee that New Zealand rule put down roots. More and more Samo-
ans were dissatisfied with New Zealand. Even among the Samoan political
elite, the supporters of the New Zealand administration were never more than
a minority. Sometimes it seemed as if both sides had tacitly agreed to accept
some form of status quo. But these breathing spaces never lasted long, and
they were generally followed by even more violent clashes. In Samoa much
earlier than on other Pacific islands, the validity of a political truism was dem-
onstrated: a government cannot rule against the will of the majority of the pop-
ulation; at best it can hope to administer. New Zealand failed completely in its
attempt to break the will of the Samoan people. Nonetheless, the various
attempts it made to achieve this goal caused a great deal of damage.
From what sources did the Samoans draw this determination, their will to
reject New Zealand ambitions, and the strength to go on the offensive them-
selves? It seems paradoxical, but the Samoan independence movement was
born out of the deadly influenza bacillus. New Zealand was aware of the
strength of solidarity forged out of defeat—after all, Gallipoli was commemo-
rated like a victory every year. But their racist arrogance prevented them from
wanting to perceive the consequences. “Native unrest is my constant anxiety,”
Tate confided to his colleague in American Samoa early in 1921. The reason for
the constant unrest among the Samoans, he said, was their idea that whites and
blacks had the same rights. In his view, Samoan attempts to realize this idea
were ludicrous, and pathetic in every case. They wanted to govern themselves,
but the only form of rule they knew was that of the chiefs.103
On one crucial point the influenza epidemic even gave the Samoans a
direct advantage. The New Zealand administration’s plans to abolish the most
important Samoan prerogative, their exemption from providing labor for the
Europeans, and to force them to work on the plantations had to be abandoned
because the Samoans were physically and numerically so weakened by the epi-
demic. Thus, once again, recourse was taken to the Chinese. An emissary from
New Zealand’s administration on Samoa traveled to China and organized fresh
labor supplies. In August 1920 the first contingent of Chinese arrived from
Hong Kong. The Hong Kong authorities had banned the export of coolies, but
the New Zealand emissary got around this by putting them down as tourists to
Samoa. Completed labor contracts were presented to them only on their arrival
in Apia. In order to persuade them to sign, the prison sentence for refusing to
work had recently been abolished. Six months later it was reintroduced.104 Like
the Germans, the New Zealanders regarded the Chinese coolies merely as a
means to an end and subjected them to brutal exploitation. The specifically
Anglo-Saxon form of racism in the Pacific gave rise to regulations that in no
way lagged behind German discriminatory laws, and in some areas even out-
stripped them.105 While the Samoans struggled to achieve a greater degree of
autonomy and more equal rights, the Chinese had difficulty in being recog-
nized as humans at all.
CH4  Page 182  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:17 PM
183
5
Indigenous Responses to
 the First World War
How did the indigenous peoples in Germany’s South Pacific colonies react to
the events that, in effect, led to the end of the German administration? This
chapter does not look at how individuals came to terms with their new rulers
during the war—previous chapters have dealt with that problem. What con-
cerns us here is the essence of the new arrangements and the attitudes of larger
indigenous groups toward them. We shall be looking at local responses to cru-
cial changes in the balance of power and local strategies for dealing with them.
Above all, this chapter addresses the question of how Pacific societies tried to
influence the changes that were occuring in colonial rule.
NEW GUINEA
The diversity of groups in New Guinea meant that there could be no unified
response to the change of power. The splintering of society into a large number
of small groups makes it extremely difficult to discern a majority attitude
toward any changes in power structure. This does not mean, however, that such
a majority attitude did not exist or that the Melanesians on the whole were
indifferent. Despite their differences, the indigenous people often took a com-
mon attitude toward European prescriptions. This unanimity, achieved without
prior consultation or organization (which were not possible), allowed them to
be highly effective. This is not a paradox. Despite all their internal differences
and diversity, Melanesian cultures were always closer to each other than they
could ever have been to any of the European cultures. Because Melanesians
perceived European behavior from approximately the same vantage point and
often had similar experiences with Europeans, certain indigenous patterns of
behavior emerged, as it were, overnight.
Once these experiences and patterns of behavior had been internalized, it
required a great deal of evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, over a long
period of time, to change the stereotypes that had developed. As this evidence
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was rarely forthcoming, Melanesian views and fundamental convictions have
proved to be extremely long-lived, and their conservatism is often as stubborn
as a dictionary definition of prejudice.1 In contacts with Europeans, this
Melanesian obstinacy was certainly no disadvantage. The only pan-Melanesian
action against a change in the German system of which we know was based on
the indigenous people’s unshakeable attitude toward norms they had once
accepted. Thus the Australian military administration found it impossible to
make the Melanesian people acknowledge the devaluation of the mark that it
had proclaimed. Since the days of the Neuguinea-Kompanie, the mark had
been legal tender in the German colony. The Melanesians had gotten used to
the fact that coins could have different faces (they did not accept notes),
because the German mark had replaced the Neuguinea-Kompanie’s mark. The
shilling, therefore, was accepted without any problem as niupela mak (new
mark) as long as its value was the same as that of the mark. However, when the
military administration proclaimed that the mark was worth only eleven pence,
the local reaction was incomprehension. The indigenous people also began to
refuse to accept the shilling in trade. This response occurred at the same time
at various places in the colony and reached such proportions that the military
administration decided to introduce a special exchange rate for Melanesians.
The old shilling–mark parity was reintroduced, but only for trade with
Melanesians. The administration was to be partly compensated for the losses it
thus incurred by paying its rent for Melanesian land solely in marks. On 31
July 1919, after the end of the war, German currency ceased to be legal tender.
Again, an exception was made for the local population, who were able to
exchange their mark coins at an official rate of one mark per shilling for one
more year. But even at the beginning of the mandate, the Australian govern-
ment still decided it was more sensible to continue to allow the local popula-
tion to pay its taxes in marks, and simply to accept the losses it incurred as
a result.2
How did the indigenous population of what was at that time German
Melanesia assess the change in power as such? We have already pointed out
that Melanesians hardly made distinctions among different European national-
ities before 1914. At most, Europeans were categorized as “officials,” “mission-
aries,” or “planters.” Personal relations between Melanesians and Europeans
were the most important thing. National differences among Europeans were
difficult to detect simply because there were few opportunities for comparison.
More than 80 percent of all Europeans in the colony were German; not even
every twentieth European was an Australian.3 There was no opportunity to get
to know what could be considered “typically” Australian or “specifically” Ger-
man, and it was unimportant.
This changed with Australia’s occupation of New Guinea. Both Australians
and Germans wanted to demonstrate to the local people how they differed
from each other. Differences in attitudes and behavior affected both plantation
labor and the “free” Melanesians, but in conflicting ways. In assessing and clas-
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sifying European behavior, the local people began to take alleged or real differ-
ences into account. But even now the national aspect was secondary to
Melanesian interpretations. What was undoubtedly noted and compared was
the difference between the “old” and the “new” administration. The contrast
between Australian and German was not crucial so long as German settlers,
planters, and missionaries remained in New Guinea alongside Australian sol-
diers. Early in January 1918, when Britain called on all the Dominions that had
occupied German colonial territories to find out what the local people thought
about the changeover in power, the Australian government rejected the idea of
consulting the Melanesians about their political fate by holding a referendum,
pointing out that, because the Germans were still in the country, the Melane-
sians had little understanding of the fact that the British were the new rulers.
Melbourne suggested that a vote might be pro-German, “so long as the natives
are treated by them [the Germans] fairly decently.”4
In April, London tried again, making its real concerns more explicit this
time. It wanted evidence of the brutal treatment of the local population by
Germans to place before the Imperial Conference: (1) “Neglect of native
Rights or feelings as well as injustice or cruelty”; (2) “Any evidence suggesting
natives better under British than German control”; (3) “Information re mental
capacity of natives to formulate ideas re own government or destiny.”5
On the Administrator’s instructions, the officers responsible for the native
administration more closely investigated the German past and what the local
people thought of it. In mid-June 1918 the Administrator was forced to admit
that, despite all their efforts, nothing of significance had been found to hold
against the German colonial administration. Newspaper reports about German
atrocities had no foundation in fact; individual excesses that were brought to
the attention of the former colonial government were dealt with swiftly and
severely. And as for corporal punishment, any plantation that had the reputa-
tion of flogging too much would never have been able to recruit new labor. On
the contrary, the local people had a certain esteem for the German officials: “I
consider that the Germans generally respected native rights and customs,
natives speaking very well indeed of many of the Officials especially Governor
Hahl. . . . There is no doubt in my mind that it was chiefly due to Governor
Hahl that the Administration of the natives under German rule was as good as
it was. I am of opinion generally, that it was very good.”6
The Administrator and his closest colleagues indirectly referred to the fact
that there were two groups, with differing interests, among the Melanesian
people. Possibly a large majority of plantation workers favored a continuation
of Australian rule: “I do not, however think that this is of any value; . . . They
prefer our rule because we are less exacting, our soldiers play with them, (and
spoil them).”7
The Australian administration had given up regular tours of inspection
among the “free” Melanesians, “and in these parts the British Administration is
practically unknown.” But all this was really of no importance, he suggested,
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because, after all, it was nonsense to consult the Melanesians about their politi-
cal future: “The natives as a race are most indolent, and their ideas seldom
extend beyond eating, sleeping, smoking, and an occasional ‘sing-sing’ dance.”8
In Australia, Prime Minister Hughes had appointed staff officer Com-
mander Banks to “obtain evidence as to German ill usage of natives or unjust
dealing as to land or property or stirring up trouble among natives or selling
liquor.”9 Banks’ findings, based on statements by Australian planters and mis-
sionaries in New Guinea, tallied with the information sent by the Administra-
tor. There was no evidence of German atrocities or neglect of native rights and
customs. Again and again, the word just was used to describe relations between
the German administration and the Melanesians.10 In his own report to the
Australian government, Lucas recommended that the Melanesians—“very lit-
tle superior to the wild aboriginals of Australia”—should on no account be con-
sulted in a referendum. The local population of New Guinea had been
influenced by the Germans, “and the natives still stand in awe of them.” Pethe-
bridge, the long-serving Administrator, had expressed a similar opinion in his
final letter to the Ministry of Defence.11
Because of these unanimous assessments of the German colonial adminis-
tration in New Guinea, the British white paper on German colonial excesses
ignored New Guinea.12 More relevant than this footnote to intra-European
diplomatic history is the question of to what extent the Australian commenta-
tors really conveyed the views of the local people. It is necessary to point out
that the Australian officials, missionaries, and certainly planters, saw flogging as
an appropriate punishment. By far the majority would have welcomed its offi-
cial reintroduction. Approval of German methods of government contained an
implied criticism of the Australian administration; this may have been deliber-
ate. Even if all these circumstances are taken into account, however, the fre-
quency with which the word just crops up is still striking. This is not the place
for an explanation. I shall attempt one later, in the context of a larger overview
of developments between 1914 and 1921–1922, when the various influences
and factors at work can be better balanced against each other.
What is clear is that many Melanesians held individual German colonial
officials—above all, the long-serving governor, Albert Hahl—in high regard, in
marked contrast to their opinion of German planters and traders. There is a
great deal of additional evidence for this, to which we shall return elsewhere.
The Melanesian people who came into contact with German officials, however,
did not judge them by national criteria. Hahl, Döllinger, or Berghausen were
not regarded as good officials because they were Germans: judgments were
based on personal contact with them. It has already been mentioned several
times that personal relations between members of the colonial administration
and the local people was of crucial importance. An association among “offi-
cials,” “colonial administration,” and “German” developed later, if at all, and
was influenced decisively by contrast with the Australian colonial administra-
tion and Australian officials. One thing, however, is certain. Hahl’s reputation
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for having gained the respect of the Melanesians was, if anything, enhanced
during the war. In mid-1919 the governor-general of Australia reported the
impression gained by his private secretary during a visit to New Guinea. Hahl,
he said, “combined an earnest desire for developing the possession with a
strong sense of justice towards the native population.”13
In 1918–1919, the only evidence of local opinions of the German adminis-
tration consisted of individual impressions and Melanesians’ experiences with
German officials. Melanesians did not identify their personal experience of
individual officials in the colonial government with Germany or the Germans.
It was more the Australians who did this. For Melanesians, nationality was not
yet important. They judged Europeans by their behavior and function, not
according to nationality. In 1918–1919, therefore, most Melanesians in the
European colonial administration’s sphere of influence had no reason to take
much interest in the question of whether the change that had taken place in
the European order in 1914 should be perpetuated or reversed. In 1919 the
vast majority of the people of New Guinea lived beyond all European control
and was in this sense “independent” anyway. Indigenous concepts and strate-
gies for influencing European decisions are not recognizable and almost cer-
tainly did not exist. They would have required mechanisms for shaping public
opinion and a higher-level local organization. New Guinea lacked both. The
fact that this was so then did not mean, however, that it would remain so for-
ever. To one of Australia’s leading legal minds, however, the Melanesians’ lack
of activity in 1918 symbolized a natural state of everlasting infancy: “They are a
kind of perpetual infants. Like Peter Pan, they will never grow up.”14
NAURU
In Nauru the Micronesian population had left its new rulers in no doubt about
its opinion of the continued phosphate mining. The administration had even
sent the especially stubborn son of the chief, Detudamo, to prison for seditious
behavior.15 The small size of the Nauruan population was a handicap, as was
the determination of their new rulers not to lose the phosphate business.
Statements by the local people about the change in power were in great
demand, because they could be used as evidence to support one’s own case.
The Nauruans were asked several times to express their opinions about the
change in government. A visit by the Administrator of occupied New Guinea,
Pethebridge, late in September 1915, provided the occasion for all the chiefs
of Nauru to make the declaration they had been asked to prepare. However, it
was not exactly what the British had been expecting: “As children they had
always understood and hoped that at some time the British Flag would be
hoisted on their Island, however the Germans came and for many years had
treated them with kindness. For this reason they could not help feeling a cer-
tain affection for the late German Government, but they realized that what
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they had expected had now come to pass, and already they could see the bene-
fit of British rule.”16
The ambiguity of this declaration will not escape anyone who is familiar
with Pacific patterns of argument. The polite submission to British expecta-
tions is closely associated with a view of the German past which, to European
eyes, seems almost melancholy. This positive view on the part of the Nauruans
of German activities on their island is unknown from the times of the German
administration, and it is doubtful whether such a statement would have been
made then. The Nauruans’ main concern was the exploitation of the phos-
phate on their island. Under nominal German sovereignty, there had been
competition between the German administration and the phosphate company,
which was in the majority control of Britons. This had given the Nauruans a
certain amount of room for maneuver. The reference to the Germans, and the
opposition between “kindness” and “benefit of British rule” could also be seen
as a strongly stressed expectation that the new rulers had yet to fulfill. Nau-
ruan hopes for British cooperation and British expectations of a renunciation
of sovereignty by the Nauruans were carefully balanced against each other.
The declaration was a typical example of Pacific diplomacy. Outwardly, one
behaved as was expected, but the last step was deliberately not taken and a
way out was left open; while the right hand was outstretched, the left kept
something back in reserve. What the Nauruans (and many other Pacific
Islanders in other places, at other times, and in relation to other Europeans)
did not take into account was the simple fact that most Europeans either did
not, or did not want to, understand the finer points and deeper meaning
of Pacific Islanders’ negotiations. Independent Nauruan ideas were not
required. Rather, the Europeans impatiently expected the Nauruans to
acclaim European rule.
When this did not happen in 1915, new attempts were made. In May 1918
the Nauruan chiefs asked the British Administrator to pass on their wishes con-
cerning phosphate mining on Nauru to the European decision makers. There-
upon the Administrator called the Nauruan people together on a number of
occasions, in order to explain to them the difference between British and Ger-
man rule. On 29 October 1918 he sent a petition from the Nauruans to the
British high commissioner, in which the chiefs and the people of the island
asked to remain British after the war. An exact copy of this petition has sur-
vived. It lists 616 names, most signed with crosses instead of a signature. Strik-
ingly, these crosses display no individual characteristics. Of the marks made by
the fifteen chiefs, three are recognizable as personal signatures, four are writ-
ten in the same handwriting, and the rest consist of identical crosses.17 The
whole thing was a put-up job, like the one the Pacific Phosphate Company had
already tried. Now it was the administration’s turn. There were practically no
illiterates on Nauru.
In order to document more closely the unscrupulousness with which the
British colonial administration, too, pursued economic interests on the phos-
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phate islands, it is necessary to look again at neighboring Ocean Island. Less
than two weeks after the events on Nauru—that is, at precisely the time when
he would have found out exactly what had happened there—the resident com-
missioner of the British colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands decided that it
was time at last to sort things out. It was the duty of the administration, he felt,
to produce some concrete proposals about how the Banaban people could be
forcibly deported from their homes to Nauru within a period of eight to ten
years. This was necessary, he suggested, “not only in the interests of the Com-
pany, but in order that this high grade phosphate may be available for the needs
of the Empire at the cheapest cost of output.”
Scruples were unnecessary, he wrote. After all, they had not had any so far:
“Eighteen years ago the Government allowed the Company to make its own
initial terms with a handful of ignorant and illiterate natives [Ocean Island,
unlike Nauru, had no mission]. A child wrote down the names of the ‘so called
King’ and Chiefs, who were equally ignorant of the purport of the document.
This constituted the so called ‘Agreement with the Banabans for 999 years’
under date of 3rd May 1900. This agreement has never been queried by the
Government.” What was intended now was an “Imperial Measure of Neces-
sity.” For reasons of expediency, the Banabans should not be informed about
what was planned, otherwise they would try to resist the forced relocations that
were being contemplated.18 This measure could not be implemented as quickly
as had originally been planned, but the Second World War offered an opportu-
nity to dust off the old plans and put them into practice. At the end of 1945 the
Banabans were taken off Ocean Island, against their will. Instead of Nauru,
which was too close to the Banaban homeland, they were taken to a small
island in the far-distant Fiji archipelago, where the Banabans and their descen-
dants still live today.19
JAPANESE MICRONESIA
The relative isolation of the Micronesian islands under Japanese occupation
makes it difficult to say much about how the local people reacted to the change
in rulers, or to what extent they attempted to influence their own political
future. Five points, however, can be made about the regions from which we do
have evidence: (1) from the start the Micronesians regarded the Japanese take-
over as a fundamental turning point in their history; (2) from an early date they
started to draw comparisons between German and Japanese rule; (3) the
Micronesians had their own ideas about what they wanted, and especially what
they did not want; (4) they were aware that the Micronesian question had not
been settled; and (5) there is evidence that they tried to make an international
public aware of their views.
We know least about the northern and western regions of Micronesia—
those areas where Japanese influence was strongest. On Saipan, it is said, the
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Chamorros and the Caroline Islanders were so frustrated by the changes which
had taken place that by mid-1915 they wanted the Germans to return.20 There
were emotional scenes when the last Germans left Palau and Yap. On Yap, in
particular, the relationship between the local people and the few Germans
seems to have been extraordinarily good. The government doctor, who had
only been on the island for seven months, was presented with a shell axe and a
necklace, and was asked to return after the war. But on Yap something more
than the usual familiar relations between Germans and locals had evolved:
from these personal ties the people of Yap gained access to the abstract con-
cepts “German” and “the Germans.” Because the Europeans they knew, and
whose presence and activities they had come to value, called themselves Ger-
mans, the people of Yap took an interest not only in the personal fate of these
known Germans but also in the destiny of the group to which they belonged.
This explains why some Yapese could be seen rejoicing at news of German mil-
itary feats in Europe. Whereas the Germans enjoyed the real advantage of
being familiar and known, no personal ties had yet been established with the
Japanese. They were foreign in every respect, and their enmity toward the Ger-
mans made them suspect from the start. The local people’s pro-German atti-
tude was based on the activities of a few individual Germans on Yap. If these
had been judged negatively, the arriving Japanese, too, would have been
regarded in a different light. As it was, however, the people of Yap also said that
“they had liked the Germans because they had been fair.”21 What exactly con-
stituted the “fairness” that many Pacific Islanders attributed to the Germans
they knew, however, still remains an open question.
In the Marshall Islands, the local people kept in touch with the Europe-
ans even during the war. The American Board Mission had been established
there for more than fifty years, and Burns Philp trading ships regularly called
at the atolls of the Ratak and Ralik Group. American and Australian interests,
therefore, were present from the start. It is likely that both Americans and
Australians stoked local resentment of the Japanese and looked for local voices
to justify an annexation of the Marshall Islands by the United States, or by
Britain or Australia. On the other hand, the presence of the Americans and
Australians did indeed offer the islanders an alternative to Japanese rule. In
any case, it gave them a chance to make public their own ideas opposing Japa-
nese authority.
As early as 1917 the Boston Mission was convinced that, in a vote, the
overwhelming majority of Marshall Islanders would opt for an American
administration for the islands.22 One year earlier, the captain of a Burns Philp
steamer reported that all the chiefs he had spoken to had asked him to pass on
to the relevant authority their desire for a British government.23 In one particu-
lar case, when a number of chiefs wanted his help in drawing up a petition to
give their wishes formal expression, he refused: “in the absence of any direct
evidence outside the Natives’ words I fear nothing could be done.” The racist
arrogance of his view that without a European witness the word of a Pacific
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Islander was worth nothing is the best evidence that the Marshall Islands chiefs
expressed their wishes on their own initiative. The core of the petition the
European had refused to accept was the desire “to be governed by a white
race, whose ways they are familiar with and from whom they have always
received fair treatment.”24 In January 1919 the master of another Burns Philp
trading ship was handed an almost identical declaration, consisting of only two
sentences: “We Chiefs, Petty-chiefs and people of Ratak and Ralik Group want
that white-men European shall take charge of us and our islands. This is our
wish.” When the Australian asked them whether they wanted Britain, the
chiefs gave an evasive reply.25
The oligarchy of eastern Micronesia, like that of Samoa, certainly had no
intention of giving up its sovereignty. On the contrary, the chiefs’ request was
intended to halt the advance of Japanese culture. The objective was to restore a
situation with which they had been familiar and to which they had adapted.
Their aversion to the Japanese and their methods formed the nucleus of these
attempts. At all costs, they wanted to prevent Japan from continuing to control
the islands. There is a great deal of evidence, dating from throughout 1918,
that the Marshall Islanders were desperately trying to find out how they could
gain recognition for their views at the end of the war. European visitors to the
islands were regularly bombarded with questions about whether the local peo-
ple would be given a chance to participate in deciding their fate on the conclu-
sion of peace. However, the Marshall Islanders were not prepared to say which
country’s rule they favored.26
At the end of December 1918 the Japanese military government ordered
all the chiefs and many of the petty chiefs of the Ralik and Ratak Group to
Jaluit and kept them there for three months. In meetings with government offi-
cials from Micronesia and Japan, as well as with higher officers, attempts were
made to persuade members of the indigenous oligarchy to sign a document
asking for the Marshall Islands to remain Japanese. The chiefs stepped up their
efforts to establish contact with the outside world in order to make their true
views known. Letters to personal friends among the sailors and officers of the
Cormoran had been intercepted by the Japanese censor. In an unsupervised
moment, the hastily written note mentioned above was passed to the Burns
Philp captain. Most of the chiefs, however, eventually gave in to the Japanese
request. Many were heavily in debt because of the unlimited credit extended
by Japanese traders, and this was also used against them. Only the head chief
Laborio steadfastly refused to sign to the end.27
The Japanese seem to have used similar methods on other islands at the
turn of the year 1918–1919 in order to be able to present native “declarations”
in favor of a continuation of Japanese rule at the forthcoming peace confer-
ence. At Christmas (sic!) 1918, the Catholic mission in Ponape received a proc-
lamation from the Japanese commander, enclosing a copy of a letter from the
supreme chiefs of the five Ponapean tribes. The whole tone of the document
suggests that it was written by the Japanese themselves:
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We remember earlier times, when the Germans ruled these islands—at that time
we were not content because they did not look after us well. They were proud and
arrogant and treated us badly. They thought we were like animals, and that is why
we were always unhappy. . . .
In 1914, however, when the Japanese took over these islands, we began to
become contented because you (our present) rulers treat us as though we are born
Japanese. You send our children to school, so that they will soon become Japa-
nese. . . . And we will always obey you. We therefore bow before you and ask that
the Japanese will rule over us for ever.28
To the extent that the Sokeh uprising can be interpreted as a criticism of
the German administration, this declaration may have reflected real local
views, although it is diametrically opposed to the view expressed in Ponapean
sources.29 The rest of the document, in which the Ponapean elite of its own
accord promises obedience and submission—strangely enough, in terms which
are in line with Japanese rules of behavior—and expresses a wish to be under
foreign rule for ever, is patently untrue. As recently as April of the same year,
Nanpei had said that the Ponapeans could not stand the Japanese.30
SAMOA
Of all the Pacific societies whose authority structures changed at the beginning
of the European war as a result of their “German” past, none tried to influence
developments more than the Samoans. During the war, the Samoans made use
of the room for maneuver that New Zealand rule left them compared with
German rule. On only one point did they press the military administration to
reinstate a German institution: the Samoans asked for the state education sys-
tem, which had been abolished, to be restored. One of Logan’s first actions had
been to dissolve the Education Department and close the government schools.
Although the school for Europeans was reopened in 1916, the military admin-
istration repeatedly postponed the reestablishment of a government school for
Samoans. Logan believed that this sort of education was “useless.”31
In the meantime, the Samoans turned to a former German teacher and
persuaded him to give private lessons. Relatively soon this was banned, and the
teacher was first arrested, then expelled.32 As representatives of the Samoan
oligarchy put more and more pressure on the Administrator to reopen the gov-
ernment school, Logan finally gave in and permitted a “technical” school to be
established. There, according to the plans of the military governor, the young
men of Samoa were to be trained to become agricultural producers and sheep
breeders. The curriculum was to contain “subjects” such as taro and cocoa
planting, and the systematic extermination of the rhinoceros beetle.33 Logan’s
ideas were derived from his fundamental political conviction that, after the last
Chinese had been deported, the Samoans would have to be forced to work on
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the European plantations. The economic commission set up by the New
Zealand government came to the same conclusion: the whole education of
Samoans should, in future, be directed toward agriculture “so that the child
may grow up with a wider knowledge of what must, in the nature of things, be
his future life’s work.”34 But this was not what the Samoans expected from the
government school. Their knowledge of the cultivation of taro, their staple
food, far outstripped that of any New Zealander anyway. After a great deal of
toing and froing, the government school opened its doors at the beginning of
1918, but the students stayed away. The influenza epidemic finally halted the
experiment for good: there was nothing left to eat in the school that was
intended to teach the Samoans to grow food.35
When the governor-general of New Zealand visited Samoa in mid-1919,
the only schools for Samoans were mission schools, offering no more than an
elementary education. Even here striking problems presented themselves.
Under the Germans, Solf had issued a decree declaring Samoan the official
language in all schools. At some time during the war, Logan had commanded
that English was to be used as the sole language of education. The majority of
mission teachers, however, were Samoans, who themselves had an imperfect
grasp of English. In his report, therefore, the governor-general recommended
that Samoan should be reintroduced as the language of teaching. The recom-
mendations of New Zealand’s highest representative were published, but only
after the minister for external affairs had deleted his comments on the Samoan
education system.36
By the time of the governor-general’s visit, Samoan dissatisfaction with the
New Zealand administration had gone way beyond the question of education.
New Zealand’s refusal to establish a government school such as had existed
until 1914 was but one of the many Samoan grievances. The struggle for a gov-
ernment school was to go on for years, without either Samoans or New Zea-
landers budging from their opposing points of view. Whenever the Samoans
believed that a change in government personnel provided a better chance to
influence the administration’s attitude, they gave voice to the local desire for
better education. As soon as Logan’s successor, Colonel Tate, went on home
leave, they asked the Acting Administrator whether there was any chance of
giving the Samoans access to more than elementary education.37 New Zealand,
however, remained obdurate. Education for Samoans was to remain “for some
years to come, mainly if not entirely elementary,” as the second report on the
mandate of Samoa bluntly summed up New Zealand’s position.38
The Samoans did not simply accept declarations such as this. They had
recognized that there was a direct connection between their desire for self-
administration and education. If they could not acquire the key to the world of
the white man directly, then they had to approach it from a different angle. The
afakasi, those inhabitants of Samoa whose fathers were European and mothers
Samoan, were obvious mediators between Samoan culture and European
knowledge; they had access both to Samoan culture and to the European
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world. The most important man in promoting Samoan interests and indigenous
aspirations for autonomy was Olaf Frederick Nelson. The son of a Swedish
trader, he became one of Samoa’s most successful businessmen. His mother,
Sina Tugaga Masoe, was a member of the Samoan elite. In Samoa, Nelson, who
spoke Samoan, English, and German fluently, was known only as “Frederick
the Great.”39 After Nelson visited Europe early in 1921, the faipule called a
secret meeting at which they asked him to explain the European education sys-
tem and discussed its possible application to Samoa.40
Contact with the outside world was essential in order to allow the most
recent developments that could have some bearing on Samoa’s destiny to be
observed. It was also necessary to learning European strategies and passing on
Samoan ideas. Those Samoans who knew enough English subscribed to New
Zealand newspapers in order to keep abreast of political developments outside
Samoa. Increasingly, they discovered the value of newspapers as a medium for
expressing their own views, using letters to the editor in the Samoa Times to
present their ideas to Europeans both in Samoa and beyond. The Administra-
tor responded by prohibiting the publishing of letters to the editor from Samo-
ans.41 Samoan resistance to the New Zealand administration took place at a
number of levels. Whatever the Samoans attempted, their opposition never
took violent forms but made use of passive resistance and civil disobedience.
The change in Samoan behavior, compared with the bloody civil wars of only
one generation ago, and with Lauati’s action against the Germans that never
got off the ground, is striking. A number of factors may have played a part in
this reorientation: historical experience, which showed the Samoans that vio-
lence against the Europeans achieved little; the withering away of military
functions during the Pax Germanica; and finally, the death in the influenza epi-
demic of the last leaders with personal experience of war.42
What did the Samoans want? We can be sure that since the influenza
catastrophe, the overwhelming majority of the Samoan population was against
a New Zealand government. The petition in favor of joining American Samoa
was, in fact, well-timed. A new, inexperienced Administrator had just arrived,
and in Europe the Peace Conference was gathering to decide, among other
things, the future of Samoa. Via relatives in American Samoa, copies of the
petition reached the State Department and the major American dailies. But by
the time the New York Times, the first really influential newspaper on the
American East Coast, reported the Samoan desire for unification with Ameri-
can Samoa in mid-April 1919, the points had already been set in Paris.43 Quite
apart from the fact that Samoa’s political elite itself, by back-pedaling, had
already defused any potential political impact its petition might have had, the
Americans were not prepared to support the Samoan wish. While Samoans in
Tutuila celebrated on receiving the news from Apia, American officials hoped
that nothing would come of it. An original version of the petition, which had
been handed to the American secretary for native affairs in Pago Pago and to
the governor, to be passed on to Washington and to the Peace Conference,
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disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never found. When the
American governor heard that the whole matter had petered out, he was visibly
relieved.44
It is possible that the Americans were concerned about relations with their
Anglo-Saxon neighbors in the Pacific. Perhaps they were the only ones who
were sincere in declaring that they did not want to make any territorial gains of
their own by entering the war. But the most likely explanation is that they had
had enough trouble with the Samoans already under their rule. One year after
the western part of Samoa expressed its desire to amalgamate with the eastern
part under American rule, large-scale unrest broke out in Tutuila and the
neighboring islands. It culminated in the suicide of the governor and the death
of three chiefs who had been taken into custody.45 In the west of the archipel-
ago, this contributed to a cooling off—at first slowly, but then more and more
rapidly—of feelings in favor of unification. Today, little remains of the once
passionate mood in favor of a unified Samoa. The Samoans in the west admire
the greater wealth of their cousins in the east, but they look down on them a lit-
tle because, although the American Samoans escaped the ravages of the influ-
enza epidemic, they have lost contact with their past even more than the
Samoans in the west.
The Samoans’ second choice was to be administered directly by the British
Colonial Office. In June and July 1919 the Samoans had experienced the
behavior of the governor-general of New Zealand as a representative of British
interests in Samoa. It was known of him that he personally favored the model
of a “British” Samoa. His racist escapades, however, had the effect of destroy-
ing Samoan illusions that an administration by the Colonial Office might bring
advantages.46
It is striking that Germany seemed to play no role in any of the specific ini-
tiatives undertaken by the Samoans. There is some evidence that after the
influenza epidemic the question of whether a protectorate under the United
States or Germany was preferable was debated in Samoan villages.47 In Octo-
ber 1919 a traveler from England noted that only one topic was discussed at
typical Samoan malagas (social visits to neighboring villages): the end of New
Zealand rule. While the cava bowls were passed around, people debated
whether it would be better to aim for the establishment of an American admin-
istration, the status of a British Crown Colony, or the restoration of German
rule. Others argued that Samoa should appeal directly to the League of
Nations. In one hut, the British traveler listened in amazement to an animated
discussion about the German Social Democratic movement, the end of the rev-
olution in Germany, and their possible impact on Samoa.48
Many Samoans did, in fact, take a lively interest in the fate of the Germans
in Europe. The more tarnished the image of the New Zealanders became, the
brighter the island’s German past seemed. An unfavorable comparison
between the New Zealand administration and its German predecessor soon
became a standard feature of the speeches of the Samoan tulafale (orators).49
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However, during the period when the Samoans still hoped to be able to
influence their political future because the League of Nations had not yet
announced the mandate (that is, before the end of May 1921), no clear Samoan
initiative to restore the pre-1914 political situation was undertaken.
The idea of renewed German supremacy was not a realistic alternative for
Samoa in 1919–1920. The Samoans were well aware that Germany bore the
stigma of the loser, and that it was diplomatically, politically, and economically
isolated. A return to the old conditions was not a desirable objective for the
Samoan oligarchy. If any such suggestion had ever been seriously discussed,
Malietoa in particular would have resisted it strongly. But most of the rest of
the Samoan political elite, too, would probably have regarded it as a step back-
ward, almost as a personal defeat, and an admission of their own inability. The
opposition to New Zealand rule had long gone beyond the aim of restoring old
Samoan privileges introduced or recognized by the Germans. The increased
room for maneuver the Samoans had enjoyed during the war had boosted their
own political ambitions. Even before the war, the Samoans had had a certain
respect for the German administration that had nothing to do with colonial
subservience. After the war, this esteem increased with every mistake made by
the New Zealanders. But however good relations had been between the Ger-
man administration and the Samoans, there were always frictions and disagree-
ments. Above all, the Samoans had not invited the Germans into their country.
Ultimately, they had come to terms with their presence, had reached a fairly
comfortable arrangement, and had put up with Samoa’s loss of sovereignty.
Inwardly, however, they had never accepted it. The relationship between the
Samoans and the Germans before 1914 was at best a marriage of convenience,
never a love match. Furthermore, many Samoans regarded it as a temporary
marriage that could be dissolved unilaterally as soon as a suitable opportunity
presented itself. In many marriages of convenience, something like sympathy
eventually develops between the partners; and this is exactly the feeling that
spread throughout Samoa after the marriage had been dissolved from outside.
Positive Samoan statements about the German past cannot, however, hide
the fact that times had long moved beyond the constellation of 1914 not only in
Europe and the West. Samoa was in the forefront of attempts by Pacific societ-
ies to press the demand for autonomy. The 1919 petition was only a start, but it
was typical of the stage of development of Samoan political ideas. What was
presented to the Administrator contained only the essential Samoan com-
plaints about the influenza epidemic, along with the central demand for an end
to New Zealand rule and the transition to American or direct British rule. But
Samoan ideas for the future had already developed much further. The Samoan
oligarchy, including Toleafoa, Tuatago, and, apparently, even Malietoa, had
enlisted the support of an Australian who was to convey their political wishes,
via the Australian government, to Britain, and via Britain to the Peace Confer-
ence. R. Broadhurst Hill had been a member of the Australian aid expedition
during the influenza epidemic. He had been granted a Samoan title and
CH5  Page 196  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:17 PM
Indigenous Responses to the First World War 197
thereby officially accepted into the Samoan community. The political objec-
tives entrusted to this European agent were listed in order of urgency and
importance, and comprised five points: no mandate, as this would mean that
Samoa was subject to the mandatory power; as quick an end as possible to the
New Zealand administration; their own legislative council or indigenous
administration; a federation with other Pacific nations, each of which would
have its own local administration, the federation to be responsible for the for-
eign policy of the islands; and official protection by Great Britain or the United
States of America.50
Toleafoa was behind this initiative, as had already been the case with the
petition; it was probably put forward under Malietoa’s name only in order to
give it greater weight. Toleafoa was well aware that a mandate was the most
likely solution. But he had also realized that this would be detrimental to
Samoa’s attempts to gain autonomy, because it meant that the mandatory
power could introduce its own laws into the mandated territory—a fear that
was in fact later realized in the “C” mandate. However, his attempt to appeal
directly to Woodrow Wilson through a European agent failed because the
American president was unaware of Samoan voices. Perhaps he did not want to
be aware of them. The Australian and British politicians approached had no
interest in passing on suggestions from Samoa. Furthermore, the New Zealand
military administration, which was still in office, censored communications
between Toleafoa and his European intermediary after the latter had left
Samoa, thus breaking contact between them completely.51
From now on, Samoa’s indigenous leadership seized every opportunity to
express its opinion in the outside world. Early in March 1920, before the man-
date for Samoa had been declared, a group of New Zealand MPs, led by James
Allen, the minister for defense, and accompanied by a number of journalists,
visited Apia and the surrounding areas. One day after their arrival they met
local representatives. The Samoan chiefs did not mince words. Retaining the
customary Samoan politeness but speaking more and more directly and deter-
minedly, in the European manner, they demanded Samoan judges and district
officers, as was the practice in American Samoa, the resignation of Administra-
tor Tate and the New Zealand official in charge of the native administration,
Captain Cotton, as well as the withdrawal of the New Zealand military police
who had been sent to Samoa. More or less bluntly, they called for the United
States to take over the role of protecting power in future.52 These demands
went unheeded and unheard.
The nominal introduction of a civil administration on 1 May 1920 exacer-
bated the situation, and Samoan opposition assumed new forms. Without
authorization from the League of Nations, New Zealand introduced the British
legal code of 1840, which was binding on New Zealand, to Samoa, along with
many New Zealand regulations. New points of controversy were added to the
existing unresolved ones. The land belonging to German settlers, businessmen,
and trading companies on Samoa was declared New Zealand Crown land. No
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distinction was made between land that German citizens had merely leased
from its Samoan owners and actual German property. The profits from these
Samoan Crown estates went directly into the New Zealand state coffers every
year, without Samoa being financially compensated or having a chance to par-
ticipate in any way. New Zealand’s minister for external affairs later justified
this measure by pointing out that New Zealand had feared that it would lose
the mandate. It had wanted to create a fait accompli before the mandate was
granted in order to have something in reserve if it lost the mandate. The pre-
cautionary measures taken ensured that even in the worst case the Samoan
Crown estates would remain in New Zealand ownership.53
In order to protect its own trade and keep American competition as mini-
mal as possible, New Zealand also introduced new customs regulations at the
same time. Existing import duties of 12.5 percent on all goods were increased
to 15 percent ad valorem for British imports, and to 22.5 percent for all other
imports. Export duties were raised to one pound per ton of copra, and two
pounds per ton of cacao. The intention was for Samoa to be able to finance its
administration without being subsidized by New Zealand. Other financial cuts
followed. In November, the privilege of free medical treatment for members of
the Samoan administration and their families, dating from German times, was
abolished, and fees were drastically increased.54
Enormous price increases had been one legacy of the war. The new cus-
toms regulations now set the inflationary spiral spinning again. Despite all
European contact, the Samoans had maintained their own conservative life-
style. European furniture, clothes, and shoes and socks were almost unknown.
Although they occasionally enjoyed European food, Samoans had not become
dependent on it as had some Melanesians. The only European commodities
that had become widely established were lamps, sewing machines, and black
cotton umbrellas. However, even the Samoans were dependent on two prod-
ucts from outside. The lavalavas they wore were made of imported cotton
cloth, and their lamps needed kerosene or petrol.
The Samoan oligarchy reacted immediately to the price rises, demonstrat-
ing that it was quite capable of organizing resistance. It was decided to impose
a sa, a boycott of all European goods. The chiefs instructed all Samoans to
avoid European goods as far as possible in the future. Imported food only
made them lazy and ill, the chiefs claimed, and they demanded that Samoans
concentrate more on working their own gardens as they had done in former
times. European goods could be bought only with the sa committee’s express
permission, in cases of emergency or illness. Lavalavas were no longer to be
worn. Instead, Samoans were to go back to wearing siapo clothes, producing
them from the u‘a plant as before. More u‘a plants were to be cultivated imme-
diately. The chiefs set a good example, themselves wearing the old-fashioned
siapo clothes. Samoan copra was to be sold only to the highest bidder. Anyone
who broke these rules was ordered to appear before the chiefs, who issued a
warning. Repeat offenders were fined.55
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These directives issued by the chiefs proved to be highly effective. One of
the factors responsible for their success was the Samoans’ habit of living within
their means—a legacy of the prohibition, once imposed by the German admin-
istration, on debt and the granting of credit to Samoans.56 By the end of 1920,
Samoa’s imports had practically ground to a halt. Because the European traders
could not sell anything to Samoans, they did not import anything. Revenues
from tariffs and duties dried up almost completely. In Apia, chiefs patroled the
streets of the harbor and European stores as pickets, thus ensuring that the sa
was maintained. Unrest was endemic all over Samoa. The sa increasingly devel-
oped into a passive resistance movement by the Samoans against the New
Zealand administration as such. New Zealand laws were openly ignored. After
a decision by the Land and Titles Commission in the south of Upolu, some-
thing resembling a civil war broke out in September. One chief was murdered,
and his relatives took the law into their own hands in seeking redress. The
revival of the tradition of self-administration of justice came to an end only
when blood revenge had successfully been exacted. In the overheated atmo-
sphere, the wife of the New Zealand official in charge of the native administra-
tion shot a Samoan dead, turning the mood of the local population even more
against New Zealand. Similar unrest occurred in American Samoa. There, sui-
cide was the only way out for Governor Terhune.57
In December 1920, the Administrator at last decided to leave his Euro-
pean glass house in Apia and take a personal look at the country in turmoil.
Everywhere he encountered signs of considerable Samoan ill-feeling. Accord-
ing to old Samoan custom, every malaga (tour), especially by the governor, was
greeted with signs of respect. In this case, they were often omitted, being
replaced by deliberate snubs. As Tate had no idea of Samoan customs, he noted
only that the Samoans were not as polite as they usually were—and indeed,
should have been. He was uneasy during a number of speeches because the
speaker’s intonation sounded somehow strange. But as he did not understand
Samoan, and New Zealand officials who understood the language were few and
far between, all he could do was have the Samoan speeches written down and
take them home with him.
Once seated at his desk in the seclusion of his official rooms in Apia again,
the Administrator could no longer deny the extent of Samoan discontent, for
what he read was a general settling of accounts with New Zealand policy. In
Faleapuna, the tulafale (orator), in his “welcoming” address, had accused him
of all sorts of things: New Zealand should not imagine the Samoans were fools,
even if nothing had come of the petition; the New Zealand administration was
arrogant and overbearing, and compared badly with the German administra-
tion in almost all areas; New Zealand was to blame for the swollen European
administration, the waste of money, the high duties and prices; it was bleeding
the country dry; Samoan officials were earning less than they had under the
Germans, and they were not consulted. The source of Samoan dissatisfaction,
the influenza epidemic, was now presented as the result of a crime deliberately
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planned by New Zealand—“as you wish the Samoans to be all wiped out, and
take the Islands for New Zealand.” New Zealand doctors, it was claimed, were
“exceedingly bad. . . . We want quickly clever doctors for Samoa. Let no doc-
tors come to learn his profession with the Samoans.” The Samoan critique of
New Zealand activities climaxed in the pronouncement: “god witnesseth the
dissatisfaction of the Samoan with you.”58
An angry Administrator summoned the heads of the oligarchy to an
extraordinary meeting and threatened to take them to court if the sa were not
brought to a speedy end. He accused the chiefs of behaving undemocratically
by denying the Samoan people the chance freely to choose European goods.
The minister for external affairs was warned that the Samoan movement for
self-administration was intensifying and could only be halted by drastic means.
The faipule insisted on retaining influence over legislation. Malietoa, who still
supported the government, was already being called a weakling. Special powers
to deport Samoan troublemakers were required.59
On 7 January 1921, Tate issued two new proclamations. One declared that
the chiefs’ action in punishing individual Samoans on the basis of traditional
local law for breaking the sa was a criminal offense. The other threatened that
anyone who encouraged dissatisfaction against the administration “will be
severely punished.” On 10 and 11 January, the warships Chatham and Veron-
ica, which Tate had summoned by telegraph, entered the harbor of Apia. The
Samoans, however, did not allow themselves to be intimidated so easily. Two
days later at a meeting with Tate, the chiefs presented him with a thick bundle
of signatures testifying to the willingness of Samoans not to buy European
goods. At the same time, they had begun to extend the sa to copra, in order to
damage Samoa’s exports as well as its imports.60
At the official spring fono early in February 1921, the faipule renewed
their demand for the right to take part in legislating for Samoa and to have a say
in nominating officials. Tate did not engage in any dialogue on this point, but
he made a concession in another area: the law of August 1919 on vacant
Samoan titles was abolished. This law had been one of the main sources of
Samoan discontent, because the New Zealand administration had made recog-
nition of a title dependent on the payment of a fee. Samoan preliminary pro-
ceedings were thus finally driven to absurdity. Claims escalated. The situation
was exacerbated by the fact that eventually the decisions of the Land and Titles
Commission, which had hitherto been final, could be challenged on payment
of a simple fee and at the discretion of the European (but not the Samoan)
members of the commission, allowing proceedings to begin again. Tate now
promised that, in future, appointments would again be made according to old
Samoan custom, and that New Zealand officials would not have the final say.61
In other respects, too, the Samoan mass boycott achieved some success. In
December 1920 the New Zealand official responsible for native affairs, Captain
Cotton, resigned from office and left Samoa. Soon after, another European
who had aroused the anger of the Samoans threw in the towel. James Wilber-
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force Sibree had been a pastor in Samoa for the London Missionary Society
since 1898. In an interview he gave on a visit to the United States late in 1920,
he suggested that the reason for all the anger in both parts of Samoa was that
the American government had mollycoddled the Samoans. But the Samoans
were always well informed about events beyond their islands. On Sibree’s
return, they extended the sa to include the London Missionary Society and
boycotted its sermons. In order not to damage his own mission, Sibree had no
choice but to pack his bags and leave. From the end of January the actual sa
lost a little of its impetus. It was not so much New Zealand’s threat to apply
force that took some of the wind out of the Samoan boycott’s sails as its promise
to set up an official commission to investigate the increased prices in Samoa.62
At the end of April 1921, New Zealand at last received the mandate over
Samoa from the acting secretary-general of the League of Nations, Jean Mon-
net.63 In the eyes of the world, this sealed the political future of Samoa. For the
Samoans, the news from Geneva merely wound up the spring of opposition and
once again set in motion the mechanism of resistance. Using different means
and strategies, they made another attempt to rid themselves of the unwelcome
New Zealand administration and thus to achieve Samoan independence at last.
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Paris, the Versailles Treaty, and the Fate
 of Germany’s South Pacific Colonies
When the points were set for the political future of Germany’s colonies in the
South Pacific, the indigenous people were not asked for their opinion. At the
meeting of the victorious powers in Paris the only issues of principle to be
decided were the conditions under which Australia, Japan, and New Zealand
were to transform their military administrations into colonial administrations
recognized under international law. On 24 January 1919, representatives of the
main victorious powers met at the Quai d’Orsay to discuss the former German
colonies for the first time. The British Empire, providing nine of the twenty-six
delegates (five Americans, five French, four Italians, and three Japanese), rep-
resented more than one-third of those present. In his introductory speech,
Lloyd George ruled out the possibility of returning the colonies to Germany.
Germany, he said, had not only treated the indigenous people of Africa badly
but had also organized native troops “and encouraged these troops to behave in
a manner that would even disgrace the Bolsheviks.”1 The Pacific was not men-
tioned. Speaking after Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson pointed out tersely that
everyone agreed that restoring the colonies to Germany was out of the ques-
tion. This was accepted without more discussion as the basis for further talks,
with the proviso that the decision was not to be made public.2
All further “negotiations” now concentrated only on whether, or to what
extent, the German colonies were to be administered under a mandate from
the League of Nations. After the decision had been taken not to allow the colo-
nies to go back to Germany, the talks on 24 January were dominated exclusively
by the British, and discussion was not permitted. When Lloyd George advo-
cated that Australia and New Zealand annex the German colonies in the Pacific
directly, there was no stopping the Australian prime minister, Hughes. In his
inimitable manner, he pushed his way forward, arguing and gesticulating in
favor of New Guinea becoming an Australian colony. With the aid of a distorted
map he had brought with him showing the Pacific Islands like floating for-
tresses grouped around Australia’s shores, Hughes tried to bring to life for the
other delegates the typically white Australian fear of foreign invasion. “Any
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strong Power controlling New Guinea controlled Australia,” he claimed, and
did not shrink from referring directly to the Japanese sitting in the same room:
“The policies of nations were liable to change, and history showed that friends
in one war were not always friends in the next.”
“The islands were as necessary to Australia as water to a city,” he insisted,
and any foreign mandatory that was to administer New Guinea under interna-
tional control was “a potential enemy” of Australia.3
Massey of New Zealand did not want to be outdone by Hughes. Following
his colleague’s example, he too used a map to demonstrate the enormous stra-
tegic significance of Samoa—“the key to the Pacific”—for New Zealand. And
the New Zealand prime minister also more or less openly accused Japan of
being the next enemy of the Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific.4
Three days later Baron Makino presented Japan’s claims to Micronesia. He
reminded the delegates that Japan had occupied the islands to liberate the
Pacific from the threat posed by German warships. But his further arguments
in favor of a Japanese colony of Micronesia went in a completely different
direction from the strategic considerations put forward by the Australians and
New Zealanders. Japan called for possession of the islands “to protect the
Almost the real thing. Australian Prime Minister William Morris (“Billy”) Hughes exam-
ines the barrel of a disabled German gun, France, 1916. (Australian War Memorial
P1212/01)
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inhabitants and to endeavour to better their conditions.” After all, Japan had
shown a strong interest in the welfare of the island people immediately after
the occupation. It had taken care to maintain their livelihoods and had set up
schools to educate them. The local people felt comfortable under Japanese
administration and were contented. Makino was the only representative of the
three powers who had been on the winning side in the Pacific even to address
the question of the right of local populations to self-determination: he pointed
“The True Controller.” President Wilson and the idea to have a mandate system as seen
through Australian eyes. (Melbourne Punch, 6 February 1919)
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out that the local people were too primitive and their languages too diverse to
allow self-administration.5
When Wilson outlined the central points of his proposed mandate system,
it became clear that it was based on the notion that a mandatory could techni-
cally administer its mandated area as if it were an annexed territory. The only
exception made by Wilson was that there were to be no tariffs discriminating
against members of the League of Nations. For South West Africa, the U.S.
president saw no alternative to an administration by South Africa. In the case of
New Guinea, he did not yet want to commit himself, but he made it clear that,
for geographical reasons, Australia was the only possible mandatory. Since
Hughes’ visit to the United States in 1916, relations between Wilson and the
Australian prime minister had been strained. Wilson could therefore not resist
making a direct dig at Australia’s resurgent subimperialism. Australia, he said,
reminded him of a greedy real-estate owner who “would never be satisfied so
long as anyone owned any land adjoining his own.”6 The American president
had hit the nail on the head; but in the process, he stirred up a hornets’ nest.
Hughes, angry and indignant, was allegedly hard of hearing. But, like many
supposedly deaf people, he could suddenly hear very well when his interests
were at stake. Australia had “a just claim,” he burst out, honestly earned by its
contribution to the war and the price paid by its soldiers in the war. Geographi-
cally and strategically, New Guinea was as important for Australia as Alsace-
Lorraine was for France, and as far as the indigenous people were concerned,
there was no doubt that “Australia knew what New Guinea wanted far better
than any League of Nations.”7
On the evening of 27 January, the British Empire delegates met in secret
in order to agree upon their negotiating strategy for the next day. A prelimi-
nary decision on the future of the German colonies might be taken on 28 Janu-
ary. At the start, Colonial Office representatives emphasized that acquiring
colonies made economic sense. All of Britain’s African colonies, with the
exception of Nigeria and Somaliland, were self-sufficient. The same was true
of the West Indies. The only colonies that needed financial support were those
which had been acquired for strategic reasons—Aden, Cyprus, and Somali-
land. General Smuts and Robert Cecil were asked to prepare a memorandum
as a “compromise suggestion” for the British side to put forward at the Peace
Conference opposing Wilson’s ideas for the mandate. It was to propose a
three-tier mandate system based on Smuts’ wartime suggestions. The claims of
the British Dominions (South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand) were to be
satisfied by the watered-down mandate obligations, so that if possible the Ger-
man colonies could still be directly annexed. This is where the subsequent
three-class mandate was born.8
The real question—which powers would be granted mandates—soon
turned out to be purely rhetorical. On the morning of 28 January, before the
real meeting on the fate of the German colonies began, Lloyd George took
Wilson aside and tried to convince him that his idea that the mandatories
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should be selected by the future League of Nations was completely out of
place. The British prime minister threatened that if this were to happen, not a
single victorious European power would sign the peace treaty.9
If Wilson still entertained any hope that the choice of mandatories would
be left to the League of Nations (which was yet to be founded), they soon
proved to be illusory. When the official meeting of delegates from the main vic-
torious powers plus representatives of China (the meeting was about Tsingtao)
began at 11 a.m., one European after another came forward and laid on the
table the secret agreements in which the European powers had given each
other mutual assurances during the war that they would recognize each other’s
most important colonial war aims. The booty had long been divided; all that
mattered now was to give the distribution the stamp of approval, and thus
make it official. Clemenceau was the first. He linked French claims to German
colonial territory in Africa with the wartime agreements between Britain and
France concerning the former German colonies and called on Baron Makino to
disclose the relevant secret agreements with Japan. When Baron Makino was
trying to play them down, Balfour explained that, as early as 1917, Britain had
come to an agreement with Japan concerning the political future of each coun-
try’s sphere of influence in the Pacific. The last to speak was Orlando, who
reported on Italian claims to German colonial territory under the terms of the
treaty of London.10
After the Europeans, an Anglo-Saxon from the Pacific again stepped up to
the rostrum. This time it was Massey, who obviously thought that New
Zealand’s prestige and its claim to Samoa were impaired by his Australian col-
league’s outbursts, which no debating rules could curb. The New Zealand
prime minister again emphasized the strategic importance of Samoa for New
Zealand. In addition, it could be seen as compensating New Zealand for its
financial losses during the war; but compared with New Zealand’s war debt of
100 million pounds, he said, Samoa was worth only “a mere trifle.” New
Zealand had already done more for the welfare of the indigenous population,
he claimed, than any mandatory could do. And as for the Samoans themselves,
he added, “if any change in control were to be made, the inhabitants of Samoa
would be intensely dissatisfied.”11 Some of the wartime cavalry still seemed to
be active at the Peace Conference. Lying like a trooper was nothing unusual
there; the boldness of this statement by Massey would have been enough to
destroy the faith of any God-fearing Samoan present. Naturally, the New
Zealand prime minister was kept informed by telegraph about the tragic conse-
quences of the influenza epidemic in Samoa. At almost exactly the same time
as Massey was claiming Samoa as reparation for New Zealand, the representa-
tives of Samoa were presenting Administrator Tate with their petition contain-
ing the “on no account . . . New Zealand” clause.12 After Massey in Paris had
received the news from Apia, he did nothing to bring the true opinion of the
Samoans to the attention of the world. On the contrary, he regarded Samoan
views as a kind of enemy barrage designed to destroy New Zealand ambitions,
the potential consequences of which must be prevented.13
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The Paris peace negotiations produced not clarification but obfuscation.
The destiny of Samoa was discussed neither at the meeting on 28 January 1919
nor later, except when Wilson mumbled something about the United States
also possessing rights in Samoa.14 The situation in the former German colonies
in the Pacific, and what had happened there before and during the war, was
and remained terra incognita for the delegates to the Peace Conference who
were to decide the political future of these areas. Of course, they had less infor-
mation than the countries which had occupied the former German colonies,
but it is surprising that no attempt was made to cast light on any of the claims
and statements bandied about by the occupying powers. There was not a single
initiative to find out more about what the indigenous population in the various
territories felt and thought, and whether they wanted to participate in the deci-
sion-making process or not. No working group or committee of the Peace Con-
ference concerned itself with this. The countries that had occupied the former
German colonies had thrown their demands for diplomatic recognition of their
conquests into the ring. Although specific details of the future relationship
between colonial power and colony were in dispute, no realistic alternative
mandatories were ever put forward.
Machinations and manipulation, disguise and deceit were common in
Paris. Wild statements were made and facts misrepresented. Horse trading
went on, and blackmail was tried and carried out. Dissimulation was the order
of the day. As a peace conference, the whole thing was a farce. This was true in
particular of the plenary sessions, which did not take decisions and for which
only speakers who were certain to support the attitude of the council of victori-
ous powers were called upon.15 On only a single occasion, 14 February 1919,
after Wilson had broadly outlined his mandate system before the plenary
assembly, was anything like opposition voiced. The senior secretary of Emir
Faisal (to become Faisal I, king of Iraq, in 1921), the only delegate represent-
ing an area that was to be placed under a mandate, criticized the mandate sys-
tem for being too theoretical and vague. He put his finger on the secret treaties
among the victors, which were incompatible with the right of self-determina-
tion to which Wilson repeatedly referred, and stood in the way of a practical
implementation of the concept. This criticism by an Arab bird of paradise hit
the bull’s-eye, but the Big Four and the main victorious powers did not allow
his comments to deter them.16
It could justifiably be pointed out that most high-level diplomatic meet-
ings, especially when, as was the case at Versailles, a great deal is at stake, have
nothing in common with a tea party at a girls’ boarding school. Cunning and
camouflage, bluffing and browbeating, double-dealing and distortion are all
among the basic features of diplomacy. And even if the stigma of a nonorganic
and quasi-illegitimate birth often adheres to a new status quo from the start, it
often proves to be extremely tenacious, despite the fact that it has emerged
from the collapse of the existing order and has only become established under
the exceptional circumstances of war. Even “peace conferences” cannot get
around this fact. Thus, in the light of previous experience, what eventually
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came out of Versailles was only to be expected—at least as far as the political
fate of Germany’s former Pacific colonies was concerned. The prestige of the
victors of this war was theoretically on the agenda, but in reality it was never at
stake. All that remained to be sorted out were the modalities—that is, how the
world, especially, Woodrow Wilson’s America, would cope with it.
Thus the moral club that had already been wielded during the war, first by
the British and then by the American president, served in Paris and Versailles
to justify the takeover of German colonial territory, adding a new dimension to
the old tactics of imperial acquisition. Of course, there was a great deal of
hypocrisy behind it. A frustrated Wilson early threw in the towel. At the meet-
ing on the afternoon of 28 January 1919, the following note of resignation is
recorded in the minutes: “the question of deciding the disposal of the German
Colonies was not vital to the world in any respect.”17 The British saw their
chance. During a break in the meeting on 29 January, they met behind locked
doors in the rue Nitôt and consulted on how to proceed. The British prime
minister thought it was an opportune moment to settle this question once and
for all in Britain’s favor. Once Wilson was back in the United States, he would
be exposed to completely different influences—most of them anti-British. The
mandate proposals that had been completed in the meantime were presented
and thoroughly discussed. The only point at issue now was how the Japanese
could be refused a mandate as generous as that to be given to New Zealand and
Australia without contravening the principle of equality and the secret agree-
ment of 1917. One proposal under discussion was to classify New Guinea as
only a second-class mandate, not, like South West Africa and Samoa, a third-
class mandate. Lloyd George had to promise the hotheaded Australian dele-
gates, Joseph Ward and William Hughes, that under all circumstances Australia
would retain the right to apply its Navigation Law and White Australia Policy in
New Guinea: to non-British, and to the Japanese in particular, New Guinea was
to remain a closed colony.18
On the morning of 30 January the British delegation put on the table its
suggestion for a three-class mandate system. This provided for the Dominions
of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand outwardly to accept the mandate
solution but allowed them to apply their laws in the German colonies they had
occupied. As a minimal concession to the idea of a mandate, they would report
annually to the League of Nations, promise to keep arms and slave trading out
of the territories under their control, and not allow the indigenous people
access to alcohol. Military training for the indigenous people and military
development of the mandated territories were forbidden.19
During the afternoon session, Massey put Wilson on the spot by asking
him to say whether or not he accepted the British proposal. Wilson, already
infuriated by a press campaign in favor of direct annexation and against the
mandate system, orchestrated by Hughes in sensational newspapers such as the
Daily Mail, replied by asking heatedly whether Australia and New Zealand
were giving him an ultimatum by asking this? Hughes, unmoved, snapped back
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that this precisely “was their attitude.” The “concessions” to the mandate solu-
tion the British deputation had worked out were the maximum that Hughes
was prepared to concede. Wilson did not dare to challenge Hughes further.
Lloyd George tried to distract attention from the quarrel between the Ameri-
can and Australian leaders by abruptly turning the discussion to the “nigger
armies” with which the mandates were to dispense. But this was no longer nec-
essary. In the battle between the two fighting cocks, Wilson had secretly and
quietly retracted his spurs. As though he still had everything under control,
the president of the United States announced at the end of the meeting that a
provisional agreement had been reached about the German territories outside
Europe.20
In fact, nothing concrete had been discussed, and not a single point pre-
sented by the British had actually been debated. What had really happened,
and what had put an end, so to speak, to any “discussion” of the future of the
German colonies, was Woodrow Wilson’s obvious failure to defend his concept
in the face of a direct challenge by William Hughes. The illusory world of the
American president had burst like a bubble in seconds. When it came to the
crunch, he proved to be incapable of defending his ideas against the age-old
maxim that might is right. The news of Wilson’s apparent capitulation, and the
ease with which this had been achieved, was soon doing the rounds. From then
on, the label of weakling or braggart—at best, the accusation of having behaved
unrealistically—adhered to the American president like chewing gum. If any-
thing, the further course of the conference and Wilson’s part in it helped to
consolidate these ideas. For his adversary from the southern hemisphere, the
success of 30 January 1919 was like David’s victory over Goliath. He dined out
on it for years. For the rest of his life, Hughes had only contempt for Wilson,
whom he saw as a failure. He regarded the American president as a puffed-up
cock who gave in when it came to a real fight.21 Wilson’s climb down opened
the way for acceptance of British ideas on the political future of the German
colonies. The proposed three-tier mandate went down in the minutes, without
opposition, as “Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories.”22 The dice had long
been thrown, but only now were the numbers on them revealed.
The only question remaining was how to keep the unloved Japanese at as
great a distance as possible. The British suggestion for a third-class mandate
represented only a superficial compromise by the Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific
with Wilson’s ideas, which went much further. In fact, great care had been
taken to build the Australians’ and New Zealanders’ traumatic fear of the Japa-
nese threat unobtrusively into the mandate package. This is why the develop-
ment of an indigenous army and the use of mandated areas as military bases
were prohibited for C class mandates. Similarly, it was hoped that the obliga-
tion to provide regular mandate reports would make it possible to have a better
overview of what Japan was doing in its area. In this case, New Guinea could
also be classified as a C class mandate. For, as Hughes and Ward argued at the
meeting of empire delegates on 8 March 1919, it was less disadvantageous to
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Australia to allow the Japanese to exclude other nationalities from their area
north of the equator than to accept free trade in general, because it would also
give Australia the right to keep the Japanese out of its own mandates. It was
relatively simple for the British side to put its ideas into practice, and to hide
the real reasons for the various clauses, because the working out and imple-
mentation of Wilson’s suggestions concerning the League of Nations’ mandate
“The Bing Boys Coming Home Again.” New Zealand’s leading politicians Massey and
Ward arrive with their gifts from the Paris Peace Conference. (The New Zealand Truth,
2 August 1919)
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for the former German colonies was in the hands of the British Empire delega-
tion from start to finish. What finally went into Article 22 of the League of
Nations Treaty was, therefore, an almost unadulterated British interpretation
of the mandate system.23 For the Dominions at least, it was only one step away
from direct annexation. As Hughes put it, the difference between a colony and
a C class mandate from the League of Nations was like that between freehold
and a 999-year lease.24
On 7 May 1919 the mandates for the former German colonies were made
public. The announcement was made, not by the newly created League of
Nations, but by the main victorious powers of the war, the Supreme War Coun-
cil. The League of Nations’ only duty was to hand over the mandate certifi-
cates. In itself, this was purely a formal matter, but because of the United
States’ and Japan’s second thoughts and objections, it dragged on for eighteen
months. When the Versailles Peace Treaty officially came into force on 10 Jan-
uary 1920, the mandates for the former German colonies had still not been
granted. The Japanese were infuriated by the humiliation they had suffered in
Paris when Wilson and Hughes had succeeded in having the principle of racial
equality rejected; officially, the Japanese resisted the granting of the mandates
on the grounds that the application of Australia’s Navigation Laws would keep
Japanese trade out of New Guinea. In the United States, the public mood had
swung around completely, and criticism of the provisions of the Versailles
Treaty was on the rise. America now brought up the infringement of free trade
by the mandatory powers Australia and New Zealand and called for equal trad-
ing rights in the mandated territories. Eventually, late in 1920, after consider-
able British pressure, Japan gave up its resistance in a “spirit of conciliation and
co-operation.” Thus the Council of the League of Nations was finally able to
issue the mandates on 17 December 1920. However, Australia, Japan, and New
Zealand did not receive their official copies of the mandates until late April
1921. This marked the formal end of the German colonial period in the
Pacific.25 From now on, according to the Australian prime minister, there was
no further need for an Australian representative in Geneva, as the League of
Nations was nothing but a “pompous debating society.”26
American resistance to the implementation of the mandates in the Pacific
continued even after the League of Nations had officially presented them. In
January 1921, the American envoy in London handed the Foreign Office a
note in which his government formally protested against the infringement of
the Washington Samoa Agreement of 2 December 1899. Here, as in New
Guinea, the United States demanded “most favored nation” status. But as the
United States had withdrawn completely from the League of Nations, London
simply ignored its complaint.27 The Japanese, by contrast, preferred to come to
a diplomatic agreement with their eastern Pacific neighbor after Washington
had registered its claims to Yap in the Caroline Islands, the headquarters of an
internationally important cable station. In connection with the Washington
Pacific Conference, Japan granted the United States a number of special rights
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on Yap. Thereupon, early in February 1922, the United States officially recog-
nized Japan’s territorial possessions in the Pacific under international law.28
Were there any real alternatives to the Versailles policy of confirming the
conquests of war? Was there any chance that the ideas of the Pacific Islanders
could have played a part in the decisions taken at the Peace Conference? Did
any groups or individuals in Australia, New Zealand, or Japan put forward
counterproposals to official government policy? If so, how strong and how rep-
resentative were they? And finally, what, if any, influence did Germany have on
the political future of its colonies in the South Pacific?
One point can be established relatively briefly and simply. At no time were
the Pacific Islanders consulted about their ideas for their own political future.
Their possible interests played no part in the negotiations except as pretexts
used to justify imperial greed. The manipulated declarations approving of the
status quo, held in reserve, did not even have to be unpacked. No one, it seems,
was bothered by the fact that no attempt had been made to find out the views
of the indigenous people on the decisions that were about to be made. And
none of the participants, including the Germans (who were excluded from the
discussions), was ultimately prepared to be a spoilsport. Whatever the German
delegation might claim, on one essential point it differed not one jot from its
opponents in the negotiations. For all Europeans, the idea that the colonized
peoples could be given any real influence in deciding their own political future
was equally taboo.
Most German people had become disillusioned with the whole colonial
idea after the quick military conquest of Germany’s colonies, which had put up
almost no resistance. Africa continued to exert a certain attraction, and discus-
sions of the allegedly great economic and political value of Germany’s African
colonies, which were the subject of numerous memoranda, filled many column
inches in the German press. The German east of the Black Continent still
seemed to offer a platform for the gaining of prestige. The value of Germany’s
colonies in the South Pacific, by contrast, was subjected to increasingly fre-
quent and vehement questioning by German public opinion. As early as the
end of November 1914, Hahl had written to Solf in a tone of resignation that
they had both probably sacrificed their lives to the Pacific in vain, as Germany
would withdraw completely from Asia and the South Pacific in order “to facili-
tate the conclusion of peace, and to prevent future complications.”29 All that
New Guinea, Micronesia, and Samoa had to offer, it seems, was their status as
bargaining counters in a future peace. In 1916 the German foreign office had
promised to cede Micronesia, as well as Tsingtao, to Japan, in order to achieve
the separate peace with Tokyo that it wanted.30 As early as 1899, the German
government had been prepared to hand over the Mariana Islands to Japan.31
Even former German colonial officials who had been responsible for Microne-
sia, such as the Landeshauptmann of the Marshall Islands, Georg Irmer, were
now openly critical of the acquisition of Micronesia—“one of the more expen-
sive ironies of world history”—and recommended that Germany should
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renounce its claim to the islands.32 The only people and associations who advo-
cated that Germany retain its colonies in the South Pacific were those who had
direct interests there. This included the missionaries.33 But the lead was taken
by the Vereinigung deutscher Südseefirmen (Association of German Compa-
nies in the South Pacific), based in Hamburg. However, it did not have much
political influence, and it achieved little beyond occasional promises by the
German colonial office not to give up the Pacific colonies “from the start.” But
those who had real political influence were convinced that the Pacific was of
little value to Germany and should be given up. Already in spring 1915 the vice
president of the German Reichstag, Paasche, a member of the National Liberal
Party, publicly said just that. Even at a point in the war when Germany’s
chances of victory seemed better than ever—the peace of Brest-Litovsk had
just been concluded and the German spring offensive was overrunning the
French trenches—Solf, the German colonial secretary, refused to speak in sup-
port of Germany’s colonies in the South Pacific for fear that he might dupe the
Japanese.34 Solf himself, although he had made his career in the Pacific, was
among those who advocated the colonial war aim of concentrating Germany’s
colonial possessions in Africa. In its recommendations, presented early in 1916,
a commission he had set up to work out colonial war aims placed Melanesia
(Papua, the Solomons, the New Hebrides, and New Caledonia, but not Fiji) at
the bottom of the list of colonial territories that were to be claimed from Brit-
ain and France in the event of a “decisive victory.” If it turned out to be only a
“middling victory,” New Caledonia was to be demanded from France (because
of its chrome and nickel deposits) in the case that the attempt to gain French
West Africa or Somaliland (Germany’s first and second priorities, respectively)
was unsuccessful. If Germany won a “moderate victory,” it was prepared to
renounce any expansion of its empire in the South Pacific. Indeed, the com-
mand of the colonial forces that was asked to assess colonial war aims “from a
military point of view” went one step further. By the end of the same year it had
come to the conclusion that, even if Germany won a resounding military vic-
tory, it should concentrate exclusively on Africa and give up its possessions in
the Pacific—“in military and power political terms, colonies as scattered and
distant as our possessions in the South Pacific . . . have no value.”35 Of the high-
ranking officers, only a retired admiral, Grapow, strongly advocated the reten-
tion of Germany’s Pacific colonies. He was one of those for whom the South
Pacific had value as a “collector’s item,”36 because he could not forget his visits
to Samoa and the show that had been put on for him there. It was owed to Ger-
many’s reputation and honor, he said, “to keep the German flag flying there, so
that her prestige does not suffer!” But even Grapow believed it was necessary
to cede at least the Marianas to Japan.37
In reality, these were nothing but sand-table exercises. The German colo-
nial secretary was fully aware of this. In July 1916 he wrote to his wife: “I really
do not know what will become of our colonies in future. But I consider it my
duty to continue acting as if we were sure of getting them back. The Chancellor
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no longer believes this.”38 One year later the German colonial office began the
process of dissolving its administration in regard to German New Guinea.
Resistance within the administration, however, forced Solf to backtrack. On 14
December 1917, another governor for German New Guinea, Eduard Haber,
was appointed, because “it is necessary to document in the eyes of the foreign,
and especially the German, public, that we are certainly not prepared to give
up the colony [German New Guinea].” This was the only case in which a gover-
nor was appointed to a German colony during the war. It had become formally
necessary because Governor Albert Hahl was increasingly showing the strain of
his long tour of duty in the tropics. In February 1915, Hahl, who had volun-
teered as an infantryman, suffered severe heart failure and was declared unfit
for active service or garrison duty. Medical treatment in Kissingen, one of Ger-
many’s most renowned spas, provided only limited relief. On 28 April, there-
fore, Hahl was withdrawn from any further active colonial service overseas “for
the foreseeable future.” Haber and Hahl exchanged places. Hahl took over
Haber’s position as a vortragender Rat in the German colonial office while
Haber was appointed governor of German New Guinea. Both kept their exist-
ing salaries.39
The Kaiser and Ludendorff both protested against Haber’s formal appoint-
ment. They saw this step, taken “during the war and without being able to
provide any assurances on the future of the colony,” as rushing ahead inappro-
priately. In their opinion, it would unnecessarily prejudice Germany’s bargain-
ing position on colonial matters at the forthcoming Peace Conference. Quite
clearly, both had long since written off a German presence in the South Pacific.
Nor did it fit in with their image of a postwar Germany.40
Germany entered the peace negotiations pursuing defensive tactics on
colonial policy. It was interested only in limiting the threatened loss of prestige.
From the start, it was clear that Germany would have to cede colonies. Its first
aim was to recover as many colonies as possible apart from Tsingtao, which had
officially been relinquished. If the status quo ante on the question of colonies
could not be achieved even partially, Germany was prepared to give the colo-
nies to the victorious powers as a kind of pawn to be redeemed when it had ful-
filled the peace terms imposed on it. In the worst case, Germany expected to
receive at least a League of Nations mandate, though not necessarily for its
former colonies; it would have been prepared to accept different territory sim-
ply to avoid German prestige suffering a knockout blow in the eyes of the
world.41 All the talk about access to raw materials was only a pretext, because
German officials were aware of the influence of European colonial rhetoric on
their wartime enemies. But just as the main point of Germany’s colonial ambi-
tions, at least since the 1890s, had been to increase its international standing,
the real concern now was desperately to preserve its dented prestige. When
even this proved impossible, all German efforts were concentrated on restoring
its lost international reputation by revising the sentence of professional and
moral incompetence that had been passed on German colonial policy and writ-
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ten down in the peace treaty for all the world to see. Thus, German revisionist
ambitions for colonial policy were more a matter of political prestige than of
obstructed economic interests. The real economic value Germany placed on its
colonies is shown by the fact that colonial interests were represented by a sin-
gle member of the peace delegation. He was a totally unknown Geheimrat,
who had little experience in the subject. Only after the C class mandatories
were made public in May 1919 was a second, more competent official, Eduard
Haber, assigned to the colonial commission in the German peace delegation.
Haber soon gave up when he noticed that no real interest in his advice was
being taken.42
Germany’s chances of regaining its colonies, or some of them, in the peace
treaty were not increased, to say the least, by the behavior of its delegation to
the Peace Conference. But the Allied secret treaties were the main factor
working against a modification of the colonial situation achieved as a result of
the war. Added to this was the British determination under no circumstances
to agree to any weakening of the position on the German colonies it had
achieved in wartime. During the war, London, with great diplomatic skill, had
avoided making any clear statements on the future of the German colonies,
while creating the impression that each case was open to negotiation after the
war. Within Britain’s decisive political circles, however, it was clear from the
start that the conquered German colonies would be given back only if Britain
had to admit complete defeat. If they had had their backs to the wall, the Brit-
ish would have been prepared at most to return Togo and Cameroon, which
during the war were regarded as belonging more to the French than the Brit-
ish sphere of influence anyway. Under no circumstances, however, was Britain
prepared to give up German East Africa or the German colonies occupied by
the Dominions.43
Of all those who took part in the Peace Conference, the British delegation
was by far the best prepared to push through its colonial war aims. Erzberger’s
damning statements on German colonial policy in Africa lay prepared in the
drawer. Similarly, materials were ready for white papers discrediting the Ger-
man colonial administration, presenting it as especially cruel and monstrous,
and the finishing touches were feverishly being put to them in November 1918.
It was well known within the British government that the German public’s
enthusiasm for the colonies had evaporated, that the supporters of the colonial
movement had become a minority in Germany, and that Germany was almost
unanimous about giving up its Pacific colonies.44
The British government, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Domin-
ion of New Zealand had set the points for a takeover of Germany’s Pacific colo-
nies, with as few conditions attached as possible, by the late autumn of 1918.
The people of Australia and New Zealand certainly felt some pride in their mil-
itary achievements in conquering the German colonies. War propaganda had
stirred up extremely hostile feelings against Germans living in Australia and the
Pacific Islands,45 and the majority of the population approved of excluding the
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Germans from the Pacific, although most had little interest in the political
future of the islands in the north. The same was true of the press. It is no exag-
geration to say that, despite the widespread aversion in Germany to further
colonial experiments in the Pacific, at the time of the Paris negotiations the
Germans were much better informed than the Australians and New Zealanders
about the geography and people of New Guinea and Samoa. Opposition to offi-
cial Australian and New Zealand policy on the German colonies was limited to
marginal groups. The Australian Labor Party’s attitude toward imperialism was
long dominated by its leader, William Hughes, the prime minister who had
begun his career as a trade unionist. Finally, in the course of his attempt to
introduce universal conscription, Hughes was expelled from the Labor Party
on 15 September 1916,46 and the party became more anti-imperialist again.
Nonetheless, its representatives were unable to express a joint opinion on the
issue of the occupied German colonies. In August 1917, when the Senate and
the House of Representatives debated the nonreturn of the German colonies,
Ferricks, the Queensland MP, expressing a minority opinion, spoke against a
continued Australian presence in New Guinea. Ferricks argued that Australia
was not even capable of developing its own land. The Northern Territory was
evidence enough of this. He suspected that the strategic arguments concealed
commercial greed and a wish to exploit the black workers of the islands. Fer-
ricks called for the people of these territories to be allowed to vote on their own
future. His lone voice, however, went unheard and unheeded.47 Occasionally,
the Australian Worker, organ of the radical socialists, spoke out against the con-
tinuation of Australia’s activities in New Guinea. At its interstate conference in
June 1918, the Federal Labor Party resolved at least to keep the future of the
occupied Pacific Islands open.48
The armistice in Europe put the future of Germany’s Pacific colonies onto
the agenda. As soon as the news became known in Australia, the premier of
New South Wales, Holman, instructed New South Wales’ agent-general in
Britain—each of the Australian states had a representative in London—to
inform the British colonial secretary, Long, of the views of the New South
Wales government on the future of the neighboring Pacific Islands. The gov-
ernment of New South Wales, the most populous of the Australian states,
regarded itself, together with Queensland, as most likely to be called upon to
express an opinion on the future of the Pacific Islands, largely because of its
geographical position. Premier Holman was a peculiar character. Like Hughes,
he was a member of the Labor Party, and like Hughes, he had been expelled
from the party because of his militaristic views. This did not affect his popular-
ity. As the cofounder of the Nationalist Party, he was reelected to office with a
majority of the vote. In the same way as Hughes, he had extremely imperialistic
or subimperialist-nationalistic impulses; on a visit to Fiji in 1916 he had called
for Australia to annex the British Crown Colony. Now, however, he showed a
much more moderate side. Apparently overcome by the prospect of peace at
last, he seemed to revert to socialist ideals: “Ministers’ own view is war not
CH6  Page 216  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:18 PM
Paris and the Fate of Germany’s Colonies 217
fought for conquest or annexation. Important demonstrate this by not insisting
unduly upon steps which, though justified as precautions, may be interpreted
as aggressions,” he cabled to Charles Wade, New South Wales’ diplomatic rep-
resentative in London.49 Wade was instructed to inform Long that, in the view
of the New South Wales government, Australia’s only strategic interest was for
the former German Pacific Islands to be neutralized under the supervision of
an international commission, in order to guarantee that no bases from which
Australia could be attacked be set up there in the future—a completely justifi-
able demand. Holman added: “If, however, Allied Governments are satisfied
no fear of future hostilities with new German Government, probably Republi-
can, Ministers’ feeling is question of Pacific Islands can be left unreservedly to
Peace Congress. Under such circumstances, Australia will have no interests.”50
On the same day, Acting Prime Minister Watt introduced a resolution in
the Senate and the House of Representatives that opposed returning the
Pacific Islands to Germany. It also called on the Peace Conference to take Aus-
tralia’s interests into account when deliberating upon the disposition of the
islands “essential to the future safety and welfare of Australia.” There was little
evidence of any dissenting views. After a short debate, the Senate passed the
resolution unanimously—the Labor MPs also voting for it. In the House of
Representatives, the Socialists voiced a certain amount of opposition, but here
too the resolution was adopted by the chamber by a straight majority vote.51
Hughes was already in Europe, and when Watt found out what Holman had
done, he issued two severe reprimands and forbade state governments to
express opinions to imperial authorities directly, bypassing the federal govern-
ment.52 Thus the only initiative suggesting an alternative to Australian control
of New Guinea to come from men of political influence in Australia was killed
before it had even seen the light of day. The Australian Labor Party held back
from criticizing an Australian takeover of New Guinea. In its manifesto for the
federal elections of 1919, it even attacked the government for having accepted
the Japanese penetration of Micronesia too easily at the peace negotiations.53
After this initiative by the premier of New South Wales, there was no other
serious attempt to question Anglo-Saxon control of New Guinea—apart from
one marginal note. On 23 November 1921—just over six months after Australia
had received the mandate so long desired by the federal government—Lynch,
a West Australian, said in the Senate, more or less out of the blue, that the
mandate for New Guinea should be given to the United States, as it placed too
much of a burden on the Australian taxpayer. After some protest from his irri-
tated colleagues, the previously unknown backbencher from the bush retracted
his motion.54
What criticism there was of Australian subimperialism was concentrated
among those supporters of mainstream imperialism who advocated the idea of
an intact British Empire. Some, such as the governor-general, for example,
were opponents of a national subimperialism because they saw it as posing a
threat to the coherence of the empire. Others were deeply suspicious of the
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Australian federal government’s ultranationalist policy; but the only chance
they saw of taking effective action against it was under the pretext of protecting
the interests of the British Empire. The fact that the Australian government
regularly bombarded the Colonial Office with petitions in an attempt to expand
the country’s political influence in the region has already been demonstrated
above. There was hardly a Pacific island that had not been the object of Austra-
lian greed at some time or other. The war and the military occupation of New
Guinea and Nauru were an added stimulus; Australia had sat down to its meal
with a good appetite, but while eating, its stomach had expanded, and it wanted
even more.
Early in 1915, in a conversation with the governor-general destined to be
transmitted to higher circles in London, Prime Minister Fisher had referred to
“the long-standing wish cherished in Australia to be possessed of New Cale-
donia and the New Hebrides.” Still, it was the same story as in the case of Brit-
ish New Guinea in the late nineteenth century: Australia wanted it but did not
want to spend any money on it. As both New Caledonia and the New Hebrides
were governed more from Paris than from Whitehall, and France was Britain’s
principal ally in the war, the governor-general proposed instead an “administra-
tive area from New Guinea to the Solomons, inclusive.” This “would suit Aus-
tralia well.” Another target was Portuguese Timor. The local manager of an
Australian firm apparently became impatient. Late in 1915, he made a quick
decision and raised the Australian flag in the interior of East Timor, presenting
himself to the indigenous people as their new commander. At the end of 1917
application was made for the phosphate-rich Christmas and Ocean Islands,
which were under British control, to be transferred to Australian rule. The
armistice in Europe was barely a month old, and the government was discuss-
ing, not the mandate for New Guinea, but the acquisition of Dutch New
Guinea, Tonga, and even France’s possessions in the Pacific.55 According to the
1921 census, just over 4.5 million whites—the Aborigines were not counted—
lived in Australia, in an area four-fifths the size of Europe, but the Australian
government’s land hunger was seemingly insatiable. When news of the Austra-
lian prime minister’s political success in Paris reached Australia, the Protestant
missions urged the government to finish the job properly and annex the New
Hebrides as well.56 After his return, Hughes himself persuaded the cabinet to
expand the Australian territories of Papua and New Guinea to include the hith-
erto British Solomons. Speaking to Australian soldiers who had just disem-
barked, he explained, “I believe that at no distant future Australia will occupy a
greater position than England.”57
Australia regarded the Pacific as its very own private duck pond and would
tolerate no rivals, the governor-general had written to his superiors in Britain,58
hoping that at the appropriate time the British government would accept his
proposal to set up a Pacific High Commission for all the islands under British
control, and place him at the head of it. Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson watched
the Japanese incursion into Micronesia with a certain degree of cynicism,
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believing that it would give the Australian government a jolt and make it con-
centrate on developing its own continent: “This fool’s paradise needs a rude
awakening, and if a Japanese naval base near the Line should act as a solvent
then it would be a blessing in disguise!”59
The Australian governor-general’s hope that Britain could be persuaded to
intervene more actively in the fate of the former German Pacific colonies, and
thus to repress Australian subimperialism, was illusory from the start. The war
had brought home clearly to the motherland how much it depended on the
help and support of the Dominions. To refuse their wishes, or to offend their
governments, would have put the continued existence of the empire at risk,
after it had just got away again with a black eye.60 Hughes gave these fears fur-
ther substance when, during the conference, he openly threatened to break off
Australia’s special relationship with Britain if it refused to accept what he
regarded as Australia’s justified demands. The governor-general’s plans had no
chance of success. The few people who developed similar models had even less
chance of seeing them adopted. Their activities were dismissed as the acts of
political muddleheads. At best, no notice was taken of their criticism of Austra-
lia’s posturing as a great power; at worst, it was defamed as the prefabricated
slander of agents paid to spread German propaganda.61
The governor-general on the other side of the Tasman, too, believed that
the former German colonies should not be administered by New Zealand. In
his view, New Zealand had its own difficulties, which had not been lessened by
the war. It was more than likely that Samoa’s problems would take a back seat.
New Zealand, he pointed out, could not afford to develop Samoa. And just as
the governor-general of Australia cited Australia’s failures in the Northern Ter-
ritory and Papua, so governor-general Liverpool emphasized New Zealand’s
unsatisfactory policy in the Cook Islands, which had been under direct New
Zealand control since 1900. The only solution he could see was for Samoa to
become a British Crown Colony. He suggested that all the British islands in the
Pacific (plus the Cook Islands, which had so far belonged to New Zealand),
should come together under one high commissioner, who should be based in
Fiji, not in Australia.62
There was some support for the governor-general of New Zealand’s views
among the white population of Samoa—as early as the end of 1915, the thirty-
seven leading non-German businessmen in Apia had petitioned the colonial
secretary to set up the same administration as under the Germans, “only under
the British Flag.”63 In addition, the longer the New Zealand military adminis-
tration lasted, the more the general mood of the Europeans in Samoa swung
against rule by New Zealand. Nonetheless, the idea of Samoa becoming a Brit-
ish Crown Colony was illusory for the same reasons that the notion of New
Guinea becoming a Crown Colony or being ruled by Britain under a mandate
was illusory. In New Zealand public criticism of a takeover of Samoa was much
stronger than that in Australia, but the fact that the liberal-conservative-nation-
alist New Zealand government had shown itself far more loyal than Australia to
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Britain during and after the war was enough to make it impossible for London
to deal differently with the subimperialist dreams of Melbourne and Welling-
ton. In addition, criticism in the press, like that expressed by the Labour oppo-
sition in New Zealand, concentrated on one main point: the dependence of the
Samoan economy on Chinese labor instinctively gave many New Zealanders a
bellyache. This was caused less by social and economic considerations, or sym-
pathy for the exploited Chinese, than by the deep-seated Yellow Peril syn-
drome combined with the New Zealand variant of the White Australia Policy.
“It is a remarkable feature that New Zealand is being asked to take over the
control not only of a captured German colony but the loving care of a horde of
cheap and nasty Chinese coolies,” wrote the (Auckland) Truth, one of New
Zealand’s highest circulation dailies, in October 1919. It went on to admit to
“the instinctive horror of the white at the thought that his country is to become
the dumping ground of Asiatic hordes.” Surely it would be better for the man-
date for Samoa, with its “scum of Asia,” to go to Britain, or for Samoa to
become part of a western Pacific confederation under a British high commis-
sioner, argued the paper.64
The MP James McCombs put forward the same views, for the same rea-
sons, after returning from a visit to Samoa. McCombs was a member of the
Social Democratic Party, which was to the left of the Labour Party.65 In theory,
“The Principle of a White New Zealand Endangered.” (The New Zealand Truth,
25 October 1919)
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the anti-Chinese front commanded a majority in the New Zealand government
as well. But the problem was that, since the influenza epidemic, the old idea
put forward by the military governor, Colonel Logan, of forcing the Samoans to
work on European plantations and then repatriating the Chinese no longer
seemed feasible. The weakened Samoans had trouble ensuring their own sur-
vival, and there was no question of forcing them to work for Europeans. In
response to this quandary, the cabinet in Wellington decided on a compromise.
Chinese workers were to continue to be imported into Samoa, but under par-
liamentary pressure from the Labour Party the government promised at least
to do away with the coolie system; and Samoan women were to be protected
from sexual advances by Chinese men. Of course, the government declaration
that the system of using Chinese laborers as coolies in Samoa had been abol-
ished was pure hogwash. But it kept criticism by the Labour Party at bay for
the time being. Nonetheless, the excited debate in parliament prevented the
government from sneaking a paragraph allowing corporal punishment exclu-
sively for Samoans into the Samoa Constitution Order, as Administrator Tate
had asked it to do.66 The leader of the New Zealand Labour Party, Harry Hol-
land, an Australian, was one of the strongest critics of New Zealand policy on
Samoa. But even the Labour Party did not produce any concrete suggestions
for an alternative to New Zealand rule there.
Voices against a continuation of their country’s rule in the German Pacific
territories occupied during the war were probably even rarer in Japan than in
Australia or New Zealand. But they did exist.67 Despite the considerable eco-
nomic progress made during the military administration, a majority of public
opinion agreed that Japan’s acquisition of Micronesia had brought it few eco-
nomic benefits. All the more, therefore, were the islands to be retained for rea-
sons of prestige; Japan could not afford to lose face in front of Europeans and
Pacific Islanders. Strategic reasons, too, were repeatedly cited for the retention
of the islands. It was argued that they served as a forward defense against the
American threat from the Philippines, and especially from Guam.68 Just as
Hughes had developed a South Pacific variation of the Monroe Doctrine, so
the Japanese had a northern Pacific version, according to which the political
future of the North Pacific area was to be decided by Japan alone.69 Radical
imperialist circles made no secret of the fact that they regarded Micronesia
only as a springboard for the south or southeast. In the Marshall Islands, the
captain of a Japanese warship is alleged to have told the local people that New
Caledonia and Australia were next on the list. Greedy Japanese eyes were fixed
mainly on Indonesia. But even India was regarded by some as the end of one
stage of Japan’s southern mission, which had started in Micronesia.70 A position
paper prepared by the Japanese navy for the Paris peace negotiations empha-
sized the value of the islands, with Palau (the Japanese headquarters) as the
geographical center of a region that included the Philippines, Indonesia, New
Guinea, and Polynesia.71
Germany being driven out of the Pacific area had seriously upset the bal-
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ance of power. More than anything else, Japanese inroads caused nervousness
and anxiety. Australia’s agitation was at first considerable, although the Caro-
lines were one of the few areas in the Pacific that had never figured in Austra-
lian dreams of great-power status—they were too far away and had no
commercial value. It was therefore argued internally from an early stage that
these islands could be left to Japan or the United States. The Marshall Islands,
however, were to be attached to the Anglo-Australian sphere of influence
because they were one of Burns Philp’s main markets.72 Informed by London
of Britain’s secret agreement with Tokyo, Melbourne and Sydney raised no
objections, although they were not particularly happy about this whole devel-
opment. On the eve of the peace negotiations, Hughes tried again to question
the agreements that had been made, but Lloyd George was not to be moved.
Eventually Hughes gave up, accepting that the British Empire would stick to
its wartime agreements regarding Micronesia.73 Thereafter, he endeavored to
obtain as many guarantees as possible that Japanese influence of every sort
would be eliminated and excluded from the territories occupied by Australia.
Ultimately, his policy was successful.
Nobody was more aware that the military situation in the Pacific had nev-
ertheless deteriorated considerably compared with the position before 1914
than responsible politicians and high-ranking officers in the United States.
Contrary to all Anglo-Saxon, especially Australian, propaganda, the German
presence in the Pacific had never posed a military threat to the other Pacific
nations. It had been a weak point for Germany—as the war had demonstrated
only too clearly. Germany had no great ambitions in the Pacific, which could
not be said of the “successor states” of New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. The
State Department and the United States Navy were more than worried when
Japan entered the war, and their unease increased during the war. There was
certainly no issue in Paris that touched on the United States’ interests more
closely than the Pacific question. In American eyes, Samoa’s fate was clearly of
secondary, or even tertiary, significance. After all, America had the only useful
harbor in the island group, and neighboring New Zealand, a would-be great
power, posed no military threat. New Guinea, by contrast, and especially
Micronesia, were of high strategic value to the United States: Guam and the
Philippines were right on its doorstep.
It has recently been suggested that Wilson’s anger at the demands made by
the Australian prime minister at the Peace Conference had less to do with
Hughes’ open contempt for Wilson’s ideas on the mandate system than with
the American president’s fear that the Japanese, like the Australians, might
annex the areas they had occupied and then use them as naval bases.74 One
could go a step further and argue that Wilson’s mandate concept had little to do
with idealistic motives, but was based on the United States’ concrete political
interests. The State Department in Washington had become aware of the
secret agreement reached between the Allies and Japan during the war.75 Pri-
marily interested in blocking Japanese influence, the United States had to find
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a strategy of circumventing this agreement in such a way that neither openly
questioned Britain’s Allied commitments nor forced Japan into taking a special
role. Only a mandate system supervised by the League of Nations offered any
guarantee that Japan would not one day use Micronesia as a military takeoff
point against America.76 This not only explains why Wilson was so annoyed
about Hughes’ stubbornness on annexation, but also casts new light on the
American president’s apparent indifference toward the mandate question once
it had been established that C class mandates (and thus Micronesia) could not
be fortified and that annual reports would provide some information about
what Japan was doing in its islands, which—thanks to Hughes’ stubbornness—
were so cut off from the rest of the world.
In any case, important voices in the State Department considered Micron-
esia in Japanese hands, or even in British ownership, as such a dangerous threat
to America’s position that they even regarded returning the islands to Germany
as a better solution. In the latter case, it might be possible to acquire the terri-
tory from Germany at a later date in exchange for American reparations
claims—an idea that was not so far removed from the German delegation’s
alternative scenario.77 Leading American diplomats did not join in the sharp
international criticism of Germany’s colonial rule in Micronesia. From an early
stage they defended the German colonial administration there against attack,
even expressing something approaching modest praise for it.78
To calculate political probabilities in retrospect is always a risky business,
because human behavior cannot be measured in any absolute way. If I never-
theless cannot resist the temptation, I shall initially go no further than to say
that the indigenous peoples of the Pacific colonies never had any chance of
influencing the future of their homelands. Similarly, it could be said that Ger-
many’s chances of getting back one of its former colonies on the basis of a
return to the status quo ante were nonexistent. If it had conducted its negotia-
tions more skillfully, if it had possessed better information about disagreements
among the Allies, and if, especially, it had been more determined on the colo-
nial question, we cannot totally exclude the possibility (although many question
marks remain) that Germany might have been given a mandate, under strict
conditions, for Micronesia (or parts of it)—that is, the area which, apart from
Tsingtao, it was most prepared to relinquish. If history had taken this course,
the consequences might have been significant. A minimal concession of this
nature would have considerably reduced the heavy psychological burden the
Treaty of Versailles placed upon the young German republic. Micronesia would
have been spared Japanese pressure, at least for a while. Perhaps German
democrats would have decided to put an ideal into practice and to grant inde-
pendence earlier than others did elsewhere. Micronesia’s political future was
not fixed quite as firmly by the war situation as that of New Guinea, Nauru, and
Samoa. This is shown not only by the variety of American plans for the region,79
but also by Japan’s readiness to accept some of the United States’ demands for
Yap. And whereas Nauru, New Guinea, and Samoa were more than Australia
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and New Zealand could digest anyway, a broad majority in Japan always consid-
ered Micronesia to be of secondary importance to the East Asian mainland,
where Japan’s political ambitions were focusing. Micronesia remained an off-
shoot of Japanese imperialism. But whatever might have happened if . . . , one
thing is certain. The French, who also wanted their mother country to partici-
pate in the run on Germany’s Pacific colonies,80 never had the faintest chance
of success.
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“New” Colonial Policy and Indigenous
Interpretations of Colonial Rule in the
Light of the First World War
THE LASTING IMPACT OF THE MILITARY IN THE
SOUTH PACIFIC MANDATES
Martial law and military administration ended in 1921–1922 (Japanese Micro-
nesia) in Germany’s former Pacific colonies. It soon became apparent, however,
that the changes which had taken place during the European war, or had been
set in motion by the new colonial rulers, did not dissolve into thin air overnight
on the introduction of a civil administration. On the contrary, patterns of behav-
ior that had emerged under the exceptional circumstances of military rule were
consolidated, and were only now able to put down real roots. In other words,
the Australian, Japanese, and New Zealand colonial administrations all grew out
of, and were based upon, the respective military administrations that had pre-
ceded them. Without the military administrations, the civil administrations are
unthinkable. The years 1921 and 1922 were by no means a “zero hour” in the
Pacific. The break with the German past and its legacy, and the development of
specifically Australian, Japanese, and New Zealand colonial administrations
took place at different times in the various regions. In Japanese Micronesia it
began as early as 1915, during the reconstruction phase in which Micronesia
was “Japanized.” In New Guinea the turning point was 1917–1918 at the latest,
when it became clear that the administration was unable, and probably unwill-
ing, to act against the excesses perpetrated by the recruiters. From that time,
lack of a clear policy toward the local population, with a daily vacillation be-
tween the extremes of sympathy and the most brutal inhumanity, depending on
the attitude of each individual Australian official, increasingly established itself
as the main feature of the Australian presence in New Guinea. The end of the
German administration etched itself more deeply into the memories of the local
people in Samoa than elsewhere, because the transition from one foreign ruler
to another was, in retrospect, firmly associated with a specific event—namely,
the influenza epidemic. In the process, the fact that a majority of Samoans saw
the arrival of the New Zealanders as a stroke of luck, because they believed (and
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this hope lasted for four years) that this would give them greater autonomy and
a better chance for self-determination, is generally suppressed.
For Samoa i Sisifo and Papua New Guinea, both independent states today,
and the Micronesian islands, 1914–1918 was a turning point, less because of
the nominal switch of colonial masters than because of the fundamental
changes in living conditions that took place during those years. The contrast
with the period before 1914 is especially clear in one specific area. The terri-
tory that had once been the “German” South Pacific had become a zone of
potential military conflict of the first rank, whose explosive nature was exposed,
rather than concealed, by the provisions of the C class mandate. Before 1914,
militarism in New Guinea, Micronesia (except for Guam), and Western Samoa
had been expressed only in parades and the military marches given by the Ger-
man imperial navy on its occasional visits. These festival-like events were popu-
lar among the local population, and also met the need of sailors and naval offi-
cers for rest and change after the monotony of life on board ship. Samoa had
much to offer in this respect—an attractive landscape, cava ceremonies with a
real Pacific chief, and the opportunity to flirt with the taupou (village virgin).
The adventurous could undertake small expeditions into the swamps of New
Guinea, where malaria-induced fevers transformed leeches into greedy mon-
sters and the startled bush people into bloodthirsty cannibals.
But despite all military justifications for colonial rule, the Pacific was not a
theater for German dreams of world domination. The aspiration to be a world
power may have been a background factor when, at the turn of the century,
Germany decided to become more politically active in the South Pacific and to
accept “responsibility.” But at least in military-strategic terms, this claim was
never translated into reality in the Pacific. The hypocrisy on which the Wil-
helmine Empire was built was clearly revealed in the South Pacific. Germany
wanted to be a world power, but in putting this aim into practice, it became
apparent that Germany’s eyes were bigger than its stomach. There was not a
single naval base in Germany’s sphere of influence in the Pacific, and none was
ever established. Plans do not even seem to have been drawn up—at least, they
have yet to be found. But quite apart from the lack of naval bases, Germany did
nothing to protect its colonies from external attack. Nowhere were weapons or
ammunition stored for an emergency; settlers were not given any military train-
ing; there was no such thing as a colonial force. Unless we assume that the
bombastic words spoken in Germany were nothing but rhetoric, the only con-
clusion we can draw is that imperial overstretch was a reality for the German
empire long before the First World War.
At least in retrospect, it is clear that, contrary to Australia’s passionate dec-
larations, Germany’s Pacific colonies had been a force for stability among the
powers in the Pacific. Germany’s military exclusion from the Pacific opened up
a Pandora’s box. Now the real potential for conflict that had been concealed by
the alleged German threat became obvious. Instead of the Pacific becoming a
zone of peace and security, as war propaganda proclaimed, the feeling of being
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under threat and in danger grew. The Australian prime minister’s “success” at
Versailles in obtaining the right to apply national laws in C class mandates, and
in keeping other powers out of mandated areas, boomeranged. Micronesia, cut
off from the rest of the world, became a constant source of suspicion and dis-
trust. In addition, the seeming secrecy of the Japanese fed constant speculation
in Australia, the United States, and New Zealand that, contrary to all League
of Nations regulations, Japan was attempting to prepare some sort of aggres-
sive act.
The Australian government’s main motive in acquiring New Guinea had
been strategic. Few recognized that it might have been in Australia’s strategic
interests to maintain New Guinea as a German colony.1 Africans, Asians, and, to
a lesser extent, Pacific Islanders, had been exploited as European cannon fod-
der during the war. But now, for the first time in the history of imperialism in
the Pacific, whole territories were acquired primarily to be used by colonial
powers as forward defenses in a future war. Micronesians and Melanesians
were sitting on a powder keg that could be ignited by any quarrel between
Tokyo and Washington, or Tokyo and Canberra. By the mid-1920s, Supreme
Chief Joel of the small Micronesian island of Mokil was already convinced that
the outbreak of a war between Japan and America was only a matter of time.2
At the end of 1919 the Japanese press, agitated by the American president’s
refusal to recognize the principle of racial equality at Versailles, was full of
threats of war against the United States. In August, Japanese shipyard workers
vented their anger on a steamer of the Pacific Mail Line in Kobe, and two
American ships’ officers were temporarily detained. The second act of this
drama took place one year later, when drunken Australian soldiers insulted the
Japanese crew of the steamer Madras Maru and threatened to throw her cap-
tain, Ishikawa, overboard.3 Public figures poured more oil on the fire. In Lon-
don, the Speaker of the Australian Senate, Millen, said in an interview with The
Times: “racial purity must be maintained to the very point of death.”4 In March
1919, the director of the Australian secret services, Major Piesse, predicted in a
secret memorandum that a racial war between East and West would break out
in the near future. A little later, on Hughes’ express wish, Piesse was appointed
director of the prime minister’s special department for all matters relating to
the administration of New Guinea under the mandate.5
The Washington Conference let off some of the steam that had built up in
the Pacific since 1914. But there was little change in the basic antagonism
between Japan on the one hand, and the Europeans and Americans on the
other. Even after the “official” beginning of the civil administration, the mili-
tary continued to dominate the routine and day-to-day business of most of the
colonial mandates in the Pacific. Strangely enough, this was least evident in the
Japanese mandate, where the tone was set by graduates of the imperial univer-
sities, especially law graduates from the University of Tokyo.6 Nonetheless, the
Japanese soldiers and officers who had been stationed at the radio communica-
tions station in Saipan, and who had left their position after the Washington
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Conference, all without exception returned on the next ship, but in civilian
clothes. A number of Japanese small traders on the Micronesian atolls were
former soldiers who had ended up in Micronesia at the beginning of the war.7 A
naval liaison office (kaigun bukan-fu), led by an officer below staff rank, was
maintained as part of the civil government in Koror on Palau.8
The military was a much stronger presence in the Australian-mandated
territory of New Guinea and in New Zealand-mandated Samoa than in Japa-
nese Micronesia. The Australian and New Zealand administrations were civil in
name only. Although they fulfilled the C class mandate’s prohibition on milita-
rizing mandated areas,9 essential areas of the administration could hardly have
been more militarized. Before 1914 the military had had no influence on the
policy of the colonial administration. In fact, two out of the five German gover-
nors of Germany’s South Pacific territories had not even done military service
(Schultz and Haber). Now the tone was set by generals throughout. Before the
outbreak of the Second World War, all the Administrators of the Australian-
mandated territory of New Guinea (Major General Wisdom, Brigadier General
Griffiths, Brigadier General McNicoll) and all the Administrators of the New
Zealand-mandated territory of Samoa (Colonel Tate, General Richardson,
Colonel Allen, Brigadier General Hart) were high-ranking officers, mostly gen-
erals. Practical colonial experience and knowledge of the Pacific Islands and
their peoples were not called for when Administrators were being selected; all
that counted were their military careers and ranks.
A six-inch gun mounted at Fort Raluana commanding the entrance to Blanche Bay,
c. 1918. (Australian War Memorial H 01987)
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The selection of the first “civil” Administrator of mandated New Guinea
can be regarded as typical. Of the thirty-two applicants, those with clear admin-
istrative experience in the Pacific had no chance. Australian-born Thomas Rob-
erts, former finance minister of Tonga and secretary of the British High
Commission for the Western Pacific, was not short-listed. Nor was Seaforth
Mackenzie, who had the most experience dating from the days of the military
administration and had temporarily filled the position of Acting Administrator.
Roberts was “only” a lieutenant, but Mackenzie was a lieutenant colonel. Gov-
ernor Murray of Papua, who had indicated, after the Australian government’s
decision to administer Papua and New Guinea separately, that he would prefer
to administer New Guinea to Papua, was set aside because under no circum-
stances did Lucas want him in Rabaul. The shortlist consisted of four brigadier
generals (including the three who later became Administrators, Wisdom, Grif-
fiths, and McNicoll), one lieutenant colonel, and a captain. Griffiths, the last
Administrator of the military administration, was almost certainly put in second
place because the appointments board did not want the smoothness of the
transition from a military to a civil administration to be too obvious. As com-
pensation, Griffiths was appointed Administrator of Nauru.10 Wisdom, who was
finally chosen for the mandated territory of New Guinea, had a respectable
military career behind him but no experience of colonial administration or of
dealing with non-Europeans. In his application, however, Wisdom claimed that
he had “a good idea of the true perspective as regards the relations between the
European and the native inhabitants.” As evidence for this statement, he cited
a visit to tea and caoutchouc plantations in Ceylon.11
The first civil Administrator was explicitly instructed by the prime minister
to give preferential treatment to the officers of the existing military administra-
tion when selecting officials for the civil administration, and also to act on
Walter Lucas’ suggestions concerning personnel. As director of the Expropria-
tion Board, Lucas had filled it with soldiers returning from Europe.12 Until
1942 the officials who had most contact with the local people, the district and
patrol officers, were almost exclusively either officers of the former military
administration or Australian soldiers who had returned from Europe. The pre-
dominance of the military element among Australian colonial officials contin-
ued even after 1945. It is at least an open question whether the training of an
officer or soldier was of any advantage for colonial service. In any case, the “sol-
dier-officials” in New Guinea behaved exactly as they had done while on active
service, and thus survived: “Once they were entrenched, it was hard to dig
them out, however incompetent they proved to be.”13 Soldiers and officers who
could not cope with the colonial administration tried themselves out as planters
or, most often, as recruiters of indigenous labor. In these undertakings, too,
they had the support of the highest authorities. The word went around that
Administrator Wisdom had claimed that any soldier who had been in France
would be “a successful recruiter” in New Guinea.14
Military titles, military language, and military habits permeated life in the
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Australian-mandated territory from the start. The same was true of Samoa,
where New Zealand had not even bothered to change the Administrator at the
beginning of the mandate administration. The last commander of the military
administration, Colonel Tate, became the first Administrator of the civil admin-
istration, and along with him most of the military officials remained in office. At
the start of his career in Apia, Tate had written to a military friend that there
were “soft jobs with heavy pay” in Samoa.15 Tate did a great deal to give com-
rades who found themselves unemployed at the end of the war a chance in
Samoa. The “civil” administration—“nothing more than the old military gov-
ernment under a new name”16—employed 134 officials in May 1921. By the
end, the German administration had consisted of 46 officials.17 The authority
that the New Zealand administration had lost among Samoans since the influ-
enza epidemic was replaced by authoritarian behavior, and the bureaucratic
militarists also increasingly alienated the British settlers, who wistfully remem-
bered the period of German colonial administration: “I was there when West-
ern Samoa was under German control, but the residents did not learn anything
about ‘Prussianism’ until after the war, when they found themselves in British
hands,” noted an eyewitness.18
In a continuously recurring cycle of repression and resistance, the adminis-
tration felt it was imperative to emphasize military elements as much as possi-
ble. “Uniforms and salutes are essential,” wrote Administrator Tate, who set
great store by always appearing in military uniform.19 His successor, Richard-
son, began his period of office by demanding the title “Excellency,” which,
within the British colonial system, was reserved for the governors-general of
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The authorities in London
pandered to these personal vanities by granting the Administrators of New
Guinea and Samoa the right to receive fifteen-gun salutes, and the Administra-
tor of Nauru the right to an eleven-gun salute. “This is thought to be a great
addition of strength to the Government,” rejoiced Brigadier General Wisdom
from Rabaul. Wisdom himself placed great value on being addressed as “His
Honour the Administrator.”20
CHARACTERISTICS OF MANDATE POLICY IN THE
SOUTH PACIFIC, 1922–1942
The Australian Approach
Militarism was not the only legacy of the war period adopted by the mandate
administrations. Certain trends that had emerged between 1914 and 1921 were
strengthened rather than weakened. In Australian New Guinea this included
the ubiquitous presence of Burns Philp. Burns Philp’s plans to take over all the
German plantations at once had been unsuccessful,21 but after the collapse of
copra prices, the company was able to keep its monopoly of the far more lucra-
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tive transport business until the mid-1920s. The condition, pushed through by
Lucas, that the trade of the German plantations and businesses in the process
of being liquidated by the Australian government could be carried only by Brit-
ish ships, and that all had to go via Sydney, guaranteed fat profits for Burns
Philp. At the end of 1923, the freight rate between Rabaul and Sydney, dictated
by Burns Philp, was 50 shillings per ton. Before the war, it had been 20 marks
(equal to 20 shillings). Nevertheless, the company’s activities in the Pacific
Islands were still subsidized by the Australian government to the tune of
£55,000 annually. Like others before him, Wisdom discovered that the con-
tracts between Burns Philp and the government had been cooked up behind
the back of the Administrator of New Guinea.22 Only after Hughes’ resignation,
when Shepherd gradually lost his influence as a gray eminence, did the proce-
dures that had functioned so smoothly between the company and its supporters
in the prime minister’s office become less effective than they had previously
been.
When facing potential trading rivals, Burns Philp had always been quick to
demand guarantees that Australia’s interests would be placed first. But when its
own profits were at stake, wriggling out of such obligations seemed to be the
best policy. Circumventing all regulations, the company used the loophole of
Bougainville to smuggle the copra it had bought into its own warehouses in the
Shortland Islands (British Solomons), whence it was taken directly to San Fran-
cisco. Thus Burns Philp avoided the customs and cargo duties that would have
been imposed in Sydney and that the Australian government had hoped would
bring it direct profit from its takeover of New Guinea.23
As long as Lucas enjoyed the prime minister’s trust and had the real say in
Rabaul, Burns Philp had nothing to fear. Lucas’ position was so secure that he
did not have to be alert about defending Burns Philp’s activities. But it was the
German place-names in the territory that kept him awake at night. Most of all,
he was worried about Kaiser-Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago, for
which there were neither British nor indigenous alternatives. When instructing
Piesse to put things right, he carefully pointed out that in the selection of new
names, the pronunciation of the “thick-lipped (tongued) Melanesians” must be
taken into account.24 Neither King George’s Land nor Kitchener Archipelago,
proposed by the government geologist of Papua, were ever really accepted; nor
was Australnesia, suggested by the Melbourne newspaper Argus and favored
by Piesse himself. Kaiser-Wilhelmsland became simply North East New
Guinea, while the Bismarck Archipelago retained its name, and even Lucas
eventually had to come to terms with this. The name New Hanover, given by
Captain Carteret in honor of George III, survived, because the government
anthropologist, Chinnery, who favored abolishing it, was away on an extended
stay in the goldfields of Morobe when the Administrator sought his advice. In
some cases the indigenous names adapted by the German administration were
given up in favor of the old British colonial names. Thus the Wussi became the
Markham River again; Manus went back to being the Admiralty Islands.25
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For the indigenous population, however, such concerns were secondary for
the moment. The military administration had made a number of crucial changes
in the everyday life of the Melanesians during the war. For plantation workers,
the abolition of corporal punishment was at first a relief; but it was largely a
relief on paper only, as illegal punishments were increasingly tolerated and new,
brutal punishments (such as Field Punishment No. 1) introduced. As there was
no uniform administrative policy, and the central administration did not carry
out checks on the site, each district officer decided for himself and his area
whether policy was interpreted in a humanitarian or a racist-brutal manner. The
lack of central guidelines and of agencies that could have supervised the behav-
ior of colonial officials on the site was the main reason for the growing unrest
and agitation among the free Melanesians, those who were not bound to the
Europeans by labor contracts. The autonomy of these Melanesians was limited
to a hitherto unprecedented extent by widespread recruiting, which the admin-
istration did nothing to control. Operations whose cynical brutality is reminis-
cent of the worst episodes in the history of European contact, and in which
some officers of the administration took part, profoundly unsettled the indige-
nous population and led to numerous violent clashes. In addition, one of the
main supports of German colonial policy, the acceptance of the Melanesian
principle of internal arbitration of disputes and its implementation by the Euro-
pean-appointed luluai, was abandoned. When European and Melanesian views
clashed, there was now no middle way left. The German practice of partial
acceptance and tolerance of indigenous patterns of behavior and legal notions
had been given up quite suddenly and replaced by uncompromisingly western
European, Anglo-Saxon norms, which were regarded as absolute. The indige-
nous people were to be forced to follow this path, with the sanction, if necessary,
of the harshest punishments in the European legal repertoire. In addition, it
became clearer and clearer that Australian colonial policy was not prepared to
make European knowledge available to the Melanesian. The transfer of mod-
ernization through education was boycotted by the Australians.
All these aspects of Australian occupation policy were continued under the
mandate administration. Although it is understandable that the military admin-
istration did not develop a grand framework for its policies, it is astonishing that
the mandate administration showed a similar lack of interest in defining princi-
ples for implementing the provisions laid down by the League of Nations or for
developing a specifically Australian colonial policy in New Guinea. Somehow
the impression arises that, after shouting bloody murder and gaining New
Guinea at last, the Commonwealth of Australia turned its back on the terri-
tory—like a toy in which a child loses interest as soon as he has beaten his
rivals. The “basic principle” that New Guinea was to be financially self-support-
ing without assistance from the Commonwealth, announced by Prime Minister
Hughes, certainly contributed to the fact that policy in the Australian mandate
of New Guinea was totally dependent on the moods and fluctuations of day-to-
day politics.
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One month after the beginning of the civil administration, a question was
asked in the Australian parliament as to whether the federal government had
drawn up a policy for the mandated area. The following reply was given: “The
question asked . . . is of so general a character as to make a definite reply diffi-
cult.”26 Without further ado, Parliament returned to the agenda. Three months
later, when another MP again asked when the House could expect a statement
by the prime minister on government policy in the mandated area, the inquisi-
tive parliamentarian was called to order and informed that this sort of question
was not permitted.27
Piesse wrote one memo after another criticizing Australian procedures in
New Guinea. Despite his purely military background, and probably contrary to
Hughes’ expectations, Piesse was not only concerned with the strategic and eco-
nomic implications of the mandate, but also took the responsibilities Australia
had assumed together with the C class mandate seriously. His first objection
was to the unrestrained recruiting of the indigenous population, with all its neg-
ative side effects. Like the German colonial administration before him, Piesse
was forced to recognize that there was a direct and causal relationship between
population decline and the recruitment of workers. Working conditions on the
plantations administered by the Expropriation Board were little better than the
excesses of the recruiters. By the end of 1921, conditions resembled those dur-
ing the worst period of the Neuguinea-Kompanie’s rule. Lacking all medical
attention and forced to work extremely hard without regular food, workers died
in great numbers. On expiry of their contracts, laborers were not repatriated
but kept in Rabaul, where they had to wait months for their deferred pay. In the
meantime, they ran into debt in order to survive. This made it easier to press
them into a new labor contract later. At least in the quick repatriation of work-
ers after the expiry of their contracts the German colonial administration had
been better, wrote Piesse in an internal memorandum.28
The practice of district officers instructing the native police to capture
Melanesians and then selling them to the plantations for commission was also
continued unchanged by the mandate administration, and was another point
criticized by Piesse. Administrator Wisdom even supported recruitment and
the forced removal of children from their villages.29 On the plantations them-
selves, conditions certainly improved by the time the mandate administration
became more settled. But on two decisive points nothing changed: workers
were regularly flogged and wages remained at 1914 levels. There is ample evi-
dence that, despite official prohibition, the administration of corporal punish-
ment continued to be a privilege exercised by European employers in New
Guinea. The workers were too intimidated by previous negative experiences
to complain.30
In 1914 the average wage of Melanesian plantation workers had been five
marks.31 The equivalent wage of five shillings was the maximum wage under
the military administration, and it was deliberately kept at this level by the
mandate administration. Higher rates of pay “will have the effect of enabling
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him to avoid work,” argued the Administrator, who was at the same time con-
sidering expropriating Melanesian land in order to force more Melanesians
into working for the Europeans.32 Early in 1929, when wages were still pegged
at five shillings per month, of which less than half was paid out in cash, a strike
was held in Rabaul. Led by Police Sergeant Rami and Sumsuma, a local schoo-
ner captain, three thousand workers went on strike. There may have been a
connection with the announcement of the arrival of the first German steamer
since 1914. Both Rami and Sumsuma had started their careers under the Ger-
man colonial administration and must have been well aware that there had
been no fixed maximum wage at that time.33
The German colonial administration had attempted to leave free Melane-
sians as much traditional autonomy as possible. The policy of withdrawing
these prerogatives, begun under military rule, was continued under the man-
date administration. In 1922 marriage regulations for the indigenous popula-
tion were promulgated. These gave the Administrator the power to prevent a
Melanesian woman from marrying according to traditional customs. It is highly
likely that the Sacred Heart Mission was behind this initiative. After the end of
the German colonial administration, it saw a good opportunity to press for
Christian, Western principles of marriage to be adopted and given priority over
indigenous ones, without compromise. An earlier attempt had been unsuccess-
ful, almost ending in disaster for the mission.34
Education the Australian Way
Australian attitudes about the transmission of European know-how, however,
were quite different. To be sure, it was the mandate administration’s explicit
policy “to discourage the learning of local dialects,” and Tok Pisin was no longer
recognized in courts of law. But the mandate administration was more than
hesitant when it came to teaching Melanesians English. By 30 June 1922 not
more than eleven pounds and eleven shillings had been spent on education in
the mandated area.35 In the same year, the Technical School and the School of
Domestic Economy were opened in Rabaul. The Technical School manufac-
tured coal baskets and wastepaper baskets; one of its three classes was made up
of students who could neither read nor write, and who were not taught to. In
fact, this institution employed underage government laborers, and the name
“Technical School” was nothing but a cover. Its mere existence, however, led
the League of Nations to believe that the mandate administration was doing
something in the field of education. A visitor in October 1925 regarded the
whole thing as a bad joke.36
According to the Administrator’s statement, the School of Domestic Econ-
omy had been established “for the purpose of providing wash-boys and
cooks.”37 Students had to cook for three days every week and spent the rest of
their time washing and ironing. As even Australia’s official mandate report
admitted, this was nothing but an attempt, financed by Melanesian taxes, “to
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train natives as domestic servants.”38 To finance the two schools, the mandate
administration had introduced a new tax, called the Education Tax. All Melane-
sians who were not in a contractual relationship with a European had to pay ten
shillings education tax in addition to the annual head-tax of ten shillings. The
Administrator justified this procedure by pointing to the guidelines, issued by
the Australian government, which insisted that the mandate had to be finan-
cially self-supporting. Thus it was self-evident that those who derived benefit
from the institutions—meaning the indigenous population—should be taxed to
pay for them.39 European employers were also meant to contribute one shilling
education tax per Melanesian employee, but it was not collected from them
until 1928. In 1933, when it was manifestly clear that the revenue from this tax
was not being used to educate the local people, it was renamed Native Labour
Tax. In contrast to the local people, Europeans in the mandated area did not
have to make a compulsory contribution toward the education of their chil-
dren: the school for Europeans in Rabaul was free.40
In the late 1920s the director of the Queensland Education Authority went
to New Guinea to inspect education in the mandated area. He criticized the
state schools for what they were: institutions that provided cheap Melanesian
labor to Europeans. But even McKenna’s modest aim of providing real elemen-
tary schooling for Melanesians, not going beyond the level prescribed for ten-
year-olds in Australia, was boycotted on all sides and at all levels. The settlers
and planters made no secret of the fact that their lack of support for schooling
for the indigenous people derived only from the concern that it might enable
the Melanesians to question the established system, which was based on the
Europeans giving orders and the Melanesians being willing to carry them out.
The administration shared these views, but expressed them a little less directly.
Immediately before McKenna’s arrival in the mandated area, the Ministry for
Home and Territories, the authority responsible for issues relating to New
Guinea, had put out a memorandum summing up its “policy”: “The consensus
of opinion in recent years of native educational authorities has been that it is
undesirable to stress too much the literary education of natives, which usually
makes them something in the nature of an indifferent European, but that edu-
cation should aim at making a native a better native.”41
From the early 1920s Australia in New Guinea showed what “making a
native a better native” meant in practice. Australian policy clearly demonstrates
that the crucial factor in racism is whether the people subject to the colonial
administration have the chance to make use of, or to reject, the greater oppor-
tunities or imponderables resulting from cultural contact. Forcing a colonized
people to accept the hitherto unknown patterns of behavior of its colonial mas-
ters is, in essence, as racist in motivation as the notion that the achievements of
their colonial masters should be denied to them. The attitudes of the Austra-
lians in New Guinea were shaped by the view that, in their behavior to each
other, and toward whites, Melanesians had to conform to European legal ideas.
On the other hand, Australians did not want Melanesians to copy European
CH7  Page 236  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:19 PM
Interpretations of Colonial Rule 237
behavior in terms of education and external appearances. Thus Australian poli-
cymakers were not interested in persuading the local people to adopt Euro-
pean dress, as the much and justifiably criticized nineteenth-century
missionaries had tried to do, because they had wanted to force non-Europeans
to adopt European behavior in order to “civilize” them. The objective of Aus-
tralian policy in the mandated territory of New Guinea, by contrast, was delib-
erately to maintain a difference between non-Europeans and Europeans.
Therefore Melanesians had to be denied access to European education; and for
the same reason they were also ordered not to wear European clothing. From
their external appearance alone, Melanesians were to be recognizably the
“other,” the “primitive.” In July 1923 the local people were forbidden to wear
anything but the loincloth. All European clothing owned by Melanesians was
destroyed. Thus the mandated area adopted an ordinance that Murray had
already put into force previously in neighboring Papua.42 It is doubtful whether
such ordinances, and especially what lay behind them, were ever registered by
the Mandate Commission in Geneva. Nevertheless, the statistics in annual
reports made it clear to the League of Nations that Australian expenditure on
education and schools in New Guinea was steadily decreasing, until by 1937 it
had practically dropped to 1921 levels. To criticism the Australian representa-
tive replied that “the natives of New Guinea were most primitive.” Right until
the outbreak of the Second World War, it was the mandate administration’s
deliberate policy not to have any plans for educating the indigenous people.43
Australian Administrative and Legal Policy
A completely different approach was taken to legal policy. Here the German
system of adapting Melanesian legal customs, already undermined by the mili-
tary administration during the war, was completely abandoned. In 1923 the
Queensland criminal code was adopted, although it was not obvious why this
should have been particularly suitable for New Guinea. Queensland was known
especially for the brutality with which it persecuted the Australian Aborigines.
This clumsy sledgehammer approach to instilling European, Anglo-Saxon val-
ues into the criminal justice system is clearly documented in its outcome. At
the end of the first year of the mandate administration, 18 of the 452 indige-
nous prisoners were serving sentences of more than five years, a length of sen-
tence unknown during German times. The longest sentence was thirteen years;
and ten Melanesians were awaiting execution.44 The death sentence continued
to be an important factor in Australian “native policy” in New Guinea until the
outbreak of the Pacific War. According to official figures, about 65 Melanesians
were hanged between May 1921 and January 1942. The memoirs of at least
one district officer, who does not suppress the everyday reality of New Guinea
under the Australian mandate administration, however, suggest that the real
figure was much higher.45
Similarly, everyday colonial life meant the continuation of the rule of terror
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of many district officers. It now became clear that the excesses which had been
perpetrated in many parts of New Guinea between 1914 and 1921 could not be
attributed only to the exceptional circumstances of the war. Rather, the brutal,
arbitrary rule of individual officials was the inevitable consequence of a policy
that provided no concrete guidelines for relations between the colonial admin-
istration and the local population, and left dealings between Europeans and
Melanesians largely at the mercy of the mood and personal attitudes of district
officials who were rarely accountable to their superiors. It was made clear to
independent observers, such as anthropologists, that criticism of the adminis-
tration’s behavior was unwelcome, and in fact would have negative conse-
quences for their own work.46 Nonetheless, many reports exist of offenses
committed by Australian officials against the Melanesian people, and some of
the worst crimes left a deep impression on eyewitnesses. It is striking that,
again and again, such excesses focused on the sexual humiliation of Melane-
sians, both women and men. There are reports from all over the mandate area
about the native police being misused to procure Melanesian women, who
were then sexually abused by Australian officials. In only rare cases were the
officials involved disciplined; often their behavior was excused.47 Women who
resisted were flogged; the same applied to anyone who came to their assis-
tance. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, incidents took place that
seem almost unbelievable. The worst violations of human rights of which we
are informed by local eyewitnesses (of whom a number, including some vic-
tims, are still alive) include the instance of an Australian district officer,
Edward Taylor, urinating in the face of a victim he had humiliated, and the
exhibition of naked men and women who, as “punishment,” were tied to cross-
shaped structures and, with spread legs, subjected to public humiliation in
front of their clan members, who had been ordered to be present.48 The height
of inhumanity was reached in the order, issued by an official, to punish a family
that had not built its allotted quota of road by beating two of its children, a
brother and sister, in a public place, and in the presence of their parents, until
they had sexual intercourse with each other.49
How could such incidents take place in a League of Nations mandate? In
the interwar period, the world’s attention was certainly not fixed on New
Guinea. Moreover, under the terms of the C class mandate, foreign observers
were rarely able to visit the country. The German missionaries who had stayed
in New Guinea had to take an oath of loyalty allowing any statement that could
be construed as criticism of the Commonwealth of Australia to be used as a
reason for immediate expulsion. A legislative council such as had existed before
1914, in which at least the white section of the population could advise on pol-
icy for the colony, and which provided a forum where suggestions could be
made and objections expressed, was not reintroduced until the New Guinea
Act of 1932. Even then, the number of council members who were not officials
was small, and non-Australians were, of course, excluded.50
Why was the Australian colonial administration as bad as it was? One rea-
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son is that it was apparently not subject to any public scrutiny. In the past,
European public opinion had been the best curb on abuses by colonial govern-
ments. The most obvious case was the outcry in the German press and parlia-
ment when the maltreatment of African people, especially in German South
West Africa, had come to light. But the Australian public took little interest in
the new territory in the north. This indifference, which continued for years to
come, is understandable given the completely new challenges and social dis-
ruptions that were the immediate result of the world war and largely ques-
tioned the “Australian way of life.” Yet this ignorance had long-lasting effects
on Australian policy in New Guinea. Nor, as we have seen, was New Guinea of
much importance to the Australian government either, once it had succeeded
in keeping potential rivals out. Thereafter the government’s prime concern was
for the territory to pay its own way and not to distract it from its own main
task—governing Australia itself—and its main concern—Australia’s political
and social future.
Anything that could detract from the image Australia liked to project of
New Guinea as a quiet and peaceful colony which had been acquired to serve
the best interests of the Commonwealth was, from the start, resented and
labeled “anti-Australian” smear propaganda. The Australian government sim-
ply did not want to accept that, in reality, conditions on the scene were not
what they claimed. Australia had won the colony in a kind of moral crusade
against its former colonizer. Thus, criticisms of Australia’s administration were
bound to reflect back on the very justification for Commonwealth colonialism.
A vicious circle ensued. To admit the alleged misconduct of Australian officials,
let alone to investigate it, would have cast doubt on the moral high ground
claimed by Australia. As this was out of the question, the scandalous behavior
of district officers and their inhumane treatment of Melanesians not only went
unchecked but was more or less condoned, and quite possibly even encour-
aged. Keeping Australia’s image abroad unblemished was considered more
important than stopping or reversing increasingly dangerous trends inside its
mandate, because this would have meant acknowledging the existence of some
dark areas. Moreover, any suggestion that Australia, as a newcomer in the colo-
nial field, could learn from the past experiences (and mistakes) of other Euro-
pean colonial powers was angrily rejected as undue interference in Australia’s
national affairs, which placed an insulting question mark over its ability to free
itself from its own colonial past. The German experience in New Guinea was
disregarded primarily for political reasons that had more to do with emotion
than with Realpolitik. But even the example of Britain was considered beyond
the pale. Precisely because Australia was determined to emancipate itself from
its British legacy—all the more so since the war—Britain’s wide knowledge of
colonial affairs was not considered applicable to Australian New Guinea. In this
way, Australia’s national emancipation gave rise to an unreflecting, boastful atti-
tude that was directly responsible for the worst abuses in the mandate it had
been awarded.
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It comes as no surprise, then, that occasional reports by Australian officials
openly criticizing abuses were dismissed as German propaganda or election-
eering by the Labor Party; the officials themselves were accused of being men-
tally unstable, if not mad.51 A report about the mandate administration that the
Australian government had commissioned in order to banish negative rumors
contained a number of critical comments, despite its general whitewash. The
potentially damaging impact of these criticisms was “defused” by the interven-
tion of the British representative of the International Labour Organization
(ILO) in Geneva.52 In the few cases in which members of the Mandate Com-
mission saw through the humbug in the official reports and statistics, Austra-
lians blatantly lied. The result was that Australia acquired a reputation that had
little to do with the reality of everyday colonial life in the mandated territory of
New Guinea.53
Nauru
The case of Nauru revealed the full impotence of the Mandate Commission.
The president of the commission, the Italian Count Alberto Theodoli, could do
nothing but express an empty protest given that, in effect, Britain had passed
on the mandate for Nauru to Australia without the agreement of the League of
Nations.54 The original agreement had specified that the Administrators of the
island would be appointed by the governments of Australia, Britain, and New
Zealand, in turn. In fact, however, this agreement was never implemented.
Instead, Australia appointed all the Administrators of Nauru. This also meant
that Australia assumed sole responsibility for internal policy there. Paragraphs
2 and 3 of a secret supplementary clause to the Nauru Islands Agreement of
1919, negotiated by the three governments in 1921–1922, explicitly stated that
the Executive Administrator was bound to obey the instructions only of the
government which had appointed him, and that, conversely, any regulations he
issued required the agreement of his government to be valid. An attempt by
Churchill, as colonial secretary, to put through a proviso preventing Nauru
from being regarded as Australian territory in any respect fell victim to
Hughes’ determined veto.55
In reality, Nauru was an Australian “mandate,” while Britain and New
Zealand had claims to a share in its commercial exploitation. As in the case of
New Guinea and Samoa, all the Administrators were high-ranking military
officers (Brigadier General Griffiths, Naval Commander Garsia, Lieutenant
Colonel Chalmers) or closely associated with the military (the deputy secretary
for defense, Newman). This had been considered necessary, given “the ten-
dency of the Nauruans to create difficulties with the leasing of land necessary
for the adequate operations of the British Phosphate Commission.”56 When the
Mandate Commission expressed its fears that the Nauruans, and thus the main
principles of the League of Nations mandate, might suffer under the economic
exploitation of the island, the New Zealand delegate, James Allen (formerly
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minister for defense) replied that the three governments would not allow
Nauru to be exploited. Incidentally, he went on, the mandatories were far from
making any profit out of their position. On the contrary, they administered
their territories at a loss to themselves. The Australian delegate, Joseph Cook,
went one step further in insisting that the three phosphate commissioners were
responsible to the Administrator. This was a downright lie, as it had been
agreed that the phosphate commissioners were to be directly responsible to
their governments, and thus independent of the Administrator.57
The Mandate Commission’s timid attempts to make it more difficult to
exploit the Nauruan people had little effect in reality. According to official fig-
ures, phosphate valued at £10,275,632 was exported from Nauru between 1922
and 1941; a sum of £235,993 (2.3 percent) was credited to the Nauruans. This
included not only payments to landowners but also the mandate administra-
tion’s expenditure, which was charged to Nauru as a cost incurred for the bene-
fit of the local population.58
The mandatories used all means at their disposal to break Nauruan resis-
tance to the exploitation of their environment and the destruction of their
fields and gardens. The case of the Aiwo people, whose land was rich in phos-
phate and therefore an early target for acquisition, illustrates the promises,
tricks, and deceit used in the process. Before Nauru was taken over by the
three governments, the Pacific Phosphate Company had already driven the
Aiwo from some of their traditional lands, promising that no more would be
required in future. Under a new name (British Phosphate Commission), and
with the support of the three mandatories, the company now demanded that
the Aiwo give up more land for phosphate mining. The Administrator reported
that the people “were exceedingly sad and wept bitterly, and that they had
absolutely resolved not to leave their houses and land unless forced to do so by
the Government, and if the Government forced them many would die.”59 The
Aiwo soon accepted their fate. Their own chief even consented to the com-
bined actions of the Australian mandate administration and the British Phos-
phate Commission: “To put the matter plainly the land owners are most
strongly opposed to leasing any more land on the flat, where our houses and
our main food supplies are, but the Administrator has explained to us that our
phosphates are helping to maintain the food supplies of the world and assisting
the poorer people by keeping down food prices, we therefore consider it our
duty in this particular instance to help.”60 Pointing the moral finger was an
effective tactic even when applied to non-Europeans.
Late in 1930 almost the entire population of Nauru came together to
oppose a decision by the Administrator, Newman, to appoint a successor to the
late Supreme Chief Daimon. Newman favored a chief whom the phosphate
commissioners had recommended as “invaluable” in the distribution of land to
the British Phosphate Commission.61 On Nauru, chiefs were democratically
elected by the men and women of each tribe. This traditional practice, which
smoothed the way even for women to become chiefs, had been sanctioned by
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the German administration, with the proviso that the chiefs elect among them-
selves a head chief, who was to be the administration’s main point of contact
with the Nauruan people. This procedure was initially adopted unchanged by
the Australian military administration.62 The Administrator’s action thus repre-
sented a clear violation of a traditional principle, which had so far always been
recognized by the Europeans. When the Administrator went on leave, ten of
the fourteen chiefs petitioned against the measure he had introduced. Finally,
on 17 March 1931, 577 men and women of Nauru over sixteen years of age, rep-
resenting 41 percent of the indigenous Nauruans and about 80 percent of the
adult population, called upon the Australian prime minister to remove Adminis-
trator Newman from office and not send him back to Nauru. The chiefs
appended a petition listing the main reasons for their request: Newman had
consulted neither the chiefs nor the people before making his arbitrary deci-
sions; he had high-handedly canceled land titles that the German administration
had recognized and registered; and he neglected education.63 It is a fact that the
Administrator had strongly rejected the idea of providing more than elementary
education for the Nauruans. Giving them access to such education would be
very unwise, he argued, because disturbances would be the inevitable conse-
quence. The Administrator saw the present situation as confirming his fears,
and warned again: “a little learning can become more or less of a danger.”64
Australia saw no reason to change its Administrator on Nauru. After his
return, Newman called together all the chiefs and lectured them like a fire-
and-brimstone preacher:
I feel very sorry for you. . . . You remember the lessons in the Bible . . . you
remember they were in the garden of Eden enjoying themselves; Enjoying all the
wonderful gifts that God had given them and everything was happy and bright until
one day Eve listened to bad advice given by a Serpent and all of us know what hap-
pened then.
Now you Chiefs are in the same position. You live on a beautiful Island—I
doubt whether the garden of Eden could have been more beautiful—You are sur-
rounded by every comfort that you can wish for. You have the three Great Nations
of the World—England, Australia and New Zealand to support you with Australia
in executive control; always ready to promote to the utmost your material and
moral well being and your social progress; And you have a sympathetic Administra-
tion safeguarding your interests and ever watchful over your affairs.65
Soon thereafter, the ever watchful administration dismissed the chiefs Dabe
and Deigareow. Australia’s representative in London was informed that the
whole incident concerning the appointment of a new supreme chief and the
petitions from the Nauruan people would not be mentioned in the next man-
date report, as this would only lead to awkward questions in Geneva.66
Having excluded the international public, the three powers got down to
business in Nauru. Disregarding the ideas and objections of the Nauruan land-
owners, the Europeans mined phosphate for all they were worth. The fact that
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this would irreparably damage the environment, destroy the basis of the peo-
ple’s livelihood in the long term, and, step by step, turn Nauru into a ghostly
lunar landscape, was obviously unimportant to them. Now and again, the Nau-
ruans were permitted to vent their bottled-up frustrations on the Chinese coo-
lies.67 This killed two birds with one stone: the emotions of the local people
were redirected toward a useful scapegoat, and rebellious Chinese phosphate
workers were kept in check. The system of exploiting the country, its people,
and workers brought in from elsewhere functioned extremely well for Austra-
lia, Britain, and New Zealand for almost a decade. From the end of 1930, how-
ever, this system developed more and more cracks. In 1932, of all people, the
head chief imposed by the administration against the wishes of the majority of
the population first expressed in public the demand for self-administration for
all Nauruans. The shocked phosphate commissioners were at last forced to see
that they could not go on as usual forever. Their reaction was to step up phos-
phate extraction even further.68
Japan in Micronesia
At the end of 1921 the administration of Japanese Micronesia passed from the
naval ministry to the Ministry of the Interior; in March 1922 the withdrawal of
troops began. An imperial decree of 30 March 1922 established a separate
South Pacific administration, directly subordinate to the prime minister. The
aims of the Japanese mandate administration were no different from those
which had been pursued since 1915; if anything, they were intensified. The
main objective was to integrate Micronesia into the Japanese empire and to
exploit the islands by, and for the benefit of, Japanese settlers. From 1 June
1922 the mandated area was treated as part of Japan in terms of customs and
tariff policy. This differed from practice both in the German colonies before
the war and in comparable Australian and New Zealand territories after 1921.
Japanese policy was directed toward the complete assimilation of local civiliza-
tions, even at the cost of the destruction of the Micronesian character of the
land and the people. Once the Micronesians had accepted these fundamental
features of Japanese policy, or at least given the impression that they had come
to terms with them, the existing system allowed them a certain amount of room
for maneuver. The extent of this latitude is highly controversial, however. If the
Japanese attempt at colonization can be compared with European colonialist
enterprises at all, it most resembles French attempts to persuade “their” island-
ers to abandon their own culture and totally adopt la civilisation française. But
even this comparison is of only limited validity, because the French were much
less consistent in their efforts than the Japanese. Above all, the French, unlike
the Japanese, never aimed to wipe out the Pacific Islanders as a separate race;
at most, their objectives were limited to making the Pacific peoples give up
their traditional cultures. In addition, it is generally accepted that the French
system gave the assimilated indigenous population much greater opportunities
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to exert influence, and much more freedom of action, than was ever conceiv-
able under Japanese administration.
There is no doubt that health care and education were considered means
of gradually achieving the colonial target. Nevertheless, education and health
care in Micronesia were considerably better under the Japanese colonial
administration than they had been under the German administration. No com-
parison with parallel Australian and New Zealand administrations is possible,
because there was simply nothing comparable in New Guinea or Samoa.69
But even Japanese medical achievements could not alter the fact that the
Studying the new order. Marshallese girls study a Japanese almanac map, c. 1917. (Pho-
tograph by Thomas J. McMahon. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales)
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enormous acceleration of “Western” modernization under the Japanese admin-
istration left losers and victims behind. Like the Germans before them, the
Japanese were forced to recognize that the people of Yap rejected just about
everything that both Europeans and Japanese defined as “progress.” Even the
fact that Yap was least affected by the influx into Micronesia of Japanese and
Okinawans could not hold up, let alone reverse, the extremely rapid decline in
its population, which had already begun under the German colonial adminis-
tration (if not under the Spaniards). Before and after 1914 the local population
was subjected to all sorts of medical treatment, yet the causes of the people’s
distress was clearly apparent. In their collision with a culture which they
regarded as completely alien, the people of Yap did not react with a mixture of
assimilation and cultural symbiosis—the sort of forward defense practised by
most other South Pacific Islanders. Instead they withdrew into an attitude
described as fatalistic by foreigners for whom the domination of nature was the
ultima ratio of human activity, and who regarded as suspicious any behavior
other than active rebellion against developments over which man has only lim-
ited control. Between 1903 and 1911 the indigenous population of Yap fell by
13.5 percent; between 1920 and 1933, by almost 50 percent. In 1933 there
were two hundred deaths annually for every eighty births.70
The European delegates at the meetings of the Mandate Commission in
Geneva, however, were much more interested in concealed evidence of mili-
tary activities possibly undertaken by Japan in its mandated area than in the
decline of the indigenous population of Yap. We know today that, at least until
it left the League of Nations, Japan had no covert military operations and did
not rearm in Micronesia.71 But Japan, too, had reason to present a distorted
picture of its colonial reality to the world. It was less concerned to put forward
untruths about its native policy than to prevent the loss of face that might
threaten when Japanese customs were revealed to a Europeanized world.72
Samoa under the New Zealand Mandate
The undisputed Pacific champions in adapting to European strategies while at
the same time maintaining traditional ways of life were the Samoans. The his-
tory of Samoa under the New Zealand mandate administration is full of desper-
ate attempts by the Samoans to find the correct European key to get rid of
their unwanted New Zealand masters. Their determination in pursuing the
goal of self-rule, even after many setbacks, is astounding. New Zealand had
expected that the announcement of the official mandate over Samoa on 26 May
192173 would bring to an end the period of instability when the lack of clarity in
the situation had spurred the Samoans on to offer resistance. In order to dem-
onstrate New Zealand’s lasting commitment to Samoa, the New Zealand minis-
ter for external affairs, Lee, went to Apia one and a half months later. His
courtesy visit to the Samoan house of assembly (fono) was quickly transformed
by the Samoan faipule assembled there into a demonstration of the indigenous
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political will. The spokesperson for the faipule, Toelupe, reminded the audi-
ence of the first visit by a New Zealand minister for external affairs one year
previously, and of his promise that Samoa would be satisfied under New
Zealand rule. Nothing had changed, Toelupe pointed out, and then read out
another Samoan petition again calling for an end to New Zealand administra-
tion.74 This time, however, the Samoans had gone one step further than in
1919. They asked for the mandate to go directly from New Zealand to Britain;
but in addition to a governor appointed from London, local officials were to
take care of the day-to-day administration. As well as the usual complaints—
such as that New Zealand, unlike Germany, did not consult them—the Samo-
ans, in an appendix to their petition, put forward one of the strongest argu-
ments against the New Zealand mandate in a world dominated by European
concepts and ideas. They argued that New Zealand rule over Samoa was illegal,
because the war had not invalidated the Berlin Treaty of 1889, which had been
agreed to at the time by the Samoan representatives. The point was that, after
1900, Germany had continued to recognize the main terms of the 1889 treaty,
granting its rivals, Great Britain and the United States, privileges, and recog-
nizing the Samoan self-administration. The New Zealand Constitution Order,
the basis for the current administration of Samoa, by contrast, had been pro-
mulgated without taking the terms of the 1889 treaty into account, and without
the consent of the Samoans. It was therefore invalid. This document was
addressed directly to George V.75
A petition to the Prince of Wales, who was known to the Samoans from a
visit in 1920, provides more information about the background to the Samoans’
ideas and wishes:
We are much distressed in mind; we are most anxious for our people and the gen-
erations of Samoa to come; we fear trouble between the representatives of New
Zealand and the Samoans; we wish to avoid trouble and any unfriendly
action. . . . This government ignores us. We pay taxes, but have no voice in the leg-
islation or the expenditure. . . . We do not want our right to govern ourselves
ignored by the New Zealanders. Help us, and show us how to govern wisely and
fairly. . . . Our sons and daughters are educated by the missionaries, and go out to
other lands to teach and to preach the Kingdom of God. Similarly our sons can be
taught to govern our earthly Kingdom in Samoa; only help and teach us to do this.
New Zealanders do not try to help us to govern ourselves, but it seems as if they
want everything for themselves.76
The strategy pursued by the Samoans in 1919 had failed. At that time, they
had appealed indirectly to the Great Powers, in the awareness that they would
be making the official decisions about Samoa’s future in Paris. It was only logi-
cal that the Samoans now appealed directly to the British royal family, because
although the mandate had been given to New Zealand, New Zealand was still
constitutionally dependent on Britain. The criticisms the Samoans advanced
were modeled on the classic European demands for the right to self-determi-
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nation: they paid taxes but had no influence over legislation, and could not
even monitor what happened to their taxes. A special Samoan grievance was
that the New Zealand administration had given up the German practice of
publishing annual reports on Samoan taxes and expenditure on the Samoan
self-administration in the Savali.77 Added to this was the major complaint that
the mandate regulations were being ignored. New Zealand was doing nothing
to promote the aim, central to the mandate concept, of self-rule for the indige-
nous people. Finally, the Samoans pointed to the fact that they had already
attained a “European” level. Not only were they Christianized and literate, but
they were instrumental in passing on these European achievements to other
islands in the Pacific. From as early as the end of the nineteenth century, New
Zealand subimperialism had been matched by an analogous local imperialism
that was Samoan, but European-influenced, in character.
Attempts have been made to discredit these Samoan activities by arguing
that they breathe a European spirit.78 Such reasoning reveals an excessively
Eurocentric worldview, because it assumes that non-Europeans are limited, or
restrict themselves, to traditional behavior, and that they are incapable of, or
resist, accepting European models and applying them to their own situation or
transforming them to fit their own needs. The idea of Samoans operating with
“European” arguments does not fit into the picture seen by those who refused
them political self-determination until 1962. Similarly, it diametrically chal-
lenges a European view, still widespread today, according to which non-Euro-
peans should be satisfied with the role of the traditional victim, and which
insists that they need European support to help them defend themselves
against other Europeans. The fact that as early as 1919 non-Europeans, and
especially those who so perfectly embodied Rousseau’s noble savage, were able
and willing to study European political theories and to make their own selec-
tion, according to their own needs and wishes, from what was offered, chal-
lenges a number of European preconceptions dating from both before and
after the Enlightenment. “We hear it is reported that some white people are
persuading us to be discontented. We wish to assure Your Highness that such a
report is false. We are quite able to discern the errors of the New Zealand gov-
ernment ourselves, and to act of our own free will,” was the Samoan response
to any questioning of their ability to operate using “European” political dic-
tion.79 The Administrator warned that the real aim of the Samoans was self-
administration, even political independence. Although the European settlers
living in Samoa were also dissatisfied with the New Zealand administration,
they would not dream of supporting such Samoan objectives.80
As in 1919, supreme chief Malietoa Tanumafili wanted to frustrate the
faipule’s petition at all costs. With the active support of the Administrator, he
suggested withdrawing the petition and “reconsidering” it for six months. This
time, however, the chiefs were not prepared to allow themselves to be put off
so easily. After a stormy meeting, they insisted on sending the petition as it
stood to the Colonial Office immediately.81 The New Zealand government
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passed the petition on, but as it did so it pressed Britain not to give in to the
Samoans on any point. They were “utterly incompetent” to undertake any
administrative tasks, it suggested, and the idea of self-administration was
absurd. A refusal could be justified in the eyes of the world by pointing out that
the faipule lacked democratic legitimation. And incidentally, the New Zealand
government went on, they must not be allowed to keep appealing directly to
the king, thus ignoring the existence of New Zealand, “which Dominion they
are inclined to place upon an equal status with Samoa.”82
When no reply had been received from Whitehall by the beginning of
October, the New Zealand government got cold feet. On the instructions of the
government, which was openly panicking, the governor-general telegraphed
London, pointing out that the Samoans were determined to achieve indepen-
dence and that a quick reply was absolutely necessary in order definitively to
clarify New Zealand’s position vis-à-vis Samoa.83 Behind this lay a letter from
Toleafoa Afamasaga to the prime minister of New Zealand, expressing mini-
mum demands: New Zealand was to accept local suggestions for changes in the
Samoan constitution, the Samoa Act; the position of the faipule was to be
legally legitimated; Samoan representatives were to sit in the Legislative Coun-
cil; Samoans were to be permitted to be assessors; and the head of the Native
Affairs Department was to be a Samoan.84 The reply that finally arrived from
London stated that neither Britain nor New Zealand was able to change the
mandate they had received from the League of Nations on 17 December
1920.85 The buck had been passed from Wellington to London, and from Lon-
don to Geneva. A later attempt by the Samoans to appeal directly to the
League of Nations was also unsuccessful, even though this time its democratic
character was beyond all doubt.86
The malietoa, as head of the Samoan oligarchy, could have expected to
gain power as a result of greater political autonomy. In European eyes, it
remains a mystery why he of all people repeatedly intervened in favor of New
Zealand.87 As far as the New Zealand administration was concerned, he was
a useful fool who could be exploited to promote its own interests: “He is a
dud—but a very pleasant one—He has no ideas of his own . . . but he is loyal
to the core.”88
But even without the malietoa, the number of those who wanted to get rid
of the New Zealand mandate administration grew. Every renewed breach of
Samoan etiquette increased the size of the group that was dissatisfied with the
status quo. What had started as opposition limited to the small circle of faipule
and a general uneasiness among the majority of the Samoan population turned
into a strictly organized mass movement, the mau, with a clearly defined objec-
tive—political independence.89 New Zealand was forced to experience for itself
a phenomenon that has often been repeated throughout history: once a move-
ment gets off the ground, it cannot be halted by belated concessions. In 1925
New Zealand declared its willingness to grant the Samoan council (fono a
faipule) statutory recognition, but this was no longer enough to satisfy the
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Samoans’ desire for more self-administration. It was the same story, a little
later, with the “concession” of allowing the two supreme chiefs to become
members of the Legislative Council. What would have been welcomed as
progress in 1919 or 1921 was too little five years later, when it inspired songs
ridiculing Malietoa Tanumafili. Samoan demands were always one step ahead
of New Zealand’s concessions. More and more Samoans gathered around
Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III, the leader of the mau movement. The situation
was aggravated even more by the fact that he was a member of a noble family
that had allegedly been favored by the Germans but had been ousted from the
control center of the Samoan oligarchy by the New Zealanders. By 1928, West-
ern Samoa was practically in a state of anarchy, when almost 80 percent of
Samoans, following the instructions of the mau, stopped paying their head-tax
and boycotted the colonial administration at all levels. In a remote corner of
the world, and unobserved by the international press, New Zealand soldiers,
equipped with seaplanes and tracker dogs, combed the swamps of Samoa, look-
ing for the leaders of the mau. Those who were caught were sent to prison in
New Zealand. The absolute nadir in New Zealand–Samoan relations was
reached on 28 December 1929, when, at a peaceful demonstration, Tupua
Tamasese Lealofi III and eight of his closest supporters died in a hail of bullets
fired by the New Zealand military police. Lealofi’s dying words implored the
Samoans not to give up the strategy of passive resistance.90
INDIGENOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF COLONIAL RULE AND
THE BEWILDERMENT OF EUROPEAN HISTORIOGRAPHY
Given what happened after 1918, it is not surprising that the German past
seemed increasingly rosy in Samoan eyes. In fact, the period after the outbreak
of the First World War was at least as important as the time before 1914 in
shaping the image of the Germans in those Pacific societies which had once
been under German colonial rule. Twenty years after the German period had
come to an end, Samoans already looked back to it as a golden age. Microne-
sians and Melanesians still have similar associations and use similar expres-
sions. When people in the part of New Guinea that had been German speak of
the “gut taim bipo” (the “good old times”), they mean, not the period of tradi-
tional tribal warfare, but the time after pacification by Germany as a colonial
power.91 After 1914, when relations with the new colonial power grew increas-
ingly acrimonious, a new image of the Germans emerged that could not have
existed before, because there were no real grounds for comparison. Added to
this was a tendency, which can be observed in almost all human societies and
cultures, to idealize the past at the expense of the present. But it would be his-
torically incorrect to dismiss this retrospective, mostly positive, perception of
the Germans in the Pacific as pure nostalgia.92 Two points demand attention.
First, these assessments were based on real historical experience. How-
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ever, compared with what came before, and especially after it, German colonial
rule lost its rough edges, and negative experiences, especially inconsistencies,
dissolved in the perceptions of the people. What remained was a purified core
of memories consisting predominantly of positive elements. Second, it cannot
be stressed enough that European assessments and judgments of European
behavior do not necessarily coincide with Melanesian, Micronesian, or Polyne-
sian views and interpretations. Against a completely different historical back-
ground, yardsticks for measuring colonial activity may also be completely
different. Views of “good” and “bad,” “right” and “wrong,” and the attributions
of blame derived from them, can vary enormously.
The statement that all colonial rule was essentially the same is profoundly
Eurocentric and is not true to the experiences of colonized peoples. Any such
categorical imperative put forward by European historians of imperialism also
raises the objection that, in attempting to smooth out differences, one must
consciously accept the fact that generalizations become trivializations, which
relativize, play down, and ameliorate the real character of different colonial
regimes. If evil is undifferentiated, then everyday experience loses its force, and
negative experiences become less real, finally disappearing in a generalized and
distant fog. Only a detailed examination of similarities and differences makes it
possible to arrive at the sort of historical assessment that is necessary if history is
not to be misused simply to confirm preconceived opinions and theories.
Samoan Perceptions
There can be no doubt that the representatives of Wilhelmine Germany and
oligarchically structured Samoa shared a number of basic values, which were
reversed under New Zealand rule. Both societies placed a high value on cere-
monial, ritual forms of salutation and behavior and the exchange of polite
addresses, and this facilitated mutual understanding between two cultures that
were otherwise extremely different. By contrast, the Samoans perceived the
“democratically” undifferentiated behavior of New Zealanders as an insult and
open expression of disregard for Samoan mores.93 It is curious that the colonial
representatives of a semiauthoritarian state were more prepared to give the
colonized population a certain amount of space than were the emissaries of a
democracy, who thought that they could regain lost authority by behaving in an
authoritarian and militaristic way. The small, but important, difference
between authority and authoritarian behavior plays a significant role in the
analysis of indigenous behavior toward European rule. In all of the Pacific soci-
eties that Germany colonized, steadfastness, persistence, and willpower were
recognized and valued highly, not only among their own people, but equally in
the behavior of the other, the enemy—that is, the colonial rulers. In Samoa,
this quality was called mamalu. Europeans have found it totally incomprehensi-
ble that even those who suffered under it admired the power and the success of
the stranger.
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The automatic disappearance of hitherto accepted boundary posts during
the occupation of Samoa seemed, at first, to open the door to greater auton-
omy. But even short-term satisfaction about the “New Zealand chance” did not
change much the Samoan respect for the behavior of the German administra-
tion.94 The greater the pressure on the Germans in Samoa, the more sympathy
the Samoans had for them. The influenza epidemic conferred on the German
system a semisacrosanct character; the German public health system became a
symbol of European efficiency and professionalism as such. The Samoan view
of the Germans as irreproachable scholars and scientists who went about their
work without offending the local people became almost an obsession. As a rule,
Samoans sought medical treatment in American Pago Pago, but if this was not
possible, they would, under certain circumstances, go miles farther to be
treated by one of the few German priests, just to avoid New Zealand doctors
and hospitals.95
Samoan contempt for the British-New Zealand system of justice, which
took no account of Samoan traditions—“if that is justice what is injustice?”
complained the mau newspaper96—was matched by a growing esteem for the
former German system. “Samoa owes Germany nothing except gratitude for
the fourteen years during which Germany controlled Western Samoa,” wrote a
Samoan who was deeply disappointed by developments after 1914, at a time
when hardly anyone in Germany still remembered Samoa.97 Samoans kept in
touch with Germans whom they had known in Samoa, and a close affinity
existed long after the Germans left there. The wife of the last governor, Erich
Schultz, received gifts of dollar notes from Samoa on the first birthday of her
child, born in Germany, with the message that the Samoans were aware that
times were hard in Germany and that dollars were worth a great deal. After the
Second World War, former Samoa-Germans still received CARE packages
from Apia, to help them over the worst. And it has long been known that Solf,
who had laid the foundations for the special relationship between Germans and
Samoans, received telegrams in his new post in Japan, congratulating him on
his rescue after the great earthquake of 1923 and expressing the wish of the
“Samoan people” that he would return to Samoa as governor.98
Since the influenza epidemic, the Samoans’ negative experiences under
the regime that succeeded the Germans were certainly the strongest influence
in shaping their perceptions of the previous German colonial administration.
This should not, however, obscure the fact that, even before 1914, a relation-
ship had been achieved in which the Samoans not only respected the German
administration but also trusted it in a way that went far beyond the usual rever-
ence expressed by colonial subjects for their colonial masters. This was possible
because in Samoa, unlike in Africa, Germany did not put its superior power
permanently on display. In certain areas it recognized Samoan prerogatives and
priorities, and placed them out of bounds for Europeans. This delicate balance
between reciprocal rights and responsibilities worked strikingly well until 1914.
But even this deliberate and ingenious cooperation between German officials
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and the Samoan oligarchy could withstand shocks only so long as those who
were responsible for the system enjoyed the support of their respective group.
Before the outbreak of the European war, the number of those who saw the
prevailing situation as restricting their own aims and interests had grown on
both the Samoan and the German sides. As so often happens in history, the sta-
tus quo could not be preserved forever. Paradoxically, the sudden end New
Zealand’s military intervention put to the German colonial regime prevented
the likely collapse of the system from its own inertia, thus ensuring that the
Samoans would see the German past in a positive light.
The View from Micronesia
Something similar applies to the other German territories in the South Pacific.
For instance, it is not at all certain whether the German colonial administration
in Nauru would have been able to continue steering a narrow course between
maintaining indigenous land ownership, honoring the Reich’s guarantee to give
compensation for damaged land, and allowing the Europeans to exploit the
phosphate commercially. Today, however, ecologically ruined Nauru blames
the former mandatory powers: Britain, Australia, and New Zealand are accused
of having exploited all the rights and privileges of the former German conces-
sions without having observed the duties and protective measures prescribed
by the German colonial administration.99 It is indeed possible that their “Ger-
man” past may have protected the Nauruans from the worst. Whereas the
Banaban people were, in the end, taken away from their home and relocated
on a small island in the Fiji archipelago in order to allow phosphate mining to
proceed undisturbed over the whole of Ocean Island, the special law that theo-
retically applied to Nauru at least made it impossible to displace the local
people.
Today it is said in Micronesia that the Germans were easier to get along
with than the Japanese, who were more overpowering. As in Samoa and Nauru,
it is the sharp break in experience before and after 1914 which distinguishes
the German from the Japanese administration. It is interesting to observe that
many Micronesians are much less critical of the Japanese than are Europeans
and Americans. Similarly, the biting criticisms of the mandate administration
that one finds in Samoa are not heard in Micronesia—at least, not in western
and northern Micronesia. In the mid-1980s it was impossible to deny the feel-
ing that Tokyo’s policy of Japanization had been highly successful. Many Micro-
nesians of the generation born between 1920 and 1935 subscribed to and reg-
ularly read Japanese newspapers and magazines and spoke Japanese among
themselves. Older people who had experienced German rule, looking back,
associate the beginning of “modernization”—which they by no means regard as
a positive development—with the arrival of the Japanese. Under the Germans
little had changed in the traditional way of life; Western clothes were rarely
worn. But under Japanese influence traditional life-styles were rapidly given
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up. The German period is presented as calm. In retrospect, it is seen as a time
when Micronesians accepted the minor interventions of the administration all
the more readily because they were, on the whole, left in peace. German offi-
cials were described as good-natured, affable, not arrogant, and reliable.
Unlike the Japanese, they had mercilessly punished any cheating by traders,
such as manipulation of copra scales. The small German presence helped to
moderate the potential consequences of culture contact and colonial rule, and
made the situation less threatening for the Micronesians. The coexistence
between Micronesian life-styles and German demands and ideas—now seen as
positive—contrasts with the following Japanese period. Because of the large
numbers of officials and Asian settlers, Japanese customs permeated almost all
areas of life, like an octopus with tentacles reaching into every corner and suf-
focating indigenous alternatives from the start. What were previously per-
ceived as coherent Micronesian groups and associations dissolved; the “single”
Micronesian world broke apart; Micronesian society fragmented. Alcohol
abuse became common, and it was possible for Micronesians to possess fire-
arms. Intra-Micronesian disputes not only increased in number, but escalated,
assuming new and hitherto unprecedented dimensions. This is the view of the
traditional, older generation, a group that is rapidly dying out.100
There is evidence that, at the beginning of Japanese rule, many Microne-
sians were unhappy about the increasing pressure from outside and looked for
ways of influencing—or even getting rid of—the Japanese via the Europeans.
The last Europeans in Micronesia unanimously report that the intimidated
indigenous population was desperately seeking a way out of the dilemma.101
Japanese administrative officials did not acquire the reputation of being impar-
tial “referees” the Germans had enjoyed, because, as Micronesians saw it, in
cases of conflict between settlers and locals the Japanese always decided in
favor of the settlers. Even making a complaint was a difficult undertaking for
the indigenous people.102 Relatively few non-Japanese visitors entered the Jap-
anese-mandated territory during the 1920s and 1930s, and those who did come
were under constant Japanese surveillance. Their reports suggest that the Japa-
nese policy of education and assimilation was beginning to work, at least among
the younger people.103 Nonetheless, a British secret agent, who in 1926 suc-
ceeded in traveling through Micronesia for the War Office in order to recon-
noiter Japanese military installations, was asked by Micronesians on three
occasions in three different places, when he managed to slip away from his Jap-
anese escort, whether the islands would soon be given back to the Germans.104
While the Samoans accused the successor regime of having restricted their
autonomy, some Micronesians longed for a return of the conditions under
which, though they could not prevent foreign rule, it had at least impinged rel-
atively little on the usual rhythm of life.
German “influence” in Micronesia lasted longest in the Mariana Islands.
The leaders of the Chamorro and Caroline Island people at the beginning of
the 1950s had all attended the German primary school. The German language
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was still relatively widespread and was used by a number of American officials
when dealing with the local people, because it retained the prestigious ring “of
somewhat authoritarian efficiency which the islanders are fond of ascribing to
the Germans.” The handwritten “German” alphabet lasted even longer than the
German language, because the Caroline Islanders used it almost exclusively for
their own correspondence.105 A possible reason for this is that the people of the
Caroline Islands, who, since the beginning of European contact, had been con-
sidered “conservative” compared with the Chamorros, wanted to exclude Japa-
nese influence and control at least from their personal communications.
The Melanesian Outlook
The main feature of the Australian mandate administration in New Guinea
continued to be arbitrary rule. The lack of policies, guidelines, and administra-
tive controls meant that relations between Melanesians and Europeans were
determined almost exclusively by the personal attitudes of the district officers
and patrol officers on the scene. Thus, in some areas all floggings were strictly
punished, whereas, in the majority of cases, corporal punishment was not only
tolerated, but was administered with increased severity in comparison with
what had been permitted under the Germans. There were similar discrepan-
cies in the treatment of “free” Melanesians. It is probably historically correct to
state that a number of Australian officials were the first to see Melanesians pri-
marily as human beings with equal rights. This went much further than the
common attitude of German officials before 1914, who might have been pre-
pared to protect the Melanesians but nevertheless regarded them essentially as
colonial subjects, and thus inferior. But it must be pointed out at the same
time, and with equal certainty, that clashes between Australians and Melane-
sians displayed a degree of brutality and contempt that would have been incon-
ceivable during the German period. In fact, it was probably unique in the
Pacific, if we exclude the treatment of the Australian Aborigines. The Austra-
lian mandate administration’s native policy constantly oscillated between two
extremes, but before 1942 it cannot be said that the balance tipped in a more
positive direction as time passed.106
The local people were completely unsettled by the fact that policies
changed with every new official, by the Australian mandate administration’s
open disregard for Melanesian ideas of law, and, finally, by the seemingly abso-
lutely arbitrary exercise of criminal justice,107 in which the German system had
been abandoned. For Melanesians, Australians were not as predictable as the
Germans had been. Predictability in the behavior of strangers is a crucial—if
not the most important—factor in any cultural contact. Australian behavior was
categorized, and the expressions Melanesians used to describe it speak vol-
umes. “Olsem pikinini bilong King—giaman” (that is what the children of the
king [of Britain] are—liars). Or the Australians were simply described as “long-
long”, which in Tok Pisin expresses something close to “arbitrary.”108
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These experiences of unpredictability in Australian behavior, and of Aus-
tralian arbitrariness, not only fundamentally influenced the image of Austra-
lians in Melanesian eyes, but also encouraged Melanesians to look back at the
German regime and retrospectively assess it. The first to speak out were the
intellectual élite, those who could read and write. They passed their anger and
frustration on to their former teachers whom they now accused of having let
them down. “Why do the Germans make no move to free us? Have they forgot-
ten us? Do they not care about us at all? What do they say when you tell them
about us? Write to us about it! Our [German] officials should come back
again! . . . Our calmness is just a front, in our hearts we have sorrow and grief.
Day by day we are waiting for news to arrive that the Germans are coming
back, but always in vain. You will never hear that we are happy with the
English. Take note of what our heart says: a man had a wife. Another man stole
her and she had to stay with him. But her heart was with her first, legal hus-
band, and stayed there. Send our opinion to the paper, so that the English and
the Germans read it and comment on it!”
This and similar statements109 were connected with a growing desire to
grasp what had actually happened during the war and with an equally sharp-
ened power of observation directed toward what the new masters were doing:
“write and tell us how everything is, what the war was really about, and whether
the Germans are coming back, or whether the English are going to stay here?
We know nothing for certain, and are grieving for you. Hide nothing from us,
but write us the truth, so that we can comfort ourselves and take hope. Just
think, in two months’ time all the Germans who are still here are to leave the
country—some have already left on the Molusia. You know that at Raluana
there were canons that were later taken away. Now they have been set up again
in Matupit. If you know why, write and tell us!”110
No doubt the German missionaries who received such messages from their
former students felt flattered. But they did nothing to pass on these complaints
and certainly took no action. Rather they were afraid that if such local opinion
became public it would jeopardize their already much endangered position.111
Largely left to themselves, the local people tried using various strategies to deal
with the arbitrariness of Australian rule or even manipulate it to their own
advantage. “Volunteering” to accompany the colonial administration’s punitive
expeditions as police-soldiers in order to get the chance to execute paybacks
under the guise of official business, a tactic known since before 1914, contin-
ued.112 The tultul used his monopoly of the position of interpreter to demand
tribute from his fellow villagers who had been charged by the administration. If
they refused, he simply translated their statements incorrectly, thus producing
a conviction. Everything we know suggests that this was the beginning of cor-
ruption in New Guinea. The colonial administration did not notice this devel-
opment—the first crack in hitherto seemingly closed village social
communities, giving way to individualization.113
The Anglo-Australian justice system, making no concession to traditional
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notions, was totally incomprehensible to Melanesians. They tried to come to
grips with it in the same way in which they had hitherto approached the super-
natural. Since time immemorial Melanesians had believed that they could
influence the uncontrollable by means of magic if they had the right charms or
spells. Now an old Melanesian made it his special business to develop a recipe,
based on betel nuts, for guaranteeing success in Australian trials. The fact that
the old man lived on the hill of Namanula, not far from the governor’s resi-
dence, suggested to Melanesians that his charms would be especially potent.114
Until after the turn of the century, violent clashes between Melanesians
and European traders, planters, and missionaries were not unusual. Under the
Australians, local resistance was directed against officials. A number were
attacked and injured or killed. The extent of the hatred that had been stored
up, at least among certain segments of the population, became apparent at the
beginning of the Pacific War. Unlike the Germans in 1914, the Australians dis-
armed the Melanesian police because they feared they might make common
cause with the Japanese. In the Sepik, where this was no longer possible, local
police detachments joined forces and hunted down as many Europeans as they
could. Two officials were killed. There are many indications that large numbers
of Melanesians saw the arrival of the Japanese as a positive step, which could
be described as a “liberation,” if this word did not have other connotations.115
Just as in Samoa and Micronesia the image of the German administration
and of its officials developed as fundamentally different and generally more
favorable only in retrospect and in direct comparison with the next regime, so
in New Guinea perceptions of the German colonial administration were cru-
cially shaped by contrast with the Australians and the measures they intro-
duced. To start with, judgment was passed on individuals. In people’s
memories, Albert Hahl grew into an almost superhuman father figure. Even in
the 1960s, the Tolais still regarded him as “pren tru bilong mipela,” which cor-
responds pretty exactly to the European notion of “a devoted friend,” or “our
real friend.” An anthropologist working among the Tolai at this time, collecting
local interpretations of the past, was asked how Hahl’s family was.116 In a cul-
ture where almost everything is built on personal relations, not on institutions,
and in which even objects are often given proper names, the German gover-
nor’s successors lost their identity and became simply “Doctor Hahl Inglis”117—
Melanesians could hardly have expressed the distance separating them from
the Australian governor more clearly.
Evidence of a special emotional relationship between Melanesians and
German officials is not limited to Hahl. Early in the 1980s, the last surviving
Melanesians who had experienced German colonial rule in Madang insisted
that they had had extraordinarily good personal relationships with many Ger-
mans. Given the well-known German reactions to the alleged “revolts” of 1904
and 1912, Europeans, who tend to generalize and whose generalized views
leave little space for personal relationships, find it difficult to understand such
statements. In any case, this indigenous view places a large question mark over
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Eurocentric, dogmatic judgments.118 When the Kai people on the Rai coast
south of Madang heard of the death of the German Bezirksamtmann
Berghausen after the war, they struck up the traditional dirge.119 Years later,
one of his Australian successors was almost hacked to death on the Rai coast.
Unusually, this attack was initiated and carried out by women,120 which strongly
suggests that Albert Nurton, too, had abused his position to violate Melanesian
women. Another German whose memory has been kept alive in New Guinea
to the present day is Franz Boluminski, former Bezirksamtmann of Kaewieng.
During the 1920s his grave became a shrine for the people, who hoped for a
magical transfer of powers through contact with his memorial cross. The
Melanesians of his region regarded him as “good, fierce, just, inexorable.”121
These views of Boluminski take us to the heart of the Melanesian assess-
Boluminski’s grave. Kavieng, 1950. (Photograph by W. Brindle. Australian Archives 
Canberra)
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ment of German colonial policy. It is hardly conceivable that a European, at
least of the postwar generation, could connect the qualities “inexorable” and
“just.” For a European, the first adjective has negative connotations; the other
is unequivocally positive. The Melanesians, however, saw no contradiction
between the two, but almost certainly regarded them as complementary.
Everything we know suggests that the local people saw the authoritarian behav-
ior of their German Bezirksamtmann as a positive attribute.122 On the other
hand, it is quite possible that the administrative methods used by the East
Prussian official would today be presented to the world by Amnesty Interna-
tional as an example of inhumane colonialist practice. The problem of judging
Boluminski is supplemented by contemporary Melanesian assessments of the
German colonial regime as a whole. Here the description “strict but fair” or
“strict but just,” which we have often quoted, had established itself.123 A west-
ern European historian of the end of the twentieth century could perhaps
accept the attribution “just” if it had originated in Samoa or Micronesia. But
this is not the case, for in Samoa this word is hardly used, and though it appears
in certain regions of Micronesia, it is by no means as universal as in the former
German area of Melanesia. There, however, such judgments are difficult to
accept. How can the German colonial system, in which corporal punishment
and flogging were the basic means of discipline—and Boluminski was very
much in favor of them—be perceived as “just”?
Attempts have been made to explain that German administrative methods
closely resembled traditional methods of control practised in Melanesian vil-
lage society.124 The argument is that the procedures used by the Germans in
dealing with Melanesian cultures (the imposition of the Pax Germanica, if nec-
essary by force, the taking of hostages, punishing the whole community or clan
if the real culprit could not be found or evaded punishment) and with individu-
als (corporal punishment) matched the Melanesians’ horizon of experience
within their own culture. They were familiar—a crucial factor in encounters
with the alien. This does not justify such measures, but it explains why they
were widely accepted without much resistance. The only uprising against Ger-
man rule in the Pacific broke out after the application of corporal punishment
by a German official, which would seem to contradict this theory. But it hap-
pened in Micronesia, where the German administration had not used corporal
punishment before, and it is striking that the one local source we possess does
not seem to rate the whipping as particularly significant in the outbreak of
unrest, because it does not even mention it. The European editors of the indig-
enous chronicle found this so remarkable that they appended their own
account of this event.125
When analyzing reports or stories by Melanesian plantation laborers, espe-
cially those working in Samoa, who experienced discriminatory treatment first
hand in that they were beaten whereas Samoans were not, it is noticeable that
corporal punishment is often made light of and hardly features in their reminis-
cences. The positive experiences mentioned are: good and regular food; cheap
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goods; the easy availability of new goods that could be taken home after the
expiry of contracts, thus allowing them to pay bride prices and conferring a
higher status in the numerous traditional ceremonies of exchange; and, finally,
exposure to new ways of behaving in daily contact with the many “others” (that
is, Melanesians from other tribes and Europeans). As negative experiences
they listed frequent and sometimes bloody clashes with Melanesians from
other clans, attempts to harm each other as much as possible, and the monot-
ony and boredom of life on the plantations. Corporal punishment is described
as “harsh,” but here, too, considered “fair.” Others do not mention it at all, or
not until they are explicitly asked.126 This may be an example of psychological
repression of unpleasant experiences, but this is not a sufficient explanation,
especially as other colonial excesses by Europeans, such as Australian brutality
in New Guinea, are still so very much alive in people’s memories. Nor were the
Melanesian workers in Samoa pleased when the New Zealanders arrived there.
On the contrary, on Christmas Day 1914, black workers hoisted the German
flag at their quarters as a protest against what they saw as the failure of the New
Zealanders to observe the conditions laid down in German contracts. 127
By 1914, the Germans had the recruiters under control, and the Melane-
sians knew exactly what to expect on the plantations. This is how a Samoan his-
torian explains the largely positive memories of the black plantation workers.128
It seems to me that expectations and their fulfillment—or lack of it—are a key
that can help late-twentieth-century Europeans understand Pacific interpreta-
tions of the German and subsequent colonial regimes. The Pacific categoriza-
tion of “just” has little to do with European notions of justice. The behavior of
the Germans was more predictable than that of the Australians because it was
more consistent. The probable reaction of Germans to local actions could be
foreseen, and thus they were more susceptible to manipulation, or attempted
manipulation, by the local people. Germans supplemented, but did not alter,
the Melanesian view of the world. Their appearance on the scene could be
explained as a new corollary to a familiar and established system. Coming to
terms with German actions and reactions required adjustment but no funda-
mental change. The existence of the Germans and the methods and measures
they used did not fundamentally place the indigenous view of things in ques-
tion. In retrospect, this clearly distinguished Germans from Australians, whose
actions and patterns of behavior appeared erratic, lacking a firm basis, less pre-
dictable, and altogether more puzzling. Melanesians were not sure how to
behave toward Australians who, at least until 1942, remained a mystery to most
of them.
As far as we are aware at present, the universal ethical value system that
Asians and Europeans had developed throughout the course of their histories
did not exist in any of the precolonial Melanesian societies. The familiar, the
known, the related, the personal and close, were antitheses of the alien, the
unknown, the dangerous, the life-threatening, and could thus become a substi-
tute for the “good,” or even the “just.” With the Germans, the Melanesians
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knew where they stood and could adapt accordingly. Strict discipline, including
corporal punishment, was as much an integral part of Pacific cultures as was
acceptance of, and respect for, authority and determination—what today would
be called leadership qualities.129 In February 1964 the first parliamentary elec-
tions were held in New Guinea, and the Tolai Bikman, To Petet Tokaul,
informed the candidates that his people would support them if they advocated
the reintroduction of “German” methods.130
The behavior of the few German colonial officials in situ uniquely shaped
Germany’s policies in the Pacific. Halfway across the world from home, which
meant that communication with their official superiors took weeks, they found
personal satisfaction in maintaining close personal contacts with the colonial
population under them, and their work provided them with a substitute satis-
faction they had never known before. “In relating to the indigenous people,
personal qualities are all-important,” Hahl had recognized correctly; and he
had recommended personal continuity as the crucial factor in creating trust
and establishing peaceful relations.131 But the South Pacific was not a spring-
board for ambitious careerists, of whom more was expected and who had to
provide quick results, and it was certainly not an arena in which fame could be
gathered or reputations made. In most cases, attempts to do this amounted to
creating a sensation, and they were partly responsible for the worst conse-
quences of colonialism in Africa.
Germany’s Pacific colonies were a quiet backwater of Wilhelmine Ger-
many that could develop in its own way so long as the Reich’s interest remained
minimal, and the most important positions were filled by confident officials
who were able to make decisions relatively freely.132 More than elsewhere, the
decisions made by German officials adapted local conditions rather than
changed them. In my opinion, the economic aspects of German colonialism, at
least in the South Pacific, have been overemphasized at the cost of the psycho-
logical factor. It is too easy simply to assume that every decision made by the
colonial administration was dictated by economic interests. This was clearly not
true. On several occasions Governor Hahl successfully undermined the efforts
of economic interest groups who had gained the ear of the German Colonial
Office, and who wanted to confiscate phosphate-bearing land belonging to the
Marshall Islanders because they thought that the local demands for compensa-
tion were too high.133 Anyone who claims that everyday colonial reality was
shaped, not by the people on the site, but by a system of whatever sort in which
people were merely bloodless actors,134 has not grasped the dimensions of past
structures and processes.
The potential susceptibility of this noninstitutionalized condition should
not be underemphasized. Extreme dependence on the personal qualities of the
officials could easily have upset the balanced imbalance between Germans and
Pacific Islanders. A few German officials of the sort who went to Africa could
very quickly have brought down the whole delicate structure of relations
between the colonial administration and the indigenous people. Boeder in
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Ponape shows clearly how catastrophic the “master race” mentality could have
been in the Pacific.135
Conclusions
As we have seen, the former “German” South Pacific experienced a number of
colonial systems based on different attitudes toward the indigenous population.
This investigation of developments between 1914 and 1921–1922 has not only
revealed clear regional differences among the policies of the various colonial
powers but has also shown the necessity for a reassessment of Germany’s pio-
neering role. Falling between the extremes of forced assimilation to the extent
of ethnic self-denial (Japanese Micronesia) and a general prohibition on the
adoption of European life-styles (Australian New Guinea), the original German
colonial administration appears to have been surprisingly liberal. On the one
hand, it allowed the local people to conserve or adapt traditional life-styles; on
the other, it also gave them the chance to participate in the possibilities of
European-German ideas of progress rather than blocking their access to mod-
ernization altogether. Pressure to do or not to do anything was much weaker
under the German colonial administration than it was under the Japanese or
Australians, and local societies had greater latitude in which to make their own
decisions. The First World War and the handing over of the colonial adminis-
trations to Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were by no means nominal
changes in the history of New Guinea, Micronesia, and Samoa, respectively. As
we have shown, it was clear early on that, deliberately or not, colonial policy
underwent basic changes that were perceived by the indigenous peoples as a
fundamental break in their relations with Europeans. The fact that there were
also continuities is so self-evident that it does not need special emphasis. In the
eyes of Melanesians, Micronesians, and Samoans, the new, the different, and
the alien were the crucial factors. Finding out that foreign overlords were not
all the same, and that their behavior and the order they imposed could be dif-
ferentiated from each other, was a completely new experience for many Pacific
Islanders. For many it was a shock.
The First World War and its consequences represented a turning point in
the history of New Guinea, the Micronesian Islands, and Western Samoa. In
Micronesia the Japanese administration was largely responsible for the fact that
a modern and potentially universal society broke over the population like a
spring flood. As enough niches for traditional behavior remained within the
Japanese system, however, the indigenous people on the whole came to terms
with this event, as they did with natural phenomena such as typhoons. In New
Guinea it was the deliberate policy of the Australian mandate administration to
prevent the indigenous people from having access to the modern world, and to
this end it denied them the material means of learning to handle it. But as the
Australian colonial administration, unlike the German administration, was not
prepared to alleviate even the worst direct and indirect effects of the impact of
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introduced modern technologies and ideas, a specifically Australian system of
colonial apartheid developed. On the one side was the world of the Europeans,
who had growing access to the latest modern conveniences and were increas-
ingly prepared to use them in their everyday lives. On the other side were the
indigenous people, mere observers, who were denied the practical advantages
of progress. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the idea that
Europeans were trying to frustrate Melanesian attempts to participate in West-
ern “progress” and its products took root. It also provoked a Melanesian
response dominated by a belief centering around the acquisition of these
goods. Until the outbreak of the Second World War, a new turning point, the
attitude of the Australian administration made it difficult for the Melanesian
people under its control gradually to grow into a modern, Western, universal
society. Indeed, it delayed this development. Compared with other colonial
administrations in the Pacific, Australian rule in New Guinea had possibly the
most serious consequences. It is difficult to judge how many of Papua New
Guinea’s present-day problems can be attributed more or less directly to this
historical legacy. In my opinion, however, there is unquestionably a link.
Of all the European colonial systems in the Pacific, the Australian was also
probably the most inhumane. Admittedly, it perpetrated none of the sorts of
atrocities that took place in Africa, or under National Socialist or Communist
regimes. But given a changed world and a changing Zeitgeist, it is more than
disconcerting to discover what brutalities were possible during peacetime in
the backwaters of world politics. Australian politicians undoubtedly had little
experience in developing and implementing a colonial policy. Their extreme
nationalism and chauvinism, which elevated racism into a doctrine for political
survival, certainly did not make it easier for Australians to deal with an unfamil-
iar people. Added to this was an exaggerated opinion of themselves that had
originated in wartime propaganda, but then took its own course, and subse-
quently had long-lasting repercussions. It blinded the Australians to their own
mistakes, because they saw any criticism of their behavior as automatically cast-
ing doubt on their wartime propaganda, and thus on their own political posi-
tion. To the present day, historical myths whose roots lie in wartime propagan-
da have hardly been faced up to. Nor have they been discarded by Australian
historiography, thus demonstrating the longevity of such ideas.
Something similar can be said of New Zealand’s policy in Samoa. This case
clearly demonstrates that any historical attempt to interpret colonial reality
exclusively on the basis of the colonialists’ racist attitudes reflected in the docu-
ments will not capture this reality. Indeed, it will distort it, because the ques-
tion of what consequences it had for the colonized people is more relevant than
the search for the roots of European racism. There may be worlds—positive or
negative—between (colonial) claims and (colonial) reality. It is obvious that lib-
eral theories and slogans do not, by a long way, constitute a liberal society until
they are implemented. By the same token, it is possible for a colonial society
that is theoretically built on racist roots to be much more liberal in practice
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than a society based on theoretically liberal policies.136 Thus New Zealand’s pol-
icies in Samoa may appear theoretically more liberal than those of its German
predecessor, but in practice they proved to be more authoritarian. What counts
in history are not the theories drawn up by politicians or developed by histori-
ans. Much more important is the translation of ideas into reality—including all
the inconsistencies, chance events, side effects, foreign influences, and pecu-
liarities that comprise everyday, historical reality. How was this past reality
experienced and how was it perceived? These alone are fitting subjects for his-
torical analysis and evaluation. Anything else is mere paper history.
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Notes
PREFACE
1 One of the most recent general histories of the Pacific Islands calls it an epidemic
of “measles,” Scarr 1990, 263 and 266. For Europeans, it seems, “measles” at least
sounds serious, whereas “flu” obviously does not. By far the best account of the epi-
demic is not by a historian but a journalist. But Field’s treatment of sources is so
careful and thorough that his criticism of New Zealand historians for having paid
“scandalously little attention” to what has happened in Samoa since 1914 is well
justified (Field 1984, xvi).
2 Firth 1986, xiv. “It was the old colonial order under new management” (ibid., 2).
3 Boyd 1969, 122, 128, 133, and 140.
4 Salisbury 1970, 40.
5 Griffin, Nelson, and Firth 1979, 54.
6 One characteristic example is the claim that the influence of the companies was
always stronger than that of the administration, and that the German governor of
New Guinea, Hahl, had to leave because of the pressure of the large companies in
the colony (Firth 1989, 201–202, 1986, 5; and the official war history, Mackenzie
1927, 224). Needless to say, the official war history was heavily censored despite
the fact that the occupation of the territory involved no real military secrets. Also
very revealing are the more general comments on the overall effects of Australian
occupation (Mackenzie 1927, 233; and Griffin, Nelson, and Firth 1979, 44). See
also May 1989, 121, who rightly points out that in the late 1950s Rowley had
already discovered there were significant differences in the way Germans and Aus-
tralians applied methods that, superficially, seemed to be identical (see Rowley
1958, 192; also 11, 27). It seems that the results of historical research done as early
as 1958 were somehow lost by later historians.
7 Registered (sic!) letter from three Tongan Members of Parliament, Nukualofa, 10
November 1919, to the governor of American Samoa, NARA, RG 80, File 3931,
Box 33.
8 Gann 1984, 519. See also Griffin, Nelson, and Firth 1979, 8: “Britain was dif-
ferent.”
9 Thus the Australian geographer Price 1972, 208; for similar comments, ibid., vi
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(“enlightened and generous colonialism”), and 219 (“What the Australians brought
in was good”). Price 1963, 135: “there are few tropical colonies with so clear a
record of humane endeavour.”
10 Boyd 1987.
INTRODUCTION: THE GERMAN LEGACY
1 On the Neuguinea-Kompanie debacle, see Firth 1971–1973. On the acquisition of
Micronesia, Brown 1977 and Hardach 1988. For German rule in the Marianas, see
Hardach 1990b; in Ponape, Ehrlich 1978a; in the Caroline Islands, Christmann,
Hempenstall, and Ballendorf 1991; for the Marshalls, Treue 1976; and for Micro-
nesia as a whole, McKinney 1947. No comprehensive account of German Samoa
exists; but see Meleisea 1987, passim. For all of Germany’s Pacific possession, see
Hiery 1993b and Hiery, ed., Handbuch der “deutschen” Südsee (Paderborn: Schö-
ningh, 1996.
2 Hardach 1988, 13, refutes the orthodox view (Brown 1977, 151) that the acquisi-
tion of the Carolines would have been a logical consequence of the occupation of
Kiauchow in 1897 and the naval laws of 1898.
3 The last German government doctor in Yap, Ludwig Kohl-Larsen, 1927, 143.
Wächter 1941 had already worked it out that Germany’s Pacific colonies were more
for prestige than commercial or strategic value.
4 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. X. Legislaturpe-
riode, 159, sitting of 6 March 1902, vol. 5 (1902), 4637 and 4641.
5 General comments, such as, for example, “as the late-comer in the imperialist divi-
sion of the world, Germany was anxious to exploit the maximum advantage from
those remaining fragments of the earth” (John Moses 1989, 173), are far removed
from historical reality. “Inflexible” (ibid., 175).
6 Gann and Duignan 1977, 138–139, and 142–143.
7 The work of Georg Fritz, Bezirksamtmann of Saipan, and Erich Schultz (-Ewerth),
the last governor of German Samoa, deserves special mention (without wishing to
detract from the efforts of others). Schultz continually applied for his contract in
Samoa to be extended, “as I intend in any case to conclude the observations, made in
the years during which I have been concerned with land and titles in Samoa, as well
as during my official and private dealings with Samoans generally” (Schultz to Solf,
Apia, 5 February 1907, NML: GPRS I.A. 25). On Fritz, Hardach 1990b, 77–78.
8 Interview with Henriette Godinet-Taylor, Apia, 13 January 1989; see also Jacques
1922, 14–15, and Nelson 1979, 64.
9 For Hahl, see Biskup 1968b (still the best study), and the English translation of his
memoirs, ed. Peter Sack (Hahl 1980). For Solf, see Vietsch 1961. A new biography
by Peter Hempenstall will appear soon.
10 Hempenstall 1978, vii.
11 Firth 1986. For an early critique of Firth’s views, see Sack 1985; for Firth’s defense,
Firth 1985.
12 Typical of this one-dimensional view are statements such as the following: “the
Germans had the same aims in Melanesia as in Africa. They sought to create a col-
ony for the white man, who should be able to survey his docile black labourers from
the comfort of a plantation bungalow. The New Guinean’s part in the scheme
was to do what he was told, . . . above all to sign a three-year labour contract. Over-
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whelming force was to be used against any New Guineans who objected” (Firth, in
Griffin, Nelson, and Firth 1979, 39). Similar utilitarian stereotypes can be found in
John Moses 1989, 175.
13 See the deliberations of the government council, 4th period, 8th and 10th sessions
of 24–28 August and 10 November 1911; Amtsblatt für das Schutzgebiet Deutsch-
Neuguinea 3 (1911): 207 and 256–257.
14 There is much evidence to support this. For an English source, see, e.g., the state-
ment by J. M. C. Forsayth, British consul to German New Guinea, to an Australian
commission late in the war: “As a rule wherever there was land with coconuts on it,
they [the European planters] were told that it belonged to the natives, and they
[the colonial government] would not allow the natives to sell it.” The Parliament of
the Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, British and Australian
Trade in the South Pacific, 1918, 66.
15 The people of the small Witu Islands, for example, made such a large profit from
selling their local copra that in 1914 they were able to pay a 50 percent increase in
taxes and could still afford to purchase a rowing and sailing cutter for their own use.
Report by commander Zuckschwerdt, Cormoran, Rabaul, 10 February 1914, BAP:
RKolA no. 2656.
16 Hahl, 6 July 1909, to the Secretary for Colonial Affairs, BAP: RKolA no. 5009.
17 Hundreds of local court files document this; see AAC: AA 1963/83, cf. p. 86.
18 Hahl 1980, 13. Bezirksamtmann Rudolf Karlowa, manuscript on “Rechtsverhält-
nisse der Eingeborenen” (law among the indigenous population), Friedrich-Wil-
helmshafen, 1 June 1907, to the Government, AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 212. What
we know of indigenous views of German pacification supports this intepretation;
see Foster 1987.
19 Frommund 1926, 54–55, and the lefthand illustration on 49.
20 The Bezirksamtmann of Rabaul, Stuebel, concluding peace, 16 February 1912,
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CHAPTER 2: THE GERMAN SOUTH PACIFIC UNDER THE
SHADOW OF WAR
1 In any conversation, white inhabitants of Papua would immediately start apologiz-
ing for the conditions prevailing there; Bassett 1969, 11. Governor Murray, Port
Moresby, 15 October 1915 to the Australian Governor General, ANL: MS 696–
6960. There are many admiring reports, written by the occupation troops, about
the German colony of New Guinea. See among others, the diary of Warrant Officer
Lance Balfour Penman, AWM: PR 82/171: “The Germans have evidently spent a
lot of money in a wise manner” (ibid., 12).
2 On the behavior of the officers, see eyewitness reports in Readings in New Guinea
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Pethebridge, 1 May 1916 and 24 November 1916, to the Ministry of Defence, AWM:
33/55–54. Immediately after the occupation in September 1914, Ravenscroft confis-
cated all the cash belonging to businesses and authorities and kept much of it for
himself. From the post office in Herbertshöhe alone he took 16,000 marks. Captain
T. R. Eather, Treasurer, Rabaul, 23 October 1916 to Petherbridge, ibid.
3 Lieutenant E. Carlile, commander of Herbertshöhe, 26 April 1915, to his brother
in Australia, AWM: 1 DRL 188.
4 Acting Governor Haber, Berlin, 15 April 1915 to the Secretary of State in the Ger-
man Colonial Office, BAP: RKolA no. 2613.
5 “There’s nothing left to loot—unless we carried away sideboards and chests of
drawers, and they are all of solid oak”; Carlile, 6 June 1915, from Rabaul, AWM: 1
DRL 188. There is a great deal of evidence, both Australian and German, from all
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troops. According to the General Report of the Rabaul Garrison, 137 Australian
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Rabaul alone. Their punishments totaled 324 days of “field punishment” and 453
days “forfeited pay” (AWM: 33/36). General Report of Lt. Col. Russel Watson
(commander of the expeditionary force after Holmes had been appointed Admin-
istrator), undated (early 1915), AWM: 33/6; collector of customs, Sydney, return
showing values of goods other than luggage brought or sent to Sydney from
Rabaul by or on behalf of Expeditionary Force, AAC: A 2—17/3836. See also
Administrator Holmes, 27 October 1914, to the Minister of Defence in Mel-
bourne, AWM: 33/10; report of Basil Holmes to the Administrator, 28 December
1914, about the occupation of Kieta, AWM: 33/3; and AWM: 3 DRL 2943. Diaries
written by soldiers Mitchell (entry dated 19 September 1914—even drawers and
cupboards were removed from the government building); Read (entry dated 18
September 1914: things that could not be stolen from the government building,
such as book shelves, were smashed with rifle butts and bayonets in a fit of vandal-
ism; 1 October 1914: the bell of the mission church in Siar was taken to Sydney);
and O’Hare, all in MLS. Report by the captain of the Manila (Norddeutscher
Lloyd), August Roscher, 13 December 1914 from Amboina (Dutch New Guinea)
to the German Colonial Office, BAP: RKolA no. 2612; station leader of Kieta,
Doellinger, Bad Meinberg, 19 April 1915, to the German Colonial Office, BAP:
RKolA no. 2613.
6 Diary of Private Scheidel, AWM: 3 DRL 2268, esp. entries dated 14 October, 26
October, 1 November, and 14 November 1914. 1914–1915. The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia. Rabaul: Alleged misuse of Red Cross Gifts, and Loot-
ing by military officers and Privates. Report on, by Hon. W. M. Hughes, Attorney
General [Melbourne, 22 July 1915], 7. Administrator Holmes, 27 October 1914, to
the Ministry of Defence in Melbourne, AWM: 33/10.
7 On 30 May 1915, ANL: MS 696/23. “A disagreeable scandal,” the Governor-Gen-
eral personally, 5 May 1915, to the Colonial Secretary Harcourt, ANL: MS 696/686.
1914–1915. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. Rabaul: Alleged
misuse of Red Cross Gifts, and Looting by military officers and Privates. Report on,
by Hon. W. M. Hughes, Attorney General [Melbourne, 22 July 1915]; Prime Minis-
ter Hughes, Melbourne, 12 October 1916, to the Governor-General, to be passed
on to the Colonial Secretary; AAC: A 2—1917/3836. Debates in the Australian
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House of Representatives on 22–23 April, 7, 12, and 27 May 1915, in the Senate on
7 May 1915. Further documents in AAM: MP 367/1/0—404/11/298.
8 Report by Administrator Pethebridge, no. A/6, Rabaul, 19 February 1915, to the
Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/12–10.
9 Diary of the Warrant Officer Lance Balfour Penman, left Sydney 20 November
1915, AWM: PR 82/171.
10 But see District Order no. 33, 25 May 1918, in AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 237. A pri-
vate in Matupi had told his corporal that if no beer was provided he could look for
another guard.
11 Administrator Pethebridge, 15 April and 26 April 1916, from Rabaul to the Minis-
try of Defence, AWM: 33/54. Lieutenant Carlile, 6 June and 27 June 1915, from
Rabaul, AWM: 1 DRL 188.
12 Administrator Pethebridge, 6 November 1915 to the Ministry of Defence in Mel-
bourne, AWM: 33/12-1. One of the “crooks” was Pethebridge’s deputy, Lieutenant
Mackenzie, author of the official Australian War History of Rabaul. In 1936 he was
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for falsification of documents in connection
with his attempt to purchase some of the confiscated German plantations; Nelson
and Piggott 1987, xxxii.
13 “Enormous quantities of precious metal,” report by Haber after traveling through
the lower Waria valley, from 22 July to 11 August 1914, to the German Colonial
Office, BAP: RKolA no. 2996. Haber found platinum as well as gold. The govern-
ment of German New Guinea had been aware of the gold deposits for years but
had banned mining in the area. Unlike in Papua, the colonial administration had
deliberately not granted any privileged mining rights for minerals and oil (which
had also been discovered), because it feared an uncontrolled influx of gold miners
and prospectors. This, the goverment believed, would have endangered its primary
aim of developing the colony’s agriculture. Report by Fiebig, junior mining official,
Champagne, 25 July 1915, to the German Colonial Office, BAP: RKolA no. 2358.
14 A. L. Joubert, “Gold in New Guinea,” Rabaul Record, no. 3, 1 May 1916, 6–8.
15 Townsend 1968, 180–182.
16 Letter from Thurnwald, 9 March 1915, from Madang, DKB 26 (1915), 304/05; a
copy of his diary about the Sepik is in UPNG: AL-125. Holmes, 11 December
1914, to the Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/10. On Thurnwald, see Melk-Koch
1989.
17 “Needless to say in happy ignorance that the law of the land forbade us doing so,”
diary of Lt. Commander Gerald Ashby Hill, 111–114, here 110, AWM: 1 DRL 351.
See also Thomas J. Denhan: “On the Sepik (Kaiserin Augusta) River. Resources of
the River,” Rabaul Record, no. 9, 1 November 1916, 9. After a heated debate in
Germany, birds of paradise, crowned pigeons, and cassowaries were declared pro-
tected species on 1 November 1913. Protection was for a limited period (until 15
May 1915), during which time a German ornithologist was to study the behavior of
the birds and prepare a scientific report on whether general protection was neces-
sary or not. The white heron was not officially protected, but an export duty of
1,000 marks per kilogram of feathers made the hunt uneconomical. Amtsblatt für
das Schutzgebiet Deutsch-Neuguinea, 5 (1913): 218 and 275–276. The debate is in
BAP: RKolA no. 7789.
18 Hill diary, AWM: 1 DRL 351, 92–93; and MLS: MSS 2935, 30 January 1915 entry.
19 L. Gors, “Bird of Paradise Hunting,” Rabaul Record, no. 1, 1 March 1916, 10.
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20 Kurt Kuhn of the Neuguinea-Kompanie (New Guinea Company), on 11 Septem-
ber 1915 to Administrator Pethebridge, AWM: 33/54.
21 Pethebridge, 12 January 1916 to the Ministry of Defence, ibid., underlinings in
original. Pethebridge, 13 September 1915, to the Controller General Trade and
Customs, Melbourne, ibid. Information about the smuggling of birds to Dutch
New Guinea is in AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 246, “Akte Pieper.” Five years later
Administrator Wisdom used similar arguments: “business can be done by us, if we
get rid of the sentimental mushiness.” Wisdom, Rabaul, 18 November 1921, to the
Prime Minister’s Office, AAC: A 518/1—A 846/1/77.
22 Birds of Paradise Exportation Ordinance, 27 February 1920, Government Gazette
Rabaul, vol. 7, no. 2, 28 February 1920; Amendment, 28 January 1921, Govern-
ment Gazette Rabaul, vol. 8, no. 2, 31 January 1921; both in AAC: A 518/1—A
846/1/77.
23 Ordinance, Rabaul, 16 November 1921; New Guinea Gazette, no. 17, 17 Novem-
ber 1921, 89. Administrator Wisdom, Rabaul, 18 November 1921, to the Prime
Minister’s Office, AAC: A 518/1—A 846/1/77. Prime Minister’s secretary, 29 April
1922 from Melbourne, to the Secretary of the Wildlife Preservation Society of Aus-
tralia, AAC: A 518—F 830/1. On the widespread custom of smuggling birds of par-
adise via Dutch New Guinea, F. M. Cutlack, “Drive for Madang,” Sydney Morning
Herald, 13 September 1921.
24 Memorandum by the Secretary to the Australian Prime Minister, 7 July 1922, to
the Administrator of New Guinea; and Administrator Wisdom, Rabaul, 24 August
1922 to the Prime Minister’s Secretary, AAC: A 518–F 830/1.
25 “The position at present is that the birds are being shot anyway, and we get nothing
out of it.” Administrator Wisdom, private, 19 January 1926 from Rabaul to his
superior, the Minister for Home and Territories, J. G. McLaren, AAC: A 518—F
830/1. Birds and Animals Protection Ordinance 40/1922 (penalty: £ 100 or six
months in prison), AAC: A 518—A 846/1/77. Evidence for the involvement of Aus-
tralian district officials in the lucrative bird of paradise trade via Dutch New
Guinea can be found in Lambert 1942, 84; Townsend 1968, 63–66; and M. H. Ellis,
“Rabaul Scandal,” Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 23 June 1923. The hunting of crowned
pigeons, too, was unaffected by the official prohibition. Hunters simply claimed
that the birds had attacked them, and that they had shot them “in self-defence”
(Townsend 1968, 82).
26 Holmes, 28 November 1914, quoted by the Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/10.
27 Rowley 1958, 12–33. After Pethebridge’s death, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie
was Acting Administrator for a short period.
28 District Officer Captain Walters in his office on 18 February 1916 to Fathers Erd-
weg and Lopinot, AKM: C-39: Gayabachronik, 21.
29 Rejection of an application by the chair of the Australian Methodist Mission, Will-
iam H. Cox, Rabaul, 8 February 1917 (“it is the wish of the Natives that we pur-
chase”) to Administrator Pethebridge, AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 245: “Part 1917
Correspondence.”
30 Intelligence Report Administrator Johnson, no. 10, Rabaul, 15 May 1919, AAC: CP
103/11, New Guinea Reports 2/15. The first Australian troops were paid with German
banknotes. Diary of Private Scheidel, Rabaul, 15 October 1914, AWM: 3 DRL 2268.
In February 1915, German government revenues to the value of 319,241.66 marks
were taken to Sydney in twenty-four chests; report A 13 of Administrator Pethe-
bridge, Rabaul, 10 February 1915, to the Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/12–10.
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31 Administrator Pethebridge, Melbourne, 16 November 1917, AAC: A 3934—SC 30/
1. Telegram from the Colonial Secretary, 1 March and 22 November 1916. Tele-
gram from the Australian Federal Government, 22 March 1918 to the Colonial
Secretary, ibid.
32 Holmes, 4 October 1914 and 26 December 1914, to the Minister of Defence,
AWM: 33/10.
33 Memorandum by Administrator Pethebridge, 28 April 1916, to the Ministry of
Defence, AAC: A 3934—SC 30/1. The Adminstrator also stated in an interview on
a visit to Sydney that New Guinea’s trade, shaped by the German colonists, served
Australian interests and did not harm them; “Germans in New Guinea,” Samoa
Times, no. 35, 26 August 1916.
34 Table in Intelligence Report no. 27, 20 November 1920, AAM: MP 1049/1—18/
0587.
35 Statement by Capt. Phibbs, Collector Customs, Rabaul, 5 September 1919, before
the Royal Commission, AAC: CP 661/15.
36 Patrol report of the District Officer, Captain Walters, Madang, 15–18 February
1916, AWM: 33/54. In many places, the bush had encroached on the main road
from Madang to Alexishafen, and in places it was totally impassable.
37 In Rabaul, Australian officers pulled up the tram tracks and sold them privately.
Negotiations of the Court of Enquiry, in Government Gazette Rabaul 5, no. 7 (15
July 1918): 62, and no. 8 (15 August 1918): 78. On the deterioration of the trams in
Rabaul under military occupation, see also J. J. Cummins, 29 January 1918, to
Major N. de H. Rowland, “Report on Tram Lines,” AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 245, and
Acting Administrator Mackenzie, 25 February 1918, to the Deputy Judge, ibid.,
860/18. At the beginning of the civilian administration, an observer sent to New
Guinea by the Australian prime minister to take stock of the situation noted dilapi-
dation everywhere. The collapse of public utilities was especially marked in the
outlying stations, but was also clearly visible in the capital. Street lighting had been
discontinued. The lamp posts were in a shed belonging to the former Public Works
Department which, shortly before the observer’s arrival, had been shut down for
financial reasons. Lewis F. East, “Interim Report on the Administration of New
Guinea. Public works and buildings,” confidential, Melbourne, 7 October 1922,
AAC: A 981—NG 30, pt. 1.
38 Patrol Leader, Captain Olifent, District Officer of Eitape, 8 March 1919, to the
Military Secretary in Melbourne, AAM: MP 367—404/11/245.
39 North of Madang a real battle broke out in July 1915 between 100 “free” locals and
25 Melanesian policemen led by an Australian sergeant; patrol report of Lieutenant
W. M. B. Ogilvy, 12 August 1915, AAC: A 457—710/3; statement by Father Kirsch-
baum to the patrol officer, Olifent, Olifent, 8 March 1919, to the Military Secretary
in Melbourne, AAM: MP 367—404/11/245. “The natives are beginning to get out
of hand”—thus the Australian governor of neighboring Papua complained about
the impact the government’s inactivity in occupied German New Guinea was hav-
ing on his colony (Murray, Port Moresby, 15 October 1915, to the Australian Gov-
ernor-General, ANL: MS 696–6960). Even in parts of Neu Mecklenburg (now
New Ireland), which was administratively relatively well off, having two district
officers, there was chaos and disorder. An English planter to the District Officer,
Emira, 8 April 1916, AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 246.
40 Statement by Lieutenant Oliver John Thompson, Government Auditor, Rabaul, 9
October 1919, to the Royal Commission, AAC: CP 661/15/1. One year earlier,
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Administrator Johnston had already discovered irregularities in the collection of
the head-tax in Bougainville; Johnston, 1 November 1918 to Secretary of
Defence, AWM: 33/55. Friends and visitors from Australia were involved in col-
lecting taxes; Bassett 1969, 112. The fact that the patrol or district officer col-
lected head-taxes personally left the door wide open to abuses, even after the
introduction of the civilian administration; Townsend 1968, 58–59. See also Over-
ell 1923, 179.
41 In addition to the sergeant responsible, a corporal and a private were also involved.
District Court Martial, Rabaul, 16–20 July 1920, AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 238.
42 The Australian officers regarded collecting the head-tax as a kind of sport, in which
the object was to prove that they could collect more than the German administra-
tion: “every nigger pays a tax of 10 shillings [according to the official exchange rate,
this was the equivalent of 10 marks, the average tax during the German colonial
period] per year which they have to be chased for, it seems rather like highway rob-
bery but it is a German custom and of course we are supposed to be administering
their laws” (Lieutenant Carlile, Herbertshöhe, 12 September 1915, to his mother,
AWM: 1 DRL 188). By the next day, Carlile could report that in Toma district he
had collected 5,000 marks more than the German administration (letter of 13 Sep-
tember 1915, ibid.). Abuses (“South African methods”) in tax collecting by the
officer in charge of native affairs: Report of Administrator Pethebridge, no. A 117,
10 February 1916; AWM: 33/12–9. Double taxation: E. L. Piesse memorandum, 7
and 9 May 1921, for the Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Department about talks
with the Resident Magistrate of the British Shortland Islands, near Bougainville,
and with former Administrator Griffiths, AAC: A 457—710/3.
43 Administration Order no. 20, 23 December 1914, AWM: 33/3.
44 “Acclimatising Native Birds from Australia,” Rabaul Record 2, no. 7 (1 July 1917): 2.
45 “Rabaul Botanic Reserve Regulations,” Rabaul, 15 March 1918, § 14 and 15; Gov-
ernment Gazette Rabaul 5, no. 3 (15 March 1918): 23–24. Similar regulations were
passed one month later for Käwieng; Government Gazette Rabaul 6, no. 10 (25
October 1919): 76–77.
46 In Australia, British colonists regarded tropical trees as “untidy” and “primitive.”
Whole landscapes fell victim to an “almost maniacal tree-felling” (Butcher and
Turnbull 1988, 23). Their appearance thus changed completely. See Butcher and
Turnbull 1988, and esp. Bolton 1981.
47 Statement by the Australian Director of the Botanic Gardens Howard Oliver New-
port, 6 September 1919, to the Royal Commission, AAC: CP 661/15/1. The Ger-
man experiments with breeding tropical plants were abandoned, and existing
contacts with the Tropical Institutes in Singapore, Ceylon, and Java were broken
off (ibid.). The porcelain name-tags were taken home by Australian soldiers as sou-
venirs; MLS: MSS 930, 149 (26 September 1914). On official orders to cut down
trees in Madang, see Captain Skeet, Madang, 1 January 1917, AWM: 33/34; in
Rabaul: Intelligence Report Administrator Griffiths, no. 30, 22 February 1921,
AAC: CP 103/11, New Guinea Reports 2/15.
48 Radlauer memorandum, AHM. Deer hunting was also permitted with official per-
mission at this stage; decree by the district officer (Bezirksamtmann) of Neupom-
mern (New Britain), Toma, 9 August 1914; Amtsblatt für das Schutzgebiet Deutsch-
Neuguinea 6(1914): 288–289. 
49 Memorandum by Administrator Johnson, Rabaul, 9 February 1920, to the Ministry
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of Defence, AAC: A 518—A 254/1/1, pt. 1; “Distressing Accident,” Rabaul Record
3, no. 5 (May 1918): 2.
50 They were known among Pacific Islanders as “bloody pirates”; Scarr 1990, 211 (see
also 181) and Buckley and Klugman 1986, 67.
51 Burns, 12 November and 11 December 1907, to Hunt, ANL: MS 52, 32/52–1567,
and 32/52–1568.
52 Over lunch, the prime minister, Atlee Hunt, James Burns, and Woodford, a com-
pany employee, discussed raising Burns Philp’s contract (officially readvertised) for
providing postal services between Australia and the New Hebrides; ANL: MS
1100/4: diary entry of 6 January 1904. Burns (Sydney, 11 January 1910) asks Hunt
about what behavior is appropriate in order to ensure that the contract is extended;
ANL: MS 52, 32—52/1574. Hunt informs Burns about the necessary procedure
(Melbourne, 18 January 1910); ibid., 52/1573. Hunt tells Lucas which cabinet min-
isters opposed extending Burns Philp’s postal contract (Melbourne, 19 May 1910);
ANL: MS 52, 2—52/124.
53 The Governor-General, 11 January 1915, from Melbourne, to Colonial Secretary
Harcourt, personal, ANL: MS 696/645; the Governor-General, Melbourne, 13
April 1915, confidential, to the Colonial Secretary, ibid., 6960; the Governor-Gen-
eral, 15 October 1916, to Stamfordham, personal, ibid., 246; Burns, London, 27
and 29 September 1915, to the Governor-General, ibid., 7234–7241; Grey, Howick,
Lesburn, Northumberland, 1 December 1915, to Lord Novar, ibid., 7530.
54 ANL: G 21119 and G 21134.
55 Holmes, 27 October 1914 to the Ministry of Defence in Melbourne, AWM: 33/10
and AAC: A 1—21/11251. The threat Holmes used against the merchants was that
the administration would offer no help if there were to be any unrest among the
local plantation workers (ibid.). Lieutenant Keith Heritage, Rabaul, 27 October
1914, to the Administrator: “The deportation of the disturbing element allowed
negotiations to run smoothly, and . . . the bulk of the goods . . . were taken over by
the merchants, much against their will.” AWM: 33/36. The company’s view in Buck-
ley and Klugman 1983, 10–11. Here, there is no word of the importance of the
Administrator for striking Burns Philp’s deal. Confidential and personal letter of
thanks from Lucas to Holmes (undated, October 1914), MLS: MSS 15, Box 2 (“I
see day light now after some anxious moments . . . command me if there is any-
thing I can possibly do for you in Australia”).
56 Holmes, Rabaul, 28 November and 11 December 1914, to the Ministry of Defence
in Melbourne, AWM: 33/10. On the mixing of military and political motives with
the private commercial interests of Burns Philp in Madang, see MLS: MSS 3034,
1 November 1914.
57 Holmes, Rabaul, 29 December 1914, to the Ministry of Defence in Melbourne,
AWM: 33/10.
58 Report by Foss, retired American Rear Admiral, NARA: RG 38, K-5-a no. 11331 A
(Box 1063). According to this account, Holmes was also a partner in the company;
report by Captain August Roscher, Amboina, 13 December 1914; BAP: RKolA no.
2612. Cf. DKB 26 (1915), 144. Here Holmes is described as the son-in-law of one
of the owners of Burns Philp. The Australian Dictionary of Biography is strangely
mute on the subject. An indirect hint is found in a private letter of Captain Keith
Heritage, Rabaul, 3 November 1914, in which he emphasizes how quickly Burns
Philp appeared on the scene in the occupied colony. AWM: 1 DRL 347.
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59 S. W. Harris, “Early Recollections of the War,” Rabaul Record 2, no. 9 (1 Septem-
ber 1917): 8; cf. ibid., no. 2 (1 February 1917): 4.
60 Lieutenant Keith Heritage, Rabaul, 27 October 1914, to the Administrator;
Holmes’ marginal comment: “since received” (official confirmation), AWM: 33/36.
Holmes, 28 October 1914, to the Ministry of Defence: “The commission . . . does
not seem excessive,” ibid.
61 Memorandum, “Trade between the Commonwealth and the late German Posses-
sions in the Pacific—Burns Philp & Co’s participation therein,” AAC: A 4—NG 12.
Memorandum by Administrator Pethebridge, 17 August 1916, ibid., Burns Philp
Archives, Sydney: Box 21, private and confidential report no. 26, 31 March 1916.
Only a summary of the events (without the significant details) in Buckley and Klug-
man 1983, 37.
62 Pethebridge, 3 July 1916, to the Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/54.
63 Deputy Administrator Mackenzie, 16 February 1918, to the Ministry of Defence.
The agreement was allegedly concluded in July 1916 and confirmed by the Minis-
try of Defence; AWM: 33/55.
64 Agreement between Burns Philp and the Military Administration of New Guinea,
December 1916, ibid. The company’s view in Buckley and Klugman 1983, 61.
65 Jaluit-Gesellschaft, Hamburg, 21 August 1915 to the German Colonial Office, for
the Germania, BAP: RKolA no. 2505.
66 Memorandum Chief Law Officer Mackenzie, Melbourne, 2 March 1919, to the
Governor-General, AAC: CP 103/11, New Guinea Reports Box 1/13, Sale of Land
at Buka; 12,500 acres is the equivalent of just under 5,060 hectares. In February
1918 the Buka Plantations and Trading Company Ltd., which also belonged to
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northeast coast of Bougainville; Government Gazette Rabaul 5, no. 2 (15 February
1918): 9-10.
67 Administrator Johnston, 24 February 1919, to the Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/56.
68 Memorandum of the Secretary to the Australian Governor-General, 18 July 1917,
AAC: CP 78/34/1—Bun 9.
69 Administrator Griffiths, 6 November 1920, to the Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/57.
70 Report by August Roscher, Amboina, 13 December 1914, BAP: RKolA no. 2612.
71 AKM: C-39: Gayabachronik, 40.
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tember 1911 to 21 March 1919 in Burns Philp Archives, Sydney, Box 21. The larg-
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“patriotism,” which was otherwise always appealed to in order to justify privileges,
was apparently no obstacle.
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turnover.” Private and confidential report no. 28/1918; Burns Philp Archives, Syd-
ney, Box 21.
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Lord Inchcape; Burns Philp Archives, Sydney, Box “Mandated Territory.”
75 ANL: 696/7052, and Burns Philp Archives, Sydney, Box 21: private and confidential
report no. 29/1919.
NOTES1  Page 288  Friday, October 19, 2001  12:21 PM
Notes to Pages 65–67 289
76 Burns Philp Archives, Sydney, Box 21: private and confidential report no. 30/1920.
It is almost superfluous to mention that the directors of the new company were the
same as those of the old company (James Burns, James Forsyth, and Lord Inch-
cape). See also Buckley and Klugman 1983, 108–124.
77 On the notorious “game licences” issued “to disperse the blacks,” see Pethebridge’s
memorandum “Notes on the Pacific,” 31 December 1915, 9, AAM: MP 367/1–404/
11/129. The history of relations between British Australians and aborigines has
recently begun to be written after years of neglect; see, among others, Elder 1988,
Reynolds 1989, and Markus 1990. Article 127 of the Australian Constitution, 9 July
1900, deleted in 1967; Sawer 1975, 62.
78 See Healy 1987 and, for one specific case, Inglis 1975.
79 MLS: MSS 2935, 29 September 1914; Father Vormann, Hollandia, 22 November
1914, to the Superior of the Steyler Missionaries, Noser Library, Madang.
80 AWM: 3 DRL 7734, 5 September 1914 entry. See also Piggott 1984, 50.
81 Diaries of Private Scheidel (9 October 1914 entry) and Colonel A. W. Ralston,
AWM: 3 DRL 2268 and 2943. Report by Judge Weber, 17 March 1915, BAP:
RKolA no. 2996; undated extract from Hamburg-Südsee AG’s plantation report
1914, BAP: RKolA no. 2612. See also Piggott 1984, 60.
82 Colonel Holmes, 4 October 1914, to the Ministry of Defence in Melbourne, AWM:
33/10. In the Sepik district the proportion of police who refused to continue serv-
ing after the German administration came to an end was especially high. Captain
Ogilvy, O.C. Native Affairs, Rabaul, 30 December 1915, to the Administrator,
AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 245.
83 MLS: MSS 2935, 11 and 28 September 1914; MLS: MSS 3034, 14 September
1914; AWM: 3 DRL 6061; MLS: MSS 930, 23 September 1914; MLS: MSS 2880,
2 October 1914; AWM: PR 89/5, 24 October 1914. For other incidents, see Piggott
1984, 53. The monotony of life as a soldier increased the temptation to let off steam
at the expense of the local population. This happened repeatedly, even later. In
mid-July 1915, for example, an Australian soldier went mad, attacked the local peo-
ple, and emptied the magazine of his gun. Lieutenant Carlile, Commander of Her-
bertshöhe, 17 May 1915, to his mother, AWM: 1 DRL 188.
84 Holmes, 4 October 1914 and 26 December 1914, to the Ministry of Defence,
AWM: 33/10.
85 “Nigger”: the Governor-General of Australia, Melbourne, 25 December 1918, per-
sonal and private, to Colonial Secretary Long, ANL: MS 696/1123; undated memo-
randum by the governor general of Australia “on Administration of Pacific Islands,”
ibid., 2247; Senator de Largie (Western Australia) in the Senate on 9 August 1917,
in a debate about the German possessions in the South Pacific, AAC: A 3934—SC
12/19. Diaries of Colonel A. W. Ralston (AWM: 3 DRL 2943), Lieutenant Com-
mander G. A. Hill (AWM: 1 DRL 351), Lieutenant Bowen (AWM: 3 DRL 7734),
Lieutenant Read (MLS: MSS 3034), Naval Medical Officer Dr. Fred Hamilton-
Kenny (MLS: MSS 930), Private Scheidel (AWM: 3 DRL 2268), A. O’Hare (MLS:
MSS 2935). Letters from Lieutenant E. K. Carlile, commander of Herbertshöhe,
later district officer of Morobe, to his mother (AWM: 1 DRL 188), from Lieutenant
William David Hunter to his wife (AWM: 1 DRL 369). See also the designations
for the local people used by Lieutenant W. E. McIlwaine, district officer and at the
same time native magistrate, in the Rabaul Record 2, no. 10 (1 October 1917): 10
(“Lofty and Lorea”), and no. 11 (1 November 1917): 9–10 (“An Interview”). “Kana-
kas”: Colonel Holmes, Rabaul, 26 December 1914, to the Ministry of Defence
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(AWM: 33/10); Lance Balfour Penman diary (AWM: PR 82/171). On the “favorite”
racist terms used by the Australian troops in New Guinea, see also Piggott 1984,
56–57. The derogatory term “nigger” was by no means used only at the beginning
of the military administration. See, for example, the statements made before the
Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea at the end of 1919, AAC: CP 661/
15/1. Flippant words by the first Australian Administrator of the civil administra-
tion, Wisdom: see Wisdom, Rabaul, 22 April 1925, to his superior Minister for
Home and Territories, AAC: A 518—D 11215, pt. 1.
86 Firth 1986 completely disregards these basic features of German colonial policy
after 1899. But see now my “Das Deutsche Reich in der Südsee. Eine Annäherung
an die Erfahrungen verschiedener Kulturen,” Habilitationsschrift, Freiburg i. Br.
1993.
87 According to Piggott 1984, 57, “a vocabulary of strong but innocent prejudice.”
88 Press Officer Jens Lyng, Rabaul Record 9 (1 November 1916): 5 (“German New
Guinea. Economic and Social Life”). Lyng was one of the Australians who outdid
each other in compiling lists of negative qualities allegedly typical of Melanesians.
Lyng, “Something about the Natives,” Rabaul Record 2, no. 3 (1 March 1917): 7–
10; no. 9 (1 September 1917): 12–13; see also Piggott 1984, 56. Healy 1987, esp.
216–17, has already emphasized the difference between Australian and German
ways of treating the indigenous people of New Guinea. He calls German adminis-
trative methods “associationist,” and Australian ones “assimilationist.”
89 The Melanesian bushman “is always the same, a dirty, smelly, skin-diseased, slob-
bery, betel-chewing, bleary eyed specimen.” Major Ogilvy, Officer-in-Charge of
Native Affairs, “Cannibalism and Lost Illusions,” Rabaul Record 2, no. 6 (1 June
1917): 7. Satirical comments about the peculiarities of Melanesian cultures can be
found repeatedly. See, for instance, “Something of the Soothing Sing-Sing,” Rabaul
Record, no. 2 (1 April 1916): 3, or the “jokes” Australian sailors played with the
people on the river Sepik, AWM: 1 DRL 351, 125. See also Piggott 1984, 57, and
Hiery 1992c, 201.
90 Hiery 1992c, 201.
91 Memorandum by Administrator Johnson, 20 October 1919, to the Royal Commis-
sion, AAC: CP 661/15/2. See also H. Thurnwald 1937, 150–151.
92 “The two words ‘damn’ and ‘bloody’ . . . sound remarkably funny from the lips of a
nigger,” MLS: MSS 3034, 12 October 1914. By 1916, the curse “Goodam” had
reached as far as the Baining Hills; the luluai of the village of Kuruduä, Togogoan,
used this expression to spur his people on to work when they no longer reacted to
his commands in their mother tongue. Lieutenant H. N. Leach, “The Fringe of the
Bainings,” Rabaul Record 1, no. 7 (1 September 1916): 7.
93 “Something about the Natives,” Rabaul Record 2, no. 3 (1 March 1917): 8.
94 Lieutenant Gordon Clifton, “Patrol in New Guinea,” Rabaul Record 1, no. 10
(1 December 1916): 11; Lieutenant McIlwaine, “An Interview,” Rabaul Record 2,
no. 11, 1 November 1917: 10.
95 Johnston, 14 March 1919, to the Ministry of Defence: “corporal punishment for
Natives,” AWM: 33/56.
96 Captain C. W. Bray, “The Kanaka as a Hospital Patient,” Rabaul Record 1, no. 5
(1 July 1916): 9; see also Piggott 1984, 54–55.
97 Lambert 1942, 103–105. During his time as director of the native hospital in
Rabaul—“an ideal chance to experiment and observe”—Lambert conducted a
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series of experiments on Melanesian patients who had been stopped from escaping
by a barbed-wire fence. His reaction to the cases of death that obviously occurred
was limited to similarly cynical comments; ibid, 99–100.
98 “No native will receive treatment unless the prescribed form is correctly com-
pleted and submitted,” District Order No. 774, 15 October 1920, AAC: AA 1963/
83, Bun 237.
99 Statement by Principal Medical Officer Lt. Col. John Wellesley Flood, Rabaul,
8 September 1919, to the Royal Commission, AAC: CP 661/15/1. In addition to his
income from his private practice, the medical officer was paid £650 annually by the
government (ibid.).
100 Ibid. and “Dear Hospitals,” Melbourne Herald, 31 October 1923, AAC: AA 1963/
83, Bun 237. With interruptions, Flood had been in Rabaul since December 1914;
AAC: CP 661/15/1.
101 Lewis F. East: “Report on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea,”
Melbourne, 7 October 1922, AAC: A 981—New Guinea 30, pt. 2. The report dis-
appeared into the prime minister’s drawer, and its findings were never published.
102 Rabaul Record, no. 7 (1 September 1916): 9. Australian soldiers forced the “nigger
police” to catch fish for them using this method. Serious injuries were the logical
consequence; MLS: MSS 2935, 23 November 1914.
103 Lieutenant E. Carlile, Commander of Herbertshöhe, 6 June 1915, to his mother,
AWM: 1 DRL 188.
104 Lyng 1925, 26.
105 “Education, as far as teaching the Natives to read and write, is a waste of time.”
Captain Tennent to the Royal Commission, AAC: A 518–A 254/1/1, pt. 1, 34.
106 District Officer McAdam, Rabaul, 10 September 1919, to the Royal Commission,
AAC: CP 661/15/1.
107  Speech by Atlee Hunt, 24 January 1920, to a Methodist conference in Queensland,
AAC: CP 661/15/2.
108 Circular from Administrator Johnson, no date [c. 1919], to all missions; AAC: CP
661/15/1. Wolfers 1972 provides an excellent survey of the racist legal regulations
issued by the Australian administration in New Guinea. He also briefly examines
the military administration’s “principles,” including the ban on Melanesians using
public toilets and washrooms, as well as benches in the parks and streets of Rabaul.
These offenses incurred a punishment of one month’s imprisonment plus “corporal
chastisement.” See Wolfers 1972 and Government Gazette Rabaul 5, no. 3 (15
March 1918): 23–24.
109 AWM: PR 82/171.
110 Vol. 2, no. 6, 1 June 1917, 7; see also Piggott 1984, 57. This contains further exam-
ples of disparaging comments made by Australians about Melanesian women.
111 Piggott 1984, 58.
112 Lieutenant W. E. McIlwaine, “Native Law in the Pacific,” Rabaul Record 2, no. 8
(1 August 1917): 8–9.
113 Troop diary Herbertshöhe, AWM: 33/13, 23 September 1914. On the rape of
women hospital patients, see statement by Heilgehilfe (Nurse) Müller, report by
von Sigriz, on board the Sonoma, 19 January 1915, PAA: A. Der Weltkrieg no. 13,
vol. 14; on female prisoners, Piggott 1984, 58. In Rabaul, Australian officers orga-
nized regular hunts for local women “for the purpose of having connection”; docu-
ments in AAM: B 543–W 112/4/895.
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114 Administrator Thomas Griffiths, 14 July 1920, confidential, to the Minister of
Defence; the new District Officer Major McAdam, Manus, 15 July 1920, personal
and confidential to the Administrator, AAC: A 457–710/3; See also Piggott 1984, 58.
115 Ibid. Singleton may even have returned. A police master of the same name
attracted attention through his illegal recruiting in Kaewieng early in 1921. Former
Administrator Griffiths, 7 May 1921 to Piesse, AAC: A 2219, vol. 13.
116 Report by Burrows, Acting Commander of the warship Una, 20 April 1917, AAM:
MP 367–D 404/11/15. The Administrator had asked Burrows to take a closer look
at what was happening in the Solomons after the resident commissioner of the
neighboring British Solomons had reported that Melanesians were coming over the
border in droves, complaining about Australian rule in Bougainville; AAC: A 457–
710/3. Hunter himself had reported that he had shot two indigenous women on a
punitive expedition. Report of District Officer Lieutenant A. J. Hunter, Bukuluku,
22 January 1917, ibid.
117 Summary of evidence, Eitape, 15 and 16 October 1921, before District Officer
A. J. Thompson. Summary of evidence taken at Wanimo, 20, 21, and 24 October
1921; AAC: A 5–NG 24/1437. While the Melanesian police were away searching
the Sepik villages for women for the police master, he assaulted the policemen’s
wives (ibid.). The official in neighboring Dutch Humboldt Bay complained to a vis-
iting Australian ship that Pole had even sent the police over the border to fetch
women for him. (Captain Kenny, Eitape, 23 April 1921, confidential, to the Admin-
istrator; ibid.) Pole did not return from leave, took off for England, and from there
demanded the discharge money due to him. Deputy Administrator, 3 January 1923,
to the Prime Minister’s Office, AAC: A 5, NG 24/1437. Morobe: Willis 1974, 67–68,
75–76.
118 Statement by Sergeant Edward Taylor, Police Master of Gasmatta, 9 December
1919. As far as Taylor could find out, the incidents had occurred toward the middle
of 1918; AAC: A 457–710/3.
119 AKM: C-39, Gayabachronik, 27.
120 Rowley 1958, 117–118, and Memorandum by Administrator Johnston, Rabaul, 14
June 1918, to the Minister of Defence, AAM: MP 367-C 404/11/109. On the gov-
ernor’s draft regulations, see Hahl, 15 March 1914, to the Secretary of State in the
German Colonial Office (copy), AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 201, and BAP: RKolA no.
2314.
121 Hahl’s explanations of the planned labor regulations, esp. Article 52, in ibid. Among
the almost revolutionary measures were: a prohibition on recruiting school stu-
dents, maternity leave for women workers from two months before the confine-
ment, and compulsory smallpox vaccinations for all workers at the employer’s
expense. The new regulations were intended to be valid for the whole of German
New Guinea—that is, including Micronesia. In Micronesia wages had always been
paid in cash. The colonial government, too, had always paid its local blue- and
white-collar workers in cash, and without deductions (Hahl, ibid.).
122 Missions, settlers, planters, and Pacific companies were up in arms against the gov-
ernment’s plans. The government was accused of one-sidedly favoring the indige-
nous people at the expense of the planters, who were being recklessly harmed; it
was claimed that concern for the workers was exaggerated in every respect. Memo-
randum of the Neuguinea-Kompanie, Berlin, 29 July 1914, BAP: RKolA no. 2314.
123 Rowley 1958, 122.
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124 By the end of 1918, the 1917 ordinance had been amended five times. Native
Labour Ordinance, 20 January 1919 (with effect from 27 January 1919), Rabaul
Government Gazette, no. 1, 27 January 1919. Even this was not the end of the
experiments and attempts to adapt to the realities of everyday colonial life. By the
end of the military administration in April 1921, there had been another twelve
revisions, supplementary provisions, and implementing regulations.
125 Statement by Major T. L. McAdam, Officer in Charge of Native Affairs, Rabaul, 10
September 1919, and Wilson Gillan, Treasurer and Paymaster, Rabaul, 5 Septem-
ber 1919, to the Royal Commission, AAC: CP 661/15/1.
126 J. Lyng, Rabaul Record, no. 9 (1 November 1916): 5.
127 Lyng, no year [1919], 230, and esp. Rowley 1958, 126–128. According to the
Labour Ordinance of May 1915, the recruitment of women without their hus-
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district officer of Kieta, Captain A. R. McGregor, “The Island of Buka”, Rabaul
Record, no. 10 (1 December 1916): 10, who had to have this ban pointed out to
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disregard of this regulation—was again legalized; Rowley 1958, 127. This step
was justified by reference to the need to avert homosexuality, which would other-
wise arise spontaneously and spread to local village society. Administrator
Johnston, memorandum of 20 October 1919 to the Royal Commission, AAC: CP
661/15/2.
128 Memorandum by Administrator Johnston, 20 October 1919, to the Royal Commis-
sion, AAC: CP 661/15/2. A recruiting contract that has survived from 1916 esti-
mates the “price” of a male laborer with a three-year contract as 90 marks (four
pounds, ten shillings), and that of a single woman as 120 marks (six pounds).
Recruiting contract Curt A. Schultze–Adolf Jahn, 2 February 1916, AAC: AA 1963/
83, Bun 246.
129 But see the report by the District Officer of Morobe, Carlile, 20 January 1916, to
Pethebridge, on the upper Waria people’s concern about the activities of the
recruiters; AWM: 33/55–54. The brutality of a Chinese recruiter’s method in the
area of Malala (north of Madang) in 1916 is documented in AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun
245, “Crown Law Office.” For an account, partially sanitized, of a recruiter, see
S. Hawkes, “Recruiting in the Pacific,” Rabaul Record 2, no. 2 (1 February 1917):
7–8, and “Illegal Recruiting,” ibid., no. 7 (1 July 1917): 4–5.
130 J. Lyng, Rabaul Record 1, no. 7 (1 September 1916): 8.
131 Memorandum by Johnston, 20 October 1919, for the Royal Commission, AAC: CP
661/15/2.
132 Report by Komine, 23 January 1918, Intelligence Report Administrator Johnston
no. 2, Rabaul, 11 July 1918, AAM: B 539–AIF 112/6/43, and AAC: CP 103/11,
New Guinea Reports 2/15; report by Strasberg about his visit to the south coast of
Neupommern (New Britain), 27 February –14 April 1918, AAM: MP 367–404/
11/689.
133 Extract from the logbook of the Takubar, Kwoi Bay, 4 March 1918, ibid.
134 Memorandum by the missionary Flierl, “A Treatise on Recruiting and Labour
Trade, becoming a most serious problem in this Colony,” 15 October 1918, in Fli-
erl, Heldsbach, 17 October 1918, to Administration Headquarters, Rabaul, AAM:
MP 367–404/11/689.
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135 Radio message from District Officer Dillane, Morobe, 16 January 1919, to the
Administrator, AWM: 33/56.
136 In July 1918 a special patrol to Baining in the north of Neupommern (New Britain)
had seen, only too clearly, the results of violent recruiting. Administrator Johnston,
Rabaul, 16 October 1918 to the Ministry of Defence, AAM: MP 367–404/11/689.
The Sepik district was the most affected. In the hinterland of Eitape, the Adminis-
trator was shown three hundred recruits—“a wretched looking lot”—who were so
unfamiliar with “civilization” that they had to be shown how to wear lavalavas
around their hips. None of them knew Pisin nor whom they would be working for.
The Administrator himself was convinced that they had been cheated but did not
intervene. On the return journey to Madang, a recruiter confessed that “his party
had killed 25 to 30 natives.” Administrator Johnston, 24 September 1918 to the
Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/55. In late 1918 or early 1919, a recruiter shot sev-
enteen Aseati people on the Sepik. Radio message from Captain Olifent, 22 Janu-
ary 1919, to the Administrator, AWM: 33/56. For recruiting abuses in the Lae area,
Willis 1974, 68–72.
137 Marginal comment by George Foster Pearce, 31 December 1918, on a letter from
Administrator Johnston, 22 November 1918, AAM: MP 367–404/11/689. Note by
the Deputy Chief Censor, 3 January 1919: “Censors instructed accordingly,” ibid.
138 Patrol report Lieut. Gl. M. Wilder Neligan, District Officer Talasea, July 1920,
AAC: A 2–20/2980.
139 Madang and Namatanai. Intelligence Report Administrator Rabaul, no. 29, 20 Jan-
uary 1921, AAM: MP 1049/1–18/0587.
140 Governor Hahl, Rabaul, 24 May 1913, report no. 368, to the Secretary of State in
the German Colonial Office (copy), AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 205.
141 Table in AAC: A 1–23/18422.
142 Figures for 1919: Major T. L. McAdam, Officer in Charge of Native Affairs, Rabaul,
10 October 1919, to Atlee Hunt, AAC: CP 661/15/1. For figures for 1913, see note
140 above.
143 Secretary to the Prime Minister, Melbourne, 12 February 1923, on the Administra-
tor’s report of 3 September 1921 for the drafting of the annual report for the
League of Nations, AAC: A 1–23/18422. The table actually specifies 30,849 Mela-
nesian workers, but this was obviously an arithmetical error, as the number for
Kokopo (3,421 workers) was added again to the figures for Rabaul (8,260 instead of
4,839).
144 ANL: MS 882/6/686, “Expropriation.” Hahl, report no. 368, 24 May 1913, AAC:
AA 1963/83, Bun 205.
145 Major Cummins, Director of Census and Statistics for the Military Government,
Brisbane, 24 November 1921, to the Australian Prime Minister, AAC: A 518–F
840/1/3, pt. 1. Homosexuality was also known as a consequence of the plantation
economy in Papua, the British Solomons, and the New Hebrides. Ibid.; see also
Lambert 1942, 22–23, and Reed 1943, 220–221.
146 Piesse, “Return of Indentured Labour New Guinea 9 May 1921,” ANL: MS 882/
6/144.
147 Hahl, report no. 368, 24 May 1913, AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 205.
148 Piesse memorandum, “The Native Population and Native Labor,” 20 June 1922,
AAC: A 1–23/18418. Piesse to East, Melbourne, 14 June 1923, ANL: MS 882/6/
464. Piesse, confidential and personal, to Secretary for Home and Territories
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J. McLaren, ANL: MS 882/6/490–491. He accused Australian Minister Joseph
Cook—who, in 1923 at the Mandate Commission in Geneva, denied any connec-
tion between a rise in the number of workers and population decline—of lying;
ANL: MS 882/6/538.
149 Appendix to the Administrator’s report, Rabaul, 5 October 1922, to the Secretary in
the Prime Minister’s Department, AAC: A 1–23/18422. Piesse memorandum,
“Decline of the Native Population,” 11 April 1923, for the Secretary in the Prime
Minister’s Department, AAC: A 1–23/18418. In it, Piesse criticized the administra-
tion and the Administrator in Rabaul for having withheld the statistics from him
until he requested them repeatedly. Between 1914 and 1920 the decline in the
population of Madang was even more extreme than that in Neu Mecklenburg/New
Ireland. Whereas the latter area possessed the best infrastructure in New Guinea,
roads in the Madang district had suffered badly from neglect during the war years.
It is therefore likely that the result of the 1920 census reflected less a decline in the
population than a retreat of the administration. See Rivers 1922, 5, and, for the
general problem of population decline in the Pacific, McArthur 1968.
150 Holmes, 27 October 1914, to the Ministry of Defence, AWM: 33/10. Diary of
Major Heritage’s Kaewieng expedition, 25 October–1 November 1914, AWM: 33/
33/1. In three days, Heritage administered a total of 410 blows to twenty-eight peo-
ple. “All boys and Kanakas between Kapsu and Kaewieng were told that the situa-
tion was just the same as before,” ibid. See also Nelson 1978, 136. “My arm was
aching for about 4 hours”—Sergeant Hocking about his way of making “niggers”
work; letter of 16 December 1914, AWM: 3 DRL 2985.
151 Rowley 1958, 137–138. A comparison of the right of employers to punish their
employees in the July 1915 ordinance with Hahl’s draft of 1914 (BAP: RKolA no.
2314) reveals some improvements and some changes for the worse. Common to
both was only the possibility of arrest for a maximum of three days. The Australian
ordinance limited corporal punishment to a maximum of ten blows within fourteen
days, while Hahl had set the maximum at twenty blows (not ten; Rowley 1958, 137)
in the presence of a medical assistant. The former governor of German New
Guinea also wanted to allow a fine of up to 30 marks; the Australians regarded 20
marks as the upper limit. The Australians also permitted confinement in chains and
in a darkened cell, for which Hahl’s draft did not provide.
152 Rowley 1958, 138–139.
153 AKM: 39, Gayabachronik, 19/20.
154 Rowley 1958, 140–142. Even before corporal punishment was reintroduced for
offenses other than murder and rape, Ogilvy made frequent use of it. On 18
December 1915 he ordered a house boy to be given twenty strokes with a cane
before a group of assembled Melanesian government workers and servants. Ogilvy,
O.C. Native Affairs, Rabaul, 6 January 1916 to the Administrator, AWM: 33/54.
155 Report by Administrator Pethebridge, no. A 112, Rabaul, 3 December 1915, to the
Minister of Defence; AAM: MP 367–479/27/50 and AWM: 33/12-10. Marginal
comment by Minister of Defence Pearce, 7 January 1916, ibid.; see also Rowley
1958, 143. The spectre of white women being threatened by black or brown men
was a constant source of concern to European colonial policy in the Pacific. On
Papua, see Inglis 1975.
156 Rowley 1958, 144–145.
157 Para. 48, 2. Confinement in a darkened cell had been abolished in March 1918;
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Rowley 1958, 145. Sexual offenses were “immorality,” attempted rape and rape,
attempted homosexuality and adultery, and homosexuality and adultery; labor
offenses included “gross insubordination,” “defiance of authority,” arson—this was
intended primarily to prevent the setting fire to plantations—and attempted physi-
cal assault and physical assault (to protect supervisors and foremen). Serious crimi-
nal offenses were murder (in every case of murder that did not warrant the death
penalty, corporal punishment was obligatory), attempted murder, robbery, house-
breaking, theft, and “wilful false statements before any court,” which, if it were not
expressed so vaguely, could be seen as an attempt to introduce something like per-
jury for the indigenous population. Native Labour Ordinance 1919, § 48, 6.
158 Rowley 1958, 145–146. Effective on 23 May 1919 through the Native Labour Ordi-
nance No. 3A/1919, Rabaul, 22 May 1919; Government Gazette Rabaul, 6, no. 5
(23 May 1919): 39.
159 Memorandum by Administrator Johnston and Judge Major N. de H. Rowland,
“corporal punishment for Natives,” Rabaul, 14 March 1919, to the Minister of
Defence, AWM: 33/56.
160 Ibid. and Intelligence Report Administrator Rabaul no. 10, Rabaul, 15 May 1919,
AAC: CP 103/11, NG Report, Box 2/15; See also Rowley 1958, 147–148. Leg irons
had not been used in German New Guinea, but they were used in Papua. Even
there, however, their use had been limited. The ministry of defense therefore sent
only the handcuffs but no leg irons; Rowley 1958, 147.
161 “Believe that considerable effect will be obtained by exposing offenders to ridi-
cule. . . . Absolutely no cruelty attached to such imprisonment.” Secret telegraphic
report from the Administrator, Rabaul, 20 May 1919, to the Ministry of Defence,
AAC: A 457–710/3; see also Rowley 1958, 148–149.
162 Statements by Lance Corporal Hector Norman McLean, Police Master, Depart-
ment of Native Affairs, Rabaul, and Lieutenant Alan Reginald Hanlin, Adjutant
Native Police. Proceedings Board of Enquiry, Rabaul, 2–3 December 1919, AAC:
A 457–710/3.
163 Statement by Pastor William James Chambers, ibid. Johnston, Rabaul, 19 Decem-
ber 1919 to the Secretary of Defence, AAC: A 457–710/3; see also Rowley 1958,
148, and Thompson 1990, 77. Another eyewitness reported the Administrator, on
seeing the “birds,” as saying: “Good heavens! I have seen men in agony at the
Front, but I have never seen such torture as this.” Overell 1923, 172. According to
the same source, the missionary did not pass by chance, but was called to help by a
soldier who could no longer bear the cries (ibid.).
164 Rowley 1958, 149; cf. ibid., 148. Marginal comment by Minister of Defence,
Pearce, 13 December 1920, on a confidential memorandum of the Department of
Defence, 28 January 1920, AAC: A 457–710/3. Overell 1923, 171–172, reports that
the officer responsible returned to New Guinea shortly thereafter, where his brutal
behavior continued. Missionaries prevented his promotion to the rank of major.
165 Trial of planter Hartig, Central Court Rabaul, 9 March 1920, AAC: AA 1963/83,
Bun 238. See also Rowley 1958, 149. Field Punishment No. 1 in outlying stations,
Willis 1974, 67.
166 Various cases in the court records of the Central Court Rabaul, AAC: AA 1963/83,
Bun 239. Cf. Government Gazette Rabaul, 6, no. 11 (27 November 1919): 98, judg-
ment of 13 October 1919: “assaulting a native. verdict: guilty. no penalty.” See also
Rowley 1958, 148.
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167 AKM: 39, Gayabachronik, 35.
168 Bassett 1969, 129.
169 Rowley 1958, 150–151. Native Labour Ordinance 1922.
170 Overell 1923, 61; Rowley 1958, 149–150; and Hiery 1992c, 199. During a visit by
the Marist bishop of Kieta to Rabaul in 1933, Melanesian plantation workers from
Kieta implored him to protect them from flogging by the planters. If they com-
plained to the district officers, the laborers said, they did not intervene, and all that
happened was that the planters beat them even more. The bishop noted that “every
plantation overseer makes use of a cane” (T. J. Wade, Kieta, 3 November 1933, to
Administrator Griffiths, PMB 4). The bishop’s plea went unheard and unheeded.
In 1935 beating was normal practice in New Guinea and was not punished by the
courts. See Pacific Islands Monthly, 31 March 1935: “Question of Corporal Punish-
ment in New Guinea.”
171 “I am of the considered opinion that the time for their wholesale abolition is not
yet”—The Chief Judge, Papua and New Guinea, summing up his position on the
question of the abolition of corporal punishment; memorandum, “Corporal Pun-
ishment,” Supreme Court, Port Moresby, 4 January 1951 [sic!] to the Administra-
tor Port Moresby, AAC: A 518–J 840/1/4, pt. 1. The difference between corporal
punishment in Papua and New Guinea was that in Papua an individual could be
given up to three separate whippings, with a maximum of fifty strokes each time,
while in New Guinea, no more than two separate whippings could be adminis-
tered, with up to twenty-four strokes each time. In Papua, the Administrator had
to give his approval, but not in New Guinea. Although New Guinea provisions
concerning the actual infliction of a whipping were less severe than the Papuan
ones, whipping could be imposed for a larger number of offenses in New Guinea
than in Papua; ibid.
172 Pethebridge, Report no. 23A, 10 March 1915, to the Minister of Defence, AAC:
CP 78/23–14/89/10/2. Pejorative comments are also found elsewhere: “a collection
of old rags,” Lieutenant Carlile, Herbertshöhe, 25 March 1915, to his mother,
about a meeting between the luluai and the Administrator; AWM: 1 DRL 188.
173 Administration Order no. 782, 10 December 1920, no. 9: “Appointment of Native
Officials (Luluais and Tultuls),” AAC: 1963/83, Bun 237. Native Administration
Ordinance 1921, here § 120 (3); AAC: A 981–NG 30/2.
174 Both Rowley and Firth underestimate the importance of the internal arbitration
initiated by the luluai with the official approbation and under the protection of the
German colonial administration. The reality of Melanesian life under German
hegemony, therefore, can hardly be more distorted than it is in Firth’s account
(1986, 73/74). Rowley (1958, 220–221) is rather more restrained, and he admits
that the Australians did not understand the principles on which the system was
based. But he also does not see that the confusion during the war was a direct
result of the Australians discontinuing former German administrative practices.
The fact that the luluai imposed fines in shell money both strengthened the posi-
tion of the Melanesian arbitrator and facilitated the transition toward a society in
which, under European pressure, the other model of Melanesian conflict resolu-
tion, the blood feud, was supressed. In order not to break too strongly with the ear-
lier tradition, which had never been questioned before, German judges and district
officers, to whom Melanesians could appeal against the luluai’s decision, also
imposed fines in shell money in purely Melanesian affairs. Firth incorrectly states
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that the luluai were permitted to fine only in marks, not in shell money (1986, 74),
but there is a flood of evidence to the contrary (station court records in AAC: AA
1963/83). In general, Firth’s account of the significance of shell money under the
German colonial administration is completely inaccurate. Governor Bennigsen had
forbidden all non-Melanesians (plus Melanesians who were officially recognized as
traders) to use shell money, in order to foil the attempt by European and Chinese
traders to gain an unfair advantage in the local trade by importing large numbers of
shells from outside traditional sites. The use of shell money in indigenous societies
was nowhere affected. Firth’s argument (1986, 69) that Bennigsen’s intention was
to ruin the Tolai economy is far-fetched. Verordnung des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-
Neuguinea betr. den Handel mit Muschelgeld (Diwarra) v. 18 Oktober 1900 u. v.
26. Juli 1901 betr. den Muschelgeldverkehr (Ordinance of the governor of German
New Guinea concerning the trade with shell money [Diwarra] of 18 October 1900
and of 26 July 1901 concerning trade in shell money); DKG 6, no. 171 (1901–1902):
260–261, and no. 244, 362–363. A good contemporary work about shell money on
the Gazelle Peninsula is that of the Fijian missionary William Taufa; BAP: RKolA
no. 2713.
175 Intelligence Report Administrator, no. 10, Johnston, Rabaul, 15 May 1919, to the
Minister of Defence, AAC: CP 103/11, NG Report Box 2/15.
176 Sub-Lieutenant Hext, Manus, 25 January 1915, to the Administrator, AWM: 33/12–
10. See also Nelson 1978, 137, and Rowley 1958, 197.
177 Police Patrol, Police Master Sergeant Beckton, 27 April–23 May 1915, AAM: B
543–W 112/7/77. Report Warrant Officer Hill to O.C. Native Affairs, no date, in
Report Administrator Pethebridge, no. 80, Rabaul, 8 June 1915, ibid. See also Nel-
son 1978, 137.
178 Captain H. Balfour Ogilvy, O.C. Native Affairs, Rabaul, 8 October 1915, to Pethe-
bridge, AAC: CP 78/23–14/89/10–1. See also Rowley 1958, 197–198 and Nelson
1978, 137. Nelson mentions only nine dead. But Ogilvy’s papers show clearly that
in a number of incidents during the punitive expedition at least sixteen Melane-
sians were shot.
179 Photographic evidence in the Linden-Museum, Stuttgart.
180 Pethebridge’s authority to Ogilvy, 15 October 1915, AWM: 33/12-1; Ogilvy, Rabaul,
23 October 1915, to Pethebridge, ibid.; see also Mackenzie 1927, 308–310 and Nel-
son 1978, 137–138. The figures Nelson gives for Melanesians dead are too low,
because he again refers only to one attack instead of to the whole punitive expedition.
181 I. H. Campbell, Choiseul Plantations Ltd., 25 October 1915, to the Administrator,
AWM: 33/36. See also Rowley 1958, 198.
182 Pethebridge, Rabaul, 8 February 1917, to Secretary of Defence; AAC: A 457–710/
3; report by Commander Burrows, Una, 20 April 1917, AAM: MP 367–D 404/11/
15; E. L. Piesse’s record of a conversation with the British Resident Magistrate of
the Shortland Islands, C. B. Nicholson, 7 May 1921, AAC: A 457–710/3; notes on
the armed conflicts in Bougainville by Carl Frost, ANL: MSS 3376. See also Mac-
kenzie 1927, 310–312, and Rowley 1958, 199–200.
183 Administrator Johnston, 17 June 1918, to Secretary of Defence, AWM: 33/35;
Johnston, 28 February 1919 to Defence, AWM: 33/56, and AAM: MP 367–C 404/
11/209. See also Rowley 1958, 201–202.
184 Johnston, 24 September 1918, to the Secretary of Defence, AWM: 33/55; Johnston,
15 March 1919 to Defence, AWM: 33/56. See also Rowley 1958, 202–204.
185 Rowley 1958, 204–205.
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186 District Officer Hunter, who was ordered by Johnston to go on a punitive expedi-
tion into the Sepik district, warned the Administrator before it began that he would
shoot the accused Melanesians rather than take them prisoner: “This will save a lot
of unnecessary carrying” (Hunter, Eitape, 17 June 1918, to the Administrator,
AAM: MP 367–C 404/11/209). Toward the end of Johnston’s period of office, on
one of the many punitive expeditions against the Sepik people, a village was set
afire and nine of its inhabitants killed on his express orders, because the deputation
did not think there was time for an investigation. Johnston, Rabaul, 19 January
1920, to the Ministry of Defence, AAC: CP 103/11, NG Reports, Box 2–556.
187 A positive exception was the temporary district officer of Manus, Captain Foulkes,
who used the German method of temporary exile with favorable results. Captain
H. S. Foulkes, Lorengau, 17 March and 25 July 1917, to the Administrator, AWM:
33/34. See also Rowley 1958, 200.
188  Rowley 1958, 205.
189 District Officer Charles Wittkopp, Manus, 10 May 1920, to Borchardt, AAC: CP
103/11–New Guinea Reports, Box 2/15. Resumé of File of Papers dealing with
Patrols in Drukul, Manus District, 26 June 1920. Father Borchardt to the District
Officer Manus, Bundralis, 8 May 1920.
190 See p. 73 above.
191 Reminiscences John Raven Fox, UPNG: AL-101/1.
192 Atlee Hunt, 18 December 1913, to Governor Murray of Papua, ANL: MS 52,
4–52/331.
193 Memorandum of the Supreme Judge, Major Rowland, Rabaul, 12 August 1918,
AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 245.
194 Administrator Pethebridge, Report A4, Rabaul, 30 January 1915, AWM: 33/12–10.
See also Nelson 1978, 138–140.
195 Administration Order no. 32, Pethebridge, Rabaul, 1 February 1915, AWM: 33/12–
10; Pethebridge, Report A 15, Rabaul, 21 February 1915, ibid.; Captain R. Grant
Thorold, Acting Administrator Neu Mecklenburg (New Ireland), Kaewieng,
8 February 1915, to the Administrator, ibid. See also Nelson 1978, 140.
196 Memorandum by Administrator Johnston, Rabaul, 19 September 1919, for the
Ministry of Defence, AAC: A 4–NG 6 and AWM: 33/56-3.
197 Instruction issued by the Imperial Commissioner, Rose, Stephansort, 1 August
1891, to Chancellor Schmiele, who had asked for permission for an execution to be
carried out on the scene of the crime “as a deterrent.” Rose explained that “the
proposed manner of executing the native might be provocative and lead to a repeti-
tion of the violence,” AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 39: Stationsgericht Herbertshöh (the
older name for Herbertshöhe). 1890. File of proceedings for murder against the
native Tororuk from Vunabalbal. Application by Schmiele, 15 June 1891, ibid. On
Toruruk’s offense, Sack 1977, 272.
198 Barely a week after the German government took over the administration, Acting
Governor Schnee sharply rejected execution by hanging (calling it “repugnant”);
Schnee, Herbertshöhe, 8 April 1899, to the German Colonial Department, BAP:
RKolA no. 4949. Formally, the means of executing the death sentence were merely
supplemented by shooting; in practice, however, shooting in the future replaced
hanging. Gouverneursverordnung betr. die Vollstreckung der Todesstrafe (Gover-
nor’s order concerning the carrying out of the death sentence), 7 April 1899 (on 1
April 1899, the German government had taken over the administration of the col-
ony from the Neuguinea-Kompanie; the statement by Sack 1977, 277–278 is there-
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fore incorrect), DKG 4, no. 46 (1898–1899): 56. During the process of introducing
the death sentence for the indigenous population, the reasons for its necessity had
been progressively narrowed down over a number of drafts; Sack 1977, 266–271.
199 Intelligence Report Administrator Johnston, no. 4 A of 9 October 1918, no. 6 of
9 December 1918, no. 9 of 12 April 1919, no. 18 of 16 February 1920, and many
more; AAC: CP 103/11–NG Reports 2/15.
200 Intelligence Report Administrator no. 32, 11 May 1921, Wisdom to the Secretary of
the Ministry of Defence, AAM: MP 1049/1–18/0587, and AAC: CP 103/11-NG
Reports 2/15. Lieutenant A. W. W. Winstone, Deputy District Officer Rabaul, Natava,
14 April 1921, to the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs, Rabaul, AWM: 33/58.
201 Hempenstall 1978, 150.
202 This account is based on the eyewitness reports in the following court records:
Central Court Rabaul, Crown vs. Aluet and Crown vs. Malbrinkkapokman, 4
March 1920, AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 238. Crown vs. Kaning. Judgment, no date [15
November 1920], Crown vs. Kamninarvet. Judgment, no date [26 January 1921];
AAC: A 457–710/3 (copy).
203 Crown vs. Kaning, AAC: A 457–710/3.
204 Crown vs. Kaminarvet, ibid.
205 Hanlin report, Mandras, 28 September 1919 and idem, Baining Report no. 3,
2 October 1919, in Intelligence Report Administrator Johnston, no. 14, Rabaul, 28
October 1919, AAC: CP 103/11–NG Reports 2/15.
206 Intelligence Report Administrator Johnston, no. 20, Rabaul, 20 April 1920, AAC:
CP 103/11–NG Reports 2/15.
207 Crown vs. Kaminarvet, AAC: A 457–710/3.
208 Griffiths, “Training of Native Children by Missions,” Rabaul, 25 February 1921, to
the Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, AAC: A 457–710/3 (copy).
209 See, for example, the generalizations Fischer noted a few years ago in the northeast
of New Guinea, almost by chance. Americans were seen as “friendly, generous,
open-handed,” Australians as “unfriendly and miserly,” and Germans as “friendly,
but not exactly open-handed. . . . The ‘image’ of the teacher is probably the most
appropriate.” Americans, Australians, and Germans “therefore represent catego-
ries, categories of language and thinking, which reflect certain complex values,
while on the other hand, individual whites are assigned to one group or the other
depending on their behaviour” (Fischer 1987, 154 and 155).
210 Fischer 1987, 160.
211 See Hiery 1992b.
212 Fischer 1987, 155.
213 The soldiers taught the Melanesians specifically British songs and airs. Diary
O’Hare, entry of 25 December 1914; MLS: MSS 2935. See also Piggott 1984, 45.
214 MLS: MSS 2935, 29 September 1914. It is striking that at first the term “Austra-
lians” is not used.
215 Ibid., 13 September 1914 entry.
216 Letter Lieutenant Carlile, Herbertshöhe, 12 February 1915, AWM: 1 DRL 188.
217 Father Fritz Vormann, Hollandia, 22 November 1914, to the Superior of the
Divine Word Mission, Noser Library, Madang; Vormann, 14 December 1914, from
Wewäk to the Superior, ibid. The term “Kanaka” or “Kanake” can have positive or
negative connotations, depending on the speaker, the context, and the intonation
used. Here a positive interpretation, with the sense of “they are like us but come
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from Sydney” seems most likely to me. Vormann interprets the Melanesian use of
the term “Kanaka” for the Australians as a criticism, which is no accident, given his
view of the word.
218 Sister Maria Ursula Schütte, Ste.-Foy-les-Lyon, 1 March 1937, to the German con-
sul in Lyon, BAP: RKolA no. 3085.
219 When the Thurnwalds visited Bougainville in September 1933 to undertake field
research, they found out that the positive assessment of Döllinger was transferred
to them, apparently only because they were Germans. Thurnwald 1937, 162 (with a
racist commentary, 163).
220 Lieutenant Carlile, Morobe, 21 December 1915, AWM: 1 DRL 188.
221 Patrol Report Lieutenant W. M. B. Ogilvy, District Officer Madang, 14–16 August
1915, AAC: A 457–710/3 (copy). The village was called Morago. At other places in
the colony the population was quick in recognizing the importance of flying the
new flag. The occupying party to the Manus islands encountered a “large catama-
ran with half a dozen natives aboard one of whom was holding up a large Union
Jack.” The Australians compensated them for “such loyalty” by presenting them
with ten sticks of tobacco. Lieutenant Axtens to his father, Rabaul, 1 December
1914, AWM: 2 DRL 308.
222 Native affairs correspondence 1915–1918, AAC: AA 1963/83, Bun 240. On 31 May
1916 the Malays were sentenced to a fine of 15 shillings or seven days in prison for
seditious words (ibid.).
223 It is certainly no coincidence that the evidence for this criticism comes from the
Sepik district and Neu Mecklenburg. The closure of the government station in
Angoram by the Australians smoothed the path for a resumption of tribal fighting
and opened the door to abuses by the recruiters. In Neu Mecklenburg, Bolu-
minski’s administrative style had created a complicated network of dependencies
between the administration and the local people. This collapsed under the impact
of war. The Administrator, 7 June 1918 to the Secretary of Defence, passing on a
report from the District Officer of Eitape. The district officer had written that he
had heard very unflattering comparisons between British and German officials
(AWM: 33/55). Letter from a British planter, Emira, 8 April 1916, to the District
Officer of New Ireland, conveying the local criticism: “The Kanakers are coming to
me complaining but it is not my business to play the ‘Kiap’ [District Officer],” AAC:
AA 1963/83, Bun 246.
224 Lieutenant G. Somerset, District Officer Morobe, Cape Cretin, 28 July 1917, to
the Administrator, AWM: 33/12–10. See also Rowley 1958, 145.
225 Board of Proceedings Court of Inquiry, Gasmatta, 9 December 1919, AAC: A 457–
710/3.
226 Potsdamhafen: Mackenzie 1927, 311. Sepik: Rowley 1958, 203. The success of
Olifent’s punitive expeditions in halting the revival of intertribal fighting was only
temporary. One year later Angoram had been destroyed again, and a new expedi-
tion had to be sent. Administrator Griffiths, 22 June 1920, to Defence, AWM: 33/
57; see also Rowley 1958, 205. Karkar: Mackenzie 1927, 311–312, and Rowley
1958, 199.
227 Government Gazette Rabaul 5, no. 11 (20 November 1918): 102.
228 Penman diary, AWM: PR 84/171, 33 (cf. also 21). Administrator Johnston, Rabaul,
14 June 1918, to the Ministry of Defence about Melanesian requests for assistance
to be given preferential treatment; AWM: 33/12-10.
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229 Precis. Crown vs. Rev. Father Schäfer, Eitape, 4 January 1922, AAC: A 457–800/5/
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sia, NARA: RG 59, 862 l. Letter by the Manager of the Jaluit Company,
J. E. Krümling, Yokohama, 2 July 1915, NARA: RG 59, 862 h. The managers of the
Jaluit Company’s trading stations were expelled in May and June 1915 (whereas the
employees were allowed to remain until 1919), ibid. The final remnant of German
influence on the Micronesian economy was swept away on 1 March 1916 when the
currency based on the silver mark was abolished (German gold continued to be
accepted). Confidential memo, Senior Naval Aide, Guam, 18 July 1917, NARA:
RG 38, K-5-a: 9217.
70 Private communication of 16 April 1915 from Burns to the Governor-General of
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Robert Stobo on Japanese Activities in the Caroline Islands, no date [April 1918],
AAC: A 2219/1, vol. 3. Protestant mission: report by Dönges, missionary from Lie-
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115 Barnett 1960, 83–84, and Tellei 1988, 4.
116 Shuster 1982, 34, and Tellei 1988, 5.
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up to twenty days’ imprisonment for refusal to obey orders they had given; if offi-
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122 Report by F. W. Thompson after a recruiting expedition to the Caroline Islands for
the British Phosphate Commission, Nauru, 21 July 1920, to the Administrator of
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ation which is very suitable.” Captain O. C. Garrison, 18 December 1917, NZA:
WA, 210/3/2; War Diary General Staff, NZA: WA 210/1, App. I. Samoa’s civilian
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1916, confidential war diary of the Military Secretary, NZA: WA 211/1; Memoran-
dum by the Minister of Defence, Allen, 27 June 1916, to the Attorney General of
New Zealand, NZA: G 21/4; Proclamations by the Military Governor, no. 29, 24
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istrator Logan, no. 32, 8 June 1916, NZA: G 21/4.
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1914, and undated Health Report, ibid., NZA: G 21/1
29 On 1 April 1915, staff costs were £33,177; on 1 April 1916 they amounted to £35,678.
Figures put together by the head of the finance administration, Loibl, 8 July 1916, in
report by the Administrator, no. 34, 3 August 1916, NZA: G 21/4. Figures for Ger-
man officials (including the English Amtmann or district officer) employed on 1 Jan-
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32 Hiery 1989, 165.
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1974.
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an official directive instructing officials “not [to] record matters of contentious
nature in patrol reports, matters which are likely to embarrass ANGAU [Australian
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try for Home and Territories, Melbourne, AAC: A 1–25/4670; statements by local
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Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, AAC: A 518/1-N 840/1/3 (concerning
Arthur Walter Windus Winstone, chief clerk to the Military Administration in
Rabaul, thereafter inspecting district officer of the Mandate Administration
responsible to the Chief Court, Rabaul); Secretary of the Mandate Administration,
Page, 24 April 1924, to Administrator Wisdom (about the deputy district officer of
Aitape, G. K. Freeman), AAC: A1–25/4670. In his final report, the official investi-
gating the cases of Freeman and Wilkins had recommended “that a public investi-
gation of these matters will aggravate the position and give feeders of the press
opportunities to write distorted and exaggerated accounts. It is improper to suggest
that the present ‘mess’ be cleaned up and those responsible replaced by saner offi-
cials.” Acting District Officer of Aitape, E. W. Oakley (who had himself been
accused), 8 February 1924, to the Government Secretary in Rabaul, ibid. On 17
January 1922, Bishop Couppé passed on to the Administrator the missions’ con-
cern over the supervision of native women by officials; AAC: A 457–800/5/1. See
also Böhm 1975, 111; NDM: Bergmann 6, 23–24 (women and girls in fear of being
abused by the district officer), and ibid., 7, 169–171 (women forced to take part in
orgies). Indigenous statements: Manasupe, June 1922, NDM: MS 322, 141; Sai and
Limu in Griffin, Nelson, and Firth 1979, 66.
48 Kituai 1988, 222, 227, and 245.
49 Amean 1973, 24. One of the victims committed suicide on the same night (ibid.).
50 Legislative Council, AAC: A 518–846/1/130. Its first meeting took place on 9 May
1933. An advisory council had been set up in 1926. After vigorous protests by the
Administrator, it consisted only of the Administrator himself and five of his subor-
dinates; ibid. Before 1914 the government council had also included representa-
tives of the non-German community, Hiery 1993b.
51 Thompson 1990, 75 and 79. A typical response by Prime Minister Hughes to a
question in the House concerning the continuation of the practice of flogging: “I
suppose it is a lie, as usual.” Commonwealth of Australia. Parliamentary Papers,
vol. 97, 12395 (session of 3 November 1921).
52 Thompson 1990, 79–81. I cannot fully agree with Thompson’s statement that the
author of the report, Ainsworth “was a critical and independently-minded
observer” (ibid., 79). A more precise reading of the report shows clearly that, on
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crucial issues (such as the uninterrupted continuation of corporal punishment),
Ainsworth relied fully on emollient statements by officials, making no independent
attempt to get to the bottom of obviously contradictory reports, or even to investi-
gate them more closely. Some of his “recommendations” to the Australian federal
government (which paid him £500) reveal his general ignorance of Melanesian
conditions. Thus, for a culture in which prosperity and economic and social rela-
tions are essentially defined in terms of pig ownership, he recommended that “the
last thing on earth in the way of animals that should be owned by natives is the pig.”
Ainsworth Report, recommendations, 8, no. 88, AAC: A 518-M 850/1/3.
53 Thompson 1990, 84. On 3 August 1922, the Australian delegate, Joseph Cook,
replied to a question put by the Swedish delegate Bugge-Wicksell in the Mandate
Commission that Field Punishment No. 1 was used only in cases of military disci-
pline in New Guinea (although the need for this in a demilitarized territory
remained unclear). Société des Nations. Commission permanente des Mandats.
Procés-verbaux de la deuxiéme session tenue à Genève du 1er au 11 aôut 1922,
Geneva, 19 August 1922, 33 (6th session, 3 August 1922), AAC: A 2219–24.
54 Ibid., 40 (7th session, 4 August 1922). See also Weeramantry 1992, 379.
55 Churchill, 21 September 1921, to the Governor-General of Australia, and Dean,
Prime Minister’s Secretary, 14 February 1922, to the Governor-General, for trans-
mission to London. Carrying out: Governor-General, 23 February 1922, to the
Colonial Secretary, AAC: A 6661–391.
56 Prime Minister of New Zealand, 28 February 1925, to the Prime Minister of Aus-
tralia, approving Australia’s procedures, AAC: A 518/1-AR 118/12.
57 Full text of the discussions in the minutes of the meeting: Société des Nations.
Commission permanente des Mandats. Procès-verbaux de la deuxième session
tenue à Genève du 1er au 11 aôut 1922, Geneva, 19 August 1922, 58 (11th session,
7 August 1922), AAC: A 2219–24. Official (published) positions are in Weera-
mantry 1992, 381 and 383.
58 Weeramantry 1992, 365–367. Figures are calculated according to table 16.1, ibid.
59 Griffiths, Nauru, 28 August 1924, to the Island Manager, Matthew Thom, AAC:
518-D 112/6/1.
60 English translation of a letter from Chief Dabe, Nauru, 9 September 1924, to
Island Manager Thom, AAC: A 518-D 112/6/1. For the treatment of the Aiwo after
1945, see Weeramantry 1992, 384–390.
61 Harold Gaze, British Phosphate Commission, Melbourne, 9 December 1930, per-
sonal and confidential, to the Australian Prime Minister’s Secretary, AAC: A 518–O
800/1/2.
62 See Hahl 1942, 39, and Report on the Administration of Nauru, 17 December
1920–31 December 1921, 1922, 6. A photograph of the chiefs of “German” Nauru,
including two women (the chiefs Eiginoba and Bodane), is reproduced in Williams
and Macdonald 1985, after p. 54.
63 Petition from the chiefs Bop, Gaunibur, Dabe, Deireragea, Buraman, Amwano,
Deigareow, Tsiminita, Evaeo, and Denca, Nauru, 29 November 1930, to the Prime
Minister of Australia, AAC: A 518–O 800/1/2; petition from Nauruans over sixteen
years of age to the Prime Minister of Australia, Nauru, 17 March 1931, ibid. In
1930, Nauru had a total indigenous population of 1,411; Pacific Islands Year Book
1944, 142. The list contains 495 signatures (85.8 percent), and 82 names followed
by a cross (14.2 percent). The latter figure is possibly somewhat high, as many
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names have obviously had marks added to them later. This suggests that the marks
are not the X’s of illiterate Nauruans, but that they may have been made later by
the Australian administration, which wanted particularly to emphasize the names
of some of the petitioners when presenting and analyzing the petition. List of com-
plaints by Deireragea, Evaio, Bop, Deigareow, Amwano, Gaunibur, Tsiminita,
Dave, Denca, and Buraman, to the Prime Minister of Australia, Nauru, 20 March
1931, AAC: A 518–O 800/1/2. See also Thompson 1992, 274–275.
64 Newman, Canberra, 30 March 1931, to the Secretary in the Prime Minister’s
Department, AAC: A 518–O 800/1/2; memorandum by Administrator Newman,
Nauru, 25 May 1931, on the education of Nauruans, AAC: A 518-C 818/1/2; see
also Weeramantry 1992, 112–113.
65 Minutes of the meeting between Administrator Newman and the chiefs of Nauru,
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